CN106027254A - Secret key use method for identity card reading terminal in identity card authentication system - Google Patents

Secret key use method for identity card reading terminal in identity card authentication system Download PDF

Info

Publication number
CN106027254A
CN106027254A CN201610041687.2A CN201610041687A CN106027254A CN 106027254 A CN106027254 A CN 106027254A CN 201610041687 A CN201610041687 A CN 201610041687A CN 106027254 A CN106027254 A CN 106027254A
Authority
CN
China
Prior art keywords
key
card
double secret
reading terminal
identity card
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
CN201610041687.2A
Other languages
Chinese (zh)
Other versions
CN106027254B (en
Inventor
李明
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Tendyron Corp
Original Assignee
李明
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 李明 filed Critical 李明
Priority to CN201610041687.2A priority Critical patent/CN106027254B/en
Publication of CN106027254A publication Critical patent/CN106027254A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CN106027254B publication Critical patent/CN106027254B/en
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0807—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using tickets, e.g. Kerberos
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

The invention provides a secret key use method for an identity card reading terminal in an identity card authentication system, and the method comprises the steps that the identity card reading terminal obtains session key request information; the identity card reading terminal encrypts the session key request information through employing an authentication encryption secret key, and obtains first encryption information; the identity card reading terminal carries out the signing of the first encrypted information through employing a secret key of a first secret key pair, and obtains first signature information; the identity card reading terminal enables the first transmission data to be transmitted to a cloud authentication platform; the identity card reading terminal receives second transmission data returned by the cloud authentication platform; the identity card reading terminal obtains a session key; the identity card reading terminal carries out data transmission with the cloud authentication platform through the session key. The identity card reading terminal uses the secret key in the identity card authentication system, thereby guaranteeing the reliability of the secret key in the identity card authentication system, and guaranteeing the safety of identity information in an identity card reading process.

