CN106162626A - Group communication is eated dishes without rice or wine the methods, devices and systems of security control - Google Patents
Group communication is eated dishes without rice or wine the methods, devices and systems of security control Download PDFInfo
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- CN106162626A CN106162626A CN201510186171.2A CN201510186171A CN106162626A CN 106162626 A CN106162626 A CN 106162626A CN 201510186171 A CN201510186171 A CN 201510186171A CN 106162626 A CN106162626 A CN 106162626A
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Abstract
The present invention proposes to eat dishes without rice or wine in a kind of group communication method of controlling security; including: for each group configuring cipher key; for deriving UE side key and the base station side key of described group; described UE side key is UE side for generating the input key of the key of signaling encryption and data encryption and/or signaling integrity protection, and described base station side key is that base station side is for generating the input key of the key of signaling encryption and data encryption and/or signaling integrity protection；In UE cluster registration process, core net issues the UE side key of described UE place group to described UE；In group call establishment process, described core net issues the base station side key of described group to the eNB at each UE place under described group.The present invention can carry out encryption and decryption with the chain of command of group communication and user face and process and signaling integrity protection, makes cluster group communication safe and reliable.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to trunking communication field, particularly relate to group communication and eat dishes without rice or wine the method for security control, device
And system.
Background technology
Trunked communication system, has become in addition to public mobile communication system vital the most
Personal communication system.The command scheduling being had due to it and emergent feature are (such as one-touch intercommunication, promptly
Calling and many group schedulings etc.), the most including that army, airport, public security, railway and electric power etc. are many
Individual important industry is widely used.
Along with the development of Clustering, trunked communication system develops to Digital Clustering from simulation cluster, arrowband collection
Group is developed to broadband cluster.Wireless wideband multimedia cluster refers to that, based on broadband wireless communication technique, employing is many
Media business form, based on the private wireless communication system of command scheduling function, is called for short broadband cluster.
Along with standardization and the commercialization of LTE, LTE has increasingly becomed broadband connections focus.Utilize
It is also inevitable development trend that LTE system does private network broadband cluster.
At present can only be for the closeest based in usim card of connected state user and unicast service in LTE system
Key is encrypted decryption processing.And the End to End Encryption mentioned in B-TrunC is also just for business datum
It is encrypted, chain of command data is not encrypted.
Summary of the invention
For the problems referred to above, the present invention proposes to eat dishes without rice or wine in a kind of group communication method of controlling security, including:
For each group configuring cipher key, it is used for deriving UE side key and the base station side key of described group, institute
Stating UE side key is that UE side is for generating signaling encryption and data encryption and/or signaling integrity protection
The input key of key, described base station side key be base station side for generate signaling encryption and data encryption and
/ or the input key of key of signaling integrity protection；
In UE cluster registration process, core net issues the UE side key of described UE place group to institute
State UE；
In group call establishment process, described core net issues the base station side key of described group under described group
The eNB at each UE place.
Preferably, also including: in group call establishment process, described core net also issues the Group of described group
Id, NAS layer AES and signaling protection algorithm integrallty give described eNB；Described eNB issues AS
Layer AES, NAS layer AES and signaling protection algorithm integrallty give the UE of described group；Described
After the UE of group receives, derive NAS layer key and AS layer key, and activate NAS layer safe machine
System and AS layer security mechanism.Further, described NAS layer security mechanism and AS layer security mechanism are swashed
After work, the RRC information that described eNB issues carries out AS encryption and integrity protection, the NAS wherein comprised
Message carries out NAS layer encryption and integrity protection；Described UE receives the group of encryption of eating dishes without rice or wine and exhales data.
Preferably, described UE side key be permanent key Group K, intermediate key Group KASMEOr
Intermediate key Group CK/Group IK, described base station side key is Group KeNB.Further, when
When described UE side key is permanent key Group K, described core net also issues for generating signaling encryption
And the random parameter RAND of the key of data encryption and/or signaling integrity protection and authentication token
AUTN.When described UE side key is intermediate key Group CK/Group IK, described core net is also
Issue for generating signaling encryption and the authentication token of key of data encryption and/or signaling integrity protection
AUTN；Further, described core net also issues random parameter RAND, for UE side to core net
Carry out legitimacy certification.
