CN106385316A - PUF fuzzy extraction circuit and method - Google Patents
PUF fuzzy extraction circuit and method Download PDFInfo
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- CN106385316A CN106385316A CN201610794033.7A CN201610794033A CN106385316A CN 106385316 A CN106385316 A CN 106385316A CN 201610794033 A CN201610794033 A CN 201610794033A CN 106385316 A CN106385316 A CN 106385316A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3278—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response using physically unclonable functions [PUF]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/12—Details relating to cryptographic hardware or logic circuitry
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Abstract
A PUF fuzzy extraction circuit relates to electronic technologies. The PUF fuzzy extraction circuit comprises a majority voting module, a Hamming code coding module and an error correction module; the majority voting module carries out majority voting on different bits of response data generated by the same excitation, a majority voting result serves as an output result of the majority voting module, and the response data is response data in response to the same excitation source for at least three times; the Hamming code coding module carries out Hamming coding on the output result of the majority voting module; the error correction module stores auxiliary Hamming codes generated in an initial stage, and compares output of the Hamming code module with the auxiliary Hamming codes to detect error information and output a final response; and the output end of the majority voting module is connected with the input end of the Hamming code coding module, and the output end of the Hamming code coding module is connected with the input end of the error correcting module. The amount of logic resources consumed by the PUF fuzzy extraction circuit is much lower than that of a fuzzy extraction circuit realized by BCH error correcting codes.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to electronic technology.
Background technology
In the last few years, with smart card, RFID (Radio Frequency IDentification, RF identification) label
With the extensive application of the physical entities such as sensor network nodes, how effective certification is implemented to these physical entities and be to ensure that system
The key factor of safety.However, because this kind of entity generally existing computing capability is poor, resource-constrained the problems such as, tradition is based on close
There is very big obstacle in application in the authentication method that code is learned.Use for reference currently widely used based on human body unique features fingerprint or rainbow
The thought to personal enforcement certification for the film, there has been proposed uniquely identify single thing based on the inherent physique of physical entity
Reason entity, realizes the method to the effective certification of physical entity.Here it is it has been proposed that physics unclonable function (Physical
Unclonable Function, PUF) concept.More and more pay close attention to people, physics unclonable function is employed
To more fields such as system authentication and key generation, and it is increasingly becoming a hot technology in hardware security field.
Physics unclonable function circuit be a kind of rely on chip features hardware function realize circuit, have uniqueness and
Randomness, by extracting the technological parameter deviation necessarily introducing in chip manufacturing proces, realizes pumping signal with response signal only
One corresponding function performance.Because same type of PUF circuit structure is identical, and after the completion of the manufacture of each PUF circuit
Function performance determines and unique, therefore, another outstanding feature of PUF circuit is with nonclonability.PUF circuit above-mentioned
Characteristic is so as to can be used for building safety chip, and defends various attacks.One physical entity is inputted with an excitation, utilizes
The random difference of its inevitable inherent physique exports a uncertain response, and such a resistance against physical clone attacks
The function hitting is as shown in Figure 1.Obviously, its topmost advantage be can resist physical clone attack generation, simultaneously with respect to
For the physical entity of resource-constrained, its advantage also includes this exciter response behavior that can not be cloned and not only can realize
Some functions as conventional public-key password, and calculating, storage and communication overhead can also be greatly reduced.
Identical excitation is applied for same chip, produces different responses because of the difference of external environment, this
Being the unavoidable problem of PUF itself, absolute stablizing cannot being ensured because PUF generates response, if only changed up from structure
It is apt to also be insufficient for the requirement to stability in practical application, typically also need to add fuzzy extraction algorithm in PUF, correct
For the excitation of same chip identical, produce the problem of different responses because external environment is different, as shown in Figure 2.
