CN106358195B - Safe activation optimization method suitable for LTE access layer - Google Patents
Safe activation optimization method suitable for LTE access layer Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/10—Integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of safe activation optimization methods suitable for LTE access layer; its main feature is that: before the safety protecting mechanism earlier than radio resource control module activation Packet Data Convergence Protocol module; by Packet Data Convergence Protocol module by all downstream messages received and its corresponding count value, it is delivered to radio resource control module together and is handled.Tegrity protection key is obtained by corresponding decoding, the safety protection function of Packet Data Convergence Protocol module is only activated after being proved to be successful, otherwise radio resource control module continues to use original security configuration.It can effectively avoid in SMC message integrity verification, since the received timing of downstream message influences and bring safety verification uncertainty hidden danger.It enables flow processing more fast and simple, reduces the time delay of Message Processing, can effectively promote the response speed of UE access LTE network.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of LTE access layer data transmission security optimization methods, more particularly to a kind of LTE that is suitable for access
The safe activation optimization method of layer.
Background technique
From the point of view of existing communication applications field, 3GPP (Third Generation Partnership is relied on
Project, third generation partner program) establish transmission mechanism it is increasingly mature.The 3GPP is found in December, 1998, more
A telecommunication standard Organization Partners endorsed " 3rd Generation Partnership Program agreement ".3GPP initial working range is for third generation movement
Communication system formulates global applicable technology specification and technical report.3-G (Generation Three mobile communication system) is based on the GSM core of development
Heart network and the wireless access technology that they are supported, mainly UMTS.The working range of subsequent 3GPP is improved, and is increased
Research and standard formulation to UTRA long evolving system.Current Europe ETSI, U.S. TIA, Japan TTC, ARIB, South Korea
6 Organization Partners (OP) of the TTA and China CCSA as 3GPP.Independent members have more than 300 families at present, in addition, 3GPP is also
13 market partners (MRP) such as TD-SCDMA industry alliance (TDIA), TD-SCDMA forum, CDMA development institution (CDG).
It is topmost Project Coordination group (PCG), by ETSI, TIA, TTC, ARIB, TTA meanwhile in the institutional framework of 3GPP
With 6 OP compositions of CCSA, technical specification group (TSG) is managed and is coordinated.It (is before 5 that 3GPP, which is divided into 4 TSG,
TSG, rear CN and T merge into CT), respectively TSG GERAN (GSM EDGE Radio Access Network), TSG RAN (wireless access network),
TSG SA (business and system), TSG CT (core net and terminal).It is divided into multiple working groups below each TSG again.As being responsible for
The TSG RAN of LTE standard points are RAN WG1 (radio physical layer), RAN WG2 (radio layer 2 and layer 3), RAN WG3 is (wireless
The network architecture and interface), 5 working groups of RAN WG4 (radio-frequency performance) and RAN WG5 (terminal consistency test).
In actual implementation process, the standard criterion that 3GPP is formulated is managed using Release as version, and average one
The formulation that a version will be completed by 2 years, the R99 at the beginning of foundation, arrives R4 later, has evolved to R10 at present.Also,
For 3GPP to the management and development of work in the form of project, the most common form is Study Item and Work Item.3GPP pairs
Received text is managed by the way of point series, and such as common WCDMA and TD-SCDMA access mesh portions standard is in 25 systems
In column, for core network part standard in the series such as 22,23 and 24, LTE standard is medium in 36 series.
Furthermore, 3GPP long term evolution (Long Term Evolution, the abbreviation LTE) system adopted extensively at present
The communication access of system/System Architecture Evolution (System Architecture Evolution, abbreviation SAE) is safely using layering
Formula security architecture mechanism.Specifically, it is divided into Non-Access Stratum (NonAccess Stratum, abbreviation according to hierarchical structure
NAS), security mechanism and access layer (Access Stratum, abbreviation AS) security mechanism, respectively possess oneself independent safety
Context.Wherein, NAS layers of safe context is negative by MME (Mobility Management Entity, mobile management entity)
Duty initialization is established, configures and is managed.And AS layers of safe context are responsible for just using eNB (evolvedNode B, enode)
Beginningization is established, configures and is managed.These safe contexts include key, security algorithm identification symbol and uplink and downlink sequence counter value
(COUNT value).
