CN106251705A - Track monitors - Google Patents
Track monitors Download PDFInfo
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- CN106251705A CN106251705A CN201610393144.7A CN201610393144A CN106251705A CN 106251705 A CN106251705 A CN 106251705A CN 201610393144 A CN201610393144 A CN 201610393144A CN 106251705 A CN106251705 A CN 106251705A
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 48
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 18
- 238000002372 labelling Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 8
- 239000012634 fragment Substances 0.000 claims abstract description 3
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 claims description 33
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 230000010006 flight Effects 0.000 claims 1
- 238000002955 isolation Methods 0.000 abstract description 10
- 238000012827 research and development Methods 0.000 abstract description 2
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 description 22
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 10
- 230000009977 dual effect Effects 0.000 description 6
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 5
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 5
- 125000004122 cyclic group Chemical group 0.000 description 4
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 4
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000007689 inspection Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000004458 analytical method Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000033228 biological regulation Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 2
- XLYOFNOQVPJJNP-UHFFFAOYSA-N water Substances O XLYOFNOQVPJJNP-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 2
- 206010003830 Automatism Diseases 0.000 description 1
- 101000606504 Drosophila melanogaster Tyrosine-protein kinase-like otk Proteins 0.000 description 1
- 238000012300 Sequence Analysis Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004888 barrier function Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001149 cognitive effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000011156 evaluation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000002349 favourable effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000011160 research Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000033764 rhythmic process Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000005070 sampling Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
- G08G5/00—Traffic control systems for aircraft, e.g. air-traffic control [ATC]
- G08G5/0095—Aspects of air-traffic control not provided for in the other subgroups of this main group
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
- G08G5/00—Traffic control systems for aircraft, e.g. air-traffic control [ATC]
- G08G5/0047—Navigation or guidance aids for a single aircraft
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
- G05D1/00—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots
- G05D1/0055—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots with safety arrangements
- G05D1/0077—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots with safety arrangements using redundant signals or controls
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
- G06F11/0703—Error or fault processing not based on redundancy, i.e. by taking additional measures to deal with the error or fault not making use of redundancy in operation, in hardware, or in data representation
- G06F11/0706—Error or fault processing not based on redundancy, i.e. by taking additional measures to deal with the error or fault not making use of redundancy in operation, in hardware, or in data representation the processing taking place on a specific hardware platform or in a specific software environment
- G06F11/0736—Error or fault processing not based on redundancy, i.e. by taking additional measures to deal with the error or fault not making use of redundancy in operation, in hardware, or in data representation the processing taking place on a specific hardware platform or in a specific software environment in functional embedded systems, i.e. in a data processing system designed as a combination of hardware and software dedicated to performing a certain function
- G06F11/0739—Error or fault processing not based on redundancy, i.e. by taking additional measures to deal with the error or fault not making use of redundancy in operation, in hardware, or in data representation the processing taking place on a specific hardware platform or in a specific software environment in functional embedded systems, i.e. in a data processing system designed as a combination of hardware and software dedicated to performing a certain function in a data processing system embedded in automotive or aircraft systems
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
- G06F11/0703—Error or fault processing not based on redundancy, i.e. by taking additional measures to deal with the error or fault not making use of redundancy in operation, in hardware, or in data representation
- G06F11/079—Root cause analysis, i.e. error or fault diagnosis
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
- G06F11/16—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
- G06F11/16—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware
- G06F11/1629—Error detection by comparing the output of redundant processing systems
- G06F11/1637—Error detection by comparing the output of redundant processing systems using additional compare functionality in one or some but not all of the redundant processing components
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Quality & Reliability (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Aviation & Aerospace Engineering (AREA)
- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
- Remote Sensing (AREA)
- Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Biomedical Technology (AREA)
- Traffic Control Systems (AREA)
- Navigation (AREA)
Abstract
The present invention relates to track monitoring.Including the following step in time repeated for monitoring the method for the flight path of aircraft, comprising: receive and compare two track targets, described track target identical flight path initial with two determined the most independently of one another is associated；And if between two track targets, difference occurs, then by making comparisons with the last known state not made a mistake, and from two flight paths, determine the track of mistake, the last known state not made a mistake is corresponding to two identical track targets.Research and development describe flight plan fragment, the labelling while current leg changes, the application of mistake isolation, have the application of the notice of wrong track according to the operations level of security of RNP AR program and be defined as pilot.Also describe software and system aspects.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the field of the system and method for track for monitoring aircraft.
