CN106209360A - A kind of authentication identifying method of wildcard based on the close algorithm of state - Google Patents

A kind of authentication identifying method of wildcard based on the close algorithm of state Download PDF

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Publication number
CN106209360A
CN106209360A CN201610582210.5A CN201610582210A CN106209360A CN 106209360 A CN106209360 A CN 106209360A CN 201610582210 A CN201610582210 A CN 201610582210A CN 106209360 A CN106209360 A CN 106209360A
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China
Prior art keywords
skeyid
key
hash
cky
state
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CN201610582210.5A
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Chinese (zh)
Inventor
林晨
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Anhui Province Postal Communication Electricity Ltd Co
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Anhui Province Postal Communication Electricity Ltd Co
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Priority to CN201610582210.5A priority Critical patent/CN106209360A/en
Publication of CN106209360A publication Critical patent/CN106209360A/en
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

The present invention relates to a kind of encryption method, particularly relate to a kind of use state close algorithm when being IPSEC VPN, the method using wildcard based on the close algorithm of state.The present invention can realize a kind of identity of wildcard based on the close algorithm of state simple, that be prone to dispose in IPSEC VPN and differentiate, particularly in some do not possess the mininet disposing state's close CA system, can completely uses the close algorithm of state to dispose IPSEC VPN.