Also, NAS layers with AS layers of security function independent by respective safe mode command (Security
Mode Command, abbreviation SMC) activation.Specifically, security function includes integrity protection and Confidentiality protection.Wherein,
NAS layers of security function refer to integrity protection and Confidentiality protection to NAS signaling.AS layers of security function, refer to control plane
The integrity protection and confidentiality of radio resource control module (Radio Resource Control, abbreviation RRC) signaling
The Confidentiality protection of protection and user face (User Plane, abbreviation UP) data.From the point of view of specific, integrity protection be by
Message body as enter ginseng generate 4 bytes MAC-I (Message Authentication Code for Integrity,
Integrity messages authentication code) value, it is tested by the MAC-I carried in comparison message and according to the calculated XMAC-I of message itself
Demonstrate,prove the integrality of message.Corresponding to be, Confidentiality protection is that message is carried out encryption and decryption processing.
From the point of view of implementing in conjunction with common security algorithm, when user equipment (User Equipment, abbreviation UE) accesses LTE network
Afterwards, UE can initiate Attach (attachment) request first and initiate network registry.Meanwhile the security capabilities parameter of UE is with Attach
Request message is dealt into MME.Later, MME selects corresponding integral algorithm and encryption and decryption to calculate according to the network security of itself configuration
Method.According to the security algorithm and root key K chosenASMEIt is generated during NAS AKA (authentication and key agreement).Also, MME
The security key that NAS can be generated is notified the NAS security algorithm of selection to UE by NAS SMC message.
At the same time, UE be related to based on KASMEAnd the carrying of NAS SMC message, it is calculated safely by the NAS layer of MME selection
Method, NAS layers of security key of Lai Shengcheng.It includes tegrity protection key and encryption and decryption key.And it is possible to according to KASMEAnd
Uplink NAS COUNT value calculates KeNB.UE is based on KeNBAnd AS layer that AS SMC message carries, being selected by eNB is calculated safely
Method generates AS layers of security key, including control plane tegrity protection key (KRRCint) and encryption and decryption key (KRRCenc) and user
Face encryption and decryption key (KUPenc)。
It, can be based on tegrity protection key and algorithm respectively to NAS SMC after UE generates NAS layers and AS layers of security key
Message and AS SMC message carry out integrity verification.If the verification passes, UE can return to the successful message of SMC.Otherwise, UE is returned
NAS SMC failure or AS SMC failure news are to network side.
From the point of view of signaling process figure in conjunction with the existing AS SMC process of Fig. 1 comprising following step:
In step 11: starting control plane message integrity protection by eNB.
In step 12: sending AS SMC message to UE by eNB, which carries the AS security algorithm etc. of eNB selection
Information, and integrity protection is carried out based on the KeNB AS Integrity Key generated and the integral algorithm indicated in this message.
In step 13: after sending AS SMC message by eNB, starting the encryption function of control plane and user face downstream message
Energy.
In step 14: after receiving AS SMC message by UE, being verified to its integrality.If the verification passes, enter
Step 15, no person enters step 19.
In step 15: if being verified, starting control plane message integrity protection and control plane and user plane messages
Downstream message decryption.
In step 16: returning through the Security Mode Complete message of integrity protection to eNB by UE.
In step 17: starting control plane by UE and user face upstream message encrypts.
In step 18: by eNB receive UE transmission Security Mode Complete message after, starting control plane and
The decryption of user face upstream message.So far, AS SMC process terminates, and AS security function is activated.
In step 19: the failure of AS SMC message integrity verification, UE return to one without by integrity protection
Security Mode Failure message illustrates this AS SMC procedure failure to eNB.
During existing AS SMC, from the point of view of protocol requirement UE handles the flow chart of AS SMC message, mainly wrap
Include following steps:
Step 21 are as follows: AS SMC passes to Packet Data Convergence Protocol module (hereinafter referred to as RRC) via bottom, through RRC
After ASN.1 decoding, learn it is AS SMC message.
Step 22 are as follows: RRC is according to KASMEAnd uplink NAS COUNT value calculates KeNB。
Step 23 are as follows: according to KeNBAnd the protection algorithm integrallty indicated in AS SMC message, calculate out integrity protection
Key KRRCint。
Step 24 are as follows: the protection algorithm integrallty and K that will be indicated in AS SMC messageRRCintKey and Security
Mode Command message content, issues AS layers of Packet Data Convergence Protocol module (hereinafter referred to as PDCP), and request PDCP is tested
Demonstrate,prove the integrality of Security Mode Command message.