Background technology
It must is fulfilled for required operation safety for managing the system and method for the track of aircraft
Condition.
Specifically, RNP-AR type aviation operation requires height.Required navigation performance (required
Navigation performance, RNP) may require authorize (authorisation required,
AR).RNP specifies the program created, to enumerate relevant spatial domain and to use to be met
Condition.Compared to other earth's surface Navigator (RNAV), using and secure context
RNP-AR program can provide huge benefit: the navigation feature that enhanced by regulation, complete
Whole property and precision guarantee the operation utilizing less minimum barrier to remove operation, and this can
In the case of can not realizing from the application depending on other programs of site run or be unacceptable,
Realize close to and set out program.
Such as, in this RNP-AR environment, if it occur that so-called remote error is (wherein
The error probability of each run is included between 10^-5 and 10^-7), then regulation requires aircraft
In the 2 × RNP passage being maintained at around reference locus.
Specifically, in the configuration of conventional dual system (two independent navigation link),
Mistake in one link (side) of system (this means that the track that aircraft is advanced occurs
Undesirable amendment) allow for being detected and be first isolated, in order to do not occurring
Fly on the side of mistake.
Entitled " for the side utilizing required navigation and guide performance to help to manage aviation operation
Method and device " patent document US 2012/0092913 disclose one and be adapted to assist in enforcement aviation
Run (this aviation operation requires to ensure navigation performance and guiding under RNP-AR environment)
Method and apparatus.The disclosure needs to use N number of system, and N is the integer more than or equal to 3.
The method comprising triple framework has limitation.
Existing method known to other include utilize for cross-check supervising device TAWS or
Manual mode.These methods also have limitation.
Exist for enabling in particular to ensure to run safety requirements (particularly under RNP-AR environment)
Improved method and the demand of system.
Summary of the invention
A kind of method that the present invention relates to flight path for monitoring aircraft, the method includes
Below the step in time repeated: receive and compare two track targets, described track target with
Two the initial identical flight paths determined the most independently of one another are associated；And such as
Really between two track targets, difference occurs, then by with the last known shape not made a mistake
State is made comparisons, and determines the track of mistake from two flight paths, does not makes a mistake
Rear known state is corresponding to two identical track targets.Research and development describe leg (or flight
Plan fragment) or current leg change while labelling, mistake isolation application,
Operation level of security according to RNP-AR program and pilot is defined as has vicious rail
The application of the notice of mark.Also describe software and system (such as, FMS, FWS) aspect.
The invention allows to the mistake in the trajectory calculation function in detection and isolation dual system.
It function including being optionally independent of two navigation links, aiming at of this function monitors often
The track of bar navigation link, with the mistake in detecting of link and alert crew.
The operation principle of present invention track based on every compared continuously in two bar navigation links.
In the case of there is not mistake, two tracks are identical and stable.Work as both links
In an appearance mistake time, difference occurs, and by having vicious side between track
The vicious side of tool is identified compared with the final state not made a mistake.
According to an aspect of the present invention, during solution can detect and isolate double navigation system
Trajectory calculation function in mistake such that it is able to maximally reduce such mistake the phase
Between deviation exceed by running the probability of restriction that safety requirements sets.
