CN106209768B - A kind of expansible RFID mutual authentication method - Google Patents
A kind of expansible RFID mutual authentication method Download PDFInfo
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- CN106209768B CN106209768B CN201610457703.6A CN201610457703A CN106209768B CN 106209768 B CN106209768 B CN 106209768B CN 201610457703 A CN201610457703 A CN 201610457703A CN 106209768 B CN106209768 B CN 106209768B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0807—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using tickets, e.g. Kerberos
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
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Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of expansible RFID mutual authentication method, reader generates the random number r of length L, calculates A in conjunction with identifier UID, and A and request Query are sent to label；Label calculates random number r by A, calculates two authenticity verification values B, C with (K, the ID) of r and itself storage and is transmitted to reader, and reader receives and sends jointly to background data base together with r after B, C, and background data base first calculates the odd bits B of BnIt is matched with the value in the even bit library of shared key, quick-searching calculates B` to corresponding (K, ID), C`, the authenticating tag true and false.If label is legal, authenticity verification value D is calculated with current key K and random number r in background data base, and D is sent to reader, while more new key K.Reader is sent to label after receiving D, and label upon receipt, calculates the true and false of D` certification reader.If reader is legal, tag update key K.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to radio frequency identification (RFID) research fields, and in particular to a kind of expansible in RFID system
RFID mutual authentication method.
Background technique
Radio frequency identification (radio frequency identification, RFID) is a crucial skill of Internet of Things
Art is usually made of background data base, reader and 3 part of label.Reader sends and receives letter to label by antenna
Number, automatic identification target object simultaneously obtains relevant information data, and information data transmission is further processed to background data base.
RFID provides function that is contactless, identifying immediately for object and object.Information is quickly and accurately collected and handles as a kind of
New and high technology, and have many advantages, such as that non-contact, wearability, at low cost, small in size, the service life is long, is widely used in supply
In the every field such as chain management, inventory's monitoring, communications and transportation, E-Passport, payment system and medical control.
In RFID system, reader and background data base are transmitted by the wire channel of safety, it is considered that it
Between channel be safe lane.The channel of reader to label is known as forward channel, and the channel of label to reader is known as
Backward channel, it is insecure channels that both channels, which all pass through wireless signal, which to be transmitted, easy to be tracked, eavesdropped, is false
Emit, retransmit and refuse the attack such as service；Simultaneously as inexpensive label has, storage is small, running space is limited, computing capability is low
The features such as, so that complicated Encryption Algorithm is very difficult to apply in RFID system.These factors have become serious restriction RFID technique
Further develop the critical issue of urgent need to resolve.
In order to overcome the problems referred above, between past 10 years, a large amount of RFID personal secrets protection scheme has been emerged in large numbers, as physics is pacified
The successive proposition of full mechanism and the software safety mechanism based on cryptographic technique etc..The former is ordered using non-cryptography mode such as Kill
It enables, the mechanism protection RFID tag data privacy such as faraday cup, active interference and label jams.The object as employed in RFID
Managing security mechanism, there are many disadvantages, then the security mechanism there has been proposed many based on cryptographic technique.It is mainly utilized
The cryptography scheme and mechanism of various relative maturities carry out the cipher protocol that design and implementation meets RFID demand.According to label cost and
RFID security authentication protocol can be divided into two classes: public key encryp scheme PKC (public by the difference of security requirement
Key crypto) and non-public key encryption system scheme NPKC (non-public key crypto).Based on public key encryp side
What most of safety certifying method of case used is ECC (elliptic curve crypto) algorithm, has very high safety strong
Degree, but calculate spend it is larger so that the cost of label is difficult to reduce, the certificate scheme that is proposed such as Godor et al. (GODOR,
NORBERT G.Elliptic curve cryptography based mutual authentication protocol
for low computation RFID systems performance analysis by imulations[A]
.2010IEEE International Conference on[C].2010.25-27).Based on non-public key encryption system scheme
What safety authentication protocol mainly used is the hash function operation with certain security intensity, because calculating cost is relatively small,
Safety is also relatively high, uses at present than wide, but most of scheme does not all account for the expansible of RFID Verification System
Property.In order to guarantee to send after anonymity, labeling requirement encrypt the identity information of oneself.Reader must first confirm label simultaneously