Step 25 are as follows: PDCP is after receiving RRC checking request, according to the algorithm and key pair SMC message indicated in request
It is verified, returns to verification result to RRC.If be proved to be successful, 26 are thened follow the steps, no person executes step 29.
Step 26 are as follows: be verified, RRC is according to KeNBAnd the Encryption Algorithm indicated in AS SMC message is calculated out plus solution
Key KRRCencAnd KUPenc,
Step 27 are as follows: all three keys and associated safety algorithm dispensing PDCP are activated PDCP safeguard protection function by RRC
Energy.The PDCP message sended and received all to subsequent UE all carry out integrity protection；To except Security Mode
All message sended and received all carry out encryption and decryption protection outside Complete message.
Step 28 are as follows: mark AS has been activated safely, and Security Mode Complete message is submitted to bottom by RRC
Transmission, this process terminate.
Step 29 are as follows: RRC continues to use original security configuration, without the use of from the Security Mode received
Configuration in Command message.That is, during this period: integrity protection is not used, also without encryption and decryption processing.And
By Security Mode Failure message, bottom transmission is submitted to, this process terminates.
Further in conjunction with practical application from the point of view of, UE receive eNB transmission Security Mode Command message after,
UE RRC needs to carry out it verifying of integrity protection.The principle that it is implemented is as shown in Figure 3.And UE needs to determine first
The corresponding COUNT value of Security Mode Command message.
According to the regulation of agreement, COUNT value is safeguarded by PDCP.Specifically, by message SN (Sequance
Number) sequence number and HFN (Hyper Frame Number Hyper Frame Number) composition.No. SN and HFN initial value are all 0.Meanwhile
As soon as the every processing uplink/downlink message of PDCP, corresponding uplink/downlink SN, which will be updated, adds 1.When SN has updated maximum value and needs
When updating again, it is 0 that SN, which is returned, while HFN updates and adds 1.
Also, network side and the side UE are in the same direction, can safeguard a COUNT value simultaneously.For same message, example
Such as Security Mode Command (SMC) message, if this article of message is the N articles downstream message that network side issues,
The side for UE, its namely UE flank the N articles downstream message received.Therefore, for same message, as integrality
The COUNT value of one of protection algorism parameter is identical in network side and the side UE.
But since SMC message is before RRC ASN.1 decoding process.PDCP has no way of judging which downstream message is as a result,
AS SMC message.This PDCP can not directly record the COUNT value of SMC message.This is with regard to root caused by current FAQs.?
That is existing agreement, which implements it, has no detailed description.Common practice is, PDCP can be according to currently safeguarding
COUNT value retrodicts out the corresponding COUNT value of SMC message.Meanwhile in most cases, receive nearest one of PDCP disappears
Breath is exactly SMC message.Therefore, by current COUNT value, subtracting 1 is exactly the corresponding COUNT value of SMC message.Because being assisted according to PDCP
Process is discussed, after having handled a downlink PDCP PDU (i.e. SMC message), the downlink SN of maintenance, which will be updated, adds 1.However, due to
Protocol requirement, eNB can transmit downlink reconfiguration in the same TTI and disappear after having sent Security Mode Command message
It ceases (RRC Connection Reconfiguration).And in this process, without waiting UE to send
Security Mode Complete message or Security Mode Failure message.
Will lead to as a result, and following situation occur: RRC request PDCP to Security Mode Command message into
When row integrity verification, PDCP has had received downlink reallocation message at this time.If to restore receive Security at this time
Corresponding COUNT value when Mode Command message, then the COUNT of PDCP maintenance at this time just needs to do the place that subtracts one twice
Reason.This just brings very big uncertainty to the safety verification of PDCP, and to be regarded as a kind of safety hidden for this uncertainty
Suffer from.