Based on identical design, the present invention also proposes a kind of core-network side device for said method, including:
Configuration module, for for each group configuring cipher key, described key is close for the UE side deriving described group
Key and base station side key；Issue module, in UE cluster registration process, issue described UE place
The UE side key of group gives described UE；In group call establishment process, the base station side issuing described group is close
Key, Group Id, NAS layer AES of described group and signaling protection algorithm integrallty give described group
Under the eNB at each UE place.
Further, when described UE side key is permanent key Group K, described in issue module also under
Hair is in the random parameter RAND of the key generating signaling encryption, data encryption and/or signaling integrity protection
With authentication token AUTN.When described UE side key is intermediate key Group CK/Group IK, institute
State and issue module and also issue for generating the close of signaling encryption and data encryption and/or signaling integrity protection
The authentication token AUTN of key.
Based on identical design, the present invention also proposes a kind of eNB device for said method, including:
Receiver module, for receiving the base station side key of the described group that core-network side issues in group call establishment process
Group Id, NAS layer AES and signaling protection algorithm integrallty with described group；Issue module,
Protect for issuing AS layer AES, NAS layer AES and signaling integrity in group call establishment process
Protect the algorithm UE to described group；Secure processing module, for exhaling NAS layer security mechanism and AS in group
After layer security mechanism is activated, the RRC information issued is carried out AS encryption and integrity protection, to it
In the NAS message that comprises carry out NAS layer encryption and integrity protection.
Based on identical design, the present invention also proposes a kind of UE device for said method, including: connect
Receive module, for receiving the UE side key of its place group that network side issues in cluster registration process；
AS layer AES, NAS layer AES and the signaling that network side issues is received in group call establishment process
Protection algorithm integrallty；Safety management module, is used for deriving NAS layer key and AS layer key, activates
NAS layer security mechanism and AS layer security mechanism；Deciphering module, in described NAS layer security mechanism
After being activated with AS layer security mechanism, data are exhaled to be decrypted process the group of the encryption of eating dishes without rice or wine received.
Finally, the present invention proposes a kind of system for said method, fills including core-network side as above
Put, eNB device and UE device.
The present invention has all carried out encrypting and decrypting process to chain of command and the user face of group communication, makes group communication
Safe and reliable.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Accompanying drawing in describing below is some embodiments of the present invention, comes for those of ordinary skill in the art
Say, on the premise of not paying creative work, it is also possible to obtain other accompanying drawing according to these accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 is that the group communication of the embodiment of the present invention 1 is eated dishes without rice or wine security control signaling process figure；
Fig. 2 is that the group communication of the embodiment of the present invention 2 is eated dishes without rice or wine security control signaling process figure；
Fig. 3 is that the group communication of the embodiment of the present invention 3 is eated dishes without rice or wine security control signaling process figure；
Fig. 4 is the core-network side apparatus function structural representation that the present invention proposes；
Fig. 5 is the eNB apparatus function structural representation that the present invention proposes；
Fig. 6 is the UE apparatus function structural representation that the present invention proposes.
Detailed description of the invention
For making the purpose of the embodiment of the present invention, technical scheme and advantage clearer, below in conjunction with the present invention
Accompanying drawing in embodiment, is clearly and completely described the technical scheme in the embodiment of the present invention, it is clear that
Described embodiment is a part of embodiment of the present invention rather than whole embodiments；It should be noted that
In the case of not conflicting, the embodiment in the application and the feature in embodiment can be mutually combined.Based on
Embodiment in the present invention, those of ordinary skill in the art are obtained under not making creative work premise
Every other embodiment, broadly fall into the scope of protection of the invention.