Description

A kind of authentication identifying method of wildcard based on the close algorithm of state
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of encryption method, particularly relate to the identity mirror of a kind of wildcard based on the close algorithm of state Other method.
Technical background
National Administration for the Protection of State Secrets is in the consideration to communication security at present, has issued the close algorithm of a series of state, including symmetry algorithm SM1 and SM4, asymmetric arithmetic SM2, cryptographic Hash algorithm SM3, it is respectively used to substitute the AES/ that in international standard, the U.S. proposes 3DES, RSA, SHA-1/MD5 scheduling algorithm.Close office of state also proposed and supports the digital certificate of the close algorithm of state, CA system, IPSec The Chinese password industry standard of VPN etc..
In international standard ipsec protocol, use IKE protocol negotiation, support wildcard and two kinds of identity of digital certificate Identification method.Wildcard identity identification method uses fairly simple, and both sides each arrange a same challenge conduct Wildcard, is used for characterizing both sides' identity；Digital certificate mode needs to rely on CA system, makes both sides and characterizes the numeral of identity Certificate.
In the IPSec VPN China-styled Certain Industry Field standard of the close algorithm of state, only describe and use digital certificate to differentiate as identity Method, and digital certificate identity identification method depends on state's close algorithm CA system.Do not possess at some and dispose the small-sized of CA system In network, then when can only use wildcard mode.And wildcard mode is built upon Diffie-Hellman key On the basis of exchange algorithm, this algorithm is not belonging to the close algorithm of state, and then the IPSEC VPN under the system of the close algorithm of state realizes In mode, lack a kind of wildcard authentication identifying method.
Summary of the invention
The purpose of the present invention be exactly realize a kind of simple, be prone to the body of the wildcard based on the close algorithm of state disposed Part discrimination method.
In order to solve above-mentioned technical problem, the present invention is addressed by following technical proposals:
The authentication identifying method of a kind of wildcard based on the close algorithm of state, comprises the following steps:
Step 1: what a wildcard PSK communicating pair promoter A and respondent B arranges in advance；
Step 2: communicating pair uses IKE agreement to carry out security negotiation, key exchange, and algorithm uses the close algorithm of state；
Step 3: use holotype to consult in the ike negotiation first stage, in interaction message 1 and message 2, promoter A and respondent B Consult mutually Security Association load SA；
Step 4: promoter A and respondent B respectively produces the random number r of a 128-bitAAnd rB；
Step 5: calculate the point on elliptic curve according to SM2 ellipse curve public key cipher algorithm, promoter A and respondent B respectively RA=[rA] G, RB=[rB]G；
Step 6: in ike negotiation first stage interaction message 3 and message 4, by RAAnd RBAs cipher key exchange payload KE_I and KE_R intercourses, and intercourses Nonce load Ni and Nr；
Step 7: promoter A calculates KA=[rA]RB, respondent B calculates KB=[rB]RA, according to elliptic curve calculations rule: KA= [rA]RB=[rA∙ rB]G=[rB∙ rA]G =[rB]RA=KB, so KA、KBIdentical, as the public keys K(K=K of first stageA =KB)；
Step 8: use wildcard PSK, derive derivative key SKEYID, be used for exchanging authentication data, it is achieved identity is recognized Card:
SKEYID = prf(PSK, Ni_b | Nr_b)
Prf (key, msg) is the hash function that the pseudo-random function of key is typically key, and hash algorithm uses SM3 to calculate Method；
Step 9: calculated for subsequent key as follows:
Derivative key SKEYID_d=prf (SKEYID, K | CKY-I | CKY-R | 0)
Certification key SK EYID_a=prf (SKEYID, SKEYID_d | K | CKY-I | CKY-R | 1)
Encryption key SKEYID_e=prf (SKEYID, SKEYID_a | K | CKY-I | CKY-R | 2)
Step 10: in ike negotiation first stage interaction message 5 and message 6, communicating pair differentiates interaction above, hands over Change authentication data HASH_I and HASH_R.This message use SKEYID_e as symmetric password encryption, algorithm use SM1 or SM4, pattern uses CBC pattern, IV=HASH (rA | rB)
HASH_I = prf(SKEYID, CKY-I | CKY-R | SAi_b | IDii_b )
HASH_R = prf(SKEYID, CKY-R | CKY-I | SAi_b | IDir_b )
Step 11: so far, the IKE first stage consults, uses and differentiate based on state's close algorithm wildcard identity, follow-up according to state The step that close algorithm standard rules specifies carries out the negotiation of second stage.
Due to the fact that and have employed above technical scheme that there is significant technique effect:
The present invention is based on this method, it is possible to realize in IPSEC VPN a kind of simple, be prone to dispose based on the close algorithm of state The authentication identifying method of wildcard, particularly in some do not possess the mininet disposing state's close CA system, can be complete The whole close algorithm of use state disposes IPSEC VPN.
Accompanying drawing illustrates:
In order to be illustrated more clearly that the embodiment of the present invention or technical scheme of the prior art, below will be to embodiment or existing skill During art describes, required accompanying drawing is briefly described.