Description

A kind of method that in authentication ids system, identity card card-reading terminal uses key
Technical field
The present invention relates to authentication ids field, particularly relate to identity card card-reading terminal in a kind of authentication ids system and use key Method.
Background technology
In prior art, the identity card reading device of No.2 residence card has an at least two module: card reading module and SAM (Secure Access Module, residence card verifying security control) module.Wherein, the identity card letter that card reading module reads Breath is all ciphertext, and the ciphertext ID card information that card reading module reads could be entered by only residence card verifying safety control module Row deciphering is read to complete identity card, and this residence card verifying safety control module is the special product that the Ministry of Public Security specifies, price Costliness, for cost-effective, the most by residence card verifying safety control module and card reading module reading separately positioned, multiple Card device can share the scheme of a residence card verifying safety control module, in this scheme, how to make key With thus ensure that the safety of identity card reading process is to need badly to solve the technical problem that.
Summary of the invention
It is contemplated that at least solve one of the problems referred to above, key is entered in authentication ids system by identity card card-reading terminal Exercise and use, it is ensured that the reliability of the key in authentication ids system, it is ensured that the peace of identity information in identity card reading process Quan Xing.
Present invention is primarily targeted at and a kind of method that in authentication ids system, identity card card-reading terminal uses key is provided.
For reaching above-mentioned purpose, technical scheme is specifically achieved in that
One aspect of the present invention provides identity card card-reading terminal in a kind of authentication ids system and uses the method for key to include:
Identity card card-reading terminal obtains session key solicited message；Identity card card-reading terminal uses authenticated encryption double secret key session key Solicited message is encrypted and obtains first and add confidential information；Identity card card-reading terminal uses the private key of the first double secret key to add secret letter to first Breath carries out signature and obtains the first signing messages；First transmission data are sent to cloud authentication platform by identity card card-reading terminal, wherein, First transfer data to include less the public key certificate of the second double secret key, the public key certificate of the first double secret key, first add confidential information, One signing messages；Identity card card-reading terminal receives the second transmission data that cloud authentication platform returns, and wherein, second transfers data to Including the public key certificate of the 3rd double secret key, the first encryption session key, the second signing messages less, wherein, the first encryption session is close Key is that cloud authentication platform utilizes the PKI of the second double secret key to be encrypted session key, and the second signing messages is that cloud certification is put down Platform utilizes the private key of the 3rd double secret key to sign the first encryption session key to obtain；Identity card card-reading terminal is close according to the 3rd The public key certificate of key pair obtains the PKI of the 3rd double secret key, and uses the PKI of the 3rd double secret key that the second signing messages is carried out sign test, If sign test result is correct, the first encryption session key is decrypted according to the private key of the second double secret key and obtains by identity card card-reading terminal Session key, and store session key；The identity that identity card card-reading terminal is obtained by session key identity card card-reading terminal Card ciphertext obtains the 3rd transmission data, and sends the 3rd transmission data to cloud authentication platform；Identity card card-reading terminal receives cloud and recognizes The 4th transmission data that card platform sends, and obtain identity card in plain text by session key deciphering the 4th transmission data；Wherein, Four transmission data include that cloud authentication platform utilizes the ciphertext that identity card plain text encryption is obtained by session key, and identity card is recognized for cloud in plain text The deciphering of identity card ciphertext is obtained by card platform.
Additionally, before identity card card-reading terminal obtains session key solicited message, method also includes: identity card card-reading terminal obtains Customer identification information, and obtain the result of customer identification information, if the result is correct, then perform to obtain session key The step of solicited message.Additionally, before identity card card-reading terminal obtains session key solicited message, method also includes: identity card Card-reading terminal also obtains maximum mistake access times and this customer identification information used of this customer identification information used Currently used number of times；Identity card card-reading terminal judges that whether the currently used number of times of this customer identification information used is less than this The maximum mistake access times of the customer identification information of secondary use, the most then perform to obtain the step of session key solicited message.
Obtain first add secret letter additionally, identity card card-reading terminal uses authenticated encryption double secret key session key solicited message to be encrypted Before breath, method also includes: identity card card-reading terminal obtains authenticated encryption key from outside, and wherein, authenticated encryption key is used for The information of queued session key is encrypted.
Obtain first add confidential information additionally, identity card card-reading terminal uses authenticated encryption double secret key session key solicited message to be encrypted Before, method also includes: identity card card-reading terminal obtain this occupation mode information of authenticated encryption key used and this The attribute information of the authenticated encryption key used；Identity card card-reading terminal judges the occupation mode of this authenticated encryption key used Information is the most consistent with the attribute information of authenticated encryption key, if unanimously, then performs identity card card-reading terminal and uses authenticated encryption close Session key solicited message is encrypted and obtains the first step adding confidential information by key.
Obtain first add secret letter additionally, identity card card-reading terminal uses authenticated encryption double secret key session key solicited message to be encrypted Before breath, method also includes: the authenticated encryption key that this is used by identity card card-reading terminal is stored in the peace of identity card card-reading terminal In the RAM of full chip.
Obtain first add secret letter additionally, identity card card-reading terminal uses authenticated encryption double secret key session key solicited message to be encrypted After breath, method also includes: the authenticated encryption key that this is used by identity card card-reading terminal is from the safety of identity card card-reading terminal The RAM of chip removes.
Carry out signature obtain the first A.L.S. additionally, identity card card-reading terminal uses the private key of the first double secret key to add confidential information to first Before breath, method also includes: identity card card-reading terminal is internally generated the first double secret key, and wherein, the first double secret key includes that first is close The private key of key pair and the PKI of the first double secret key；Identity card card-reading terminal obtains the digital certificate server PKI to the first double secret key Carry out digital certificate and sign and issue the public key certificate of the first double secret key that operation generates.
Carry out signature obtain the first A.L.S. additionally, identity card card-reading terminal uses the private key of the first double secret key to add confidential information to first Before breath, method also includes: identity card card-reading terminal obtain this use the first double secret key private key occupation mode information with And obtain the attribute information of the private key of this first double secret key used；Identity card card-reading terminal judges this first key used To the occupation mode information of private key the most consistent with the attribute information of the private key of the first double secret key, if unanimously, then perform identity card Card-reading terminal uses the private key of the first double secret key to add confidential information to first and signs and obtain the step of the first signing messages.
Carry out signature obtain the first A.L.S. additionally, identity card card-reading terminal uses the private key of the first double secret key to add confidential information to first Before breath, method also includes: the private key of the first double secret key that this is used by identity card card-reading terminal is stored in identity card card-reading terminal Safety chip RAM in.
Carry out signature obtain the first A.L.S. additionally, identity card card-reading terminal uses the private key of the first double secret key to add confidential information to first After breath, method also includes: the private key of the first double secret key that this is used by identity card card-reading terminal is from Card Reader identity card Card Reader eventually The RAM of the safety chip of end removes.
Additionally, before the first transmission data are sent to cloud authentication platform by identity card card-reading terminal, method also includes: identity card is read Card terminal inner generates the second double secret key, and the second double secret key includes private key and the PKI of the second double secret key of the second double secret key；Identity Card card-reading terminal acquisition digital certificate server carries out digital certificate and signs and issues the second key that operation generates the PKI of the second double secret key To public key certificate.
Additionally, before identity card card-reading terminal uses the PKI of the 3rd double secret key that the second signing messages is carried out sign test, method is also wrapped Include: obtain the PKI of the occupation mode information of the PKI of this 3rd double secret key used and the 3rd double secret key of this use Attribute information；Identity card card-reading terminal judges occupation mode information and the 3rd double secret key of the PKI of this 3rd double secret key used The attribute information of PKI whether consistent, if unanimously, then use the PKI of the 3rd double secret key that the second signing messages is carried out sign test Operation.
Additionally, before using the PKI of the 3rd double secret key that the second signing messages is carried out sign test, method also includes: identity card Card Reader In the RAM of the safety chip that the PKI of the 3rd double secret key that this is used by terminal is stored in identity card card-reading terminal.
Additionally, after using the PKI of the 3rd double secret key that the second signing messages is carried out sign test, method also includes: identity card Card Reader The PKI of the 3rd double secret key that this is used by terminal is removed from the RAM of the safety chip of Card Reader identity card card-reading terminal.
Additionally, the first encryption session key is decrypted by identity card card-reading terminal according to the private key of the second double secret key, to obtain session close Before key, method also includes: identity card card-reading terminal obtain this use the second double secret key private key occupation mode information with And the attribute information of the private key of this second double secret key used；Identity card card-reading terminal judges this second double secret key used The occupation mode information of private key is the most consistent with the attribute information of the private key of the second double secret key, if unanimously, then performs subsequent operation.
Additionally, the first encryption session key is decrypted by identity card card-reading terminal according to the private key of the second double secret key, to obtain session close Before key, method also includes: the private key of the second double secret key that this is used by identity card card-reading terminal is stored in identity card card-reading terminal Safety chip RAM in.
Additionally, the first encryption session key is decrypted by identity card card-reading terminal according to the private key of the second double secret key, to obtain session close After key, method also includes: the private key of the second double secret key that this is used by identity card card-reading terminal is from Card Reader identity card Card Reader eventually The RAM of the safety chip of end removes.
Additionally, method also includes: the security control condition of safety information is verified by identity card card-reading terminal, if security control Condition by checking, then safety information is updated by identity card card-reading terminal, wherein, safety information include following any one Or its combination in any: authenticated encryption key, the private key of the first double secret key and the public key certificate of the first double secret key, the second double secret key Private key and the public key certificate of the second double secret key and customer identification information.
Additionally, security control condition includes that customer identification information is verified；If security control condition is by checking, then identity card Card Reader Safety information is updated including by terminal: identity card card-reading terminal obtains more newly requested, and receives user and identify checking information, And obtain the result that user is identified checking information, if the result is correct, then identity card card-reading terminal obtains and updates Information, and be updated safety information, wherein, more fresh information includes following any one or its combination in any: new certification Encryption key, the private key of the first new double secret key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key, the private key of the second new double secret key And the public key certificate of the second new double secret key and new customer identification information.
Additionally, security control condition includes signature verification, if security control condition is by checking, then identity card card-reading terminal is to peace Full information is updated including: identity card card-reading terminal receives more fresh information；The most more fresh information includes: update content and profit Update content signed the signing messages obtained with updating private key；Update content includes following any one or its combination in any: New authenticated encryption key, the private key of the first new double secret key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key, the second new key To private key and the public key certificate of the second new double secret key and new customer identification information；Identity card card-reading terminal obtains and updates The renewal PKI that private key is corresponding, utilizes renewal PKI that signing messages is carried out sign test, and after sign test is passed through, enters safety information Row updates.
Additionally, security control condition includes that encryption key is verified；If security control condition is by checking, then identity card card-reading terminal It is updated including to safety information: identity card card-reading terminal receives more fresh information；The most more fresh information includes: utilize encryption close Key is encrypted the ciphertext obtained to update content；Update content includes following any one or its combination in any: new certification adds Decryption key, the private key of the first new double secret key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key, the second new double secret key private key with And the public key certificate of the second new double secret key and new customer identification information；It is corresponding that identity card card-reading terminal obtains encryption key Decruption key, utilizes decruption key to be decrypted ciphertext, and after deciphering completes, is updated safety information.
Additionally, the step being updated safety information includes: identity card card-reading terminal is according to the root certificate of digital certificate server The public key certificate of the first new double secret key is verified, if checking is correct, then the identity card card-reading terminal private to the first double secret key The public key certificate of key and the first double secret key is updated；And/or according to the root certificate of digital certificate server to the second new double secret key Public key certificate verify, if checking is correct, then identity card card-reading terminal is to the private key of the second double secret key and the second double secret key Public key certificate is updated.
The method that in a kind of authentication ids system that the present invention provides, identity card card-reading terminal uses key, by carrying out key Use, it is ensured that the reliability of the key in authentication ids system, it is ensured that the safety of identity information in identity card reading process Property.Further, during the use of key, by key is carried out control of authority, it is achieved that the occupation mode to key Check, it is ensured that the normal use of key.Further, by key being updated operation so that key effective Phase, to after date, has new key to replace old key, ensure again that the safety of identity card reading process.
Accompanying drawing explanation
In order to be illustrated more clearly that the technical scheme of the embodiment of the present invention, the required accompanying drawing used in embodiment being described below It is briefly described, it should be apparent that, the accompanying drawing in describing below is only some embodiments of the present invention, for this area From the point of view of those of ordinary skill, on the premise of not paying creative work, it is also possible to obtain other accompanying drawings according to these accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 be the embodiment of the present invention 1 authentication ids system in identity card card-reading terminal use key schematic flow sheet；
Fig. 2 be the embodiment of the present invention 1 authentication ids system in the structural representation of identity card card-reading terminal；
Fig. 3 be the embodiment of the present invention 1 authentication ids system in the optional structural representation of identity card card-reading terminal.
Detailed description of the invention
Below in conjunction with the accompanying drawing in the embodiment of the present invention, the technical scheme in the embodiment of the present invention is clearly and completely described, Obviously, described embodiment is only a part of embodiment of the present invention rather than whole embodiments.Reality based on the present invention Execute example, the every other embodiment that those of ordinary skill in the art are obtained under not making creative work premise, broadly fall into Protection scope of the present invention.
In describing the invention, it is to be understood that term " " center ", " longitudinally ", " laterally ", " on ", D score, " front ", Orientation or the position relationship of the instruction such as " afterwards ", "left", "right", " vertically ", " level ", " top ", " end ", " interior ", " outward " are base In orientation shown in the drawings or position relationship, it is for only for ease of the description present invention and simplifies description rather than instruction or hint institute The device that refers to or element must have specific orientation, with specific azimuth configuration and operation, therefore it is not intended that to the present invention Restriction.Additionally, term " first ", " second " are only used for describing purpose, and it is not intended that instruction or hint relative importance Or quantity or position.
In describing the invention, it should be noted that unless otherwise clearly defined and limited, term " install ", " being connected ", " connect " and should be interpreted broadly, connect for example, it may be fixing, it is also possible to be to removably connect, or be integrally connected；Permissible It is to be mechanically connected, it is also possible to be electrical connection；Can be to be joined directly together, it is also possible to be indirectly connected to by intermediary, can be two The connection of individual element internal.For the ordinary skill in the art, can understand that above-mentioned term is in the present invention with concrete condition In concrete meaning.
Describe the present invention below in conjunction with drawings and Examples.
Embodiment 1
Present embodiments providing a kind of method that in authentication ids system, identity card card-reading terminal uses key, Fig. 1 is identity card In Verification System identity card card-reading terminal use key schematic flow sheet, as it is shown in figure 1, the method comprise the following steps (S101～ S108):
S101: identity card card-reading terminal obtains session key solicited message；
In prior art, the identity card reading device of No.2 residence card has an at least two module: card reading module and resident ID card verification safety control module.Wherein, the ID card information that card reading module reads is all ciphertext, only resident identification card Checking safety control module could be decrypted identity card to the ciphertext ID card information that card reading module reads and read.
Compared with existing identity card reading device, in the present embodiment, identity card card-reading terminal only includes card reading module and does not includes Residence card verifying safety control module, i.e. need not the identity card cipher-text information to reading and is decrypted, it is only necessary to will read The identity card cipher-text information got sends to cloud authentication platform verifies and deciphers, thus obtains identity card cipher-text information.The most just Being to say, in the present embodiment, this identity card card-reading terminal can be to support the card-reading apparatus of reading identity card information, for by penetrating Frequency identifies and reads second-generation identification card information, and the second-generation identification card information read is sent to cloud authentication platform is carried out by network Certification.In specific implementation process, identity card card-reading terminal can be portable portable terminal device, such as mobile phone, it is also possible to for calculating Machine, such as panel computer, desktop computer, notebook computer etc., be not defined this in an embodiment of the present invention.
In the present embodiment, session key solicited message can include when identity card card-reading terminal communicates with the foundation of cloud authentication platform first, Identity card card-reading terminal is to the solicited message of cloud authentication platform one session key of request, and this information can be an independent request Information, it is also possible to being included in identity card card-reading terminal in the identity card card seeking information that cloud authentication platform sends, this is in the present invention Do not make restriction.
S102: identity card card-reading terminal uses authenticated encryption double secret key session key solicited message to be encrypted to obtain first and add secret letter Breath；
In the present embodiment, authenticated encryption key is for being encrypted session key solicited message, and identity card card-reading terminal uses recognizes Session key solicited message is encrypted by card encryption key, then the session key solicited message transmission after encryption is put down to cloud certification Platform, it is ensured that on the premise of not having session key, session cipher key request information still can be sent out by identity card card-reading terminal safely Deliver to cloud authentication platform.
In specific implementation process, it is preferred that authenticated encryption key is symmetric key, identity card card-reading terminal and cloud authentication platform can All to obtain the authenticated encryption key that identical symmetry algorithm generates.Certainly, authenticated encryption key can also be unsymmetrical key, The public key certificate of authenticated encryption cipher key pair is sent to identity card card-reading terminal by cloud authentication platform, and identity card card-reading terminal utilizes public affairs Key sends after being encrypted information to be encrypted to cloud authentication platform, and cloud authentication platform uses the private key of authenticated encryption cipher key pair The information of identity card card-reading terminal encryption is decrypted.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, identity card card-reading terminal uses before authenticated encryption key, need first from Outside acquisition authenticated encryption key, the authenticated encryption key of acquisition can be directly to obtain authenticated encryption key in plain text, it is also possible to It it is the authenticated encryption key obtaining ciphertext.It is safe to ensure the authenticated encryption key that identity card card-reading terminal obtains, preferably , the authenticated encryption key that identity card card-reading terminal obtains from outside is the authenticated encryption key of encryption, and identity card Card Reader is eventually End obtains the decruption key of the authenticated encryption key for deciphering encryption simultaneously, and uses decruption key close to the authenticated encryption of encryption Key is decrypted and obtains authenticated encryption key.
In specific implementation process, the encryption equipment outside identity card card-reading terminal produces authenticated encryption key, and by the certification of encryption Encryption key imports to, in identity card card-reading terminal, import identity card card-reading terminal by the way of ciphertext, prevents identity card Card Reader Terminal authenticated encryption key during obtaining authenticated encryption key is tampered, thus ensure that identity card card-reading terminal obtains The process of authenticated encryption key is reliable.Additionally, for the safety ensureing authenticated encryption key, each identity card Card Reader is eventually The authenticated encryption key of end all produces in encryption equipment internal random, reduces the dependency between authenticated encryption key, prevents certain The authenticated encryption key of identity card card-reading terminal, by after Brute Force, jeopardizes other identity card card-reading terminal.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, identity card card-reading terminal obtains the authenticated encryption key for deciphering encryption Decruption key can be to use at least one of following two mode:
A1: identity card card-reading terminal and encryption equipment shift to an earlier date consulting session key, and utilize session key encryption and decryption to obtain authenticated encryption Key.Such as, encryption equipment generates session key in advance and session key utilizes public affairs in identity card card-reading terminal certificate in advance Key is sent to identity card card-reading terminal after being encrypted, encryption equipment also utilizes session key to be encrypted by authenticated encryption key simultaneously After be sent to identity card card-reading terminal, identity card card-reading terminal can utilize the private key corresponding with certificate to decrypt session key, and Session key is utilized to decipher access authentication encryption key；
A2: identity card card-reading terminal and encryption equipment employing asymmetric arithmetic carry out encryption and decryption and obtain authenticated encryption key, such as identity Card card-reading terminal generates double secret key, and is sent by public key certificate to encryption equipment, and encryption equipment uses the PKI of cipher key pair to add certification Decryption key is encrypted and the authenticated encryption key of encryption is imported identity card card-reading terminal, and identity card card-reading terminal uses this key To the authenticated encryption key of private key pair encryption be decrypted, thus obtain authenticated encryption key.
The mode of the decruption key that above two obtains the authenticated encryption key for deciphering encryption can ensure that identity card Card Reader is eventually It is reliable that end obtains the process of authenticated encryption key.
S103: identity card card-reading terminal uses the private key of the first double secret key to add confidential information to first to carry out signature and obtain the first A.L.S. Breath；
In the present embodiment, the first double secret key is unsymmetrical key pair, wherein, the first double secret key include the first double secret key PKI and The private key of the first double secret key.The PKI of the first double secret key be sign test key, private key be signature key.In specific implementation process, the The private key of one double secret key adds confidential information sign for identity card card-reading terminal is sent to the first of cloud authentication platform, and first is close The PKI of key pair carries out corresponding sign test for cloud authentication platform, it is achieved thereby that the body that cloud authentication platform is to identity card card-reading terminal Part is verified.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, before identity card card-reading terminal uses the private key of the first double secret key, need First obtain the first double secret key.In specific implementation process, it can be that identity card Card Reader is whole that identity card card-reading terminal obtains the first double secret key End obtains the first double secret key from outside, it is also possible to be that identity card card-reading terminal is internally generated the first double secret key.In order to ensure identity card The first double secret key that card-reading terminal obtains is safe, it is preferred that identity card card-reading terminal is internally generated the first double secret key.Pass through The optional embodiment of the present embodiment, owing to identity card card-reading terminal is internally generated the first double secret key, the private key of the first double secret key is not Can derive, the PKI of the first double secret key can carry and export in public key certificate, by using identity card card-reading terminal to be internally generated Mode so that private key can not be revealed, it is ensured that the safety of the first double secret key.
First transmission data are sent to cloud authentication platform by S104: identity card card-reading terminal, and wherein, first transfers data to few bag Include the public key certificate of the second double secret key, the public key certificate of the first double secret key, first add confidential information, the first signing messages；
In the present embodiment, the second double secret key is unsymmetrical key pair, wherein, the second double secret key include the second double secret key PKI and The private key of the second double secret key.The PKI of the second double secret key be encryption key, private key be decruption key.In specific implementation process, the The information being sent to identity card card-reading terminal is encrypted by the PKI of two double secret key for cloud authentication platform, the second double secret key Private key is deciphered accordingly for identity card card-reading terminal, thus ensure that the data of cloud authentication platform and identity card card-reading terminal Transmitting procedure is safe.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, the first transmission data are sent to cloud authentication platform by identity card card-reading terminal Before, need first to obtain the second double secret key.In specific implementation process, it can be body that identity card card-reading terminal obtains the second double secret key Part card card-reading terminal obtains the second double secret key from outside, it is also possible to be that identity card card-reading terminal is internally generated the second double secret key.In order to Ensure that the second double secret key that identity card card-reading terminal obtains is safe, it is preferred that it is close that identity card card-reading terminal is internally generated second Key pair.By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment, owing to identity card card-reading terminal is internally generated the second double secret key, the second key To private key can not derive, the PKI of the second double secret key can carry and export in public key certificate, by using identity card Card Reader eventually The mode that end is internally generated so that private key can not be revealed, it is ensured that the safety of the second double secret key.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, the first transmission data are sent to cloud authentication platform by identity card card-reading terminal Before, need first to obtain the public key certificate of the first double secret key.In specific implementation process, the certificate that identity card card-reading terminal obtains is all Being signed and issued by digital certificate server, digital certificate server is usually certificate visa-granting office, and certificate visa-granting office is according to label The information of card office, the public key information of user, the signature of authority office and effect duration etc. generate the public key certificate of user.
In specific implementation process, if identity card card-reading terminal is internally generated the first double secret key, identity card card-reading terminal obtains first During the public key certificate of double secret key, identity card card-reading terminal needs to send to digital certificate server, number the PKI of the first double secret key Word certificate server is right according to information, the public key information of the first double secret key, the signature of authority office and the effect duration etc. of visa-granting office The PKI of described first double secret key carries out digital certificate and signs and issues the public key certificate of operation generation the first double secret key, and by the first double secret key Public key certificate send to identity card card-reading terminal；If identity card card-reading terminal obtains the first double secret key from outside, then obtaining Also the public key certificate of the first double secret key generated is obtained while taking.
By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment, identity card card-reading terminal is by obtaining the public key certificate of the first double secret key, permissible The public key certificate of the first double secret key is sent to recipient so that cloud authentication platform uses the PKI of the first double secret key to receiving Information carries out sign test, so that cloud authentication platform confirms the identity of identity card card-reading terminal.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, the first transmission data are sent to cloud authentication platform by identity card card-reading terminal Before, need first to obtain the public key certificate of the second double secret key.In specific implementation process, identity card card-reading terminal obtains certificate and is all Being obtained by digital certificate server, digital certificate server is usually certificate visa-granting office, and certificate visa-granting office is according to visa The information of office, the public key information of user, the signature of authority office and effect duration etc. generate the public key certificate of user.
In specific implementation process, if identity card card-reading terminal is internally generated the second double secret key, therefore, identity card card-reading terminal obtains When taking the public key certificate of the second double secret key, identity card card-reading terminal needs to send to digital certificate service the PKI of the second double secret key Device, digital certificate server is according to the information of visa-granting office, the public key information of the second double secret key, the signature of authority office and effectively Phases etc. carry out digital certificate and sign and issue the public key certificate of operation described second double secret key of generation the PKI of described second double secret key, and will The public key certificate of the second double secret key sends to identity card card-reading terminal；If identity card card-reading terminal obtains the second double secret key from outside, While obtaining, so also obtain the public key certificate of the second double secret key generated.
By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment, identity card card-reading terminal is by obtaining the public key certificate of the second double secret key, permissible The public key certificate of the second double secret key is sent to cloud authentication platform so that cloud authentication platform uses the PKI of the second double secret key to pending The information giving identity card card-reading terminal is encrypted, so that the information that identity card card-reading terminal receives is to be passed by safety Defeated receive, it is ensured that the information that identity card card-reading terminal receives is safe.
S105: identity card card-reading terminal receives the second transmission data that cloud authentication platform sends, and wherein, second transfers data to less Public key certificate, the first encryption session key, the second signing messages including the 3rd double secret key；
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, the second transmission data are sent to identity card card-reading terminal by cloud authentication platform, Need first to obtain the public key certificate of the 3rd double secret key.In specific implementation process, it is all to be demonstrate,proved by numeral that cloud authentication platform obtains certificate Book server obtains, and digital certificate server is usually certificate visa-granting office, certificate visa-granting office according to the information of visa-granting office, The public key information of user, the signature of authority office and effect duration etc. generate the public key certificate of user.
In specific implementation process, if cloud authentication platform is internally generated the 3rd double secret key, cloud authentication platform obtains the 3rd double secret key During public key certificate, cloud authentication platform needs to send to digital certificate server, digital certificate server the PKI of the 3rd double secret key Information, the public key information of the 3rd double secret key, the signature of authority office and effect duration etc. according to visa-granting office are to described 3rd key To PKI carry out digital certificate and sign and issue operation and generate the public key certificate of the 3rd double secret key, and the public key certificate of the 3rd double secret key is sent out Deliver to cloud authentication platform；If cloud authentication platform obtains the 3rd double secret key from outside, then also obtain while obtaining and given birth to The public key certificate of the 3rd double secret key become.
By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment, cloud authentication platform, can be by the by obtaining the public key certificate of the 3rd double secret key The public key certificate of three double secret key is sent to identity card card-reading terminal so that identity card card-reading terminal uses the PKI pair of the 3rd double secret key The information received carries out sign test, so that identity card card-reading terminal confirms the identity of cloud authentication platform.
S106: identity card card-reading terminal obtains the PKI of the 3rd double secret key according to the public key certificate of the 3rd double secret key, and uses the 3rd The PKI of double secret key carries out sign test to the second signing messages, if sign test result is correct, identity card card-reading terminal is according to the second double secret key Private key the first encryption session key is decrypted and obtains session key, and store session key；
In the present embodiment, due to the PKI of the 3rd double secret key be sign test key, private key be signature key, therefore, cloud authentication platform The private key using the 3rd double secret key obtains the second label after signing the first encryption session key being sent to identity card card-reading terminal Name information, identity card card-reading terminal can obtain the PKI of the 3rd double secret key according to the public key certificate of the 3rd double secret key, so that using The PKI of the 3rd double secret key carries out sign test to the second signing messages, if sign test result is correct, illustrates that the second signing messages is strictly cloud Authentication platform is sent to identity card card-reading terminal, and is not tampered with during transmission, it is achieved thereby that identity card is read The identity of cloud authentication platform is verified by card terminal.
In the present embodiment, if sign test result is correct, identity card card-reading terminal can be according to the private key of the second double secret key to the first encryption Session key is decrypted and obtains session key, and store session key, so that it is determined that identity card card-reading terminal is put down with cloud certification Carried out data transmission by this session key between platform, it is ensured that the safety of data transmission link.
The identity card ciphertext that S107: identity card card-reading terminal is obtained by session key identity card card-reading terminal obtains the 3rd biography Transmission of data, and the 3rd transmission data are sent to cloud authentication platform；
In the present embodiment, after confirming session key between identity card card-reading terminal and cloud authentication platform, it is possible to pass through session Key carries out data transmission.In specific implementation process, the ID card information that identity card card-reading terminal reads is usually ciphertext form, Identity card card-reading terminal cannot show the plaintext of ID card information, and therefore, identity card card-reading terminal needs to send identity card ciphertext It is authenticated to cloud authentication platform, and during sending, in order to ensure the safety of identity card ciphertext, identity card card-reading terminal First use session key that the encryption of identity card ciphertext obtains the 3rd transmission data, then the 3rd transmission data are sent to cloud authentication platform.
S108: identity card card-reading terminal receives the 4th transmission data that cloud authentication platform sends, and wherein, the 4th transfers data to less Utilizing, including cloud authentication platform, the ciphertext that identity card plain text encryption obtains by session key, identity card is that cloud authentication platform is to body in plain text Part card ciphertext deciphering obtains.
In the present embodiment, after cloud authentication platform receives the 3rd transmission data, first use session key that the 3rd transmission data are carried out Deciphering obtains identity card ciphertext, then checking security module identity card ciphertext sent to cloud authentication platform is decrypted and obtains identity Prove literary composition.In order to ensure identity card safety in plain text, cloud authentication platform first uses session key that identity card plain text encryption obtains the Four transmission data, then the 4th transmission data are sent to identity card card-reading terminal.Identity card card-reading terminal receives the 4th transmission number According to rear, use session key that the 4th transmission data are decrypted thus obtain identity card in plain text, it is achieved thereby that identity card Card Reader The terminal acquisition to identity card plaintext.In specific implementation process, identity card card-reading terminal can have display screen, by proof of identification Literary composition display is at display screen, in order to user reads.
By identity card card-reading terminal in a kind of authentication ids system that the present embodiment provides, key is used, it is ensured that body The reliability of the key in part card Verification System, it is ensured that the safety of identity information in identity card reading process.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, before step S101, identity card card-reading terminal can also obtain identity Card card-reading terminal customer identification information, and obtain the result of customer identification information, if the result is correct, then perform step Rapid S101, otherwise, does not perform step S101.In specific implementation process, customer identification information can be PIN code, fingerprint, Iris, face etc..When user logs in identity card card-reading terminal first, user is by physical button and/or virtual key input PIN Code, or the typing of fingerprint, iris or face is carried out by the noctovisor scan region of identity card card-reading terminal.Identity card Card Reader Terminal is started working each time, is required for confirming customer identification information so that identity card card-reading terminal obtains ability after user authorizes Start working, it is ensured that the safe handling of identity card card-reading terminal.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, before step S101, identity card card-reading terminal obtains identity card and reads The customer identification information of card terminal, and, identity card card-reading terminal also obtains the maximum mistake of this customer identification information used Access times and the currently used number of times of this customer identification information used；Identity card card-reading terminal judges this use used Family identifies whether the currently used number of times of information is less than the maximum mistake access times of this customer identification information used, if so, Then perform S101, otherwise, do not perform step S101.
In specific implementation process, the maximum mistake access times of customer identification information can be with 1 byte representation, such as, user The maximum mistake access times of identification information are " 3 ", are 3 times for representing the maximum mistake access times of customer identification information. And during identity card card-reading terminal use customer identification information, the currently used number of times of this customer identification information used of acquisition is also Can be with 1 byte representation, such as, this uses customer identification information and is to use customer identification information the 2nd time, Then the currently used number of times of this customer identification information used is " 2 ".
Identity card card-reading terminal judges that whether the currently used number of times of this customer identification information used is less than customer identification information Maximum mistake access times, the most then identity card card-reading terminal can use this customer identification information, otherwise, identity card Card Reader Terminal refusal uses this customer identification information.Such as, this uses customer identification information and is to use for the 2nd time user to know Other information, then the access times of this customer identification information used are " 2 ", and the maximum mistake of customer identification information uses secondary Number is 3 times, and owing to 2 less than 3, then identity card card-reading terminal can use customer identification information, and enters customer identification information Row checking.The most such as, this uses customer identification information and is that the 4th uses customer identification information, then this uses The currently used number of times of customer identification information be " 4 ", and the maximum mistake access times of customer identification information are 3 times, due to 4 are not less than 3, then customer identification information is verified by identity card card-reading terminal refusal.
It addition, in specific implementation process, when identity card card-reading terminal uses customer identification information, this user used of acquisition The currently used number of times of identification information can be counted by enumerator, uses customer identification information the most each time, and this user identifies Enumerator corresponding to information all can increase by 1 time.Such as, use before customer identification information at this, customer identification information by Using 1 time, rolling counters forward is " 1 ", and when this re-uses customer identification information, rolling counters forward is " 2 ", then this makes The currently used number of times of customer identification information be " 2 ".Identity card card-reading terminal judges this customer identification information used Whether the counting of enumerator is less than the wrong access times of the maximum of customer identification information, the most then identity card card-reading terminal can make Using this customer identification information, and verify customer identification information, otherwise, identity card card-reading terminal refusal identifies letter to user Breath is verified.Such as, before this uses customer identification information, customer identification information is used 1 time, counter counts Number is " 1 ", and when this re-uses customer identification information, rolling counters forward is " 2 ", and the maximum mistake of customer identification information makes Being 3 times with number of times, owing to 2 less than 3, then identity card card-reading terminal can use customer identification information, and user is identified letter Breath is verified.
By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment, by limiting the maximum mistake access times of customer identification information so that user After the access times of identification information exceed maximum mistake access times, the application that this customer identification information is relevant will be locked, thus Prevent the illegal exploration to identity card card-reading terminal.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, before step S102, identity card card-reading terminal can also obtain this The occupation mode information of the authenticated encryption key used and the attribute information of this authenticated encryption key used；Identity card Card Reader The occupation mode information of this authenticated encryption key used of terminal judges is the most consistent with the attribute information of authenticated encryption key, if Unanimously, then perform step S102, otherwise, do not perform step S102.
In specific implementation process, safety information all has an attribute information, and attribute information can use several byte representation, such as, The attribute information of authenticated encryption key is " 01 ", is used for representing that authenticated encryption key is deciphered for authenticated encryption or certification；First is close The attribute information of key pair is " 10 ", for representing that the first double secret key is for signature or sign test；The attribute information of the second double secret key is " 11 ", For representing that the second double secret key is for encrypting or deciphering.
And before identity card card-reading terminal uses safety information, making of this safety information used that identity card card-reading terminal obtains Can also be with 2 byte representations by mode information, such as, the occupation mode of this safety information used is for authenticated encryption Key, then the occupation mode information of this safety information used is " 01 "；The occupation mode of this safety information used is to use In signature or sign test, then the occupation mode information of this safety information used is " 10 "；The use of this safety information used Mode is for encrypting or deciphering, then the occupation mode information of this safety information used is " 11 ".
Identity card card-reading terminal judge the occupation mode information of this safety information used whether with the attribute information one of safety information Causing, if unanimously, then identity card card-reading terminal can use this safety information, and otherwise, identity card card-reading terminal refusal uses this peace Full information.Such as, this safety information used is authenticated encryption key, this safety information used for authenticated encryption or Deciphering, then the occupation mode information of this safety information used is " 01 ", and the attribute information of authenticated encryption key is " 01 ", The two is consistent, then identity card card-reading terminal can use authenticated encryption key.The most such as, this safety information used is first Double secret key, this safety information used is used for encrypting or deciphering, then the occupation mode information of this safety information used is " 11 ", And the first double secret key is for signature or sign test, its attribute information is " 10 ", and the two is inconsistent, then identity card card-reading terminal is refused Use absolutely the first double secret key.
