CN106372523B - Modem file security protection method and system - Google Patents
Modem file security protection method and system Download PDFInfo
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- CN106372523B CN106372523B CN201611065132.8A CN201611065132A CN106372523B CN 106372523 B CN106372523 B CN 106372523B CN 201611065132 A CN201611065132 A CN 201611065132A CN 106372523 B CN106372523 B CN 106372523B
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- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6209—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a single file or object, e.g. in a secure envelope, encrypted and accessed using a key, or with access control rules appended to the object itself
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Abstract
The invention discloses a modem file security protection method and a system, wherein the method comprises the following steps of; forming a verification table by the original block address, the original Hash and the signature information of the original modem file; in the boot process of the Bootloader, matching a preset public key with signature information, if the matching is correct, acquiring an original block address of an original modem file in a verification table, calculating a real-time Hash of the current system partition modem file, comparing the real-time Hash with the original Hash, and if the real-time Hash is consistent with the original Hash, judging that the original modem file is safe and starting up successfully; the method and the device verify the original modem file twice, firstly verify the signature information of the verification table to ensure that the signature information of the verification table is not changed, and then verify the original Hash in the original modem file to ensure that the original modem file is not changed.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of file protection, in particular to a modem file security protection method and system.
Background
According to the latest statistical report, the chip occupancy of the MTK in the android mobile phone market exceeds 30%, and the cost performance of the product is a main factor for selecting the MTK by a plurality of mobile phone manufacturers.
Modem files in the Android device based on the MTK platform are stored in a system partition, and the system partition does not provide signature protection, so the modem files on the platforms are not protected. The modem is a very important file in the system, relates to sim card related services, and becomes a target of key attack by hackers, and the security of the modem is a key concern of numerous mobile phone manufacturers and telecommunication operators.
While Google provides a DM-verify mechanism to ensure data security for system partitions, this mechanism is an open source item and may be turned off under certain conditions. Therefore, some telecom operators consider the DM-verify mechanism unreliable, and once the modem file is cracked, the modem file will cause serious loss to the operators, for example, the handset locked by the card will be able to use sim cards of other operators.
Accordingly, the prior art is yet to be improved and developed.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of the above shortcomings in the prior art, an object of the present invention is to provide a method and a system for securing modem files based on an MTK platform, and to solve the problem that the existing modem files are easily falsified to cause serious loss to an operator.
The technical scheme of the invention is as follows:
a modem file security protection method comprises the following steps:
A. forming a verification table by the original block address, the original Hash and the signature information of the original modem file, and adding the verification table into a system partition file;
B. in the boot process of the Bootloader, matching a preset public key with signature information, if the matching is correct, acquiring an original block address of an original modem file in a verification table, and entering the step C; if the matching is incorrect, judging that the original modem file is changed;
C. calculating the real-time Hash of the current system partition modem file according to the original block address of the original modem file, comparing the real-time Hash with the original Hash, and if the real-time Hash is consistent with the original Hash, judging that the original modem file is safe; and if the data files are not consistent, judging that the original modem file is changed.
Preferably, the modem file security protection method includes:
a1, resolving an original block address of an original modem file from a map file, and calculating an original Hash of the original modem file according to the original block address;
a2, signing an original block address and an original Hash of an original modem file by using a preset private key to obtain signature information;
and A3, forming a verification table by the original block address, the original Hash and the signature information, and adding the verification table to the system partition file.
Preferably, the modem file security protection method further includes, before the step a 1:
a0, in the process of compiling system files, generating a map file for recording all files of system partitions and corresponding block addresses.
Preferably, the modem file security protection method, wherein the step B specifically includes:
b1, decrypting the signature information by adopting a preset public key to obtain decrypted information;
b2, reading the current block address and the current Hash of the current system partition modem file, and calculating the content Hash of the current block address and the current Hash;
b3, comparing the decryption information with the content Hash, and if the decryption information is consistent with the content Hash, judging that the content of the verification table is not changed; if not, the content of the verification table is judged to be changed.