Fig. 1 is the network topological diagram of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is the ike negotiation first stage, when using holotype, and the negotiation of wildcard authentication based on the close algorithm of state Process；
Fig. 3 is the ike negotiation first stage, when using aggressive mode, and the association of wildcard authentication based on the close algorithm of state Business's process.
Detailed description of the invention:
Below in conjunction with embodiment, the present invention is described in further detail, and following example are explanation of the invention and this Bright it is not limited to following example.
Embodiment 1:
Present system form, as it is shown in figure 1, the network being made up of with router B router A, router A and router B it Between set up IPSEC tunnel, use the exchange of IKE protocol negotiation Security Association, key, algorithm uses the close algorithm of state, IKE first stage Use holotype.
The authentication identifying method of a kind of wildcard based on the close algorithm of state, comprises the following steps:
Step 1: what a wildcard PSK communicating pair promoter A and respondent B arranges in advance；
Step 2: communicating pair uses IKE agreement to carry out security negotiation, key exchange, and algorithm uses the close algorithm of state；
Step 3: in the interaction message 1 and message 2 of ike negotiation first stage, promoter A and respondent B consults mutually one Security Association load SA；
Step 4: promoter A and respondent B respectively produces the random number r of a 128-bitAAnd rB, such as
rA = 3945208F 7B2144B1 3F36E38A C6D39F95 88939369 2860B51A 42FB81EF 4DF7C5B8
rB= 59276E27 D506861A 16680F3A D9C02DCC EF3CC1FA 3CDBE4CE 6D54B80D EAC1BC21
Step 5: calculate the point on elliptic curve according to SM2 ellipse curve public key cipher algorithm, promoter A and respondent B respectively RA=[rA] G, RB=[rB] G, such as
RA = 09F9DF31 1E5421A1 50DD7D16 1E4BC5C6 72179FAD 1833FC07 6BB08FF3 56F35020
CCEA490C E26775A5 2DC6EA71 8CC1AA60 0AED05FB F35E084A 6632F607 2DA9AD13
RB = 04EBFC71 8E8D1798 62043226 8E77FEB6 415E2EDE 0E073C0F 4F640ECD 2E149A73
E858F9D8 1E5430A5 7B36DAAB 8F950A3C 64E6EE6A 63094D99 283AFF76 7E124DF0
Step 6: in ike negotiation first stage interaction message 3 and message 4, by RAAnd RBAs cipher key exchange payload KE_I and KE_R intercourses, and intercourses Nonce load Ni and Nr；
Step 7: promoter A calculates KA=[rA]RB, respondent B calculates KB=[rB]RA, according to elliptic curve calculations rule: KA= [rA]RB=[rA∙ rB]G=[rB∙ rA]G =[rB]RA=KB, so KA、KBIdentical, as the public keys K(K=K of first stageA =KB), such as
KA = 335E18D7 51E51F04 0E27D468 138B7AB1 DC86AD7F 981D7D41 6222FD6A B3ED230D
AB743EBC FB22D64F 7B6AB791 F70658F2 5B48FA93 E54064FD BFBED3F0 BD847AC9
KB = 335E18D7 51E51F04 0E27D468 138B7AB1 DC86AD7F 981D7D41 6222FD6A B3ED230D
AB743EBC FB22D64F 7B6AB791 F70658F2 5B48FA93 E54064FD BFBED3F0 BD847AC9
Result of calculation also demonstrates KA=KB；
Step 8: use wildcard PSK, derive derivative key SKEYID, be used for exchanging authentication data, it is achieved identity is recognized Card:
SKEYID = prf(PSK, Ni_b | Nr_b)
Prf (key, msg) is the hash function that the pseudo-random function of key is typically key, and hash algorithm uses SM3 to calculate Method；
Step 9: calculated for subsequent key as follows:
Derivative key SKEYID_d=prf (SKEYID, K | CKY-I | CKY-R | 0)
Certification key SK EYID_a=prf (SKEYID, SKEYID_d | K | CKY-I | CKY-R | 1)
Encryption key SKEYID_e=prf (SKEYID, SKEYID_a | K | CKY-I | CKY-R | 2)
Step 10: in ike negotiation first stage interaction message 5 and message 6, communicating pair differentiates interaction above, hands over Change authentication data HASH_I and HASH_R.This message use SKEYID_e as symmetric password encryption, algorithm use SM1 or SM4, pattern uses CBC pattern, IV=HASH (rA | rB)
HASH_I = prf(SKEYID, CKY-I | CKY-R | SAi_b | IDii_b )
HASH_R = prf(SKEYID, CKY-R | CKY-I | SAi_b | IDir_b )
Step 11: so far, the IKE first stage consults, uses and differentiate based on state's close algorithm wildcard identity, follow-up according to state The step that close algorithm standard rules specifies carries out the negotiation of second stage.
Use after the inventive method, it is possible to realize in IPSEC VPN a kind of simple, be prone to dispose based on the close calculation of state The authentication identifying method of the wildcard of method, particularly in some do not possess the mininet disposing state's close CA system, energy The complete close algorithm of use state disposes IPSEC VPN.
Embodiment 2:
Present system form, as it is shown in figure 1, the network being made up of with router B router A, router A and router B it Between set up IPSEC tunnel, use the exchange of IKE protocol negotiation Security Association, key, algorithm uses the close algorithm of state, with embodiment 1 base This is identical, except that the IKE first stage uses aggressive mode.
When using aggressive mode to consult, it is characterised in that comprise the following steps::
Step 1: promoter A sends SA, KE, Ni load, and wherein KE generates method with the generation method in embodiment 1；
Step 2: respondent B sends SA, KE, Nr, HASH_R load, and wherein KE generates method, wildcard PSK derives and spreads out The method of raw key SK EYID, and HASH_R computational methods are with the generation method in embodiment 1；
Step 3: promoter A sends HASH_I load, the method that wherein wildcard PSK derives derivative key SKEYID, And HASH_I computational methods are with the generation method in embodiment 1.