Identity can use the private information of label just to verify the legitimacy of message, this needs background data base to attempt all labels
Key information be decrypted, that is to say, that confirm that the cost of label and number of tags are in a linear relationship, when number of tags is excessive
When determine that label cost is excessive.Scheme (Sarma S E, Weis S A, the Engels D W.RFID that Sarma S E et al. is proposed
systems and security and privacy implications[G]//LNCS 2523:Proc of the 4th
Int Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems(CHES2002).Berlin:
Springer, 2003:454-469) since ID does not use dynamic refresh mechanism, metalID is remained unchanged, label be easy by with
Track positioning, and (key, ID) is sent with plaintext version, is easy stolen hearer and is obtained；The scheme that Ohkubo M et al. is proposed
(Ohkubo M,Suzuki K,Kinoshita S.Hash-chain based forward-secure privacy
protection scheme for low-cost RFID[C]//Proc of the Symp on Cryptography and
Informantion Security.Los Alamitors, CA:IEEE Computer Society, 2004:719-724) only
It is one-way authentication protocol, and the agreement is highly susceptible to re-transmission and impersonation attack；Scheme (the LEE S that Lee S M et al. is proposed
M,HWANG Y J,LEE D H,et al.Efficient authentication for low-cost RFID systems
[A].Proceedings of International Conference on Com-putational Science and Its
Applications [C] .2005.619-627) due to handling every time solicited message, Denial of Service attack cannot be prevented；
The scheme that Wang Shaohui et al. is proposed is (to the expansible two-way authentication side RFID of privacy after Wang Shaohui, Liu Sujuan, Chen Danwei satisfaction
Case [J] Journal of Computer Research and Development, 2013,06:1276-1284.) in label and the reader random number r1, r2 that generate all be
Plaintext transmission, and hash function algorithm be all it is disclosed, attacker can pass through exhaustion method breaking cryptographic keys Key value；Jin Yong
(Jin Yongming, Wu's chess is crystal-clear, Shi Zhiqiang, Lu Xiang, and Sun Limin is assisted based on the RFI D light-weight authentication of PRF for the scheme of bright et al. proposition
View research [J] Journal of Computer Research and Development, 2014,07:1506-1514) safety is relatively high, but label produces in the program
The cost that random number improves label is given birth to, in addition the agreement, which needs to be traversed for, confirms that tag identity makes background data base calculation amount
Larger, scalability is not strong；Scheme (Alomair B, the Cuellar J, Poovendran that Alomair B et al. is proposed
R..Scalable RFID systems:A privacy-preserving protocol with constant time
identification[J].IEEE Trans on Parallel and Distributed Systems,2012,23(8):
1-10) and scheme (Godor G, the Imre S.Hash-based mutual authentication that proposes of Godor G et al.
protocol for low-cost RFID systems[C]//Proc of the 18th EUNICE Conf on
Information and Communications Technologies.Berlin:Springer, 2012:76-87.) although
Solved the problems, such as by the way of assumed name it is expansible, but the scheme that proposes of Alomair B et al. cannot provide after to personal secrets
Property, and Godor G et al. propose scheme resisting asynchronous cannot attack, attacker by reset, forge message so that label and
The key data stored in reader is inconsistent, to destroy the subsequent certification of label and reader.On this basis, Wo Menshe
An expansible safety certifying method based on Rabin algorithm is counted, this method avoids the defect of above scheme, makes the cost of label
It substantially reduces, and the query cost of background data base is greatly reduced, there is important research significance and use value.
Summary of the invention
The present invention is for existing many RFID security certificate schemes in cost and the upper Shortcomings of safety and scheme
Scalability is bad etc., and one kind of design has good confidentiality, integrality, availability, high efficiency and low cost can
The RFID mutual authentication method of extension.
The purpose of the present invention is realized by the following technical solution: a kind of distensible RFID mutual authentication method, including
Step:
1) reader generates the random number r that a length is L, then obtains random number r and shared identifier UID operation
The A being calculated finally is sent to label together with request certification Query order by A together；
2) after label receives request certification Query order and A, the UID of itself storage is first taken out, then calculates and extracts r,
Computations finally are carried out using (K, the ID) of label itself storage and the r being calculated, generate two authenticity verification values B, C,
And calculated result is sent to reader；
3) after reader receives B and C, the database on backstage is sent to together together with the random number r itself generated；
4) background data base is after receiving the information that reader is sent, calculating B firstn, BnFor the odd bits of B, then with
Element Rapid matching in shared key even bit library obtains corresponding (K, ID), calculates and generates B`, C`, and whether verifying B`, C`
Equal with B, C, if equal, background data base calculates reader authenticity verification value D, and the value of D is sent to reader, simultaneously
More new key K；
5) after reader receives the information D that background data base is sent, label is forwarded that information at once, and label calculates
D` out, whether verifying D` is equal with D, if equal, more new key is K, authenticates successfully；Otherwise illustrate that reader is to forge,
Authentification failure.