In order to solve security risk that may be present, the prior art 201310013744.2 provides a kind of data safety biography
Transmission method and LTE access net system.It has been related to the heterogeneous network based on long term evolution LTE system when implementing.Tool
For body, this heterogeneous network includes: LTE core network, LTE access net and LTE user equipment, is disposed in the LTE access net
There are one or more macro base station MeNB, one or more low power nodes LPN are deployed in the coverage area of the MeNB.Into
For one step: when the LTE user equipment accesses the MeNB, the MeNB obtains base station key from the LTE core network,
The first access layer secret key is generated according to the base station key, and passes through its control plane interface between the LTE user equipment,
Corresponding control plane information and user data are encrypted using first access layer secret key, and to corresponding control plane information into
The LTE user equipment is sent to after row integrity protection；The MeNB determines point of the user data of the LTE user equipment
Flow Policy, and by its backward LI(link interface) between LPN, sent to corresponding LPN provided for the LTE user equipment it is more
Control plane information needed for the request message of streaming service, the LPN and the second access layer secret key；The MeNB is received
The request response that the LPN is sent, will be from one in the user data that the LTE core network receives according to the distributing strategy
Part is by its interface in the user plane between the LTE user equipment, using first access layer secret key to relative users
Data are sent to the LTE user equipment after being encrypted, another part in the user data is passed through the backward chain
Road interface is sent to the LPN；The LPN encrypts corresponding user data using second access layer secret key, and
Encrypted user data the LTE user is sent to by its interface in the user plane between the LTE user equipment to set
It is standby.
In brief, base station key is obtained from core net by MeNB, the first access layer can be generated according to base station key
Key, and corresponding control plane information and user data are encrypted using the first access layer secret key, and corresponding control plane is believed
Breath is sent to LTE user equipment after carrying out integrity protection；MeNB determines the distributing strategy of the user data of LTE user equipment,
And it is sent to corresponding LPN and provides the request message of multiple stream transmission service for LTE user equipment；MeNB receives asking for LPN transmission
Response is asked, the first access layer secret key will be used to phase from a part in the user data that core net receives according to distributing strategy
It is sent to LTE user equipment after being encrypted using user data, another part in user data is sent to LPN；LPN is used
Second access layer secret key encrypts corresponding user data, and encrypted user data is sent to LTE user equipment.
When implementation, by macro base station in heterogeneous access networks by cipher key delivery to LPN, so that radio chains between LPN and UE
The safety protection function of configuration may be implemented in the transmission of road, has ensured the security performance of the system architecture.But this is needle
Transmission to Radio Link between LPN and UE cannot fundamentally improve the hidden of safe activation mechanism present in LTE access layer
Suffer from.
Separately there is a prior art, CN200880113207.2 describes the feature of the NAS layer (L3) in LTE WTRU, by
This allows the NAS protocol layer that 3 message of layer is routed to correct NAS entity, and to new NAS message type and information element
It is encoded.Propose the new architecture for enabling NAS safety.When generating NAS message, the agreement mirror based on the NAS message
Not Fu (PD), the NAS message header in indicator field, the type of the NAS message, NAS safety profile state variable
And it is made whether to encrypt the NAS message according at least one of instruction of RRC agreement, be decrypted and/or complete
The decision of whole property inspection.The NAS safety profile state variable is used to indicate whether NAS safety is currently activated, and can be with
Include a bit.
It is practical to solve the problems, such as it is to allow the NAS protocol layer that L3 message is routed to correct LTE NAS entity (example
Such as EMM and ESM).Allow the coding of new NAS message type and new NAS IE.New NAS framework is provided to enable NAS
Safety and allow NAS PDU to the encryption key stream for generating equal length length determination.In addition, described in allowing
NAS layers in radio link failure and switching post-processing SN and HFN.
But also it is only type, the NAS safety to indicator field, the NAS message in the header of NAS message
Character state variable and meet subsequent encrypting and decrypting or integrity checking according at least one of instruction of RRC agreement
It needs, can not explicitly determine COUNT value corresponding to related news such as NAS message, can equally be brought to safety verification
Hidden danger.More importantly not can avoid by consensus standard realize SMC during there is authentication failed, both it is possible that
It should be verified but due to protocol method not thorough the case where leading to the failure.
In brief, according to existing data processing method, in some cases it may appear that SMC information authentication is twice
Just pass through, i.e. the timing of downstream message affects COUNT value.And even more serious situation is, some protocol realizations do not account for
The problem of to downstream message timing, and then secondary verifying is not carried out, so that SMC authentication failed, causes link establishment to fail.
In view of the above shortcomings, the designer, is actively subject to research and innovation, it is a kind of suitable for LTE access to found
The safe activation optimization method of layer makes it with more the utility value in industry.