Claims (4)

1. the authentication identifying method of a wildcard based on the close algorithm of state, it is characterised in that comprise the following steps:
Step 1: what a wildcard PSK communicating pair promoter A and respondent B arranges in advance；
Step 2: communicating pair uses IKE agreement to carry out security negotiation, key exchange, and algorithm uses the close algorithm of state；
Step 3: use holotype to consult in the ike negotiation first stage, in interaction message 1 and message 2, promoter A and respondent B Consult mutually Security Association load SA；
Step 4: promoter A and respondent B respectively produces the random number r of a 128-bitAAnd rB；
Step 5: calculate the some R on elliptic curve according to SM2 ellipse curve public key cipher algorithm, promoter A and respondent B respectivelyA =[rA] G, RB=[rB]G；
Step 6: in ike negotiation first stage interaction message 3 and message 4, by RAAnd RBAs cipher key exchange payload KE_I and KE_R intercourses, and intercourses Nonce load Ni and Nr；
Step 7: promoter A calculates KA=[rA]RB, respondent B calculates KB=[rB]RA, according to elliptic curve calculations rule: KA=[rA] RB=[rA∙ rB]G=[rB∙ rA]G =[rB]RA=KB, so KA、KBIdentical, as the public keys K(K=K of first stageA= KB)；
Step 8: use wildcard PSK, derive derivative key SKEYID, be used for exchanging authentication data, it is achieved identity is recognized Card:
SKEYID = prf(PSK, Ni_b | Nr_b)
Prf (key, msg) is the hash function that the pseudo-random function of key is typically key, and hash algorithm uses SM3 to calculate Method；
Step 9: calculated for subsequent key as follows:
Derivative key SKEYID_d=prf (SKEYID, K | CKY-I | CKY-R | 0)
Certification key SK EYID_a=prf (SKEYID, SKEYID_d | K | CKY-I | CKY-R | 1)
Encryption key SKEYID_e=prf (SKEYID, SKEYID_a | K | CKY-I | CKY-R | 2)
Step 10: in ike negotiation first stage interaction message 5 and message 6, communicating pair differentiates interaction above, hands over Change authentication data HASH_I and HASH_R.
2. this message uses SKEYID_e to use SM1 or SM4 as symmetric password encryption, algorithm, and pattern uses CBC pattern, IV=HASH(rA | rB)
HASH_I = prf(SKEYID, CKY-I | CKY-R | SAi_b | IDii_b )
HASH_R = prf(SKEYID, CKY-R | CKY-I | SAi_b | IDir_b )
Step 11: so far, the IKE first stage consults, uses and differentiate based on state's close algorithm wildcard identity, follow-up according to state The step that close algorithm standard rules specifies carries out the negotiation of second stage.
A kind of authentication identifying method of wildcard based on the close algorithm of state, first stage IKE Consult to use holotype, need mutual 6 interaction messages to complete, it is characterised in that: aggressive mode can also be used to consult, 3 interaction messages are needed to complete.
4., when using aggressive mode to consult, comprise the following steps::
Step 1: promoter A sends SA, KE, Ni load, and wherein KE generates method with the generation method in claim 1；
Step 2: respondent B sends SA, KE, Nr, HASH_R load, and wherein KE generates method, wildcard PSK derives and spreads out The method of raw key SK EYID, and HASH_R computational methods are with the generation method in claim 1；
Step 3: promoter A sends HASH_I load, the method that wherein wildcard PSK derives derivative key SKEYID, And HASH_I computational methods are with the generation method in claim 1.
CN201610582210.5A 2016-07-22 2016-07-22 A kind of authentication identifying method of wildcard based on the close algorithm of state Pending CN106209360A (en)

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CN107171786A (en) * 2017-05-19 2017-09-15 成都极玩网络技术有限公司 Network agent account control method
CN107493169A (en) * 2017-09-26 2017-12-19 安徽皖通邮电股份有限公司 A kind of authentication identifying method based on quantum key and national secret algorithm
CN108696518A (en) * 2018-05-09 2018-10-23 深圳壹账通智能科技有限公司 User's communication encrypting method, device, terminal device and storage medium on block chain
CN108829725A (en) * 2018-05-09 2018-11-16 深圳壹账通智能科技有限公司 User communication method, device, terminal device and storage medium on block chain
CN109274663A (en) * 2018-09-07 2019-01-25 西安莫贝克半导体科技有限公司 Communication means based on SM2 dynamic key exchange and SM4 data encryption
CN109547209A (en) * 2018-11-19 2019-03-29 北京大学 A kind of two side's SM2 digital signature generation methods
WO2019214070A1 (en) * 2018-05-09 2019-11-14 深圳壹账通智能科技有限公司 Encryption method for user communication on block chain, apparatus, terminal device and storage medium

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CN107171786A (en) * 2017-05-19 2017-09-15 成都极玩网络技术有限公司 Network agent account control method
CN107493169A (en) * 2017-09-26 2017-12-19 安徽皖通邮电股份有限公司 A kind of authentication identifying method based on quantum key and national secret algorithm
CN108696518A (en) * 2018-05-09 2018-10-23 深圳壹账通智能科技有限公司 User's communication encrypting method, device, terminal device and storage medium on block chain
CN108829725A (en) * 2018-05-09 2018-11-16 深圳壹账通智能科技有限公司 User communication method, device, terminal device and storage medium on block chain
WO2019214069A1 (en) * 2018-05-09 2019-11-14 深圳壹账通智能科技有限公司 Method and apparatus for encrypted user communication on blockchain, and terminal device and storage medium
WO2019214070A1 (en) * 2018-05-09 2019-11-14 深圳壹账通智能科技有限公司 Encryption method for user communication on block chain, apparatus, terminal device and storage medium
CN108696518B (en) * 2018-05-09 2020-12-04 深圳壹账通智能科技有限公司 Block chain user communication encryption method and device, terminal equipment and storage medium
CN108829725B (en) * 2018-05-09 2021-06-25 深圳壹账通智能科技有限公司 Block chain user communication method, block chain user communication device, terminal equipment and storage medium
CN109274663A (en) * 2018-09-07 2019-01-25 西安莫贝克半导体科技有限公司 Communication means based on SM2 dynamic key exchange and SM4 data encryption
CN109547209A (en) * 2018-11-19 2019-03-29 北京大学 A kind of two side's SM2 digital signature generation methods

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Application publication date: 20161207