Therefore, before identity card card-reading terminal uses authenticated encryption key, first obtain the use of this authenticated encryption key used Mode information and the attribute information of this authenticated encryption key used also judge the user of this authenticated encryption key used Formula information is the most consistent with the attribute information of authenticated encryption key, if unanimously, identity card card-reading terminal just can use authenticated encryption Key.
By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment, by the attribute of authenticated encryption key is defined, such as, can only recognize The authenticated encryption key that card uses cannot be used for data encryption or deciphering calculates or can only carry out signing or the double secret key of sign test can not Calculating for data encryption or deciphering, the occupation mode of authenticated encryption key is checked by identity card card-reading terminal so that identity Card card-reading terminal directly refuses the occupation mode being not allowed to, it is ensured that the normal use of authenticated encryption key.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, before step S102, this can also be made by identity card card-reading terminal The authenticated encryption key safety chip that is stored in identity card card-reading terminal RAM in, after step s 102, i.e. in identity Card is after card-reading terminal makes to be finished authenticated encryption key, identity card card-reading terminal by authenticated encryption key from Card Reader identity card card-reading terminal Safety chip RAM in remove.In specific implementation process, the safety chip of identity card card-reading terminal uses authenticated encryption close During key, can be temporarily stored in the RAM of safety chip by authenticated encryption key, the application relevant when authenticated encryption key uses After completing, identity card card-reading terminal forces to remove this authenticated encryption key from safety chip internal RAM.Pass through the present embodiment Optional embodiment, it is ensured that the RAM of safety chip does not haves the residual data of safety information, it is to avoid safe hidden Suffer from.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, before step S103, identity card card-reading terminal can also obtain this The attribute information of the private key of the occupation mode information of the private key of the first double secret key used and this first double secret key used；Body Part card card-reading terminal judges the occupation mode information of the private key of this first double secret key used and the attribute of the private key of the first double secret key Information is the most consistent, if unanimously, then performs step S103, otherwise, does not perform step S103.This process and above-mentioned examination certification The occupation mode of encryption key is similar to, and does not repeats them here.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, before step S103, this can also be made by identity card card-reading terminal The private key of the first double secret key safety chip that is stored in identity card card-reading terminal RAM in, after step s 103, i.e. exist After identity card card-reading terminal uses the private key of the first double secret key, identity card card-reading terminal by the private key of the first double secret key from Card Reader identity The RAM of the safety chip of card card-reading terminal removes.This process and above-mentioned storage to remove the process of authenticated encryption key similar, Do not repeat them here.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, before step S106, identity card card-reading terminal can also obtain this The attribute information of the PKI of the occupation mode information of the PKI of the 3rd double secret key used and this 3rd double secret key used；Body Part card card-reading terminal judges the occupation mode information of the PKI of this 3rd double secret key used and the attribute of the PKI of the 3rd double secret key Information is the most consistent, if unanimously, then performs step S106, otherwise, does not perform step S106.This process and above-mentioned examination certification The occupation mode of encryption key is similar to, and does not repeats them here.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, before step S106, this can also be made by identity card card-reading terminal The PKI of the 3rd double secret key safety chip that is stored in identity card card-reading terminal RAM in, after step s 106, i.e. exist Identity card card-reading terminal use the 3rd double secret key PKI after, identity card card-reading terminal by the PKI of the 3rd double secret key from Card Reader identity The RAM of the safety chip of card card-reading terminal removes.This process and above-mentioned storage to remove the process of authenticated encryption key similar, Do not repeat them here.
In the present embodiment, if the effect duration of safety information expires, safety information can be updated by identity card card-reading terminal, its Middle safety information can include following any one or its combination in any: authenticated encryption key, the private key of the first double secret key and first The public key certificate of double secret key, the private key of the second double secret key and the public key certificate of the second double secret key and customer identification information.In order to ensure The reliability of new safety information, identity card card-reading terminal needs to verify the security control condition of safety information, if safety Control condition is by checking, and safety information just can be updated by identity card card-reading terminal.In specific implementation process, Ke Yiwei At least one in following four kinds of optional embodiments:
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, security control condition can be customer identification information checking, such as to PIN Code, fingerprint, iris, face are verified, if by checking, then safety information is updated by identity card card-reading terminal.
In specific implementation process, renewal process includes: identity card card-reading terminal obtains more newly requested, and receives user and identify checking Information, and obtain the result that user is identified checking information, if the result is correct, then identity card card-reading terminal obtains Taking more fresh information, and be updated safety information, wherein, more fresh information includes following any one or its combination in any: new Authenticated encryption key, the private key of the first new double secret key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key and the second new double secret key Private key and the public key certificate of the second new double secret key and new customer identification information.
In specific implementation process, after identity card card-reading terminal reception user identifies checking information, user can be identified checking information Sending the background server to identity card card-reading terminal, user is identified that checking information and customer identification information are carried out by background server Compare, then user will be identified the result of checking information returns to identity card card-reading terminal.Or, identity card card-reading terminal After reception user identifies checking information, user is identified checking information and identity card card-reading terminal self storage by identity card card-reading terminal Customer identification information compare, thus identity card card-reading terminal obtains identifying user the result of checking information.
Such as, identity card card-reading terminal finds that the effect duration of this authenticated encryption key expires when using authenticated encryption key, then body The process of part card card-reading terminal can be initiated an application and update the request of this authenticated encryption key, and identity card card-reading terminal can be passed through Display screen shows or speaker play cuing user inputs customer identification information, as shown " input PIN code " by display screen Information or play " input PIN code " prompting user by speaker and input PIN code, it is defeated that identity card card-reading terminal receives user The PIN code entered, identity card card-reading terminal can send it to the background server of identity card card-reading terminal and verify that this PIN code is No correct or the PIN code of its and identity card card-reading terminal self storage can also be compared and verifies, if the result is Correctly, illustrate that user authorizes identity card card-reading terminal to be updated authenticated encryption key, then identity card card-reading terminal obtains new Authenticated encryption key, and be updated with the authenticated encryption key that new authenticated encryption double secret key is old.If the result is mistake, Illustrate that authenticated encryption key is updated by user's with no authorized identity card card-reading terminal, then identity card card-reading terminal stops certification The renewal of encryption key.
In specific implementation process, it can be that identity card card-reading terminal is only to authenticated encryption that safety information is updated by identity card card-reading terminal Key is updated, or the private key of the first double secret key and the public key certificate of the first double secret key are only carried out by identity card card-reading terminal Update, or the private key of the second double secret key and the public key certificate of the second double secret key are only updated by identity card card-reading terminal, or Customer identification information is updated by person's identity card card-reading terminal, it is also possible to for above-mentioned four kinds of combination in any updated.Identity card is read Card terminal is updated according to practical situation, and this is not defined by embodiments of the invention.
Correspondingly, the more fresh information that identity card card-reading terminal obtains can be new authenticated encryption key, or the first new key To private key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key, or the private key of the second new double secret key and the public affairs of the second double secret key Key certificate, or new customer identification information, it is also possible to for the combination in any of above-mentioned four kinds of more fresh informations.Identity card card-reading terminal Obtaining more fresh information according to practical situation, this is not defined by embodiments of the invention.
By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment so that safety information is updated in the case of user authorizes, it is ensured that more The authenticity of new process.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, security control condition can be signature verification, and such as identity card Card Reader is eventually Holding and carry out sign test to updating the private key signing messages obtained of signing update content, if by checking, then identity card Card Reader is eventually Safety information is updated by end.
In specific implementation process, renewal process includes: identity card card-reading terminal receives more fresh information, more fresh information and includes that renewal is interior Holding and utilize and update private key and sign update content the signing messages obtained, wherein, update content includes following any one Plant or its combination in any: the PKI card of new authenticated encryption key, the private key of the first new double secret key and the first new double secret key Book, the private key of the second new double secret key and the public key certificate of the second new double secret key and new customer identification information；Identity card Card-reading terminal obtains and updates renewal PKI corresponding to private key, utilizes and updates PKI the update content after signature carries out sign test, and After sign test is passed through, safety information is updated.
In specific implementation process, updating private key and renewal PKI can be unsymmetrical key, the server sending update content uses Renewal private key carries out signature and obtains signing messages update content, and will update public key certificate, update content and signing messages together Being sent to identity card card-reading terminal, identity card card-reading terminal obtains renewal PKI according to updating public key certificate, and uses renewal PKI Signing messages is carried out sign test, after sign test is passed through, utilizes update content to be updated.
Such as, when identity card card-reading terminal updates authenticated encryption key, identity card card-reading terminal receive new authenticated encryption key with And utilize and update private key and new authenticated encryption key is signed the signing messages obtained, identity card card-reading terminal obtains and updates private The renewal PKI that key is corresponding, and the signing messages of new authenticated encryption key is carried out sign test, if the verification passes, illustrate new The source of authenticated encryption key is legal, then identity card card-reading terminal replaces old authenticated encryption key with new authenticated encryption key, Otherwise, illustrating that the source of new authenticated encryption key is illegal, identity card card-reading terminal refusal is replaced with new authenticated encryption key Old authenticated encryption key.
In specific implementation process, it can be that identity card card-reading terminal is only to authenticated encryption that safety information is updated by identity card card-reading terminal Key is updated, or the private key of the first double secret key and the public key certificate of the first double secret key are only carried out by identity card card-reading terminal Update, or the private key of the second double secret key and the public key certificate of the second double secret key are only updated by identity card card-reading terminal, or Customer identification information is updated by person's identity card card-reading terminal, it is also possible to for above-mentioned four kinds of combination in any updated.Identity card is read Card terminal is updated according to practical situation, and this is not defined by embodiments of the invention.
Correspondingly, identity card card-reading terminal obtain more fresh information can be new authenticated encryption key and new authenticated encryption close The signing messages of key, or the private key of the first new double secret key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key and the first new key To the signing messages of private key and the signing messages of public key certificate of the first new double secret key, or the private of the second new double secret key The signing messages of the private key of key and the public key certificate of the second double secret key and the second new double secret key and the PKI card of the second double secret key The signing messages of book, or new customer identification information and the signing messages of new customer identification information, or above-mentioned four kinds more The combination in any of fresh information, or the server sending update content use update private key to new authenticated encryption key, new the The private key of one double secret key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key, the private key of the second new double secret key and the second double secret key Public key certificate, the combination in any of new customer identification information carry out the signing messages obtained of signing.Identity card card-reading terminal is according to reality Border situation obtains more fresh information, and this is not defined by embodiments of the invention.
By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment, owing to identity card card-reading terminal is when updating new safety information, to sending more The signature authentication of the server of new content, the identity with the server of certification transmission update content is legal, thus ensure that new peace The source of full information is legal, reliable.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, security control condition can be that encryption key checking, such as identity card are read Card terminal is encrypted, to update content, the confidential information that adds obtained to encryption key and is decrypted, and after deciphering completes, to safety Information is updated.
In specific implementation process, renewal process includes: identity card card-reading terminal receives more fresh information, more fresh information and includes that utilization adds Decryption key is encrypted the ciphertext obtained to update content, and wherein, update content includes following any one or its combination in any: New authenticated encryption key, the private key of the first new double secret key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key, the second new key To private key and the public key certificate of the second new double secret key and new customer identification information；Identity card card-reading terminal obtains encryption The decruption key that double secret key is answered, utilizes decruption key to be decrypted the ciphertext after encryption, and after deciphering completes, believes safety Breath is updated.
In specific implementation process, encryption key and decruption key can be symmetric key, in identity card card-reading terminal and transmission update The server held can all use identical symmetry algorithm to generate encryption key and decruption key, it would however also be possible to employ the side of offered Formula negotiates encryption key and decruption key.Certainly, encryption key and decruption key can also be unsymmetrical key, send and update The server of content uses encryption key to be encrypted update content, and the update content after encryption and decruption key certificate is sent out Giving identity card card-reading terminal, identity card card-reading terminal is according to decruption key certificate acquisition decruption key, and uses decruption key pair Ciphertext after encryption keys is decrypted.
Such as, when identity card card-reading terminal updates authenticated encryption key, identity card card-reading terminal receives the service sending update content Device utilize encryption key new authenticated encryption key is encrypted obtain add confidential information and decruption key certificate, identity card Card Reader Terminal obtains decruption key according to decruption key certificate, and uses decruption key to carry out the confidential information that adds of new authenticated encryption key Deciphering, after having deciphered, then identity card card-reading terminal replaces old authenticated encryption key with new authenticated encryption key.
In specific implementation process, it can be that identity card card-reading terminal is only to authenticated encryption that safety information is updated by identity card card-reading terminal Key is updated, or the private key of the first double secret key and the public key certificate of the first double secret key are only carried out by identity card card-reading terminal Update, or the private key of the second double secret key and the public key certificate of the second double secret key are only updated by identity card card-reading terminal, or Customer identification information is updated by person's identity card card-reading terminal, it is also possible to for above-mentioned four kinds of combination in any updated.Identity card is read Card terminal is updated according to practical situation, and this is not defined by embodiments of the invention.
Correspondingly, the more fresh information that identity card card-reading terminal obtains can be the confidential information that adds of new authenticated encryption key, or newly The private key of the first double secret key and the first new double secret key public key certificate add confidential information, or the private of the second new double secret key The public key certificate of key and the second double secret key add confidential information, or new customer identification information add confidential information, or above-mentioned four The combination in any of kind of more fresh information, or send the server by utilizing encryption key of update content to new authenticated encryption key, new The private key of the first double secret key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key, the private key of the second new double secret key and the second key To public key certificate, the combination in any of new customer identification information be encrypted the cipher-text information obtained.Identity card card-reading terminal root Obtaining more fresh information according to practical situation, this is not defined by embodiments of the invention.
By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment, the most correct deciphering of identity card card-reading terminal has obtained update content, just shows The identity of the server sending update content is legal, so that new safety information just can be carried out more through encryption key checking Newly, it is ensured that the terminal authentication of server to sending update content, it is ensured that the source of new safety information is legal, can Lean on.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, the content owing to updating includes the public key certificate and/or the of the first double secret key The public key certificate of two double secret key, therefore, identity card card-reading terminal needs the public key certificate of the first new double secret key and/or second close The public key certificate of key pair is verified, or as described in above-mentioned optional embodiment, when security control condition is signature verification, body After the signature verification of the public key certificate of the first new double secret key and/or the public key certificate of the second double secret key is passed through by part card card-reading terminal Again the public key certificate of the first new double secret key and/or the public key certificate of the second double secret key are verified, or such as above-mentioned optional enforcement Described in mode, when security control condition is encryption key checking, the identity card card-reading terminal public key certificate to the first new double secret key And/or second the encryption key of public key certificate of double secret key be verified after public key certificate and/or to the first new double secret key again The public key certificate of two double secret key is verified.I.e. identity card card-reading terminal according to the root certificate of digital certificate server to new first The public key certificate of double secret key is verified, if checking is correct, then identity card card-reading terminal is close to the private key of the first double secret key and first The public key certificate of key pair is updated；The public key certificate of the second new double secret key is carried out by the root certificate according to digital certificate server Checking, if checking is correct, then the private key of the second double secret key and the public key certificate of the second double secret key are carried out more by identity card card-reading terminal Newly.
In specific implementation process, identity card card-reading terminal the most all stores the root certificate of digital certificate server, and this root certificate is used The certificate obtained from digital certificate server in checking identity card card-reading terminal is the most legal.Therefore, identity card card-reading terminal receives After the public key certificate of the public key certificate of the first new double secret key and/or the second new double secret key, digital certificate server to be used Root certificate the public key certificate of the first new double secret key and/or the public key certificate of the second new double secret key are verified, if checking Correctly, illustrate that the public key certificate of the first new double secret key and/or the public key certificate of the second new double secret key are to be serviced by this digital certificate Device generates, and is legal, then, and and identity card the card-reading terminal public key certificate of the first new double secret key and/or the second new key To public key certificate replace public key certificate and/or the public key certificate of the second double secret key of old the first double secret key.By using numeral card New public key certificate is verified by the root certificate of book server, it is ensured that the legitimacy of new public key certificate.
By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment so that the security control condition of safety information is tested by identity card card-reading terminal Card, only security control condition is by checking, and safety information just can be updated by identity card card-reading terminal, it is ensured that new The reliability of safety information.
The method using key by identity card card-reading terminal in the authentication ids system that the present embodiment provides so that safety information In authentication ids platform, it is ensured that the reliability of key, it is ensured that the safety of key in identity card reading process.Enter one Step ground, during the use of key, by key is carried out control of authority, it is achieved that the occupation mode of key is checked, Ensure that the normal use of key.Further, by key is updated operation so that the effect duration of key to after date, There is new key to replace old key, ensure again that the safety of identity card reading process.
Fig. 2 be the embodiment of the present invention 1 authentication ids system in the structural representation of identity card card-reading terminal, as in figure 2 it is shown, This identity card card-reading terminal includes processing module 11, communication module 12 and memory module 13.
Processing module 11, is used for obtaining session key solicited message；Use session key solicited message described in authenticated encryption double secret key It is encrypted and obtains first and add confidential information；The private key using the first double secret key adds confidential information to described first to carry out signature and obtains first Signing messages；Public key certificate according to the 3rd double secret key obtains the PKI of the 3rd double secret key, and uses the PKI pair of the 3rd double secret key Described second signing messages carries out sign test, if sign test result is correct, described identity card card-reading terminal is according to described second double secret key Described first encryption session key is decrypted and obtains described session key by private key；By identity described in described session key The identity card ciphertext that card card-reading terminal obtains obtains the 3rd transmission data；Obtained by described session key deciphering the 4th transmission data Identity card is in plain text；