Summary of the invention
In order to solve the above technical problems, the object of the present invention is to provide a kind of safe activation suitable for LTE access layer is excellent
Change method.
Safe activation optimization method suitable for LTE access layer of the invention, it is characterised in that the following steps are included:
Step 1 is activated at radio resource control module (Radio Resource Control, abbreviation RRC) and is grouped
Before the safety protecting mechanism of data convergence protocol module (PDCP), received by Packet Data Convergence Protocol module by all
Downstream message and its corresponding count value, be delivered to radio resource control module together and handled.
Step 2 is decoded the every downstream message received by radio resource control module, if solution
Meaning after code is Security Mode Command message (SMC), then enters step three, otherwise, process terminates.
Step 3 requires to calculate and deduces key (K according to radio resource control moduleeNB), it is ordered according to safe mode
It enables protection algorithm integrallty indicated by message combine with deduction key, calculates tegrity protection key (KRRCint)。
Step 4, by radio resource control module by tegrity protection key and Packet Data Convergence Protocol module
Count value entrained in message, the protection algorithm integrallty of Security Mode Command message instruction, safe mode command is delivered to disappear
The integrity verifications algorithm parameters such as breath are directly passed to security algorithm unit (Security Algorithm Unit, abbreviation
SAU)。
Step 5, the parameters pair that security algorithm unit is transmitted according to radio resource control module, to safe mould
Formula command messages carry out integrity verification.It is by security algorithm unit that integrity verification result notice is wireless after verifying
Resource Control protocols module.
Step 6, radio resource control module are handled after receiving integrity verification result, if being proved to be successful,
The safety protection function of Packet Data Convergence Protocol module is then activated, otherwise radio resource control module continues to use original
Security configuration.
Step 7, after being verified, Packet Data Convergence Protocol module receives the safety of radio resource control module
Activation instruction, opens safety protection function, and Packet Data Convergence Protocol module is delivered under radio resource control module
The corresponding count value of message is no longer carried in row message, Packet Data Convergence Protocol module voluntarily calls peace according to protocol requirement
Full algorithm unit carries out safe protection treatment to message.
Further, the above-mentioned safe activation optimization method suitable for LTE access layer, wherein in the step one,
Corresponding Hyper Frame Number (Hyper Frame Number, abbreviation HFN) is in initial value, value 0.
Further, the above-mentioned safe activation optimization method suitable for LTE access layer, wherein the count value
It is COUNT value (sequence counter value) or for SN (sequence number).
Further, the above-mentioned safe activation optimization method suitable for LTE access layer, wherein described in step 4
Transmission method is message communicating mode.
Further, the above-mentioned safe activation optimization method suitable for LTE access layer, wherein described in step 4
Security algorithm unit is the algorithm accelerator installation constituted using hardware；Or the security algorithm unit is to pass through calculating
The software algorithm module that machine language compilation (software) is constituted.
Further, the above-mentioned safe activation optimization method suitable for LTE access layer, wherein described in step 6
Activate the safety protection function process of Packet Data Convergence Protocol module as follows:
Firstly, radio resource control module is according in deduction key and access layer (AS) Security Mode Command message
The Encryption Algorithm of instruction calculates out encryption and decryption key (KRRCenc) and user face encryption and decryption key (KUPenc)。
Then, radio resource control module protects encryption and decryption key, user face encryption and decryption key, control plane integrality
Protect key (KRRCint) three and associated safety algorithm dispensing Packet Data Convergence Protocol module.It is converged by activation packet data
The safety protection function of poly- protocol module, Packet Data Convergence Protocol module is to subsequent user equipment (User Equipment, letter
Claiming UE) all message sended and received carry out integrity protection.(Security Mode is completed to except safe mode
Complete) all message sended and received outside message, progress encryption and decryption protection.
Later, mark access layer has activated safely, and the message that radio resource control module completes safe mode mentions
Give bottom transmission.
Still further, the above-mentioned safe activation optimization method suitable for LTE access layer, wherein described in step 6
Radio resource control module continues to use original security configuration, and radio resource control module, which does not use, to be received
Configuration in Security Mode Command message does not use integrity protection, and without encryption and decryption processing, safe mode is failed
(Security Mode Failure) message submits to bottom transmission.