Advantageously, the method according to the invention can significantly decrease deviation by running safety requirements
(such as, in the link of double navigation system occurs that track is wrong to the probability of the restriction set
By mistake).If not optimal situation, it is also possible to reduce the probability that off-track is far.
Advantageously, the method according to the invention makes a mistake by automatically identifying in dual system
Part or side (during such mistake, need not the resource of other devices), the present invention
The cognitive load of crew can be reduced, and thus can limit the complexity of system (i.e.,
Need not include the resource that the three of three links reconfigure).
Specifically, the probability occurred in mistake this for single link each run exceedes
In the dual system of 10^-5, this system can be used for RNP-AR work by the present invention.
Advantageously, the method implemented in double navigation system can automatism isolation one bar navigation link
In the mistake of trajectory calculation function.Statement " isolating erroneous " is appreciated that and refers to inspection
Sniffing generation (determining the existence of problem) by mistake and determine which bar in both links occurs
Mistake (more precisely, determines that origin or its circumference of mistake, or the spy of mistake
Property or performance).In existing system, crew must implement other method and identify
Mistake and/or change navigation mode are to continue flight；Under RNP-AR environment, these existing sides
The operation secure context that is implemented in of formula has limitation and insufficiency.
Advantageously, according to certain embodiments of the present invention, the enforcement of method can be automatic,
And thus saved the additional analysis of part of generating units personnel and any extra time delay of reaction,
This time delay is likely to increase deviation according to environment.
Accompanying drawing explanation
One according to the embodiment of the present invention be given with reference to drawings described below preferred and unrestricted
The form of property, various aspects of the invention and advantage will be apparent from:
Fig. 1 shows the routine work of the present invention；
Fig. 2 A and Fig. 2 B shows the example of error detection；
Fig. 3 A and Fig. 3 B shows the schematic diagram of track management function；
Fig. 4 shows the illustrative steps of the comparison of track；
Fig. 5 shows the exemplary embodiment party of the method according to the invention in flight management system
Case；
Fig. 6 shows a different embodiment.
Detailed description of the invention
A kind of method disclosing flight path for monitoring aircraft, the method includes following
The step in time repeated, comprising: receive and compare two track targets, described track mesh
Mark identical flight path initial with two determined the most independently of one another to be associated；With
And when given when, if difference occurring between two track targets, then by with do not occur
The last known state of mistake compares, and determines mistake from two flight paths
Track, the last known state not made a mistake is corresponding to two identical track targets.
" final state not made a mistake " can be defined as two identical final states of track.
The mistake simultaneously occurred for the change detected with current leg, the state provided after change
Knowledge also so that provide the final state not made a mistake become it is known that and thus
Occur and the change of current leg occur simultaneously wrong time be isolated.
Article two, track independently of one another and is determined under identical original state.Therefore, even
The track that the double counting of continuous ground goes out determines must be consistent in time, takes in inferring correlation computations
The modulus of of short duration time delay.Due to the well-balanced property of this supposition, in addition to situations below, result
Must be identical: a) situation and/or b) the track generation of mistake occurs simultaneously in twice independent determination
Change (change of the leg such as, occurred along with the manual modification performed by pilot).
Comparison with the final state not made a mistake solves the uncertainty of the first situation.According to
Other embodiments of the method for the present invention can eliminate remaining being associated with the second situation not
Definitiveness.
In one is researched and developed, track target is complete flight path.Track target relatively is (i.e.,
Send to deviation calculate function) can be complete track (such as, flight management system grasp
Vertical current or reference locus).
One research and develop in, track target for include one or more leg (such as, TF and/
Or the leg of RF type) track section.The step of the comparison of track can be according to path segment
Order perform.