Communication module 12, for the first transmission data are sent to cloud authentication platform, wherein, described first transfers data to few bag Include the public key certificate of the second double secret key, the public key certificate of described first double secret key, described first add confidential information, described first signature Information；Receiving the second transmission data that described cloud authentication platform returns, wherein, described second transfers data to include that the 3rd is close less The public key certificate of key pair, the first encryption session key, the second signing messages, wherein, described first encryption session key is described Cloud authentication platform utilizes the PKI of described second double secret key to be encrypted session key, and described second signing messages is described Cloud authentication platform utilizes the private key of the 3rd double secret key to sign described first encryption session key to obtain；Pass the described 3rd Transmission of data sends to described cloud authentication platform；Receive the 4th transmission data that described cloud authentication platform sends, wherein, the described 4th Transmission data include that described cloud authentication platform utilizes the ciphertext that described identity card plain text encryption is obtained by described session key, described body Part proves what the deciphering of described identity card ciphertext was obtained by literary composition for described cloud authentication platform.
Memory module 13, is used for storing described session key.
By the identity card card-reading terminal in the authentication ids system that the present embodiment provides, by identity card card-reading terminal to key Use, it is ensured that the reliability of safety information, it is ensured that the safety of identity information in identity card reading process.
In prior art, the identity card reading device of No.2 residence card has an at least two module: card reading module and resident ID card verification safety control module.Wherein, the ID card information that card reading module reads is all ciphertext, only resident identification card Checking safety control module could be decrypted identity card to the ciphertext ID card information that card reading module reads and read.
Compared with existing identity card reading device, in the present embodiment, identity card card-reading terminal only includes card reading module and does not includes Residence card verifying safety control module, i.e. need not the identity card cipher-text information to reading and is decrypted, it is only necessary to will read The identity card cipher-text information got sends to authentication platform verifies and deciphers, thus obtains identity card cipher-text information.Namely Saying, in the present embodiment, this identity card card-reading terminal can be to support the card-reading apparatus of reading identity card information, is used for passing through radio frequency Identify and read second-generation identification card information, and the second-generation identification card information read is sent to authentication platform is authenticated by network. In specific implementation process, identity card card-reading terminal can be portable portable terminal device, such as mobile phone, it is also possible to for computer, example Such as panel computer, desktop computer, notebook computer etc., in an embodiment of the present invention this is not defined.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, identity card card-reading terminal also includes acquisition module 14, as shown in Figure 3. Acquisition module 14, is used for obtaining authenticated encryption key, the first double secret key and the second double secret key, and wherein, authenticated encryption key is used for Session key solicited message is encrypted；Acquisition module 14 obtains authenticated encryption key from outside, and obtains the first double secret key, Wherein, the first double secret key includes private key and the PKI of the first double secret key of the first double secret key；Acquisition module 14 obtains the second double secret key, Wherein, the second double secret key includes private key and the PKI of the second double secret key of the second double secret key.Additionally, acquisition module 14 is additionally operable to obtain Peek word certificate server carries out digital certificate and signs and issues the public key certificate of the first double secret key that operation generates the PKI of the first double secret key And acquisition digital certificate server carries out digital certificate and signs and issues the public affairs of the second double secret key that operation generates the PKI of the second double secret key Key certificate.By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment, identity card card-reading terminal obtains the certification needed in authentication procedures The PKI card of encryption key, the private key of the first double secret key and the public key certificate of the first double secret key and the second double secret key and the second double secret key Book, it is ensured that the safety of identity information in identity card reading process.
In specific implementation process, authenticated encryption key is for being encrypted session key solicited message, and wherein, session key please , when identity card card-reading terminal communicates with the foundation of cloud authentication platform first, identity card card-reading terminal is put down to cloud certification to ask information to include The solicited message of platform one session key of request, this information can be an independent solicited message, it is also possible to is included in identity card Card-reading terminal is in the identity card card seeking information that cloud authentication platform sends, and this does not the most make restriction, as long as sending out first Deliver letters breath time, utilize this this information of authenticated encryption double secret key to be encrypted.Therefore, identity card card-reading terminal uses certification to add Session key solicited message is encrypted by decryption key, then sends the session key solicited message after encryption to cloud authentication platform, Ensure that on the premise of not having session key, session cipher key request information still can be safely sent to by identity card card-reading terminal Cloud authentication platform.
In specific implementation process, it is preferred that authenticated encryption key is symmetric key, acquisition module 14 and cloud authentication platform can be equal Obtain the authenticated encryption key that identical symmetry algorithm generates.Certainly, authenticated encryption key can also be unsymmetrical key, and cloud is recognized The public key certificate of authenticated encryption cipher key pair is sent to acquisition module 14 by card platform, and acquisition module 14 utilizes PKI to be encrypted Information be encrypted after send to cloud authentication platform, cloud authentication platform uses the private key of authenticated encryption cipher key pair to acquisition module The information of 14 encryptions is decrypted.
In this optional embodiment, it can be directly to obtain certification in plain text that acquisition module 14 obtains authenticated encryption key from outside Encryption key, it is also possible to be the authenticated encryption key obtaining ciphertext.In order to ensure that the authenticated encryption key that acquisition module 14 obtains is Safety, it is preferred that the authenticated encryption key that acquisition module 14 obtains from outside is the authenticated encryption key of encryption, and obtains Module 14 obtains the decruption key of the authenticated encryption key for deciphering encryption simultaneously, and uses decruption key to add the certification of encryption Decryption key is decrypted and obtains authenticated encryption key.In specific implementation process, the encryption equipment outside acquisition module 14 produces certification and adds Decryption key, and import to, in acquisition module 14, by the way of ciphertext, import acquisition module by the authenticated encryption key of encryption 14, prevent acquisition module 14 authenticated encryption key during obtaining authenticated encryption key to be tampered, thus ensure that acquisition It is reliable that module 14 obtains the process of authenticated encryption key.Additionally, for the safety ensureing authenticated encryption key, each obtain The authenticated encryption key of delivery block all produces in encryption equipment internal random, reduces the dependency between authenticated encryption key, prevents The authenticated encryption key of certain acquisition module, by after Brute Force, jeopardizes other acquisition module.
In this optional embodiment, acquisition module 14 obtains the decruption key of the authenticated encryption key for deciphering encryption and can adopt By at least one of following two mode:
A1: acquisition module 14 and encryption equipment shift to an earlier date consulting session key, and it is close to utilize session key encryption and decryption to obtain authenticated encryption Key.Such as, encryption equipment generates session key in advance and session key utilizes PKI in identity card card-reading terminal certificate in advance It is sent to acquisition module 14 after being encrypted, sends after encryption equipment also utilizes session key to be encrypted by authenticated encryption key simultaneously To acquisition module 14, acquisition module 14 can utilize the private key corresponding with certificate to decrypt session key, and utilizes session key Deciphering access authentication encryption key；
A2: acquisition module 14 and encryption equipment employing asymmetric arithmetic carry out encryption and decryption and obtain authenticated encryption key, such as, obtain mould Block 14 generates double secret key, and is sent by public key certificate to encryption equipment, and encryption equipment uses the PKI of cipher key pair to authenticated encryption key Being encrypted and the authenticated encryption key of encryption is imported acquisition module 14, acquisition module 14 uses the private key of this double secret key to adding Close authenticated encryption key is decrypted, thus obtains authenticated encryption key.
The mode of the decruption key that above two obtains the authenticated encryption key for deciphering encryption can ensure acquisition module 14 The process obtaining authenticated encryption key is reliable.
In this optional embodiment, it can be that acquisition module 14 obtains first from outside that acquisition module 14 obtains the first double secret key Double secret key, it is also possible to be that acquisition module 14 is internally generated the first double secret key.In order to ensure the first key that acquisition module 14 obtains To being safe, it is preferred that acquisition module 14 is internally generated the first double secret key.Due to acquisition module 14, to be internally generated first close Key pair, the private key of the first double secret key can not derive, and the PKI of the first double secret key can carry and export in public key certificate, by adopting The mode being internally generated with acquisition module so that private key can not be revealed, it is ensured that the safety of the first double secret key.
In specific implementation process, the first double secret key is unsymmetrical key pair, and wherein, the first double secret key includes the public affairs of the first double secret key Key and the private key of the first double secret key.The PKI of the first double secret key be sign test key, private key be signature key.In specific implementation process, The private key of the first double secret key is signed for the information that acquisition module 14 is sent to recipient, and the PKI of the first double secret key is used for Recipient carries out corresponding sign test, it is achieved thereby that verify the identity of acquisition module.
In this optional embodiment, it can be that acquisition module 14 obtains second from outside that acquisition module 14 obtains the second double secret key Double secret key, it is also possible to be that acquisition module 14 is internally generated the second double secret key.In order to ensure the second key that acquisition module 14 obtains To being safe, it is preferred that acquisition module 14 is internally generated the second double secret key.Due to acquisition module 14, to be internally generated second close Key pair, the private key of the second double secret key can not derive, and the PKI of the second double secret key can carry and export in public key certificate, by adopting The mode being internally generated with acquisition module so that private key can not be revealed, it is ensured that the safety of the second double secret key.
In specific implementation process, the second double secret key is unsymmetrical key pair, and wherein, the second double secret key includes the public affairs of the second double secret key Key and the private key of the second double secret key.The PKI of the second double secret key be encryption key, private key be decruption key.In specific implementation process, The information being sent to acquisition module 14 is encrypted by the PKI of the second double secret key for recipient, and the private key of the second double secret key is used Decipher accordingly in acquisition module 14, thus ensure that recipient is safe with the data transmission procedure of acquisition module.
In this optional embodiment, the certificate that acquisition module 14 obtains all is signed and issued by digital certificate server, numeral card Book server is usually certificate visa-granting office, and certificate visa-granting office is according to the information of visa-granting office, the public key information of user, authority The signature of office and effect duration etc. generate the public key certificate of user.
In specific implementation process, if acquisition module 14 is internally generated the first double secret key, therefore, acquisition module 14 obtains first During the public key certificate of double secret key, acquisition module 14 needs to be sent by the PKI of the first double secret key to digital certificate server, numeral card Book server according to the information of visa-granting office, the public key information of the first double secret key, the signature of authority office and effect duration etc. to described The PKI of the first double secret key carries out digital certificate and signs and issues the public key certificate of operation generation the first double secret key, and by the public affairs of the first double secret key Key certificate sends to acquisition module 14；If acquisition module 14 obtains the first double secret key from outside, then while obtaining also Obtain the public key certificate of the first double secret key generated.Acquisition module 14 is by obtaining the public key certificate of the first double secret key, permissible The public key certificate of the first double secret key is sent to recipient so that recipient uses the PKI of the first double secret key to enter the information received Row sign test, so that recipient confirms the identity of acquisition module 14.
In specific implementation process, owing to acquisition module 14 is internally generated the second double secret key, therefore, acquisition module 14 obtains second During the public key certificate of double secret key, acquisition module 14 needs to be sent by the PKI of the second double secret key to digital certificate server, numeral card Book server according to the information of visa-granting office, the public key information of the second double secret key, the signature of authority office and effect duration etc. to described The PKI of the second double secret key carries out digital certificate and signs and issues the public key certificate of operation described second double secret key of generation, and by the second double secret key Public key certificate send to acquisition module 14；If acquisition module 14 obtains the second double secret key from outside, then same obtain Time also obtain the public key certificate of the second double secret key generated.Acquisition module 14 by obtaining the public key certificate of the second double secret key, The public key certificate of the second double secret key can be sent to recipient so that recipient uses the PKI of the second double secret key to being sent to The information of acquisition module 14 is encrypted, so that the information that acquisition module 14 receives is received by safe transmission, Ensure that the information that acquisition module 14 receives is safe.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, memory module 12 is additionally operable to authentication storage encryption key, the first double secret key Private key and the public key certificate of the first double secret key, the private key of the second double secret key and the public key certificate of the second double secret key.By this Optional embodiment so that the process of double secret key identity information all performs in security context, both ensure that the safety of key data In turn ensure that the safety of identity information.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, identity card card-reading terminal also includes acquisition module 14, is used for obtaining user Identification information；Memory module 13 is additionally operable to store customer identification information.In specific implementation process, customer identification information can be PIN code, fingerprint, iris, face etc..When user logs in identity card card-reading terminal first, user by physical button and/or Virtual key input PIN code, or carry out fingerprint, iris or face by the noctovisor scan region of identity card card-reading terminal Typing, and memory module 13 stores.By this optional embodiment, identity card card-reading terminal starts work each time Make, be required for customer identification information is confirmed so that identity card card-reading terminal obtains just starting working after user authorizes, it is ensured that The safe handling of identity card card-reading terminal.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, identity card card-reading terminal also includes control of authority module 15, for place The safety information that reason module 11 uses its carry out control of authority, wherein safety information may include that authenticated encryption key, first close The private key of key pair and the public key certificate of the first double secret key, the private key of the second double secret key and the public key certificate of the second double secret key and user are known Other information.
In this optional embodiment, when processing module 11 uses safety information, control of authority module 15 will be to the safety used Information carries out control of authority, if the authority of being unsatisfactory for, then processing module 11 can not use this safety information.Control of authority can be body The purposes of the safety information that identity card card-reading terminal uses is checked by card-reading terminal, access times are checked, store for part card And removing etc..By control of authority module 43, safety information is carried out control of authority, it is ensured that the safe handling of safety information.
In this optional embodiment, control of authority can be that the purposes of the control of authority module 15 safety information to using is looked into Test, i.e. control of authority module 15 is additionally operable to before processing module 11 uses safety information, obtain this safety information used Occupation mode information；Control of authority module 15, when processing module 11 uses safety information, obtains this safety information used Attribute information；Control of authority module 15 judges the occupation mode information of this safety information used and the attribute letter of safety information Breath is the most consistent, if unanimously, then performs subsequent operation.
In specific implementation process, each safety information also includes attribute information, for representing the attribute of safety information.Such as, The attribute information of authenticated encryption key is for representing that authenticated encryption key, for being encrypted the information of queued session key, obtains Module 14 also obtains the attribute information of authenticated encryption key after obtaining authenticated encryption key；The attribute information of the first double secret key is used for table Show the first double secret key for signature or sign test, acquisition module 14 also obtains the attribute information of the first double secret key after obtaining the first double secret key； The attribute information of the second double secret key is for representing that the second double secret key is used for encrypting or deciphering, after acquisition module 14 obtains the second double secret key Also obtain the attribute information of the second double secret key.
In specific implementation process, control of authority module 15 carries out control of authority to the safety information used and can be: processing module Before 11 use safety information, control of authority module 15 also obtains the occupation mode information of this safety information used, and i.e. locates Before reason module 11 uses authenticated encryption key, control of authority module 15 also obtains this occupation mode using authenticated encryption key Information, before processing module 11 uses the first double secret key, control of authority module 15 also obtains this use using the first double secret key Mode information, before processing module 11 uses the second double secret key, control of authority module 15 also obtains the occupation mode of the second double secret key Information.Whether control of authority module 15 judges the attribute information of the occupation mode information of this safety information used and safety information Unanimously, if unanimously, then performing subsequent operation, otherwise, identity card card-reading terminal refusal performs subsequent operation.
In specific implementation process, the attribute information of safety information can use several byte representation, such as, the genus of authenticated encryption key Property information be " 01 ", be used for representing that authenticated encryption key is deciphered for authenticated encryption or certification；The attribute information of the first double secret key is " 10 ", for representing that the first double secret key is for signature or sign test；The attribute information of the second double secret key is " 11 ", for expression Two double secret key are used for encrypting or deciphering.
And before processing module 11 uses safety information, the use of this safety information used that control of authority module 15 obtains Mode information can also be with 2 byte representations, and such as, the occupation mode of this safety information used is close for authenticated encryption Key, then the occupation mode information of this safety information used is " 01 "；This occupation mode of safety information used be for Signature or sign test, then the occupation mode information of this safety information used is " 10 "；The user of this safety information used Formula is for encrypting or deciphering, then the occupation mode information of this safety information used is " 11 ".
Control of authority module 15 judge the occupation mode information of this safety information used whether with the attribute information of safety information Unanimously, if unanimously, then processing module 11 can use this safety information, and otherwise, processing module 11 refusal uses this to believe safely Breath.Such as, this safety information used is authenticated encryption key, and this safety information used is used for authenticated encryption or deciphering, Then the occupation mode information of this safety information used is " 01 ", and the attribute information of authenticated encryption key is " 01 ", the two Unanimously, then processing module 11 can use authenticated encryption key.The most such as, this safety information used is the first double secret key, This safety information used is used for encrypting or deciphering, then the occupation mode information of this safety information used is " 11 ", and the One double secret key is for signature or sign test, and its attribute information is " 10 ", and the two is inconsistent, then processing module 11 refusal uses First double secret key.
By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment, by the attribute of safety information is defined, such as, can only be authenticated making Authenticated encryption key cannot be used for data encryption or deciphering calculates or can only carry out signing or the double secret key of sign test cannot be used for Data encryption or deciphering calculate, and the occupation mode of safety information is checked by identity card card-reading terminal so that identity card Card Reader is eventually End directly refuses the occupation mode being not allowed to, it is ensured that the normal use of safety information.
In this optional embodiment, control of authority can also be for the use of the control of authority module 15 customer identification information to using Number of times is checked, i.e. control of authority module 15 is additionally operable to processing module 11 when using customer identification information to verify, obtains The maximum mistake access times of this customer identification information used and the currently used number of times of this customer identification information used； Control of authority module 15 judges whether the currently used number of times of this customer identification information used is known less than this user used The maximum mistake access times of other information, the most then perform subsequent operation.
In specific implementation process, customer identification information also includes maximum mistake access times.Control of authority module 15 is to use Customer identification information carries out control of authority and includes: when processing module 11 uses customer identification information, and control of authority module 15 also obtains Take the maximum mistake access times of this customer identification information used and the currently used secondary of this customer identification information used Number, control of authority module 15 judges the user whether currently used number of times of this customer identification information used uses less than this The maximum mistake access times of identification information, the most then perform subsequent operation, otherwise, after identity card card-reading terminal refusal performs Continuous operation.
In specific implementation process, the maximum mistake access times of customer identification information can be with 1 byte representation, such as, user The maximum mistake access times of identification information are " 3 ", are 3 times for representing the maximum mistake access times of customer identification information. And processing module 11 is when using customer identification information, working as of this customer identification information used that control of authority module 15 obtains Front access times can also be with 1 byte representation, and such as, this uses customer identification information and is to use for the 2nd time to use Family identifies information, then the currently used number of times of this customer identification information used is " 2 ".