The present invention proposes method of controlling security of eating dishes without rice or wine in a kind of group communication, including:
For each group configuring cipher key, it is used for deriving UE side key and the base station side key of described group；Institute
Stating UE side key is that UE side is for generating signaling encryption and data encryption and/or signaling integrity protection
The input key of key, described base station side key be base station side for generate signaling encryption, data encryption and/
Or the input key of the key of signaling integrity protection；
In UE cluster registration process, described core net issues the UE side key of described UE place group
To described UE；
In group call establishment process, described core net issues the base station side key of described group under described group
The eNB at each UE place.
Further, in group call establishment process, described core net also issue described group Group Id,
NAS layer AES and signaling protection algorithm integrallty give described eNB；Described eNB issues AS layer and adds
Close algorithm, NAS layer AES and signaling protection algorithm integrallty give the UE of described group；Described group
UE receive after, derive NAS layer key and AS layer key, and activate NAS layer security mechanism and
AS layer security mechanism.
After described NAS layer security mechanism and AS layer security mechanism are activated, the RRC that described eNB issues
Message carries out AS encryption and integrity protection, and the NAS message wherein comprised carries out the encryption of NAS layer with complete
Whole property is protected；Described UE receives the group of encryption of eating dishes without rice or wine and exhales data.
Wherein, UE side key can be permanent key Group K or intermediate key Group KASME,
Can also be intermediate key Group CK/Group IK；Base station side key is Group KeNB。
Below, as a example by B-TrunC system, the method proposing the present invention is described in detail.
Embodiment 1:UE side key is cluster multi call process during permanent key Group K.
As the permanent key Group K that UE side key is this group of group, described core net also issues
For generate the key of signaling encryption, data encryption and/or signaling integrity protection random parameter RAND and
Authentication token AUTN.The eat dishes without rice or wine signaling process of security control of the group communication of this situation refer to accompanying drawing 1,
Detailed process is as follows:
UE attachment network also enters RRC connection status；
UE initiates cluster registration process；Core-network side (such as MME) accepts message in cluster registration
The UE side carrying group Group Id and correspondence thereof inside TRUNKING REGISTER ACCEPT is close
Key (permanent key Group K).
After the registration of UE cluster, idle state can be entered without business.
When certain UE initiation group service in group:
Core-network side initiates group call establishment process to eNB, and in this process, notice this group of eNB is exhaled
Group ID, base station side key Group KeNB, NAS layer AES and protection algorithm integrallty, and
Random parameter RAND and token AUTN.
ENB carry out group exhale set up time, in clustering paging message, notify that the UE of this group is about AS layer
AES, NAS layer AES and protection algorithm integrallty, and random parameter RAND and token
AUTN。
Each UE is according to receiving permanent key Group K, RAND, AUTN and AES, complete
The information such as property protection algorism derive for data and the encryption key of signaling and close for signaling integrity protection
Key.
So far, AS layer safety and the NAS layer of group communication is activated safely.The RRC that follow-up eNB issues
Message carries out the encryption of AS layer and signaling integrity protection, and the NAS information wherein comprised carries out NAS layer and adds
Close and signaling integrity protection.
In this example, eNB issues and comprises NAS message GROUP CALL SETUP INDICATION
RRC information Groupcallconfig, this RRC information carried out AS encryption and integrity protection, bag
The NAS information contained has carried out the encryption of NAS layer and integrity protection.
The group that UE reception eNB has carried out eating dishes without rice or wine to encrypt exhales data, uses derivative corresponding secret key to carry out message
Deciphering.
Embodiment 2:UE side key is cluster multi call process during intermediate key Group CK/Group IK.
When described UE side key is intermediate key Group CK/Group IK, cluster multi call process and reality
Execute example 1 essentially identical.Being with the difference of embodiment 1, UE side derives signaling encryption and data add
Close key and signaling tegrity protection key are no longer necessary to random parameter RAND, so at group call establishment process
In, core net can not send random parameter RAND.Random parameter RAND, UE side can certainly be issued
Can use this random number that core net is carried out legitimacy certification.The group communication of this situation is eated dishes without rice or wine security control
Signaling process refer to accompanying drawing 2.
Embodiment 3:UE side key is intermediate key Group KASMETime cluster multi call process.