Preferably, the modem file security protection method further includes, after the step a:
and S, compiling a preset public key to the Bootloader in an array form, so that the public key is adopted to decrypt the signature information when the Bootloader is started.
A modem file security protection system, comprising:
the composition module is used for composing a verification table by the original block address, the original Hash and the signature information of the original modem file and adding the verification table to the system partition file;
the first verification module is used for matching preset public keys with signature information in the boot process of the Bootloader, acquiring original block addresses of original modem files in a verification table if the matching is correct, and entering a second verification module; if the matching is incorrect, judging that the original modem file is changed;
the second verification module is used for calculating the real-time Hash of the current system partition modem file according to the original block address of the original modem file, comparing the real-time Hash with the original Hash, and if the real-time Hash is consistent with the original Hash, judging the safety of the original modem file; and if the data files are not consistent, judging that the original modem file is changed.
Preferably, the modem file security protection system, wherein the module specifically includes:
the original Hash generation unit is used for resolving an original block address of the original modem file from the map file and calculating the original Hash of the original modem file according to the original block address;
the signature information generating unit is used for signing the original block address and the original Hash of the original modem file by adopting a preset private key to obtain signature information;
and the appending unit is used for forming a verification table by the original block address, the original Hash and the signature information and appending the verification table to the system partition file.
Preferably, the modem file security protection system, wherein the module further includes:
and the map file generating unit is used for generating a map file for recording all files of the system partition and the corresponding block address in the process of compiling the system file.
Preferably, the modem file security protection system, wherein the first authentication module specifically includes:
the decryption unit is used for decrypting the signature information by adopting a preset public key to obtain decrypted information;
the computing unit is used for reading the current block address and the current Hash of the current system partition modem file and computing the content Hash of the current block address and the current Hash;
the comparison unit is used for comparing the decryption information with the content Hash, and if the decryption information is consistent with the content Hash, the content of the verification table is judged not to be changed; if not, the content of the verification table is judged to be changed.
Preferably, the modem file security protection system further includes:
and the compiling module is used for compiling the preset public key to the Bootloader in an array form so as to decrypt the signature information by adopting the public key when the Bootloader is started.
Has the advantages that: the method comprises the steps of verifying an original modem file twice in a Bootloader starting stage, firstly verifying signature information of a verification table to ensure that the signature information of the verification table is not changed, and then verifying original Hash in the original modem file to ensure that the original modem file is not changed; and each authentication failure results in a power-on failure.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a preferred embodiment of a modem file security protection method according to the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a preferred embodiment of a modem file security protection system according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and effects of the present invention clearer and clearer, the present invention is described in further detail below. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention.
Referring to fig. 1, fig. 1 is a flowchart illustrating a preferred embodiment of a modem file security protection method according to the present invention, as shown, the method includes the following steps:
s100, forming a verification table by the original block address, the original Hash and the signature information of the original modem file, and adding the verification table to a system partition file;
s200, in the boot process of the Bootloader, matching a preset public key with signature information, if the matching is correct, acquiring an original block address of an original modem file in a verification table, and entering the step S300; if the matching is incorrect, judging that the original modem file is changed;
s300, calculating the real-time Hash of the current system partition modem file according to the original block address of the original modem file, comparing the real-time Hash with the original Hash, and if the real-time Hash is consistent with the original Hash, judging that the original modem file is safe; and if the data files are not consistent, judging that the original modem file is changed.