According to the above aspect of the present invention, the present invention has at least the following advantages:
When verifying SMC message, it can explicitly determine the corresponding COUNT value of SMC message, can effectively avoid and disappear in SMC
When ceasing integrity verification, since the received timing of downstream message influences and bring safety verification uncertainty hidden danger.
Also, before activating PDCP security function, SMC message is carried out since RRC calls directly security algorithm unit
Integrity verification.Can be more fast and simple in this way, allowing for flow processing, reduce the time delay of Message Processing.Thereby, it is possible to effective
Promote the response speed of UE access LTE network.
The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, it is not intended to restrict the invention, it is noted that for this skill
For the those of ordinary skill in art field, without departing from the technical principles of the invention, can also make it is several improvement and
Modification, these improvements and modifications also should be regarded as protection scope of the present invention.
The above description is only an overview of the technical scheme of the present invention, in order to better understand the technical means of the present invention,
And can be implemented in accordance with the contents of the specification, the following is a detailed description of the preferred embodiments of the present invention and the accompanying drawings.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the signaling process schematic diagram of existing AS SMC process；
Fig. 2 is the flow diagram of protocol requirement UE processing AS SMC message during existing AS SMC；
Fig. 3 is the implementation diagram of protection algorithm integrallty；
Fig. 4 is the implementation process diagram of the safe activation optimization method suitable for LTE access layer；
Fig. 5 is to call directly SAU to obtain the simple schematic diagram of the integrity verification result of SMC message.
Specific embodiment
With reference to the accompanying drawings and examples, specific embodiments of the present invention will be described in further detail.Implement below
Example is not intended to limit the scope of the invention for illustrating the present invention.
Referring to the safe activation optimization method suitable for LTE access layer of Fig. 1, unusual place is to include following
Step:
Firstly, before safety protecting mechanism is activated, received by Packet Data Convergence Protocol module by all
Downstream message and its corresponding count value are delivered to radio resource control module together and are handled.Specifically, this swashs
It is radio resource control module (Radio Resource Control, abbreviation RRC) activation packet data convergence before living
Before the safety protecting mechanism of protocol module (PDCP).Also, corresponding Hyper Frame Number (Hyper Frame in this process
Number, abbreviation HFN) it is in initial value, value 0.Simultaneously, it is contemplated that a variety of realities can be met using different counting modes
The needs for applying mode, the count value used can also be SN (sequence numbers) for COUNT value (sequence counter value).
Later, the every downstream message received is decoded by radio resource control module.In practical behaviour
When making, if decoded meaning is Security Mode Command message (SMC), enter subsequent key handling step.Otherwise, it flows
Journey terminates.It (is both to turn that is, being handled when having received other kinds of message by the specific process of other message
Branches are handled to other) do not continue to the process flow of SMC message.
Specifically, steps are as follows for the key handling that the present invention uses: needing to match existing protocol processes as far as possible
It wants, can require to calculate according to radio resource control module and deduce key (KeNB).Later, according to safe mode command
Protection algorithm integrallty indicated by message is combined with deduction key, calculates tegrity protection key (KRRCint)。
Then, by radio resource control module, by tegrity protection key and Packet Data Convergence Protocol module
Count value entrained in message, the protection algorithm integrallty of Security Mode Command message instruction, safe mode command is delivered to disappear
The integrity verifications algorithm parameters such as breath, are directly passed to security algorithm unit (SAU Security Algorithm Unit).For
Meet and stablize effective data transmission, the transmission method that the present invention uses is message communicating mode.Certainly, it is contemplated that embodiment party
The diversification of formula and particularity need, can also be in such a way that SAU module provides api function.Also, in actual implementation
When, in order to reduce the software processing load on backstage, the security algorithm unit of use is the algorithm accelerator constituted using hardware
Device.Certainly, if in the case that data-handling efficiency is high, and operation accounting is little, it can also use and pass through computer language
Constituted software algorithm module collect to constitute the security algorithm unit of software type.
And then, the parameters that security algorithm unit is transmitted according to radio resource control module are to safe mode
Command messages carry out integrity verification.It is by security algorithm unit, integrity verification result notice is wireless after to be verified
Resource Control protocols module.Further, it is possible to rely on radio resource control module come to integrity verification result
Reason.