In one is researched and developed, track target is (or including) track labelling.An enforcement
In scheme, each FMS produces of (or path portion) CRC representing track
The word of 32 bits.Then FWS compares two CRC.Track labelling can be (or including)
Cyclic redundancy check (CRC) (cyclic redundancy check, CRC) file.This embodiment energy
Enough quickly compare and calculate.Such as, if track 1 has the value of 00001111, then deposit
At 4 values bit equal to 1.In order to obtain odd number bit, need to add a bit (rail
The odd check position of mark is 1).If track 2 has the value of 00000111, then there are 3
Bit is 1.In order to obtain odd number bit, need to add a bit, the odd check of track
Position is 0.In the first scenario, FMS 1 is thus sent to FWS by 1.In the second feelings
Under condition, FMS 2 is thus sent to FWS by 0.Two kinds of check bit differ, and: FWS can be by
This infers that two FMS do not have identical track, and does not receive complete track.
In one is researched and developed, described method further includes steps of and receives current leg
The instruction of change, and compare two track targets before and after the change of leg.
The instruction of change profit can receive or determine in various manners.It can be from monitoring module
(being such as not belonging to the system of the present invention) receives.Flying aircraft is towards the flight plan point of track
Advance.(manual or automatically) order from pilot changes track, described track by
FMS (in the current situation for the dual system of independent FMS) calculates repeatedly: one after the other fly
Different legs, and such that it is able to perform (or detect or initialize or determine) sequence (boat
The change of section).The instruction of the change of current leg can such as originate from the change of track (should
Track becomes equal to the track provided after the change of leg) detection.
The comparison of the track target before and after sequence can be provided with the information closing mistake.
In one is researched and developed, if described method further includes steps of leg changes it
After two targets unequal, then (from two determined the most independently of one another first phase
In same flight path) determine the track that there is mistake.In other words, this is " a target
Between " problem that compares.If two (determining independently) track mesh after the change of leg
Mark unequal: then in the middle of two tracks, there is the track of mistake.
In one is researched and developed, if described method further includes steps of leg changes it
After two targets unequal, then (from two determined the most independently of one another first phase
With flight path in) determine mistake track, described determine include comparing two track targets
The step of each, the such as next track section of plan before the change of current leg
The such as current track section of flight after the change of current leg；And determine with following
Track target be associated for mistake track: for this track target, such as at current leg
Before change, the next track section of plan is not equal to such as fly after the change of current leg
The current track section of row.In other words, this is the problem that " between target " compares.
If two track target is unequal, then can be by checking previous track target further
Content removes uncertainty, i.e. the track section that comparing such as is provided by FMS has with those
The track section of effect ground flight.
If two (determining independently) track targets after the change of leg are equal, the most not
Can carry out inferring that (two track target makes a mistake simultaneously, or they are the most normal；Then
The mistake of uncertain one side).
If lacking the instruction of the appearance of (current leg there occurs change) " sequence ", then
Possibly cannot draw deduction.
In one is researched and developed, track target is the boat including one or more TF and/or RF type
The track section of section.
In one is researched and developed, described method farther includes below step: receives and runs safety
The step of level and utilize fault tolerance threshold value (fault tolerance threshold) to perform
The step of comparison track target, described fault tolerance threshold value is according to the operation safe water received
Put down and pre-define.
Article two, the deviation between track preferably must be held in by flight performance requirement (it is input data)
In some provided limits.The subset of the path segment compared is for the described water running safety
Flat is relevant.
In one is researched and developed, for RNP-AR type program, the level of safety be included in 0.1
It is associated with the RNP value between 1 nautical mile.Such as, in the embodiment that some is favourable, peace
Full level can be RNP-0.3 level (3/10ths nautical miles).
In one is researched and developed, the step comparing track target is held when predefined time delay expires
OK.The asynchronism of predefined time delay covering system.In other words, prolong predefined
In time, perform when expiring more meaningful, and this covers the different system being embodied as determining track
Synchronicity.Such as, No. 1 FMS calculates a track, and No. 2 FMS also calculate a rail
Mark.Twice calculating not exclusively starts simultaneously at.Predefined time delay is corresponding between both links
Existing time tolerance.In other words, track is after " stablizing " (renewal of calculating)
Compare.