In the invention, before the delivery of the mobile phone, a mobile phone manufacturer can process an original modem file of the mobile phone in a compiling stage, and an original block address, an original Hash and signature information of the original modem file form a verification table and are added to a system partition file; then, the security of the original modem file is verified every time of starting, and if the original modem file is secure, namely the modem file is not changed, the starting is normal; if the original modem file is changed, the starting is failed; specifically, the method verifies the original modem file twice in the Bootloader starting stage, firstly verifies the signature information of the verification table to ensure that the signature information of the verification table is not changed, and then verifies the original Hash in the original modem file to ensure that the original modem file is not changed; each authentication failure results in a power-on failure. The invention provides protection measures for the modem files on a software level, has very small risk and cost, has very important significance for project operation, and can effectively avoid serious loss of an operator caused by the fact that the modem files are cracked.
Further, in the present invention, the step S100 specifically includes:
s110, resolving an original block address of the original modem file from the map file, and calculating an original Hash of the original modem file according to the original block address;
specifically, in the process of compiling the system file, a map file recording all files of the system partition and corresponding block addresses is generated at the same time, that is, the name of the system partition file, the block addresses, and the corresponding relationship between the system file name and the block addresses are recorded in the map file. In the map file, the corresponding block address can be determined according to the system partition file name, and the corresponding system partition file name can also be determined according to the block address. In practical application, the content extraction of the map file may be:
/system/xbin/tcpdump 293974-294294
/system/xbin/taskstats 293969-293972
/system/xbin/su 293965-293967
/system/xbin/strace 293801-293963
/system/xbin/sqlite3 293781-293799
/system/xbin/simpleperf 293680-293779；
and analyzing original block addresses (MD blocks) of the original modem file from the map file, wherein the original block addresses of the original modem file are a section of address range recorded in a xxx-xxx format, the content of the section of address is actually the content of the modem file, and the original Hash of the original modem file is calculated according to the original block addresses.
Specifically, the original Hash for calculating the original block address may use an EVP series function provided in an openssl library to calculate the SHA256Hash value of the segment of address, if the content of the segment of address is too large, the content is read in segments by using 4K as a unit, the read content is input into the EVP function, and finally one SHA256Hash value is output, and the final result is equivalent to directly calculating the SHA256Hash value for the whole segment of content. The pseudo code for computing SHA256hash values using EVP may be:
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
size_t block_size = 4096;// 4K
size_t out_size = 0;
size_t offset_block = 0;
size_t blocks = 0;
//input string for calculate SHA256 hash
const unsigned char *data = "this is the test string for calculateSHA256";
//get EVP_MD structures for the sha256 digest algorithms respectively
const EVP_MD *md = EVP_sha256();
if(!md){
FATAL("failed to get digest\n");
}
//get the SHA256 hash size
size_t hash_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
unsigned char out_hash[hash_size];
//calculate SHA256 hash
hash_file(md,
data, sizeof(data),
out_hash,&out_size,
block_size);
//print the SHA256 hash
for (size_t i = 0; i<hash_size; i++) {
printf("%02x", out_hash[i]);
}
}
int hash_file(const EVP_MD *md,
const unsigned char *in, size_t in_size,
unsigned char *out, size_t *out_size,
size_t block_size)
{
*out_size = 0;
EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
unsigned int s;
int ret = 1;
//initializes a digest context
mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
assert(mdctx);
//sets up digest context mdctx to use SHA256
ret&= EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL);
for (size_t i = 0; i<in_size; i += block_size) {
/*calculate SHA256 hash,This function can be
*called several times on the same mdctx to hash additional data
*/
ret&= EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, in + i, block_size);
}
//get the SHA256 hash value from mdctx
ret&= EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, out,&s);
//cleans up
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(mdctx);
assert(ret == 1);
if(out_size) {
*out_size = s;
}
return 0;
}。
s120, signing the original block address and the original Hash of the original modem file by using a preset private key to obtain signature information;
specifically, the preset private key corresponds to the following public key, and the invention adopts RSA 2048 algorithm to sign the original block address and the original Hash of the original modem file to obtain the signature information.
S130, forming a verification table by the original block address, the original Hash and the signature information, and adding the verification table to the system partition file.