Furthermore, if be proved to be successful, activating the peace of Packet Data Convergence Protocol module during actual treatment
All risk insurance protective function.Specifically, the safety protection function process of activation Packet Data Convergence Protocol module of the present invention
Are as follows:
Step 1 is ordered by radio resource control module according to deduction key and access layer (AS) safe mode
The Encryption Algorithm indicated in message is enabled, encryption and decryption key (K is calculated outRRCenc).Meanwhile it relying on the calculation of this step and obtaining user
Face encryption and decryption key (KUPenc)。
Step 2, by radio resource control module, by encryption and decryption key, user face encryption and decryption key, control plane
Tegrity protection key (KRRCint) three in company with associated safety algorithm dispensing Packet Data Convergence Protocol module, activates with this
The safety protection function of Packet Data Convergence Protocol module.Then, Packet Data Convergence Protocol module is to user equipment (User
Equipment UE) all message sended and received carry out integrity protection.At the same time, it is completed to except safe mode
All message sended and received outside (Security Mode Complete) message, progress encryption and decryption protection.In conjunction with reality
From the point of view of the application of border, the associated safety algorithm used here relates generally to enciphering and deciphering algorithm and protection algorithm integrallty, and both
There are four types of implementation patterns for algorithm, and both one mode corresponded to two kinds of algorithms simultaneously.The same time can only be configured by algorithm pattern ID
One mode.Such as two kinds of algorithms for currently only using mode 1 are indicated with " 001 ".
Step 3 is identified access layer and has been activated safely by radio resource control module, while passing through radio resource
The message that control protocol module completes safe mode submits to bottom transmission.
Corresponding to be, if previous verification fails, radio resource control module continues to use original peace
Full configuration.Specifically, due to using original security configuration, then radio resource control module can not use
The configuration in Security Mode Command message received.Meanwhile it not needing using integrity protection, at encryption and decryption yet
Reason.Also, in view of effectively being transmitted to the information of authentication failed, need (Security Mode that safe mode fails
Failure) message submits to bottom transmission.
Finally, to be verified by rear, Packet Data Convergence Protocol module will receive the peace of radio resource control module
Full activation instruction, to open safety protection function.Also, Packet Data Convergence Protocol module is delivered to wireless heterogeneous networks association
It discusses in the downstream message of module and no longer carries the corresponding count value of message.At the same time, Packet Data Convergence Protocol module according to
Protocol requirement voluntarily calls security algorithm unit to carry out safe protection treatment to message.
In brief, using method of the invention, during RRC activates AS security mechanism, PDCP can be by each
The COUNT value or SN value of downlink signaling message, have all passed to RRC together with message itself.Therefore, in RRC decoding downlink letter
After enabling message, it can explicitly learn one of algorithm reference of verifying AS SMC message integrity, both can clearly learn and test
Demonstrate,prove the corresponding COUNT value of AS SMC message integrity.Then, it by calling directly the relevant interface of SAU algoritic module, can obtain
To SMC message integrity verification as a result, i.e. as shown in Figure 5.
It is had the following advantages it can be seen from the above written description and the attached drawings that including at least after applying the present invention:
1, when verifying SMC message, it can explicitly determine the corresponding COUNT value of SMC message, can effectively avoid in SMC
When message integrity verification, since the received timing of downstream message influences and bring safety verification uncertainty hidden danger.
2, before activating PDCP security function, SMC message is carried out completely since RRC calls directly security algorithm unit
Property verifying.Can be more fast and simple in this way, allowing for flow processing, reduce the time delay of Message Processing.Thereby, it is possible to effectively be promoted
The response speed of UE access LTE network.