Preferably, the identifier UID that random number r and all labels and reader are shared in step 1) carries out XOR operation
It obtains
Preferably, the realization process of step 4) are as follows: background data base calculates first after receiving the information that reader is sent
Bn(odd bits of B), then in the even bit library of epicycle shared keyIn look for whether to exist and BnConsistent value, and if it exists, then
Find out withCorresponding (Knew, ID), calculate B`=Cro (r, Knew) andIt tests
It whether equal with B, C demonstrate,proves B`, C`, if equal, carries out step 5, otherwise termination protocol；If it does not exist, then last round of total
Enjoy the even bit library of keyIn look for whether to exist and BnConsistent value, if it does not exist, then termination protocol；No person find out withCorresponding (Kold, ID), calculate B`=Cro (r, Kold) andVerifying B`,
Whether C` is equal with B, C, if equal, background data base calculates reader authenticity verification value D, and the value of D is sent to reading
Device, while more new key K, otherwise termination protocol.
Preferably, the more new key in step 4) is carried out by following rule:
(1) if BnWithValue in library is consistent, then background data base more new key is as follows:
Kold=Knew；Knew=[Knew 2mod N]L；
(2) if BnWithValue in library is consistent, then back-end data library key does not need to update.
Preferably, the realization process of step 5) are as follows: after reader receives the information D that background data base is sent, at once will
The information is transmitted to label, and label calculates D`=Cro (r, [K2mod N]L), whether verifying D` is equal with D, if equal, more
New key is K=[K2mod N]L, authenticate successfully；Otherwise illustrate that reader is to forge, authentification failure.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages and beneficial effects:
This method is the design on the basis of research work in terms of using for reference recent domestic RFID security certificate scheme
A kind of expansible mutual authentication method based on Rabin algorithm.The random number of this method is by reader rather than label generates,
The cost of label greatly reduces；All information that mutual authentication process is transmitted between label and reader in this method
It is all to be transmitted again after encryption, it is safer compared with traditional transmission mode, in the information of simultaneous transmission process all
At least more than two variables are unknown for attacker, are cracked to thoroughly avoid attacker using the method for exhaustion
The security risk of key；It introduces and intersects bit arithmetic algorithm, assumed name key K and random number r is carried out to intersect bit arithmetic, and will calculate
As a result it is used as response message, the query cost of background data base is greatly reduced, while also having ensured certification to a certain extent
The confidentiality of communication；The Rabin Encryption Algorithm introduced after optimizing is encrypted instead of the one-way hash function that most of agreement uses,
It is more efficient in calculating and communication capacity.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is distensible RFID mutual authentication process flow chart of the invention.
Fig. 2 is each parameter transmittance process schematic diagram in mutual authentication process of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is intersection bit arithmetic calculating process flow chart in mutual authentication method of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
The present invention is described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawing, and embodiments of the present invention are not limited thereto.
The meaning for each symbol being related in the present embodiment the method is provided first:
R: reader；
T: label；
DB: background data base；
UID: the identifier that all labels and reader are shared；
ID: tags unique identifier symbol；
Knew: the shared key of epicycle；
The even bit of epicycle shared key；
Kold: last round of shared key；
The even bit of last round of shared key；
L: the length of key；
N: the Mersenne number of selection, N=2L-1；
R: the random number that reader generates；
XOR operation；
[]L: take preceding L of operation result
Cro (X, Y): intersect bit arithmetic, specifically, if X, Y are two s binary arrays (s is even number), X=
x1x2x3…xs, Y=y1y2y3…ys。xi, yi∈ { 0.1 }, i=1,2 ... s, intersecting bit arithmetic Cro (X, Y) is the odd bits by X
The new array in the position s for intersecting and being formed with the even bit of Y, i.e. Cro (X, Y)=y2x1y4x3y6x5…ysxs-1.Cro's (X, Y)
Detailed calculating process as shown in figure 3, take length s=16, if X=1010011100101100, Y=here
01100101100111, then Cro (X, Y)=1101101100111110.
In the scheme that this method proposes, parameters in the specific verification process of label, reader and background data base
It transmits referring to fig. 2, wherein A, B, Bn, the explanation of C, D:
B=Cro (r, K)；
Bn: the odd bits of B；
Knew=[K2mod N]L；
D=Cro (r, Knew)；
It is described as follows below with reference to verification process of the Fig. 1 to the present embodiment:
1, reader first generates random number r, then the identifier that random number r and all labels and reader is shared
UID carries out XOR operation and obtainsFinally the A being calculated is sent out together together with request certification Query order
Give label.