Control of authority module 15 judges that whether the currently used number of times of this customer identification information used is less than customer identification information Maximum mistake access times, the most then processing module 11 can use this customer identification information, and enters customer identification information Row checking, otherwise, processing module 11 is refused to verify customer identification information.Such as, this uses user to identify letter Breath and be to use customer identification information for the 2nd time, then these access times of customer identification information used are " 2 ", and user The maximum mistake access times of identification information are 3 times, and owing to 2 less than 3, then processing module 11 can use customer identification information, And customer identification information is verified.The most such as, this uses customer identification information and is that the 4th uses user to know Other information, then the currently used number of times of this customer identification information used is " 4 ", and the maximum mistake of customer identification information makes Being 3 times with number of times, owing to 4 not less than 3, then processing module 11 is refused to verify customer identification information.
It addition, in specific implementation process, when processing module 11 uses customer identification information, the basis that control of authority module 15 obtains The currently used number of times of the customer identification information of secondary use can be counted by enumerator, uses customer identification information the most each time, The enumerator that this customer identification information is corresponding all can increase by 1 time.Such as, before this uses customer identification information, user identifies Information is used 1 time, and rolling counters forward is " 1 ", and when this re-uses customer identification information, rolling counters forward is " 2 ", Then the currently used number of times of this customer identification information used is " 2 ".Control of authority module 15 judges that this user used knows Whether the counting of the enumerator of other information is less than the wrong access times of the maximum of customer identification information, the most then processing module 11 can To use this customer identification information, and verifying customer identification information, otherwise, processing module 11 is refused user is identified letter Breath is verified.Such as, before this uses customer identification information, customer identification information is used 1 time, counter counts Number is " 1 ", and when this re-uses customer identification information, rolling counters forward is " 2 ", and the maximum mistake of customer identification information makes Being 3 times with number of times, owing to 2 less than 3, then processing module 11 can use customer identification information, and enters customer identification information Row checking.
By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment, by limiting the maximum mistake access times of customer identification information so that user After the access times of identification information exceed maximum mistake access times, the application that this customer identification information is relevant will be locked, thus Prevent the illegal exploration to identity card card-reading terminal.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, identity card card-reading terminal can also include RAM module 16, such as Fig. 3 Shown in.The authority of the control of authority module 15 safety information to using can be, when processing module 11 uses safety information, and power The safety information that this is used by limit control module 15 is stored in RAM module；After processing module 11 makes to be finished safety information, The safety information that this is used by control of authority module 15 is removed from RAM module.
In specific implementation process, when processing module 11 uses safety information, safety information can temporarily be deposited by control of authority module 15 Being placed in RAM module 16, after the application that safety information is relevant has used, control of authority module 15 is forced from RAM mould Block 16 is removed this safety information.Such as, processing module 11 uses authenticated encryption key to be encrypted, control of authority module 15 Authenticated encryption key can be read from the storage address of authenticated encryption key, and be deposited in the RAM of safety chip, work as place After reason module 11 uses the encryption of authenticated encryption key, the application of this authenticated encryption key has used, then control of authority module 15 by its Compulsory Removal from RAM module 16.
By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment, it is ensured that RAM module does not haves the residual data of safety information, keeps away Exempt from potential safety hazard.
In another optional embodiment of the present embodiment, identity card card-reading terminal also includes more new module 17, as shown in Figure 3. If the effect duration of safety information expires, then safety information can be updated by more new module 17, and wherein safety information can be wrapped Include: authenticated encryption key, the private key of the first double secret key and the public key certificate of the first double secret key, the private key of the second double secret key and second The public key certificate of double secret key and customer identification information.In order to ensure the reliability of new safety information, safety is believed by more new module 17 The security control condition of breath is verified, if security control condition is by checking, safety information is updated by the most more new module 17. In specific implementation process, can be at least one in following four kinds of optional embodiments:
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, security control condition can be customer identification information checking, such as to PIN Code, fingerprint, iris, face are verified, if by checking, safety information is updated by the most more new module 17.
In specific implementation process, renewal process includes: more new module 17 obtains more newly requested, and receives user and identify checking information, And obtain the result that user is identified checking information, if the result is correct, the most more new module 17 obtains more fresh information, And safety information is updated, wherein, more fresh information includes following any one or its combination in any: new authenticated encryption is close Key, the private key of the first new double secret key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key and the private key of the second new double secret key and new The public key certificate of the second double secret key and new customer identification information.
In specific implementation process, more new module 17 receives after user identifies checking information, user can identifying, checking information sends To the background server of identity card card-reading terminal, user is identified that checking information and customer identification information compare by background server, User will be identified the result of checking information returns to more new module 17 again.Or, more new module 17 receives user and identifies After checking information, user is identified that the customer identification information of checking information and more new module 17 self storage is carried out by more new module 17 Compare, thus more new module 17 obtains identifying user the result of checking information.
Such as, processing module 13 finds when using authenticated encryption key that the effect duration of this authenticated encryption key expires, then process mould The process of block 13 can be initiated an application and update the request of this authenticated encryption key, and more new module 17 can be shown by display screen Or speaker play cuing user inputs customer identification information, as shown " input PIN code " information by display screen or leading to Crossing speaker broadcasting " input PIN code " prompting user and input PIN code, more new module 17 receives the PIN code of user's input, More new module 17 can send it to the background server of identity card card-reading terminal and verify that this PIN code is the most correct or can also The PIN code that itself and more new module 17 self stores is compared and verifies, if the result is correct, illustrates that user authorizes more Authenticated encryption key is updated by new module 17, and the most more new module 17 obtains new authenticated encryption key, and with new certification Old authenticated encryption key is updated by encryption key.If the result is mistake, user's with no authorized more new module 17 is described Being updated authenticated encryption key, the most more new module 17 stops the renewal to authenticated encryption key.
In specific implementation process, it can be to update module 17 only to enter authenticated encryption key that safety information is updated by more new module 17 Row updates, or the private key of the first double secret key and the public key certificate of the first double secret key are only updated by more new module 17, or The private key of the second double secret key and the public key certificate of the second double secret key are only updated by more new module 17, or more new module 17 Customer identification information is updated, it is also possible to for above-mentioned four kinds of combination in any updated.More new module 17 is entered according to practical situation Row updates, and this is not defined by embodiments of the invention.
Correspondingly, the more fresh information that more new module 17 obtains can be new authenticated encryption key, or the first new double secret key Private key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key, or the PKI card of the private key of the second new double secret key and the second double secret key Book, or new customer identification information, it is also possible to for the combination in any of above-mentioned four kinds of more fresh informations.More new module 17 is according to reality Situation obtains more fresh information, and this is not defined by embodiments of the invention.
By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment so that safety information is updated in the case of user authorizes, it is ensured that more The authenticity of new process.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, security control condition can be that signature verification, the most more new module 17 are right Updating the private key signing messages obtained of signing update content and carry out sign test, if by checking, the most more new module 17 is to safety Information is updated.
In specific implementation process, renewal process includes: more new module 17 receive more fresh information, more fresh information include update content with And utilize and update private key and update content is signed the signing messages obtained, wherein, update content include following any one or Its combination in any: new authenticated encryption key, the private key of the first new double secret key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key, The private key of the second new double secret key and the public key certificate of the second new double secret key and new customer identification information；More new module 17 Obtain and update the renewal PKI that private key is corresponding, utilize renewal PKI that the update content after signature is carried out sign test, and pass through in sign test After, safety information is updated.
In specific implementation process, updating private key and renewal PKI can be unsymmetrical key, the server sending update content uses Renewal private key carries out signature and obtains signing messages update content, and will update public key certificate, update content and signing messages together It is sent to more new module 17, more new module 17 and obtains renewal PKI according to updating public key certificate, and use renewal PKI to signature Information carries out sign test, after sign test is passed through, utilizes update content to be updated.
Such as, when more new module 17 updates authenticated encryption key, more new module 17 receives new authenticated encryption key and utilization Updating private key to sign new authenticated encryption key the signing messages obtained, more new module 17 obtains that to update private key corresponding more New PKI, and the signing messages of new authenticated encryption key is carried out sign test, if the verification passes, illustrate that new authenticated encryption is close The source of key is legal, and the most more new module 17 replaces old authenticated encryption key with new authenticated encryption key, otherwise, illustrates new The source of authenticated encryption key is illegal, and more new module 17 refusal replaces old authenticated encryption key with new authenticated encryption key.
In specific implementation process, it can be to update module 17 only to enter authenticated encryption key that safety information is updated by more new module 17 Row updates, or the private key of the first double secret key and the public key certificate of the first double secret key are only updated by more new module 17, or The private key of the second double secret key and the public key certificate of the second double secret key are only updated by more new module 17, or more new module 17 Customer identification information is updated, it is also possible to for above-mentioned four kinds of combination in any updated.More new module 17 is entered according to practical situation Row updates, and this is not defined by embodiments of the invention.
Correspondingly, the more fresh information that more new module 17 obtains can be new authenticated encryption key and new authenticated encryption key Signing messages, or the private key of the first new double secret key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key and the first new double secret key The signing messages of the public key certificate of private key and the first new double secret key, or the private key of the second new double secret key and the second key To public key certificate and the signing messages of public key certificate of the private key of the second new double secret key and the second double secret key, or new use Family identifies information and the signing messages of new customer identification information, or the combination in any of above-mentioned four kinds of more fresh informations, or sends out The server sending update content uses and updates private key to new authenticated encryption key, the private key of the first new double secret key and new the The public key certificate of one double secret key, the private key of the second new double secret key and the public key certificate of the second double secret key, new user identify letter The combination in any of breath carries out the signing messages obtained of signing.More new module 17 obtains more fresh information according to practical situation, the present invention's This is not defined by embodiment.
By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment, owing to identity card card-reading terminal is when updating new safety information, to sending more The signature authentication of the server of new content, the identity with the server of certification transmission update content is legal, thus ensure that new peace The source of full information is legal, reliable.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, security control condition can be encryption key checking, the most more new module 17 pairs of encryption keys are encrypted the confidential information that adds obtained and are decrypted update content, and after deciphering completes, to safety information It is updated.
In specific implementation process, renewal process includes: more new module 17 receives more fresh information, more fresh information and includes utilizing encryption close Key is encrypted the ciphertext obtained to update content, and wherein, update content includes following any one or its combination in any: new Authenticated encryption key, the private key of the first new double secret key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key, the second new double secret key Private key and the public key certificate of the second new double secret key and new customer identification information；It is corresponding that more new module 17 obtains encryption key Decruption key, utilize decruption key that the ciphertext after encryption is decrypted, and after deciphering completes, safety information carried out more Newly.
In specific implementation process, encryption key and decruption key can be symmetric key, more new module 17 and transmission update content Server can all use identical symmetry algorithm to generate encryption key and decruption key, it would however also be possible to employ the mode of offered is assisted Business goes out encryption key and decruption key.Certainly, encryption key and decruption key can also be unsymmetrical key, send update content Server use encryption key update content is encrypted, and will encryption after update content and decruption key certificate be sent to More new module 17, more new module 17 are according to decruption key certificate acquisition decruption key, and use decruption key to add encryption key Ciphertext after close is decrypted.
Such as, when more new module 17 updates authenticated encryption key, more new module 17 receives the server by utilizing sending update content Encryption key new authenticated encryption key is encrypted obtain add confidential information and decruption key certificate, more new module 17 is according to solution Decryption key certificate obtains decruption key, and uses decruption key to be decrypted the confidential information that adds of new authenticated encryption key, deciphering After completing, the most more new module 17 replaces old authenticated encryption key with new authenticated encryption key.
In specific implementation process, it can be to update module 17 only to enter authenticated encryption key that safety information is updated by more new module 17 Row updates, or the private key of the first double secret key and the public key certificate of the first double secret key are only updated by more new module 17, or The private key of the second double secret key and the public key certificate of the second double secret key are only updated by more new module 17, or more new module 17 Customer identification information is updated, it is also possible to for above-mentioned four kinds of combination in any updated.More new module 17 is entered according to practical situation Row updates, and this is not defined by embodiments of the invention.
Correspondingly, the more fresh information that more new module 17 obtains can be the confidential information that adds of new authenticated encryption key, or new the The private key of one double secret key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key add confidential information, or the private key of the second new double secret key with And second double secret key public key certificate add confidential information, or new customer identification information add confidential information, or above-mentioned four kinds more The combination in any of fresh information, or send the server by utilizing encryption key of update content to new authenticated encryption key, new the The private key of one double secret key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key, the private key of the second new double secret key and the second double secret key Public key certificate, the combination in any of new customer identification information are encrypted the cipher-text information obtained.More new module 17 is according to actual feelings Condition obtains more fresh information, and this is not defined by embodiments of the invention.
By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment, the most correct deciphering of identity card card-reading terminal has obtained update content, just shows The identity of the server sending update content is legal, so that new safety information just can be carried out more through encryption key checking Newly, it is ensured that the terminal authentication of server to sending update content, it is ensured that the source of new safety information is legal, can Lean on.
In an optional embodiment of the present embodiment, the content owing to updating includes the public key certificate and/or the of the first double secret key The public key certificate of two double secret key, therefore, more new module 17 needs the public key certificate to the first new double secret key and/or the second key To public key certificate verify, or as described in above-mentioned optional embodiment, when security control condition is signature verification, update Module 17 signature verification of the public key certificate of the first new double secret key and/or the public key certificate of the second double secret key is passed through after again to newly The public key certificate of the first double secret key and/or the public key certificate of the second double secret key verify, or such as above-mentioned optional embodiment institute State, when security control condition is encryption key checking, the more new module 17 public key certificate and/or second to the first new double secret key The encryption key of the public key certificate of double secret key be verified after public key certificate and/or the second double secret key to the first new double secret key again Public key certificate verify.The most more new module 17 is according to PKI to the first new double secret key of the root certificate of digital certificate server Certificate is verified, if checking is correct, the private key of the first double secret key and the public key certificate of the first double secret key are entered by the most more new module 17 Row updates；The public key certificate of the second new double secret key is verified by the root certificate according to digital certificate server, if checking is correct, The private key of the second double secret key and the public key certificate of the second double secret key are updated by the most more new module 17.
In specific implementation process, more new module 17 generally all stores the root certificate of digital certificate server, and this root certificate is used for testing Demonstrate,prove the certificate that more new module 17 obtains from digital certificate server the most legal.Therefore, more new module 17 receives new first After the public key certificate of double secret key and/or the public key certificate of the second new double secret key, the root certificate pair of digital certificate server to be used The new public key certificate of the first double secret key and/or the public key certificate of the second new double secret key are verified, if checking is correct, and explanation The new public key certificate of the first double secret key and/or the public key certificate of the second new double secret key are generated by this digital certificate server, Being legal, the most more new module 17 public key certificate of the first new double secret key and/or the public key certificate of the second new double secret key replace Change public key certificate and/or the public key certificate of the second double secret key of the first old double secret key.By using the root of digital certificate server to demonstrate,prove New public key certificate is verified by book, it is ensured that the legitimacy of new public key certificate.
By the optional embodiment of the present embodiment so that the security control condition of safety information is verified by more new module 17, Only security control condition is by checking, and safety information just can be updated by more new module 17, it is ensured that new safety information Reliability.
In sum, by the identity card card-reading terminal in the authentication ids system that the present embodiment provides, by identity card Card Reader Key is used by terminal, it is ensured that the reliability of key, it is ensured that the safety of identity information in identity card reading process. Further, during the use of key, by key is carried out control of authority, it is achieved that the occupation mode of key is carried out Examination, it is ensured that the normal use of key.Further, by key being updated operation so that the effect duration of key arrives After date, has new key to replace old key, ensure again that the safety of identity card reading process.
Any process described otherwise above or method describe and are construed as in flow chart or at this, represent include one or The module of code, fragment or the part of the executable instruction of the more steps for realizing specific logical function or process, and The scope of the preferred embodiment of the present invention includes other realization, wherein can not be by order that is shown or that discuss, including root According to involved function by basic mode simultaneously or in the opposite order, performing function, this should be by embodiments of the invention institute Belong to those skilled in the art to be understood.
Those skilled in the art are appreciated that it is permissible for realizing all or part of step that above-described embodiment method carries Instructing relevant hardware by program to complete, described program can be stored in a kind of computer-readable recording medium, this journey Sequence upon execution, including one or a combination set of the step of embodiment of the method.
In the description of this specification, reference term " embodiment ", " some embodiments ", " example ", " concrete example ", Or specific features, structure, material or the feature that the description of " some examples " etc. means to combine this embodiment or example describes comprises In at least one embodiment or example of the present invention.In this manual, the schematic representation to above-mentioned term not necessarily refers to It is identical embodiment or example.And, the specific features of description, structure, material or feature can at any one or Multiple embodiments or example combine in an appropriate manner.
Although above it has been shown and described that embodiments of the invention, it is to be understood that above-described embodiment is exemplary, Being not considered as limiting the invention, those of ordinary skill in the art is in the case of without departing from the principle of the present invention and objective Above-described embodiment can be changed within the scope of the invention, revise, replace and modification.The scope of the present invention is by appended power Profit requires and equivalent limits.