The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, it is not intended to restrict the invention, it is noted that for this skill
For the those of ordinary skill in art field, without departing from the technical principles of the invention, can also make it is several improvement and
Modification, these improvements and modifications also should be regarded as protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (6)
1. being suitable for the safe activation optimization method of LTE access layer, it is characterised in that the following steps are included:
Step 1, before the safety protecting mechanism of radio resource control module activation Packet Data Convergence Protocol module,
By Packet Data Convergence Protocol module by all downstream messages received and its corresponding count value, it is delivered to together wireless
Resource Control protocols module is handled；
Step 2 is decoded the every downstream message received by radio resource control module, if after decoding
Meaning be Security Mode Command message, then enter step three, otherwise, process terminates；
Step 3 requires to calculate deduction key according to radio resource control module, according to Security Mode Command message institute
The protection algorithm integrallty of instruction is combined with deduction key, calculates tegrity protection key；
Step 4 is delivered tegrity protection key and Packet Data Convergence Protocol module by radio resource control module
Entrained count value, the protection algorithm integrallty of Security Mode Command message instruction, Security Mode Command message in message, directly
It connects and passes to security algorithm unit；
Step 5, security algorithm unit carries out integrity verification to Security Mode Command message, after verifying, by calculating safely
Method unit is by integrity verification result notice radio resource control module；
Step 6, radio resource control module are handled after receiving integrity verification result, if being proved to be successful, are then swashed
The safety protection function of Packet Data Convergence Protocol module living, otherwise radio resource control module continues to use original peace
Full configuration,
The process of safety protection function for activating Packet Data Convergence Protocol module is,
S1, radio resource control module is according to the encryption indicated in deduction key and access layer Security Mode Command message
Algorithm calculates out encryption and decryption key and user face encryption and decryption key,
S2, radio resource control module is by encryption and decryption key, user face encryption and decryption key, control plane tegrity protection key
And associated safety algorithm dispensing Packet Data Convergence Protocol module, activate the safeguard protection function of Packet Data Convergence Protocol module
Can, the Packet Data Convergence Protocol module message sended and received all to subsequent user equipment, progress integrity protection are right
All message sended and received in addition to safe mode completes message, progress encryption and decryption protection,
S3, mark access layer have activated safely, and the message that radio resource control module completes safe mode submits to bottom
Layer transmission；
Step 7, after being verified, Packet Data Convergence Protocol module receives the safe activation of radio resource control module
Instruction, opens safety protection function, and the downlink that Packet Data Convergence Protocol module is delivered to radio resource control module disappears
The corresponding count value of message is no longer carried in breath, Packet Data Convergence Protocol module voluntarily calls safety to calculate according to protocol requirement
Method unit carries out safe protection treatment to message.
2. the safe activation optimization method according to claim 1 suitable for LTE access layer, it is characterised in that: described
In step 1, corresponding Hyper Frame Number is in initial value, value 0.
3. the safe activation optimization method according to claim 1 suitable for LTE access layer, it is characterised in that: described
Count value is COUNT value, or is SN.
4. the safe activation optimization method according to claim 1 suitable for LTE access layer, it is characterised in that: step 4
The transmission method is message communicating mode.
5. the safe activation optimization method according to claim 1 suitable for LTE access layer, it is characterised in that: step 4
The security algorithm unit is the algorithm accelerator installation constituted using hardware；Or the security algorithm unit is logical
Cross the constituted software algorithm module of computer language compilation.
6. the safe activation optimization method according to claim 1 suitable for LTE access layer, it is characterised in that: step 6
The radio resource control module continues to use original security configuration, and radio resource control module is not used and connect
The configuration in Security Mode Command message received does not use integrity protection, and without encryption and decryption processing, safe mode is lost
Message is imitated, bottom transmission is submitted to.
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| CN109150415B (en) * | 2017-06-15 | 2022-01-21 | 夏普株式会社 | Base station, user equipment and related method |
| CN109246692A (en) * | 2017-06-16 | 2019-01-18 | 华为技术有限公司 | Connection management method, terminal and wireless access network equipment |
| EP4451723A2 (en) * | 2019-01-15 | 2024-10-23 | Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (publ) | Radio access capabilities of a wireless device |
| EP3912376A1 (en) * | 2019-01-18 | 2021-11-24 | Lenovo (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. | Key refresh for small-data traffic |
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| CN101835156A (en) * | 2010-05-21 | 2010-09-15 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Method and system for safeguarding user access |
| CN102404721A (en) * | 2010-09-10 | 2012-04-04 | 华为技术有限公司 | Safety protecting method of Un interface, device and base station |
| CN104618901A (en) * | 2007-10-25 | 2015-05-13 | 交互数字专利控股公司 | Method for processing NAS information in WTRU and WTRU |
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| CN104618901A (en) * | 2007-10-25 | 2015-05-13 | 交互数字专利控股公司 | Method for processing NAS information in WTRU and WTRU |
| CN101835156A (en) * | 2010-05-21 | 2010-09-15 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Method and system for safeguarding user access |
| CN102404721A (en) * | 2010-09-10 | 2012-04-04 | 华为技术有限公司 | Safety protecting method of Un interface, device and base station |
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