The fuzzy extraction algorithm currently commonly used is BCH error correction algorithm.BCH code is the error correcting code that a class is commonly used, and it is initially
Response message sequence be divided into message groups by one group fixing of k position, more each message groups individual transform is grown into n (n>k)
Binary digit group, referred to as code word.The process that message groups are transformed into code word is referred to as encoding, and its inverse process is referred to as decoding.Entangle
Wrong ability is the important indicator of BCH code, if having m position to occur in that mistake in initial response message k position, if m is less than or equal to
The error correcting capability of BCH code design, then pass through BCH encoding and decoding algorithm, can complete the error correction of this m bit-errors position, otherwise it is impossible to entangle
Lookup error.
The advantage of Bose-Chaudhuri Hocquenghem error correction codes is that have powerful error correcting capability, using BCH as fuzzy extraction algorithm, it is possible to achieve many
The error correction of position, but Bose-Chaudhuri Hocquenghem error correction codes also have its shortcoming：Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem Code device and BCH decoder are required for consuming very many logic moneys
Source, and need multiple clock cycle just can complete BCH encoding-decoding process, and the fuzzy extraction algorithm required for PUF is it is impossible to account for
With excessive logical resource, and fuzzy extraction process to be completed within the comparatively short time, BCH error correction algorithm is in these areas
Do not preponderate.
Content of the invention
The technical problem to be solved is to provide a kind of PUF and obscures extraction circuit and method, and it has stronger
Error correcting capability, and the logical resource being consumed is seldom, and has the characteristics that Fast Fuzzy extracts.
The present invention solves described technical problem and employed technical scheme comprise that, PUF obscures and extracts circuit it is characterised in that wrapping
Include following part：
Majority voting module, everybody of response data for producing to identical excitation carries out majority voting, with most tables
Certainly as the output result of majority voting module, described response data is at least cubic response that identical driving source is produced to result
Response data；
Hamming code coding module, for carrying out hamming code to the output result of majority voting module；
Correction module, in the initial phase that is stored with generate auxiliary Hamming code, for Hamming code coding module
Output comparison to check its error message and to export final response；
The outfan of majority voting module connects the input of Hamming code coding module, the outfan of Hamming code coding module
Connection error corrects the input of module.
The present invention also provides a kind of PUF to obscure extracting method it is characterised in that comprising the steps：
1) majority voting is carried out to each of at least cubic response signal data from same driving source, decided by vote
Response signal afterwards；
2) hamming code process is carried out to the response signal after voting；
3) the auxiliary Hamming code that the response signal after hamming code and initial phase prestore is compared, judges whether
Wrong, if wrong and wrong digit is more than 1, export authentication failed information；If not having mistake or wrong digit to be equal to 1, output is tested
Card passes through information.
Described step 3) be：The auxiliary Hamming code that response signal after hamming code and initial phase are prestored carry out by
Position XOR calculates, and judges whether wrong, if wrong and wrong digit is more than 1, exports authentication failed information；If there is no mistake or mistake
Digit is equal to 1 by mistake, and output is verified information.
Present invention incorporates the advantage of majority voting device and Hamming code coding.Majority voting device itself extracts electricity as fuzzy
Road is it is possible to reach the ability of very high exclusion external environmental interference, but in order to lift capacity of resisting disturbance further, the present invention adds
Enter Hamming code coding module so that this obscures extracts the fuzzy extraction circuit performance that performance of circuit is realized with Bose-Chaudhuri Hocquenghem error correction codes
Quite, and the logical resource quantity that consumed is a lot of less compared with the fuzzy extraction circuit that Bose-Chaudhuri Hocquenghem error correction codes are realized.This meets PUF's
One significant design principle：Lightweight.PUF has lightweight attribute and refers to realize the number of the components and parts of physics unclonable function
Amount and size are all very littles, and this has vast application prospect in the middle of the equipment of resource-constrained.In such as RFID, sensor network
In the middle of the equipment of the resource-constraineds such as node, the logical resource leaving PUF for is little, so lightweight just becomes rigid wanting
Ask.Present invention achieves lightweight high-performance obscures extracts circuit design, make great sense in the application of lightweight PUF.