Claims (15)

1. the method that in an authentication ids system, identity card card-reading terminal uses key, it is characterised in that including:
Described identity card card-reading terminal obtains session key solicited message；
Session key solicited message described in described identity card card-reading terminal use authenticated encryption double secret key is encrypted and obtains the first encryption Information；
Described identity card card-reading terminal uses the private key of the first double secret key to add confidential information to described first to carry out signature and obtain the first signature Information；
First transmission data are sent to cloud authentication platform by described identity card card-reading terminal, and wherein, described first transfers data to less Including the public key certificate of the second double secret key, the public key certificate of described first double secret key, described first add confidential information, described first sign Name information；
Described identity card card-reading terminal receives the second transmission data that described cloud authentication platform returns, wherein, described second transmission number According at least including the public key certificate of the 3rd double secret key, the first encryption session key, the second signing messages, wherein, described first adds Close session key is that described cloud authentication platform utilizes the PKI of described second double secret key to be encrypted session key, described Two signing messages are that described cloud authentication platform utilizes the private key of the 3rd double secret key that described first encryption session key is carried out signature to obtain 's；
Described identity card card-reading terminal obtains the PKI of the 3rd double secret key according to the public key certificate of described 3rd double secret key, and uses the The PKI of three double secret key carries out sign test to described second signing messages, if sign test result is correct, described identity card card-reading terminal according to Described first encryption session key is decrypted and obtains described session key by the private key of described second double secret key, and stores described meeting Words key；
The identity card ciphertext that described identity card card-reading terminal is obtained by identity card card-reading terminal described in described session key obtains 3rd transmission data, and described 3rd transmission data are sent to described cloud authentication platform；
Described identity card card-reading terminal receives the 4th transmission data that described cloud authentication platform sends, and by described session key solution Close described 4th transmission data obtain identity card in plain text；Wherein, described 4th transmission data include that described cloud authentication platform utilizes institute Stating the ciphertext that described identity card plain text encryption is obtained by session key, described identity card is that described cloud authentication platform is to described body in plain text Part card ciphertext deciphering obtains.
Method the most according to claim 1, it is characterised in that described identity card card-reading terminal obtains session key request letter Before breath, described method also includes:
Described identity card card-reading terminal acquisition customer identification information, and obtain the result of described customer identification information, if checking Result is correct, then perform to obtain the step of session key solicited message.
Method the most according to claim 2, it is characterised in that described identity card card-reading terminal obtains session key request letter Before breath, described method also includes:
Described identity card card-reading terminal also obtain the maximum mistake access times of this described customer identification information used and this The currently used number of times of the described customer identification information used；
Described identity card card-reading terminal judges that whether the currently used number of times of this described customer identification information used described is less than this The maximum mistake access times of the described customer identification information of secondary use, the most then perform to obtain the step of session key solicited message Suddenly.
4. according to the method described in any one of claims 1 to 3, it is characterised in that described identity card card-reading terminal uses certification Encryption key described session key solicited message is encrypted obtain first add confidential information before, described method also includes:
Described identity card card-reading terminal obtains authenticated encryption key from outside, and wherein, described authenticated encryption key is for request meeting The information of words key is encrypted.
5. according to the method described in any one of Claims 1-4, it is characterised in that described identity card card-reading terminal uses certification Encryption key described session key solicited message is encrypted obtain first add confidential information before, described method also includes:
Described identity card card-reading terminal obtains this occupation mode information of described authenticated encryption key used and this uses The attribute information of described authenticated encryption key；
Described identity card card-reading terminal judges the occupation mode information of this described authenticated encryption key used described and described certification The attribute information of encryption key is the most consistent, if unanimously, then performs described identity card card-reading terminal and uses authenticated encryption double secret key institute State session key solicited message to be encrypted and obtain the first step adding confidential information.
6. according to the method described in any one of claim 1 to 5, it is characterised in that described identity card card-reading terminal uses first The private key of double secret key adds confidential information and carries out before signature obtains the first signing messages described first, and described method also includes:
Described identity card card-reading terminal obtains described first double secret key, and wherein, described first double secret key includes described first double secret key Private key and the PKI of described first double secret key；
Described identity card card-reading terminal acquisition digital certificate server carries out digital certificate to the PKI of described first double secret key and signs and issues behaviour Make the public key certificate of described first double secret key generated.
7. according to the method described in any one of claim 1 to 6, it is characterised in that described identity card card-reading terminal uses first The private key of double secret key adds confidential information and carries out before signature obtains the first signing messages described first, and described method also includes:
Described identity card card-reading terminal obtains the occupation mode information of the private key of this described first double secret key used described and obtains Take the attribute information of the private key of this described first double secret key used；
Described identity card card-reading terminal judges that the occupation mode information of the private key of this described first double secret key used described is with described The attribute information of the private key of the first double secret key is the most consistent, if unanimously, then performs described identity card card-reading terminal and uses the first key To private key add confidential information to described first and sign and obtain the step of the first signing messages.
8. according to the method described in any one of claim 1 to 7, it is characterised in that described identity card card-reading terminal passes first Before transmission of data is sent to cloud authentication platform, described method also includes:
Described identity card card-reading terminal obtains described second double secret key, and described second double secret key includes the private key of described second double secret key PKI with described second double secret key；
Described identity card card-reading terminal acquisition digital certificate server carries out digital certificate to the PKI of described second double secret key and signs and issues behaviour Make the public key certificate of described second double secret key generated.
9. according to the method described in any one of claim 1 to 8, it is characterised in that described identity card card-reading terminal uses the 3rd Before the PKI of double secret key carries out sign test to described second signing messages, described method also includes:
Obtain occupation mode information and this described 3rd double secret key used of the PKI of this described 3rd double secret key used The attribute information of PKI；
Described identity card card-reading terminal judges that the occupation mode information of the PKI of this described 3rd double secret key used described is with described The attribute information of the PKI of the 3rd double secret key is the most consistent, if unanimously, then uses the PKI of the 3rd double secret key to described second signature Information carries out the operation of sign test.
10. according to the method described in any one of claim 1 to 9, it is characterised in that described identity card card-reading terminal is according to institute Stating before described first encryption session key is decrypted and obtains described session key by the private key of the second double secret key, described method is also Including:
Described identity card card-reading terminal obtains the occupation mode information of private key of this described second double secret key used and this makes The attribute information of private key of described second double secret key；
Described identity card card-reading terminal judges that the occupation mode information of the private key of this described second double secret key used described is with described The attribute information of the private key of the second double secret key is the most consistent, if unanimously, then performs described identity card card-reading terminal according to described second The private key of double secret key is decrypted the operation obtaining described session key to described first encryption session key.
11. according to the method described in any one of claim 1 to 10, it is characterised in that described method also includes:
The security control condition of safety information is verified by described identity card card-reading terminal, if described security control condition is by testing Card, described safety information is updated by the most described identity card card-reading terminal, and wherein, described safety information includes following any one Plant or its combination in any: described authenticated encryption key, the private key of described first double secret key and the public key certificate of described first double secret key, The private key of described second double secret key and the public key certificate of described second double secret key and described customer identification information.
12. methods according to claim 11, it is characterised in that described security control condition includes that customer identification information is tested Card；
If described security control condition is by checking, the most described identity card card-reading terminal is updated bag to described safety information Include:
Described identity card card-reading terminal obtains more newly requested, and receives user and identify checking information, and obtains user is identified checking The result of information, if described the result is correct, the most described identity card card-reading terminal obtains more fresh information, and to institute Stating safety information to be updated, wherein, described more fresh information includes following any one or its combination in any: new authenticated encryption Key, the private key of the first new double secret key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key, the private key of the second new double secret key and The public key certificate of the second new double secret key and new customer identification information.
13. methods according to claim 11, it is characterised in that described security control condition includes signature verification,
If described security control condition is by checking, the most described identity card card-reading terminal is updated bag to described safety information Include:
Described identity card card-reading terminal receives more fresh information；Wherein
Described more fresh information includes: update content and utilize and update private key and sign update content the signing messages obtained；
Described update content includes following any one or its combination in any: new authenticated encryption key, the first new double secret key The PKI card of private key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key, the private key of the second new double secret key and the second new double secret key Book and new customer identification information；
Described identity card card-reading terminal obtains and updates the renewal PKI that private key is corresponding, utilizes described renewal PKI to described signing messages Carry out sign test, and after sign test is passed through, described safety information is updated.
14. methods according to claim 11, it is characterised in that described security control condition includes that encryption key is verified；
If described security control condition is by checking, the most described identity card card-reading terminal is updated bag to described safety information Include:
Described identity card card-reading terminal receives more fresh information；Wherein
Described more fresh information includes: utilize encryption key that described update content is encrypted the ciphertext obtained；
Described update content includes following any one or its combination in any: new authenticated encryption key, the first new double secret key The PKI card of private key and the public key certificate of the first new double secret key, the private key of the second new double secret key and the second new double secret key Book and new customer identification information；
Described identity card card-reading terminal obtains the decruption key that encryption key is corresponding, utilizes described decruption key to carry out described ciphertext Deciphering, and after deciphering completes, described safety information is updated.
15. according to the method described in any one of claim 11 to 14, it is characterised in that described carry out described safety information The step updated includes:
The PKI of described the first new double secret key is demonstrate,proved by described identity card card-reading terminal according to the root certificate of described digital certificate server Book is verified, if checking is correct, the most described identity card card-reading terminal is to the private key of described first double secret key and described first key To public key certificate be updated；And/or according to the root certificate of the described digital certificate server public affairs to described the second new double secret key Key certificate is verified, if checking is correct, and the most described identity card card-reading terminal private key and described second to described second double secret key The public key certificate of double secret key is updated.
CN201610041687.2A 2016-01-21 2016-01-21 A kind of method that identity card card-reading terminal uses key in authentication ids system Active CN106027254B (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201610041687.2A CN106027254B (en) 2016-01-21 2016-01-21 A kind of method that identity card card-reading terminal uses key in authentication ids system