Specifically, the original block address, the original Hash and the signature information are combined into a verification table and added into the system partition file, and the format of the system partition file is not changed by the added form.
Further, in the process of compiling the system file, compiling a preset public key to the Bootloader in an array form, so that the public key is used for decrypting the signature information when the Bootloader is started.
Further, in the present invention, the step S200 specifically includes:
s210, decrypting the signature information by adopting a preset public key to obtain decrypted information;
s220, reading a current block address and a current Hash of a current system partition modem file, and calculating the content Hash of the current block address and the current Hash;
s230, comparing the decryption information with the content Hash, and if the decryption information is consistent with the content Hash, judging that the content of the verification table is not changed; if not, the content of the verification table is judged to be changed.
Specifically, at the boot stage of Bootloader, Signature information Signature in a verification table is obtained first, and then a preset public key is used for decrypting the Signature information Signature to obtain decryption information unSignature; reading a current block address and a current Hash of a modem file in a current system partition, and calculating a SHA256Hash of the current block address and the current Hash, namely a content Hash; finally, comparing the decryption information unSignature with the content Hash, if the decryption information unSignature is consistent with the content Hash, indicating that the content of a verification table is not changed, and indicating that the verification table of the modem file in the current system partition is completely the same as the verification table of the original modem file; if not, the contents of the verification table are changed, which results in a failed boot.
Further, when the verification table content in the original modem file is not falsified, the original modem file can be further verified; specifically, the real-time Hash of the current system partition modem file can be calculated according to the original block address of the original modem file, the real-time Hash is compared with the original Hash, if the real-time Hash is consistent with the original Hash, the original modem file is judged to be safe, and the computer can be started normally; if not, the original modem file is judged to be changed, and the startup fails.
Based on the above method, the present invention further provides a modem file security protection system, wherein as shown in fig. 2, the method includes:
the composition module 100 is used for composing an original block address, an original Hash and signature information of an original modem file into a verification table and adding the verification table to a system partition file;
the first verification module 200 is used for matching preset public keys with signature information in the boot process of the Bootloader, and if the matching is correct, acquiring original block addresses of original modem files in a verification table and entering a second verification module; if the matching is incorrect, judging that the original modem file is changed;
the second verification module 300 is configured to calculate a real-time Hash of the current system partition modem file according to an original block address of the original modem file, compare the real-time Hash with the original Hash, and determine that the original modem file is safe if the real-time Hash is consistent with the original Hash; and if the data files are not consistent, judging that the original modem file is changed.
Preferably, the modem file security protection system, wherein the module 100 specifically includes:
the original Hash generation unit is used for resolving an original block address of the original modem file from the map file and calculating the original Hash of the original modem file according to the original block address;
the signature information generating unit is used for signing the original block address and the original Hash of the original modem file by adopting a preset private key to obtain signature information;
and the appending unit is used for forming a verification table by the original block address, the original Hash and the signature information and appending the verification table to the system partition file.
Preferably, the modem file security protection system, wherein the module 100 further includes:
and the map file generating unit is used for generating a map file for recording all files of the system partition and the corresponding block address in the process of compiling the system file.
Preferably, the modem file security protection system, wherein the first authentication module 200 specifically includes:
the decryption unit is used for decrypting the signature information by adopting a preset public key to obtain decrypted information;
the computing unit is used for reading the current block address and the current Hash of the current system partition modem file and computing the content Hash of the current block address and the current Hash;
the comparison unit is used for comparing the decryption information with the content Hash, and if the decryption information is consistent with the content Hash, the content of the verification table is judged not to be changed; if not, the content of the verification table is judged to be changed.
Preferably, the modem file security protection system further includes:
and the compiling module is used for compiling the preset public key to the Bootloader in an array form so as to decrypt the signature information by adopting the public key when the Bootloader is started.