In one is researched and developed, described method is further comprising the steps of: the pilot of notice aircraft
The track of mistake occurs in the middle of two tracks determined the most independently of one another.
Other aspects of the present invention are described as follows.
According to a specific embodiments, the history preserving track target (at least preserves to a certain
Historical depth), the continuous leg of such as track.This history can eliminate relevant with mistake link
Possible uncertainty.Specifically, this embodiment can detect track and " sorts " (i.e.,
The change of current leg) simultaneous mistake.
In the case of the sequence of the element of system execution track, (i.e., once carrier is through track
Element, then this element is removed and performs next guiding), compare and will use a) for every
Two tracks of bar link: current track and the track provided in the next one sorts, in order to
The track of mistake, or b) n bar track is detected, if in navigation link while sequence
Many minor sorts are if possible.
Disclosing a kind of computer program, described computer program includes code command, when
When described program is computer-executed, described code command makes the one or more of described method
Step is carried out.
Disclose a kind of one or more steps included for implementing described method device be
System.In one is researched and developed, this system includes two flight management systems or FMS.Grind in one
In Faing, this system includes the supervising device for monitoring said two flight management system or FMS.
In one is researched and developed, described supervising device includes two Flight Warning Systems or FWS.
Fig. 1 shows the routine work of the present invention.
The function 100 (that is, track monitoring and mistake isolation) of track management is by two bar navigation links
The comparison of 110 and 120 (" dual systems ") and realize.Every bar navigation link (110,120)
Including various data and instruction.Data source (111,211) about the position of aircraft can
Calculate active position (112,212), and navigation information (113,213) can calculate currently
Track (114,114).According to described current track and according to the letter about position of aircraft
Breath determines deviation (115,215), and key instruction is sent to pilot and/or automatically
Guiding system (116,216).
In other words, according to an aspect of the present invention, (it is selectively independent for monitoring function
In two bar navigation links) compare the reference locus that each of the links is used, with detect difference and
Identify the link that mistake occurs.
The comparison (that is, the step of wrong link occurs in detection difference and/or identification) of track target
Can by utilize in time different in the way of (i.e., termly or aperiodically, continuously or
Disconnected ground) perform.Monitoring can only temporarily (that is, only relevant with the time) and/or depend on
The generation of the event during flight and perform.In one embodiment of the invention, by one
Individual or the mode of multiple Flight Warning System (FWS), FWS starts and controls the frequency compared
(that is, the rhythm and pace of moving things).In certain embodiments, checking frequency is about one second.
Fig. 2 A and Fig. 2 B shows the example of error detection.In the case of mistake does not occurs,
Article two, reference locus is identical and stable.
Flight plan includes make starting point be connected to the point of arrival a series of that are referred to as " leg "
Section.The sequence of leg self has carried out standardization.Thus, leg is associated with flight path.
Fig. 2 A shows the example of the comparison of the track according to first embodiment of the invention.When going out
During existing mistake, difference 201 occurs between two tracks, and by by wrong side with there is not mistake
Final state (state 202) compares and identifies the vicious side of tool by mistake.
Fig. 2 B shows another embodiment, for this embodiment, according to the prison of the present invention
Prosecutor method is carried out by the sequence (" sequence ") analyzing leg.Such as, application is to track
The term " currently " 203 of leg and " next " 204 refer to respectively current track 203 (or
Person represents that sequence is to the rearmost point arrived and the element of current track) and represent (the row for the treatment of on track
Sequence is to arriving) element of next point 204.Term " sorts " and means current leg
Change (that is, the next leg after current leg becomes current leg).Statement is " current
Leg (current leg) " French Translator is " leg courant " or " leg en cours " or " leg
actif”.Statement " next leg " French Translator is " prochain leg " or " leg suivant ".