2, after label receives request certification Query order and A, calculates extract firstAnd B, C are calculated,
Calculated result is sent to reader.
3, after reader receives B and C, send the database on backstage to together together with the random number r itself generated.
4, background data base is after receiving the information that reader is sent, calculating B firstn(odd bits of B), then at this
Take turns the even bit library of shared keyIn look for whether to exist and BnConsistent value, and if it exists, then find out withIt is corresponding
(Knew, ID), calculate B`=Cro (r, Knew) and Verify B`, C` whether with B, C phase
Deng if equal, carrying out step 5, otherwise termination protocol.If it does not exist, then in the even bit library of last round of shared key
In look for whether to exist and BnConsistent value, if it does not exist, then termination protocol；No person find out withCorresponding (Kold, ID),
Calculate B`=Cro (r, Kold) andWhether equal with B, C verify B`, C`, if
It is equal, then step 5 is carried out, otherwise termination protocol.
5, background data base calculates reader authentication information D=Cro (r, [K2mod N]L) value, and the value of D is sent to
Reader, and more new key as follows:
(1) if BnWithValue in library is consistent, then background data base more new key is as follows:
Kold=Knew；Knew=[Knew 2mod N]L。
(2) if BnWithValue in library is consistent, then back-end data library key does not need to update.
6, after reader receives the information D that background data base is sent, label is forwarded that information at once.Label calculates
D`=Cro (r, [K out2mod N]L), whether verifying D` is equal with D, if equal, more new key is K=[K2mod N]L, recognize
It demonstrate,proves successfully；Otherwise illustrate that reader is to forge, authentification failure.
The BAN formalization of logic analysis of authentication protocol is given below, BAN logic is by Burrows, Abadi and Needham
In the logic of modality based on conviction that nineteen ninety proposes, main includes three kinds of process objects: main body, key, formula.This method is adopted
Security Proof is carried out to scheme with BAN formalization of logic analysis method.The following are the part inference rules of BAN logic:
(1) message meaning rule:It is meant that if P believes shared key of the K between P and Q, and
P receives the message { X } with K encryption XK, then P believes that Q is transmitted across message X；
(2) message freshness rule:It is meant that if a part of a formula is fresh, the public affairs
Formula is entirely fresh；
(3) nonce proof rule:It is meant that if message X is fresh, and P believes that Q was once sent
X is crossed, then P believes that Q believes X；
(4) administration rule:It is meant that if P believes that Q has jurisdiction to message X, and P believes Q phase
Believe X, then P believes X；
The idealized model of scheme is provided first:
Message 1. R → T:{ Query, A }, A is the ciphertext comprising random number r encryption；
Message 2. T → R:B, C；
Message 3. R → T:D；
The original hypothesis of scheme:
P1:(R believes R and T shared key value K).
P2:(T-phase believes R and T shared key value K).
P3:(R believes that R and T shares identifier ID).
P4:(T-phase believes that R and T shares identifier ID).
P5:(R believes the shared identifier UID of R and T).
P6:(T-phase believes the shared identifier UID of R and T).
P7: T | ≡ # (r) (freshness of T-phase letter random number r).
P8: R | ≡ # (r) (freshness that R believes random number r).
P9:(R believes T to M2Jurisdiction).
P10:(R believes T to M3Jurisdiction).
P11:(T-phase believes R to M4Jurisdiction).
Security target:
G1: R | ≡ B, R believe B；G2: R | ≡ C, R believe C；
G3: T | ≡ D, T-phase believe D.
Analysis ratiocination:
2. by message(R once receives the B that disappears), and by original hypothesis P1And message meaning ruleObtain R | ≡ T | (R believes that T is transmitted across message M to~B2)。
By assuming P7 and message freshness ruleObtain R | ≡ # (B).
By the R derived | ≡ T |~B, R | ≡ # (B) and nonce proof ruleObtain R |
≡ T | ≡ B (R believes that T-phase believes B).
By R | ≡ T | ≡ B, initial state assumption P9And administration ruleR can be obtained | ≡ B.Therefore, target
G1It must demonstrate,prove.
With above-mentioned condition and rule, proving by the same methods obtains G2And G3.Details are not described herein again.
The above embodiment is a preferred embodiment of the present invention, but embodiments of the present invention are not by above-described embodiment
Limitation, other any changes, modifications, substitutions, combinations, simplifications made without departing from the spirit and principles of the present invention,
It should be equivalent substitute mode, be included within the scope of the present invention.