In summary, the original modem file is verified twice in the Bootloader starting stage, the signature information of the verification table is verified firstly to ensure that the signature information of the verification table is not changed, and then the original Hash in the original modem file is verified to ensure that the original modem file is not changed; and each authentication failure results in a power-on failure.
It is to be understood that the invention is not limited to the examples described above, but that modifications and variations may be effected thereto by those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the foregoing description, and that all such modifications and variations are intended to be within the scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims.
Claims (4)
1. A modem file security protection method is characterized by comprising the following steps:
A. forming a verification table by the original block address, the original Hash and the signature information of the original modem file, and adding the verification table into a system partition file;
B. in the boot process of the Bootloader, matching a preset public key with signature information, if the matching is correct, acquiring an original block address of an original modem file in a verification table, and entering the step C; if the matching is incorrect, judging that the original modem file is changed;
C. calculating the real-time Hash of the current system partition modem file according to the original block address of the original modem file, comparing the real-time Hash with the original Hash, and if the real-time Hash is consistent with the original Hash, judging that the original modem file is safe; if not, judging that the original modem file is changed;
the step A is also preceded by:
a0, in the process of compiling system files, generating a map file for recording all files of system partitions and corresponding block addresses; recording system partition file names, block addresses and corresponding relations between the system file names and the block addresses in the map file;
the step B specifically comprises the following steps:
b1, decrypting the signature information by adopting a preset public key to obtain decrypted information;
b2, reading the current block address and the current Hash of the current system partition modem file, and calculating the content Hash of the current block address and the current Hash;
b3, comparing the decryption information with the content Hash, and if the decryption information is consistent with the content Hash, judging that the content of the verification table is not changed; if not, judging that the content of the verification table is changed;
and calculating the SHA256Hash value of the section of address by adopting an EVP series function provided in an openssl library, if the content of the section of address is large, reading the content in a segmented mode by taking 4K as a unit, inputting the content into the EVP function, and finally outputting the SHA256Hash value.
2. The modem file security protection method of claim 1, wherein step a is followed by further comprising:
and S, compiling a preset public key to the Bootloader in an array form, so that the public key is adopted to decrypt the signature information when the Bootloader is started.
3. A modem file security protection system, comprising:
the composition module is used for composing a verification table by the original block address, the original Hash and the signature information of the original modem file and adding the verification table to the system partition file;
the first verification module is used for matching preset public keys with signature information in the boot process of the Bootloader, acquiring original block addresses of original modem files in a verification table if the matching is correct, and entering a second verification module; if the matching is incorrect, judging that the original modem file is changed;
the second verification module is used for calculating the real-time Hash of the current system partition modem file according to the original block address of the original modem file, comparing the real-time Hash with the original Hash, and if the real-time Hash is consistent with the original Hash, judging the safety of the original modem file; if not, judging that the original modem file is changed;
the composition module further includes:
the map file generating unit is used for generating a map file for recording all files of a system partition and corresponding block addresses in the process of compiling the system file; recording system partition file names, block addresses and corresponding relations between the system file names and the block addresses in the map file;
the first verification module specifically includes:
the decryption unit is used for decrypting the signature information by adopting a preset public key to obtain decrypted information;
the computing unit is used for reading the current block address and the current Hash of the current system partition modem file and computing the content Hash of the current block address and the current Hash;
the comparison unit is used for comparing the decryption information with the content Hash, and if the decryption information is consistent with the content Hash, the content of the verification table is judged not to be changed; if not, judging that the content of the verification table is changed;
and calculating the SHA256Hash value of the section of address by adopting an EVP series function provided in an openssl library, if the content of the section of address is large, reading the content in a segmented mode by taking 4K as a unit, inputting the content into the EVP function, and finally outputting the SHA256Hash value.
4. The modem file security protection system of claim 3, further comprising:
and the compiling module is used for compiling the preset public key to the Bootloader in an array form so as to decrypt the signature information by adopting the public key when the Bootloader is started.
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