When described UE side, key is intermediate key Group KASMETime, cluster multi call process and embodiment 1
Essentially identical with 2, refer to accompanying drawing 3.Difference is, UE side derives signaling encryption and data add
Random parameter RAND and authentication token AUTN it is no longer necessary to when close key and signaling tegrity protection key,
So in group call establishment process, core net no longer issues AUTN and RAND.
By above-described embodiment it can be seen that the method that the present invention proposes can be to the user face number of cluster multi call
It is encrypted and signaling integrity protection according to control panel signaling, it is ensured that the safety of group communication.
Based on identical design, the present invention also proposes a kind of core-network side device for said method, eNB
Device and UE device.
Core-network side device as shown in Figure 4, including configuration module, for for each group configuring cipher key,
Described key is for deriving UE side key and the base station side key of described group；Issue module, be used for
In UE cluster registration process, issue the UE side key of described UE place group to described UE；Exhale in group
During foundation, issue the base station side key of described group, described group ID, NAS layer AES and
Signaling protection algorithm integrallty gives the eNB at each UE place under described group.
Further, when described UE side key is permanent key Group K, described in issue module also under
Hair is in the random parameter RAND of the key generating signaling encryption, data encryption and/or signaling integrity protection
With authentication token AUTN.
Further, when described UE side key is intermediate key Group CK/Group IK, described under
Send out module and also issue recognizing of key for generating signaling encryption, data encryption and/or signaling integrity protection
Card token AUTN.Further, also issue random parameter RAND, for UE side, core net is carried out
Legitimacy certification.
ENB device is as it is shown in figure 5, include: receiver module, for receiving core in group call establishment process
The net base station side key of described group that issues of side and Group Id, NAS layer AES of described group and
Signaling protection algorithm integrallty；Issue module, for issue in group call establishment process AS layer AES,
NAS layer AES and signaling protection algorithm integrallty give the UE of described group；Secure processing module, uses
In after group exhales NAS layer security mechanism and AS layer security mechanism is activated, the RRC information issued is entered
Row AS encryption and integrity protection, carry out NAS layer encryption and integrity to the NAS message wherein comprised
Protection.
UE device as shown in Figure 6, including:
Receiver module, for receiving the UE side of its place group that network side issues in cluster registration process
Key；AS layer AES, NAS layer AES that network side issues is received in group call establishment process
With signaling protection algorithm integrallty；
Safety management module, is used for deriving NAS layer key and AS layer key, activates NAS layer safe machine
System and AS layer security mechanism；
Deciphering module, for after described NAS layer security mechanism and AS layer security mechanism are activated, right
The group of the encryption of eating dishes without rice or wine received exhales data to be decrypted process.
Finally, the present invention also proposes a kind of system for said method, including: core net as above
Core-network side device, eNB device and UE device.
One of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that: all or part of step realizing said method embodiment can
Completing with the hardware relevant by programmed instruction, aforesaid program can be stored in an embodied on computer readable and deposit
In storage media, this program upon execution, performs to include the step of said method embodiment；And aforesaid storage
Medium includes: the various media that can store program code such as ROM, RAM, magnetic disc or CD.
Last it is noted that above example is only in order to illustrate technical scheme, rather than it is limited
System；Although the present invention being described in detail with reference to previous embodiment, those of ordinary skill in the art
It is understood that the technical scheme described in foregoing embodiments still can be modified by it, or to it
Middle part technical characteristic carries out equivalent；And these amendments or replacement, do not make appropriate technical solution
Essence departs from the spirit and scope of various embodiments of the present invention technical scheme.
Claims (16)
1. a group communication is eated dishes without rice or wine method of controlling security, it is characterised in that including:
For each group configuring cipher key, it is used for deriving UE side key and the base station side key of described group；Institute
Stating UE side key is that UE side is for generating the close of signaling encryption, data encryption and/or signaling integrity protection
The input key of key, described base station side key be base station side for generate signaling encryption, data encryption and/or
The input key of the key of signaling integrity protection；
In UE cluster registration process, described core net issues the UE side key of described UE place group
To described UE；
In group call establishment process, described core net issues the base station side key of described group under described group
The eNB at each UE place.