Brief description
Fig. 1 is the exciter response schematic diagram of mechanism of physics unclonable function.
Fig. 2 is to add the fuzzy PUF system schematic extracted.
Fig. 3 is circuit module schematic diagram of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is the structural representation of majority voting device.
Fig. 5 is the structural representation of hamming code circuit.
Specific embodiment
The circuit of the present invention includes three parts, as shown in Figure 3：Majority voting device module, Hamming code coding module and mistake
Correct module by mistake.The effect of majority voting device module is that the response that identical excitation is produced carries out majority voting, determines final
Response what is.Hamming code coding module is that the response that majority voting device module is produced carries out Hamming code coding.Mistake is entangled
The effect of positive module is to enter row operation using the Hamming code that Hamming code coding module produces with auxiliary Hamming code, obtains errors present
Information, and carry out error correction.
The present invention supports the operation in two stages：Generation phase and authentication phase.(initialize in initial generation phase
Stage), input one to PUF and encourage n time, produce n response, then with fuzzy extraction algorithm according to this n response generation one
Individual auxiliary Hamming code, for the error correcting of authentication phase.In authentication phase, the response being produced according to excitation, extracted with fuzzy
Algorithm produces a Hamming code, and the auxiliary Hamming code producing with generation phase does computing, according to operation result, response message is entered
Row error correction, and produce final response message.
The input of majority voting device is the response message that PUF produces, and in the course of the work, applies n identical to PUF and swashs
Encourage, then can produce n response, but this n response is because of the impact of external environment, and (such as supply voltage is unstable, temperature
Change, impact of peripheral electromagnetic field etc.), and not quite identical, for a certain position of response message, be not 0 to be exactly 1, most
The effect of voting machine be exactly on a certain position be relatively 0 appearance often or 1 occur often, if more than 0, finally many
Number this outputs of voting machine be exactly 0, otherwise, majority voting device this be output as 1.Each input information position is corresponding many
Number voting machine circuit is as shown in Figure 4.The quantity of depositor group is 2, and in a verification process, input information position has altogether and inputs
3 times, the information inputting each time is not 0 to be exactly 1, and depositor group is used for storing the accumulation result of these information bits, 3 input knots
Shu Hou, carries out accumulation result and 2 comparison with comparator, if accumulation result is more than or equal to 2, final information bit is 1, no
Then, final information bit is 0.
Register number required for summarizing, each information bit needs 2 depositors, is n position for response message
Situation, needing altogether 2*n depositor, adder and comparator to have altogether needs 18 gates, so majority voting device has altogether
Need 2*n depositor and 18*n gate.
On the clock cycle being consumed, for when response message is n position, will having processed this n position information, needs when
The clock cycle is 3*n/8.
The effect of Hamming code coding module is that the information bit to the output of majority voting device carries out Hamming code coding.Hamming code is
A kind of coded system that can correct bit-errors, if response message has 8, needs 6 Hamming codes can correct 1 in 8
Mistake, when response message digit is multiplied, the Hamming code of needs only need to increase by 2, for the response message of 512, needs
24 Hamming codes.During Hamming code coding some response message positions are done with xor operation, the result of xor operation constitutes final
Output Hamming code.Physical circuit is as shown in Figure 5.In figure COUNTin is the data of 9bit, represents this information bit in whole response letter
It is which position in breath, after the calculating of multiple clock cycle, the value in depositor is exactly final Hamming code coding result.The Chinese
The principle system known technology of bright code correction, such as document：[beautiful] Rober t J.McEliece writes Li Dou Yin etc. and translates. theory of information
With coding theory (second edition) [M]. Electronic Industry Press publishes.The present invention repeats no more its principle.
The logical resource that Hamming code coding module consumes is fewer, needs altogether 18 depositors, and 36 gates.Institute
The clock cycle consuming is n.