In one embodiment, mistake can be detected by the sequence analyzing leg.This
Sequence analysis makes it possible to identify mistake while leg changes.Example shown in accompanying drawing
Show the generation (misordering) mistake being detected at point 211: track sets deviates,
And No. 2 links occur in that mistake.Especially, in the sequence at the time 210, link 1
Indicate current track target B and next track target C, and link 2 indicates similarly.
At the moment 211 subsequently, after current leg changes, in link 1, current track
Target becomes C, and next track object representation is D, but for link 2, movable rail
Mark target is X rather than C.By comparing it can be determined immediately that outgoing link 2 makes a mistake and
Link 1 priori is correct.
Such as, if link 1 indicates C/D and link 2 indicates C/Y, then at the moment 211
(still) track mistake does not occurs.On the contrary, at the next change of leg, mistake will be by
Record (but this which bar that will be unable to a priori detect in both links there occurs mistake).
Should (temporarily) state (being given by way of example) be made by the mistake in Track Pick-up function
Become, if because described Track Pick-up function to be designed to " currently " track identical, the most normally
Provide identical result for " next " track.
According to some embodiment, the detection of the link made a mistake and/or compare a certain in advance
Perform after the time delay of definition.Especially, under flight environment of vehicle, it is allowed to manually changing track
Become and suppose to synchronize (in the situation with enough operation levels of security between both links
Under), the specific time delay before the detection of side of making a mistake is probably necessity, in order to wait
The track " updated ".
Fig. 3 shows the schematic diagram of track management function.
Each example of trajectory calculation system carries to " track monitoring and mistake isolation " function 100
Expression for track.Expressing possibility of this track is: a) is sent to deviation and calculates the complete of function
Track；Or b) about the subset of operation level of security of imagination (such as, only for TF and RF
Type leg), or c) represent track or the labelling of selected subset.
In one particular case, can use one or more by the method according to the invention
Track section or track labelling (that is, cohesion or compact representation).Such as, this labelling is permissible
Including cyclic redundancy check (CRC) (CRC), this cyclic redundancy check (CRC) can by adding, combination with
The redundant data relatively obtained by hash routine detects transfer or transmission error.CRC is usual
Later evaluation (sampling) therewith before transmission or transfer, is then compared to guarantee that data are strict
Ground is identical.The most frequently used CRC calculates and is designed to can detect certain form of mistake all the time,
The mistake such as caused due to the interference during transmission.
Under this environment of the present invention, for each for element or selected element set
The example of trajectory calculation system, can calculate current CRC and next CRC.The length of CRC
Degree (bit length) such as can select according to the detection level needed for safety analysis or determine.
" track monitoring and mistake isolation " function 100 stores and is received by each trajectory calculation link
Element.When detecting that in of both links (that is, the data of reception are different from change
The data of storage) time, determine which calculates function and there occurs mistake.
Make a mistake calculate function by by by the element of No. 1 trajectory calculation function transfer with by
The element of No. 2 function transfer compares and determines.In the case of complicated data set, in pairs
Utilize element to perform to compare.
Fig. 3 A shows when difference finds, " track monitoring and mistake isolation " function 100 is recognized
Surely being not carried out the trajectory calculation link of desired content is that run mistakenly.If represented
After the element of the next track of the X side before " sorting " is equal to or is equal to " sequence "
The next element of X side, then track management function performs desired task, and does not sends
False alarm.Really steady statue (that is, both sides it are in order to ensure two trajectory calculation functions
On the most all there occurs the sequence of point on track), before comparing, can add can
The time delay of choosing.
Fig. 3 B shows: if representing the unit of the next track of the X side before " sequence "
Element be not equal to " sequence " after the next element of X side, then track management function is not carried out
Desired task: by comparing two bar navigation links, it may be determined that mistake.
Fig. 4 shows exemplary track comparison step.
In shown example, compare path segment (or such as leg) in step 400.