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201610041687.2A CN106027254B (en) 2016-01-21 2016-01-21 A kind of method that identity card card-reading terminal uses key in authentication ids system

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CN106027254A true CN106027254A (en) 2016-10-12
CN106027254B CN106027254B (en) 2019-05-21

Family

ID=57082717

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CN201610041687.2A Active CN106027254B (en) 2016-01-21 2016-01-21 A kind of method that identity card card-reading terminal uses key in authentication ids system

Country Status (1)

Country Link
CN (1) CN106027254B (en)

Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN107040921A (en) * 2017-06-22 2017-08-11 东华大学 One kind is based on point-to-point SMS encryption system
CN107809311A (en) * 2017-09-30 2018-03-16 飞天诚信科技股份有限公司 The method and system that a kind of unsymmetrical key based on mark is signed and issued
CN107994996A (en) * 2017-12-13 2018-05-04 山东渔翁信息技术股份有限公司 A kind of method, apparatus and computer-readable recording medium for protecting key
CN114079921A (en) * 2020-08-04 2022-02-22 中国电信股份有限公司 Generation method of session key, anchor point function network element and system

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP2731291A1 (en) * 2012-11-12 2014-05-14 Gemalto SA Control method and device for controlling authenticity of codes resulting from application of a bijective algorithm to messages
CN104618114A (en) * 2015-01-27 2015-05-13 李明 Identity card information obtaining method, device and system
CN104639538A (en) * 2015-01-15 2015-05-20 李明 Identity card information obtaining method and system
CN104899532A (en) * 2015-05-20 2015-09-09 李明 Method, apparatus and system for acquiring identity card information

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP2731291A1 (en) * 2012-11-12 2014-05-14 Gemalto SA Control method and device for controlling authenticity of codes resulting from application of a bijective algorithm to messages
CN104639538A (en) * 2015-01-15 2015-05-20 李明 Identity card information obtaining method and system
CN104618114A (en) * 2015-01-27 2015-05-13 李明 Identity card information obtaining method, device and system
CN104899532A (en) * 2015-05-20 2015-09-09 李明 Method, apparatus and system for acquiring identity card information

Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN107040921A (en) * 2017-06-22 2017-08-11 东华大学 One kind is based on point-to-point SMS encryption system
CN107809311A (en) * 2017-09-30 2018-03-16 飞天诚信科技股份有限公司 The method and system that a kind of unsymmetrical key based on mark is signed and issued
CN107809311B (en) * 2017-09-30 2020-01-03 飞天诚信科技股份有限公司 Asymmetric key issuing method and system based on identification
CN107994996A (en) * 2017-12-13 2018-05-04 山东渔翁信息技术股份有限公司 A kind of method, apparatus and computer-readable recording medium for protecting key
CN114079921A (en) * 2020-08-04 2022-02-22 中国电信股份有限公司 Generation method of session key, anchor point function network element and system
CN114079921B (en) * 2020-08-04 2023-10-03 中国电信股份有限公司 Session key generation method, anchor point function network element and system

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN106027254B (en) 2019-05-21

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
CN109309565B (en) Security authentication method and device
CN109150548B (en) Digital certificate signing and signature checking method and system and digital certificate system
WO2020186827A1 (en) User authentication method and apparatus, computer device and computer-readable storage medium
CN108055274A (en) A kind of encryption based on alliance's chain storage data and shared method and system
CN109067801A (en) A kind of identity identifying method, identification authentication system and computer-readable medium
EP3001598B1 (en) Method and system for backing up private key in electronic signature token
CN107196966A (en) The identity identifying method and system of multi-party trust based on block chain
CN106327184A (en) Intelligent mobile terminal payment system and intelligent mobile terminal payment method based on safe hardware isolation
CN112528250B (en) System and method for realizing data privacy and digital identity through block chain
CN103546289B (en) USB (universal serial bus) Key based secure data transmission method and system
CN106227503A (en) Safety chip COS firmware update, service end, terminal and system
CN109150535A (en) A kind of identity identifying method, equipment, computer readable storage medium and device
CN106230784A (en) A kind of device authentication method and device
US8806206B2 (en) Cooperation method and system of hardware secure units, and application device
EP3001599B1 (en) Method and system for backing up private key of electronic signature token
CN103974255B (en) A kind of vehicle access system and method
CN106953732B (en) Key management system and method for chip card
CN101136748A (en) Identification authentication method and system
CN114692218A (en) Electronic signature method, equipment and system for individual user
CN106022081A (en) Card reading method for identity-card card-reading terminal, and terminal and system for identity-card card-reading
CN106027461A (en) Secret key use method for cloud authentication platform in identity card authentication system
CN106027254A (en) Secret key use method for identity card reading terminal in identity card authentication system
CN106027252A (en) Cloud authentication platform in identity card authentication system
CN106027464B (en) A kind of security information control method and identity card card-reading terminal
CN106027474A (en) Identity card reading terminal in identity card authentication system

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
C06 Publication
PB01 Publication
C10 Entry into substantive examination
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
GR01 Patent grant
GR01 Patent grant
TR01 Transfer of patent right
TR01 Transfer of patent right

Effective date of registration: 20220407

Address after: Tiantianrong building, No. 1, Zhongguancun, Beiqing Road, Haidian District, Beijing 100094

Patentee after: TENDYRON Corp.

Address before: 100086 room 603, building 12, taiyueyuan, Haidian District, Beijing

Patentee before: Li Ming