CN105978906A - Identity based communication handshake protocol - Google Patents
Identity based communication handshake protocol Download PDFInfo
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- CN105978906A CN105978906A CN201610511378.7A CN201610511378A CN105978906A CN 105978906 A CN105978906 A CN 105978906A CN 201610511378 A CN201610511378 A CN 201610511378A CN 105978906 A CN105978906 A CN 105978906A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
- H04L63/166—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the transport layer
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Abstract
The invention discloses an identity based communication handshake protocol, and relates to the basic field of network communication. According to the communication handshake protocol, the trouble of certificate transmission and verification can be removed; the handshake process is simplified; moreover, two-party authentication is finished; and a secure session is established. The technical scheme is that according to the identity based communication handshake protocol, through definition of new message contents, a TLS (Transport Layer Security) handshake protocol is thoroughly simplified; the handshake delay is reduced; and moreover, security parameter negotiation is finished. Specifically, the identity based communication handshake protocol comprises the steps of 1, establishing an identity based cryptosystem and distributing keys; and 2, carrying out handshake to negotiate security parameters. According to the identity based communication handshake protocol, through adoption of an identity based cryptography, identities and public keys are most naturally bound; use of a certificate is avoided; only two messages need to be sent in the negotiation process; the delay is low; the operation is simple and convenient; totally, there is one-time bilinear operation and one-time hash operation shared in the negotiation process; the operation efficiency is high; the calculation complexity is low; and the communication demand of the internet of things can be adapted well.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to network service basic field, the communication handshake agreement of a kind of identity-based.
Background technology
Transport Layer Security (Transport Layer Security, TLS) agreement is between transport layer and application layer, for
Information transmission provides the security service such as certification, confidentiality and integrity.Handshake Protocol is the core of TLS, and it completes client
The functions such as cryptographic algorithm negotiation, certification and session key generation between end and service end, are that communicating pair carries out data safety
The premise of transmission.Traditional tls handshake protocol is issued based on PKIX (Public Key Infrastructure, PKI)
Send out certificate realize certification and key exchange, on the one hand, certificate query and Certificate Path Construction cause bigger computing cost and
Time delay, on the other hand, certificate exchange brings bigger communication overhead, and these problems limit TLS's to a certain extent
Deployment scope.
1984, Shamir proposed ID-based cryptosystem system (Identity Based Cryptosystem, IBC),
This system does not use any certificate, directly by believable private key, the identity of user is generated center as PKI, private key
(Private Key Generator, PKG) generates and is distributed to user.IBC certificate of necessity in solving PKI generates, signs
While sending out, backing up, the problem such as cancel, hence it is evident that the system that reduces is set up and the cost safeguarded and complexity, is greatly saved and deposits
Storage space and the network bandwidth.The application of IBC becomes more and more extensive.
Quick, efficient, the development trend of miniaturization for adaptation future network, IBC is applied to network service by the present invention, carries
Going out the simplification Handshake Protocol of a kind of identity-based, its know-why being mainly concerned with has:
Zero bilinear map character:
If q is a Big prime, G1It is q rank modules, G2It is q rank multiplicative groups, maps e:G1×G1→G2For bilinear map,
Then to any Q, R ∈ G1, a, b ∈ Z, there is e (aQ, bR)=e (Q, R)ab。
Subjective entropy (the Identity Based Authenticated Key of zero identity-based
Agreement, IBAKA)
In ID-based cryptosystem system, it is ensured that the session key consulting to obtain only has communicating pair to know, i.e. at key
Completing the agreement of mutual authentication during negotiation, the present invention simply uses the one of IBAKA.
Summary of the invention
For above-mentioned technological deficiency, the present invention proposes the communication handshake agreement of a kind of identity-based, and IBC is applied to network
Communication, adaptation future network is quick, efficient, the development trend of miniaturization.
The concrete technical scheme of the present invention is:
By defining new message content, simplify tls handshake protocol, while delay is shaken hands in reduction, complete safe ginseng
The negotiation of number；Specifically include following steps:
1) foundation and the key of ID-based cryptosystem system is distributed；
2) hand shaking security parameter.