Correction module is used for authentication phase, and the Hamming code that Hamming code coding module produces is the defeated of correction module
Enter, in correction module, store the auxiliary Hamming code of generation phase generation simultaneously, this two Hamming codes do xor operation, root
According to XOR result, judge whether the response message of authentication phase is wrong, if wrong, whether mistake digit is equal to 1, if with
Upper two kinds of situations, then be verified, otherwise, authentication failed.
For the present invention, citing is described in detail to circuit workflow：Assume that response is 8bit signal, generating rank
Section, encourages to PUF3 identical, produces 3 identical responses, response value is all 10110110, then after multichannel voting machine
Value be also 10110110, this result inputs Hamming code generation module, and through xor operation, generating Hamming code is 100110, institute
It is 100110 with the auxiliary Hamming code that generation phase produces；For authentication phase it is assumed that inputting 3 identical excitations to PUF, produce
Raw response is 10010110,10010110,10110110 respectively, and after multichannel voting machine, the result obtaining is
10010110, different from the value of authentication phase gained, differ one, after Hamming code coding module, through xor operation, obtain
To result be 000000.This Hamming code carries out XOR with auxiliary Hamming code 100110, and result is 100110, has 31, generation
Table there occurs bit-errors, within the scope of error correction, can correct, so being verified.
The resource quantity that correction module is consumed is 46 gates, the clock cycle that correction module is consumed
It is 2.
The logical resource sum that the present invention is consumed is：18*n+82 gate and 2*n+18 depositor, and one is same
The logical resource quantity (34*n+110 gate and 8*n+28 depositor) that the BCH error correction circuit of sample function needs is much larger than
Logical resource quantity required for circuit of the present invention.And the total clock cycle consuming is 11*n/8, due to majority voting device
Pile line operation can be formed with Hamming code coding module, so the clock cycle consuming can be less, and the volume solution of BCH algorithm
Code will carry out multiple steps：Syndrome calculates, error location polynomial calculates and three steps of chien search, and these three steps
Suddenly it is serial, the clock cycle of consumption is 18*n, much larger than the clock cycle required for circuit of the present invention.So, the present invention
More traditional BCH algorithm has faster speed, consumes less logical resource simultaneously.
Circuit of the present invention is the important component part of PUF, and PUF mainly has four kinds of applications：Certification, random oracle, can count
Calculate function and key generator.
Certification is the most basic application of PUF.Due to attributes such as the unclonable, anti-tamper of PUF and lightweights, using PUF
It is a kind of highly useful anti-counterfeiting technology for certification.So in the related application document of PUF, this is modal form.
Its ultimate principle is:In registration phase, the identity of some CRP of each PUF physical system together with embedded PUF by
It is stored in data base.In authentication phase, verifier selects a random CRP from data base, be provided to current be
Unite and to encourage PUF, if it is observed that the response of PUF is sufficiently close to the response of storage in data base, then certification success, otherwise
Failure.In order to prevent Replay Attack, each CRP of each PUF is used only once and must be from data after checking terminates
Delete in storehouse.
Random oracle (Random Oracle) refers to that one deterministic public addressable is uniformly distributed letter at random
Number, for the input of random length, in domain output, the value of one definitiveness length of uniform design is as the answer of inquiry.It is based on
The method of PUF can be providing safety and secret protection.It to realize safety by using PUF as a random oracle
Property, but without the whole attributes using random oracle model, then it may not be necessary to simulation PUF is random as one
Prophesy machine.
Due to can be represented using linear inequality based on digital circuit PUF postponing, so it can be used to conduct
One calculable functions.This means that server does not need to store CRP, but directly calculate estimated response.This allows for
PUF has the advantage of lightweight, is more suitable for using in the equipment as resource-constraineds such as RFID, sensor network nodes.
It is used PUF mainly to consider to use digital circuit PUF as key generator.Because in integrated circuits, number
Word circuit PUF has good attribute to generate for key and store.By using suitable post-processing technology, PUF can be used for giving birth to
Produce encryption strong encryption keys so that scheme has more safety.