Method the most according to claim 1, it is characterised in that also include:
In group call establishment process, described core net also issues Group Id, NAS layer encryption of described group
Algorithm and signaling protection algorithm integrallty give described eNB；Described eNB issues AS layer AES and signaling
Protection algorithm integrallty, NAS layer AES and signaling protection algorithm integrallty give the UE of described group；
After the UE of described group receives, derive NAS layer key and AS layer key, and activate NAS
Layer security mechanism and AS layer security mechanism.
Method the most according to claim 2, it is characterised in that also include: described NAS layer safety
Mechanism and after AS layer security mechanism be activated, the RRC information that described eNB issues carry out AS encryption and
Integrity protection, the NAS message wherein comprised carries out NAS layer encryption and integrity protection；Described UE
The group receiving encryption of eating dishes without rice or wine exhales data.
4. according to the method described in claims 1 to 3 any one, it is characterised in that
Described UE side key is permanent key Group K, intermediate key Group KASMEOr intermediate key
Group CK/Group IK；
Described base station side key is Group KeNB。
Method the most according to claim 4, it is characterised in that also include:
When described UE side key is permanent key Group K, described core net also issues for generating letter
The random parameter RAND of the key of order encryption, data encryption and/or signaling integrity protection and authentication token
AUTN。
Method the most according to claim 4, it is characterised in that also include:
When described UE side key is intermediate key Group CK/Group IK, described core net also issues
For generating the authentication token AUTN of the key of signaling encryption, data encryption and/or signaling integrity protection.
Method the most according to claim 6, it is characterised in that also include: described core net also under
Send out random parameter RAND, for UE side, core net is carried out legitimacy certification.
8. according to the method described in claim 1～7 any one, it is characterised in that
In described cluster registration process, described core net passes through TRUNKING REGISTER
ACCEPT message issues described in carrying out；
In described group call establishment process, described eNB carries out institute by TRUNKING PAGING message
State and issue.
Method the most according to claim 8, it is characterised in that also include: described NAS layer safety
After being activated safely with AS layer, described eNB issues and comprises NAS message GROUP CALL SETUP
RRC information GROUPCALLCONFIG of INDICATION gives described UE, described RRC information
Carried out AS encryption and integrity protection, described in the NAS message that comprises carried out NAS layer encryption and complete
Whole property is protected.
10. the core-network side device for method as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that including:
Configuration module, for for each group configuring cipher key, described key is for deriving the UE of described group
Side key and base station side key；
Issue module, in UE cluster registration process, issue the UE side of described UE place group
Key gives described UE；In group call establishment process, issue the base station side key of described group, described group
ID, NAS layer AES and signaling protection algorithm integrallty give the eNB at each UE place under described group.
11. core-network side devices according to claim 10, it is characterised in that when described UE side
When key is permanent key K, described in issue module also issue for generate signaling encryption, data encryption and/
Or the random parameter RAND of the key of signaling integrity protection and authentication token AUTN.
12. core-network side devices according to claim 10, it is characterised in that when described UE side
When key is intermediate key CK/IK, described in issue module also issue for generate signaling encryption, data encryption
And/or the authentication token AUTN of the key of signaling integrity protection.
13. core-network side devices according to claim 12, it is characterised in that described in issue module
Also issue random parameter RAND, for UE side, core net is carried out legitimacy certification.
14. 1 kinds of eNB devices for method the most according to claim 1, it is characterised in that bag
Include:
Receiver module, for receiving the base station side of the described group that core-network side issues in group call establishment process
Key and described group ID, NAS layer AES and signaling protection algorithm integrallty；
Issue module, for issuing AS layer AES and signaling integrity protection in group call establishment process
Algorithm, NAS layer AES and signaling protection algorithm integrallty give the UE of described group；
Secure processing module, is used for after group exhales NAS layer security mechanism and AS layer security mechanism is activated,
The RRC information issued is carried out AS encryption and integrity protection, the NAS message wherein comprised is carried out
The encryption of NAS layer and integrity protection.