As the preferred technical solution of the present invention, described step 1) to be embodied as step as follows: PKG select certain specific
Elliptic curve, and constituted q rank addition cyclic group G by point thereon1, wherein q is a Big prime, and generating unit is P.Randomly chooseAs the master key of PKG, calculate Ppub=sP；
Further according to group G1Select bilinear map e so that e:G1×G1→G2, G2For q rank multiplicative group；
Map e:G1×G1→G 2For bilinear map, then to any Q, R ∈ G1, a, b ∈ Z, have e (aQ, bR)=e (Q,
R)ab。
Finally select relevant hash function H1:{0,1}*→G1, H2:G2→{0,1}n, n is key length；
After completing to initialize, the common parameter list ＜ q, G of public address system1,G2,e,n,P,Ppub,H1,H2＞；PKG generates
The public and private key pair of given identity ID, if client identity is A, then its PKI and private key are respectively QA=H1And S (A)A=sQA；
Service end identity is B, then its PKI and private key are respectively QB=H1And S (B)B=sQB, private key is sent to by safe lane
User.
As the preferred technical solution of the present invention, described step 2) specifically comprise the following steps that
(1) client sends ClientHello message, initiates session connection.
ClientHello message, structure is defined as follows:
Wherein:
Client_version is the protocol version of client；
Identity deposits the identity information of client, for producing the PKI of client；
Session_id is session identification, and its value is produced by service end；Without reusable session identification or hope
Consulting security parameter, this field should be empty, otherwise represents that client wishes to reuse this session；Session identification should be protected after generating always
Hold and deleted by time-out or the connection relevant to this session runs into fatal error and be closed；
The cipher suit list that cipher_suites is supported by client, prioritized, select for service end
Select；Newly-increased cipher suite IBAKA_WITH_AES_CBC, represents and uses IBAKA to carry out key exchange and certification, symmetric cryptography is calculated
Method is 128 AES, and encryption mode is CBC；
The compression algorithm list that compression_methods is supported by client, prioritized, for clothes
Business end selects；
(2) service end sends SeverHello message, completes the negotiation of security parameter；
SeverHello message, structure is defined as follows:
Wherein:
Server_version is the protocol version of service end；
The identity information of identity service end, for producing the PKI of service end；
Session_id is the session identification that service end uses, if the session identification in ClientHello message is not
Sky, and there is the session identification of coupling in service end, then service end is reused the session establishment corresponding with this mark and is newly connected, and is returning
The upper session identification consistent with client of band in the SeverHello message answered, otherwise service end produces a new session mark
Know, be used for setting up a new session；
Cipher_suite is the cipher suite that service end is chosen from ClientHello message, in handshake procedure
For the IBAKA_WITH_AES_CBC external member selected；During Session state reuse, this field is deposited and is reused the cipher suite that session uses；
Compression_method is the compression algorithm that service end is chosen from ClientHello message, session
When reusing, this field is deposited and is reused the compression algorithm that session uses；
(3) service end has sent SeverHello message, according to KB=H2(e(QA,SB)) session key preserving；
(4) after client receives SeverHello message, according to KA=H2(e(SA,QB)) session key preserving；
Above handshake procedure should be carried out according to flow process order, otherwise will cause fatal mistake.
Compared with prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects as follows:
(1) use ID-ased cryptography technology, complete the most natural binding of identity and PKI, it is to avoid making of certificate
With；
(2) negotiations process only needs to send two message, postpones little, easy and simple to handle；Negotiations process shares 1
Secondary bilinear operation, 1 Hash operation, operation efficiency is high, and computational complexity is low, can preferably adapt to Internet of Things Netcom
The demand of letter.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is embodiment general diagram；
Fig. 2 is embodiment handshake information flow process.
Detailed description of the invention
Below in conjunction with Figure of description and concrete preferred embodiment, the invention will be further described, but the most therefore and
Limit the scope of the invention.