If for each of the links, path segment is identical, then increase index i (that is, not making a mistake).
If difference being detected in step 412, then step 421 determine link 1 path segment (or
Leg) whether equal to reference locus element.Link 2 can also be checked (to determine the track of link 2
Whether element is equal to reference locus element；If unequal 432, it is determined that link 2 has mistake；
If equal 431, then this is the problem of a contradiction and is therefore impossible).If in step
The track element of rapid 421 links 1 is not equal to reference locus element, then inspection link 2 (determines chain
Whether the track element on road 2 is equal to reference locus element；If equal 433, it is determined that link 1
There is mistake；And if unequal 434, then cannot reach a conclusion, because this is " double mistake "
Problem, or flight plan carried out different amendments on every side).
In one embodiment of the invention, track leg is compared.
Fig. 5 shows the exemplary embodiment party of the method according to the invention in flight management system
Case scheme.
In an optional embodiment, in order to current leg change while detection and every
From mistake, function 100 determines relate only in two trajectory calculation links only one.According to
This embodiment, the step of the method is as follows: each " track monitoring and mistake isolation " function
The 100 two kinds of elements utilizing current and next type: the element of storage is with current before sequence
Element.Flight start time, all elements is initialized as current state (that is, storage work as
Front element=currentElement；The next element of storage=current next element).If
Situations below occurs, then detect trajector deviation: i) two trajectory calculation functions are in " double " formula
Running (that is, they all on identical track run), ii) trajectory calculation link includes difference
In the next element of the storage of its currentElement, and iii) the second trajectory calculation link includes
Next element equal to the storage of its currentElement.
In some (optionally) embodiment, may determine that in some cases by unit people
The trajectory modification that member performs, such as, if a) two trajectory calculation functions are in " double " formula fortune
Row (that is, they all run on identical track), b) under the storage of trajectory calculation link
The element of one type is different from the currentElement that it is current, c) another trajectory calculation link
The element of the next type of storage is also different from its current currentElement, and d) two rails
The current currentElement that mark calculates function is consistent with next element.This embodiment shows
The method according to the invention makes the existence of trajectory modification be confirmed.
In (optionally) embodiment, if it occur that situations below, then may determine that
Two trajectory calculation functions are in " double " formula fortune while two trajectory calculation functions unsuccessfully: 1)
Row (that is, they all on identical track run), 2) under the storage of trajectory calculation link
The element of one type is different from the currentElement that it is current, and 3) another trajectory calculation link
The element of next type of storage is different from its current currentElement, 4) two trajectory calculation
The current currentElement of function is different with next element.Said method is intended to detection and isolation
Single error, but double mistake can also be detected in passing.
Fig. 6 shows the modification of a kind of embodiment.
According to a specific embodiments, the flight management system that trajectory calculation function is implemented in redundancy
System (521,522) and perform to compare that (this compares with the required size of space；And with spy
Perform due to the inspection frequency of this system) monitoring module or controller 530 in implement.
In a kind of modification, monitoring module 530 can be intended to send the flight alarm system of warning
The redundant system of system (FWS).For each FMS, corresponding to a FWS.At a tool
In body embodiment, operational mode has mainly/spare type, and (that is, in FWS is main
Dynamic formula, and another holding passively and only in the case of active FWS makes a mistake connects
Pipe).The embodiment that this warning guides is only a kind of example.More usually situation is to remove
Outside warning communication, module 530 can also have more function.Module 530 can be with
Other airborne avionics system communicates.
The present invention can utilize software and/or hardware element to implement.It can be assigned as computer
Computer program on computer-readable recording medium.Described medium can be electronics, magnetic, light
That learn or electromagnetism.