Claims (4)
1.PUF obscures and extracts circuit it is characterised in that including following part：
Majority voting module, everybody of response data for producing to identical excitation carries out majority voting, with majority voting knot
As the output result of majority voting module, described response data is the sound at least cubic response that identical driving source produces to fruit
Answer data；
Hamming code coding module, for carrying out hamming code to the output result of majority voting module；
Correction module, the auxiliary Hamming code generating in the initial phase that is stored with, for defeated with Hamming code coding module
Go out comparison to check its error message and to export final response；
The outfan of majority voting module connects the input of Hamming code coding module, and the outfan of Hamming code coding module connects
The input of correction module.
2.PUF obscures extracting method it is characterised in that comprising the steps：
1) majority voting is carried out to each of at least cubic response signal data from same driving source, after being decided by vote
Response signal；
2) hamming code process is carried out to the response signal after voting；
3) the auxiliary Hamming code that the response signal after hamming code and initial phase prestore is compared, determines whether
Mistake, if wrong and wrong digit is more than 1, exports authentication failed information；If not having mistake or wrong digit to be equal to 1, output checking
By information.
3. PUF as claimed in claim 1 obscures extracting method it is characterised in that described step 3) be：After hamming code
The auxiliary Hamming code that response signal and initial phase prestore carries out XOR by turn and calculates, and judges whether wrong, if wrong and wrong
Digit is more than 1 by mistake, exports authentication failed information；If not having mistake or wrong digit to be equal to 1, output is verified information.
4. PUF as claimed in claim 1 obscures extracting method it is characterised in that described auxiliary Hamming code is in initial phase
Produce, generation step is：Input one to PUF to encourage n time, produce n response, then with fuzzy extraction algorithm according to this n
Response produces auxiliary Hamming code.
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Cited By (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN108632038A (en) * | 2017-03-17 | 2018-10-09 | 株式会社东芝 | Information processing unit |
| CN108875417A (en) * | 2017-05-09 | 2018-11-23 | 中芯国际集成电路制造(上海)有限公司 | The generation method of PUF characteristic value and device with PUF |
| CN109446846A (en) * | 2018-10-19 | 2019-03-08 | 东南大学 | A kind of physics unclonable function error correction method |
| CN109509495A (en) * | 2017-09-14 | 2019-03-22 | 清华大学 | The operating method and its operating device of resistance-variable storing device, chip and chip authentication method |
| CN110442889A (en) * | 2018-05-03 | 2019-11-12 | 北京大学 | A kind of circuit credibility design method based on PUF and Fuzzy Processing |
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Cited By (9)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN108632038A (en) * | 2017-03-17 | 2018-10-09 | 株式会社东芝 | Information processing unit |
| CN108875417A (en) * | 2017-05-09 | 2018-11-23 | 中芯国际集成电路制造(上海)有限公司 | The generation method of PUF characteristic value and device with PUF |
| CN108875417B (en) * | 2017-05-09 | 2020-05-08 | 中芯国际集成电路制造(上海)有限公司 | Method for generating a PUF signature and device having a PUF |
| CN109509495A (en) * | 2017-09-14 | 2019-03-22 | 清华大学 | The operating method and its operating device of resistance-variable storing device, chip and chip authentication method |
| CN109509495B (en) * | 2017-09-14 | 2020-09-22 | 清华大学 | Operation method of resistive random access memory, operation device of resistive random access memory, chip and chip authentication method |
| CN110442889A (en) * | 2018-05-03 | 2019-11-12 | 北京大学 | A kind of circuit credibility design method based on PUF and Fuzzy Processing |
| CN110442889B (en) * | 2018-05-03 | 2021-07-09 | 北京大学 | Circuit credibility design method based on PUF and fuzzy processing |
| CN109446846A (en) * | 2018-10-19 | 2019-03-08 | 东南大学 | A kind of physics unclonable function error correction method |
| CN109446846B (en) * | 2018-10-19 | 2023-01-31 | 东南大学 | Physical unclonable function error correction method |
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