It is an object of the invention to design the communication handshake agreement of a kind of identity-based, break away from the tired of certificate transmission and checking
Disturb, simplify handshake procedure, complete the certification of both sides simultaneously, set up secured session.Below with reference to same intra domain user Alice (letter
Claim A) to the specific embodiment of user Bob (being called for short B) initiation secure connection, the present invention will be described.In the present embodiment, by territory
The interior believable task of completing PKG from trust authority (Self-Trust Authority, STA).
The know-why being mainly concerned with has:
Zero bilinear map character:
If q is a prime number, G1 is q rank modules, and G2 is q rank multiplicative groups, maps e:G1×G1→G2For bilinear map,
Then to any Q, R ∈ G1, a, b ∈ Z, there is e (aQ, bR)=e (Q, R)ab。
Subjective entropy (the Identity Based Authenticated Key of zero identity-based
Agreement, IBAKA).
In ID-based cryptosystem system, it is ensured that the session key consulting to obtain only has communicating pair to know, i.e. at key
Completing the agreement of mutual authentication during negotiation, the present invention simply uses the one of IBAKA.
As it is shown in figure 1, the identity-based communication handshake agreement main-process stream of the present invention comprises the following steps:
1. the foundation of ID-based cryptosystem system and Private key distribution；
PKG selects certain specific elliptic curve, and such as selecting elliptic curve is y2=x3-3x, and by thereon some structure
Become q (q is a Big prime) rank addition cyclic group G1, wherein generating unit is P.Randomly chooseAs the master key of PKG, meter
Calculate Ppub=sP.Further according to group G1Utilize weil on elliptic curve to or Tate pair, construct bilinear map e so that e:G1
×G1→G2, G2For q rank multiplicative group.Finally select relevant hash function H1:{0,1}*→G1, H2:G2→{0,1}n, n key is long
Degree.After completing to initialize, the common parameter list ＜ q, G of public address system1,G2,e,n,P,Ppub,H1,H2＞.PKG generates given
The public and private key pair of identity ID, identity ID of AliceAFor Alice@company.com, then the PKI Q of its correspondenceAFor H1
(IDA), PKG is its private key S generatedAFor sQA.Identity ID of BobBFor Bob@company.com, then the PKI Q of its correspondenceBFor
H1(IDB), PKG is its private key S generatedBFor sQB, PKG passes through escape way by Private key distribution to user.
Shaken hands interactive authentication and security parameter of 2.TLS is consulted；
As in figure 2 it is shown, handshake procedure is as follows:
(1) customer end A lice sends ClientHello message, initiates session connection.Client_version is set to
1.0；Identity puts into Alice@company.com；Session_id is empty；Cipher_suites prioritization
IBAKA_WITH_AES_CBC cipher suite also arranges rational compression algorithm list.
ClientHello message, structure is defined as follows:
Wherein:
Client_version is the protocol version of client；
Identity deposits the identity information of client, for producing the PKI of client；
Session_id is session identification, and its value is produced by service end；Without reusable session identification or hope
Consulting security parameter, this field should be empty, otherwise represents that client wishes to reuse this session；Session identification should be protected after generating always
Hold and deleted by time-out or the connection relevant to this session runs into fatal error and be closed；
The cipher suit list that cipher_suites is supported by client, prioritized, select for service end
Select；The present invention increases cipher suite IBAKA_WITH_AES_CBC newly, represents and uses IBAKA to carry out key exchange and certification, symmetrical
AES is 128 AES, and encryption mode is CBC；
The compression algorithm list that compression_methods is supported by client, prioritized, for clothes
Business end selects；
(2) service end Bob sends SeverHello message, completes security parameter and consults.Client_version is chosen as
TLS 1.0；Identity puts into Bob@company.com；Suitable session_id is set；Cipher_suites selects
IBAKA_WITH_AES_CBC cipher suite also selects suitable compression algorithm.