15. 1 kinds of UE devices for method as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that including:
Receiver module, for receiving the UE side of its place group that network side issues in cluster registration process
Key；AS layer AES, NAS layer AES that network side issues is received in group call establishment process
With signaling protection algorithm integrallty；
Safety management module, is used for deriving NAS layer key and AS layer key, activates NAS layer safe machine
System and AS layer security mechanism；
Deciphering module, for after described NAS layer security mechanism and AS layer security mechanism are activated, right
The group of the encryption of eating dishes without rice or wine received exhales data to be decrypted process.
16. 1 kinds for realizing the system of method as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that including: as
Core-network side device described in claim 10～13 any one, eNB as claimed in claim 14 fill
Put and UE device as claimed in claim 15.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201510186171.2A CN106162626A (en) | 2015-04-20 | 2015-04-20 | Group communication is eated dishes without rice or wine the methods, devices and systems of security control |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201510186171.2A CN106162626A (en) | 2015-04-20 | 2015-04-20 | Group communication is eated dishes without rice or wine the methods, devices and systems of security control |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN106162626A true CN106162626A (en) | 2016-11-23 |
Family
ID=58058128
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201510186171.2A Withdrawn CN106162626A (en) | 2015-04-20 | 2015-04-20 | Group communication is eated dishes without rice or wine the methods, devices and systems of security control |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
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| CN (1) | CN106162626A (en) |
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| CN108124238A (en) * | 2016-11-28 | 2018-06-05 | 大唐移动通信设备有限公司 | The signal processing method and device of a kind of cluster group |
| CN109729522A (en) * | 2017-10-27 | 2019-05-07 | 普天信息技术有限公司 | Eat dishes without rice or wine encryption method and device under fail soft mode |
| WO2019090515A1 (en) * | 2017-11-08 | 2019-05-16 | Oppo广东移动通信有限公司 | Integrity protection control method, network device and computer storage medium |
| WO2020063540A1 (en) * | 2018-09-28 | 2020-04-02 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method for secure communication, and method and apparatus for determining encryption information |
| CN112564894A (en) * | 2020-11-11 | 2021-03-26 | 杭州浙程科技有限公司 | Method for unlocking passive lock by intelligent key dynamic secret key |
| CN112954610A (en) * | 2019-11-22 | 2021-06-11 | 成都鼎桥通信技术有限公司 | Group signaling transmission method and device |
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| CN108124238A (en) * | 2016-11-28 | 2018-06-05 | 大唐移动通信设备有限公司 | The signal processing method and device of a kind of cluster group |
| CN108124238B (en) * | 2016-11-28 | 2020-07-10 | 大唐移动通信设备有限公司 | Method and device for processing signaling of cluster group |
| CN109729522A (en) * | 2017-10-27 | 2019-05-07 | 普天信息技术有限公司 | Eat dishes without rice or wine encryption method and device under fail soft mode |
| WO2019090515A1 (en) * | 2017-11-08 | 2019-05-16 | Oppo广东移动通信有限公司 | Integrity protection control method, network device and computer storage medium |
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| WO2020063540A1 (en) * | 2018-09-28 | 2020-04-02 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method for secure communication, and method and apparatus for determining encryption information |
| CN110972135A (en) * | 2018-09-28 | 2020-04-07 | 华为技术有限公司 | Secure communication method, encrypted information determination method and device |
| CN112954610A (en) * | 2019-11-22 | 2021-06-11 | 成都鼎桥通信技术有限公司 | Group signaling transmission method and device |
| CN112954610B (en) * | 2019-11-22 | 2022-07-26 | 成都鼎桥通信技术有限公司 | Group signaling transmission method and device |
| CN112564894A (en) * | 2020-11-11 | 2021-03-26 | 杭州浙程科技有限公司 | Method for unlocking passive lock by intelligent key dynamic secret key |
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Application publication date: 20161123 |