Claims (4)
1. a kind of expansible RFID mutual authentication method, which is characterized in that comprising steps of
1) reader generates the random number r that a length is L, random number r and shared identifier UID operation is then obtained A, most
The A being calculated is sent to label together with request certification Query order together afterwards；Wherein, it shares identifier UID and is shared on mark
It signs between T and reader R；
2) after label receives request certification Query order and A, the UID of itself storage is first taken out, then calculates and extracts r, finally
(K, the ID) that is stored using label itself and the r being calculated carry out computations with bit arithmetic algorithm is intersected, and generate two
Authenticity verification value B, C, and calculated result is sent to reader；
3) after reader receives B and C, the database on backstage is sent to together together with the random number r itself generated；
4) background data base is after receiving the information that reader is sent, calculating B first1, B1For the odd bits of B, then with it is shared
Element Rapid matching in key even bit library obtains corresponding (K, ID), calculates and generates B`, C`, verifying B`, C` whether with B,
C is equal, if equal, background data base calculates reader authenticity verification value D, and the value of D is sent to reader, updates simultaneously
Key K；
5) after reader receives the information D that background data base is sent, label is forwarded that information at once, and label calculates D
`, whether verifying D` is equal with D, if equal, more new key is K, authenticates successfully；Otherwise illustrate that reader is to forge, certification
Failure；
The realization process of the step 4) are as follows: background data base is after receiving the information that reader is sent, calculating B first1, so
Afterwards in the even bit library of epicycle shared keyIn look for whether to exist and B1Consistent value, and if it exists, then find out with
Corresponding (Knew, ID), calculate B`=Cro (r, Knew) andVerify B`, C`
It is whether equal with B, C, if equal, step 5 is carried out, otherwise termination protocol；If it does not exist, then in last round of shared key
Even bit libraryIn look for whether to exist and B1Consistent value, if it does not exist, then termination protocol；No person find out withRelatively
(the K answeredold, ID), calculate B`=Cro (r, Kold) andVerify B`, C` whether with
B, C is equal, if equal, background data base calculates reader authenticity verification value D, and the value of D is sent to reader, while more
New key K, otherwise termination protocol；Wherein, K is key, KnewFor the shared key of epicycle, ID is tags unique identifier symbol, and N is
The Mersenne number of selection, N=2L-1, L is the length of key, KoldFor last round of shared key, Cro () is to intersect bit arithmetic to calculate
Method.
2. according to the method described in claim 1, it is characterized by: random number r and all labels and reader in step 1)
Shared identifier UID carries out XOR operation and obtains
3. according to the method described in claim 1, it is characterized by: the more new key in step 4) is carried out by following rule:
(1) if B1WithValue in library is consistent, then background data base more new key is as follows:
Kold=Knew；Knew=[Knew 2mod N]L；
(2) if B1WithValue in library is consistent, then back-end data library key does not need to update；
Wherein,For the even bit of epicycle shared key,For the even bit of last round of shared key.
4. according to the method described in claim 1, it is characterized by: the realization process of step 5) are as follows: reader receives rear number of units
After the information D sent according to library, label is forwarded that information at once, and label calculates D`=Cro (r, [K2mod N]L), it tests
Whether equal with D demonstrate,prove D`, if equal, more new key is K=[K2mod N]L, authenticate successfully；Otherwise illustrate that reader is to forge
, authentification failure.
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| CN112364339B (en) * | 2020-08-21 | 2022-07-12 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | Improved safe lightweight RFID authentication method |
| CN112636919B (en) * | 2020-12-08 | 2022-10-18 | 上海师范大学 | Safety analysis and verification method for NLSR (non-line-scanning) safety model of BAN-n logic |
| CN112487839B (en) * | 2020-12-15 | 2022-09-20 | 重庆西南集成电路设计有限责任公司 | Anti-copy RFID safety system |
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| KR100834714B1 (en) * | 2007-04-12 | 2008-06-02 | 경북대학교 산학협력단 | Authentication method in radio frequency identification system, and system thereof |
| US8359480B2 (en) * | 2008-12-19 | 2013-01-22 | University Of Washington | Scalable RFID systems: a privacy preserving protocol with constant-time identification |
| FR2998075A1 (en) * | 2012-11-12 | 2014-05-16 | France Telecom | METHOD FOR MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION BETWEEN A RADIO LABEL AND A READER |
| CN103338110B (en) * | 2013-06-19 | 2016-08-10 | 广东工业大学 | RFID safety authentication based on dynamic I D band search key |
| CN105530263B (en) * | 2016-01-08 | 2018-06-12 | 广东工业大学 | A kind of extra lightweight RFID mutual authentication methods based on tag ID |
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