Claims (17)
1., for monitoring the method for flight path of aircraft, the method includes in time repeating
Following steps:
-receive and compare two track targets, described track target with the most independently of one another
Two the initial identical flight paths determined are associated；And
-when given when, if difference occurring between two track targets, then by with do not send out
The last known state of raw mistake is made comparisons, and determines mistake from two flight paths
Track, the described last known state not made a mistake is corresponding to two identical track targets.
Method the most according to claim 1, track target is complete flight path.
Method the most according to claim 1, track target is for including one or more flight
The track section of plan fragment.
Method the most according to claim 1, track target is track labelling.
5., according to the method described in any one of aforementioned claim, farther include following steps:
The instruction of the change of-reception current leg,
-compare two track targets before and after leg changes.
Method the most according to claim 5, if further including steps of leg
Two targets after change are unequal, then from two determined the most independently of one another
The most identical flight path determines the existence of mistake track.
Method the most according to claim 5, if further including steps of leg
Two targets after change are unequal, then from two determined the most independently of one another
The most identical flight path determines the track of mistake, determines and comprise the following steps:
-compare each of two track targets, such as plan before the change of current leg
Next track section and such as the current track section of flight after the change of current leg；
And
-determine be associated with following track target for mistake track: for this track target, example
As before the change of current leg, the next track section of plan is not equal to such as in current boat
The current track section of flight after the change of section.
Method the most according to claim 3, track target is for including one or more TF
And/or the track section of the leg of RF type.
Method the most according to claim 1, farther includes to receive the level running safety
Step and utilize the step of comparison track target that fault tolerance threshold value performs, described mistake
Tolerance threshold value pre-defines according to the operation level of security received by mistake.
Method the most according to claim 9, for RNP-AR type program, safety
Level is associated with the RNP value being included between 0.1 with 1 nautical mile.
11., according to the method described in any one of aforementioned claim, compare the step of track target
Perform when predefined time delay expires.
12., according to the method described in any one of aforementioned claim, farther include following step
Rapid: to go out in the middle of two tracks that the pilot of notice aircraft determines the most independently of one another
The track of existing mistake.
13. computer programs, described computer program includes code command, when described program
When being computer-executed, described code command makes any one institute according to claim 1 to 12
The step of the method stated is carried out.
14. 1 kinds of systems, it includes for implementing any one institute according to claim 1 to 12
The device of the step of the method stated.
15. systems according to claim 14, this system includes two Flight Warning Systems
Or FWS.
16. systems according to claim 15, this system includes for two flights of monitoring
Management system or the device of FMS.
17. systems according to claim 16, supervising device includes two flight alarm systems
System or FWS.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| FR1501164 | 2015-06-05 | ||
| FR1501164A FR3037158B1 (en) | 2015-06-05 | 2015-06-05 | TRACK MONITORING |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
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| CN106251705A true CN106251705A (en) | 2016-12-21 |
| CN106251705B CN106251705B (en) | 2023-01-03 |
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| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201610393144.7A Active CN106251705B (en) | 2015-06-05 | 2016-06-06 | Method and system for monitoring flight trajectory of aircraft with dual navigation systems |
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| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US9965963B2 (en) |
| CN (1) | CN106251705B (en) |
| FR (1) | FR3037158B1 (en) |
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN108417096A (en) * | 2018-02-01 | 2018-08-17 | 四川九洲电器集团有限责任公司 | A kind of state of flight appraisal procedure and system |
Families Citing this family (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE102017201517A1 (en) * | 2017-01-31 | 2018-08-02 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Method and device for plausibility of a vehicle trajectory for controlling a vehicle |
| CN113535484B (en) * | 2021-09-08 | 2021-12-17 | 中国商用飞机有限责任公司 | System and method for realizing RNP AR function through extended computer |
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Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| US9965963B2 (en) | 2018-05-08 |
| CN106251705B (en) | 2023-01-03 |
| US20160358482A1 (en) | 2016-12-08 |
| FR3037158A1 (en) | 2016-12-09 |
| FR3037158B1 (en) | 2018-06-01 |
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