SeverHello message, structure is defined as follows:
Wherein:
Server_version is the protocol version of service end；
The identity information of identity service end, for producing the PKI of service end；
Session_id is the session identification that service end uses, if the session identification in ClientHello message is not
Sky, and there is the session identification of coupling in service end, then service end is reused the session establishment corresponding with this mark and is newly connected, and is returning
The upper session identification consistent with client of band in the SeverHello message answered, otherwise service end produces a new session mark
Know, be used for setting up a new session；
Cipher_suite is the cipher suite that service end is chosen from ClientHello message, and the present invention proposes
Handshake procedure in for select IBAKA_WITH_AES_CBC external member.During Session state reuse, this field is deposited and is reused session use
Cipher suite；
Compression_method is the compression algorithm that service end is chosen from ClientHello message, session
When reusing, this field is deposited and is reused the compression algorithm that session uses.
(3), after Bob has sent SeverHello message, H is passed through1(Alice@company.com) produces the PKI of Alice
QA, and pass through KB=H2(e(QA,SB)) session key preserving.
(4), after Alice receives SeverHello message, H is passed through1(Bob@company.com) produces the PKI Q of BobB, and
Pass through KA=H2(e(SA,QB)) session key preserving.
After session key has produced, both sides formally set up connection.
Obviously, the above embodiment of the present invention is only for clearly demonstrating example of the present invention, and is not right
The restriction of embodiments of the present invention.For those of ordinary skill in the field, the most also may be used
To make other changes in different forms.Here without also cannot all of embodiment be given exhaustive.All at this
The spirit of invention and interior made any amendment, equivalent and the improvement etc. of principle, should be included in the claims in the present invention
Protection domain in.
Claims (3)
1. a communication handshake agreement for identity-based, by defining new message content, simplifies tls handshake protocol, is reducing
Shake hands while delay, complete the negotiation of security parameter；It is characterized in that, specifically include following steps:
1) foundation and the key of ID-based cryptosystem system is distributed；
2) hand shaking security parameter.
The communication handshake agreement of a kind of identity-based the most according to claim 1, it is characterised in that described step 1) tool
It is as follows that body implements step: PKG selects certain specific elliptic curve, and is constituted q rank addition cyclic group G by point thereon1, wherein
Q is a Big prime, and generating unit is P；Randomly chooseAs the master key of PKG, calculate Ppub=sP；
Further according to group G1Select bilinear map e so that e:G1×G1→G2, G2For q rank multiplicative group；e:G1×G1→G2For two-wire
Property map, then to any Q, R ∈ G1, a, b ∈ Z, there is e (aQ, bR)=e (Q, R)ab；
Finally select relevant hash function H1:{0,1}*→G1, H2:G2→{0,1}n, n is key length；
After completing to initialize, the common parameter list ＜ q, G of public address system1,G2,e,n,P,Ppub,H1,H2＞；PKG generates given
The public and private key pair of identity ID, if client identity is A, then its PKI and private key are respectively QA=H1And S (A)A=sQA；Service
End identity is B, then its PKI and private key are respectively QB=H1And S (B)B=sQB, send private key to user by safe lane.
The communication handshake agreement of a kind of identity-based the most according to claim 2, it is characterised in that described step 2) tool
Body step is as follows:
(1) client sends ClientHello message, initiates session connection；
ClientHello message, structure is defined as follows:
Wherein:
Client_version is the protocol version of client；
Identity deposits the identity information of client, for producing the PKI of client；
Session_id is session identification, and its value is produced by service end；Consult without reusable session identification or hope
Security parameter, this field should be empty, otherwise represents that client wishes to reuse this session；Session identification should be always maintained at after generating
Deleted by time-out or the connection relevant to this session runs into fatal error and be closed；
The cipher suit list that cipher_suites is supported by client, prioritized, select for service end；
Newly-increased cipher suite IBAKA_WITH_AES_CBC, represents and uses IBAKA to carry out key exchange and certification, symmetric encipherment algorithm is
128 AES, encryption mode is CBC；
The compression algorithm list that compression_methods is supported by client, prioritized, for service end
Select；
(2) service end sends SeverHello message, completes the negotiation of security parameter；
SeverHello message, structure is defined as follows:
Wherein:
Server_version is the protocol version of service end；
The identity information of identity service end, for producing the PKI of service end；
Session_id is the session identification that service end uses, if the session identification in ClientHello message is not empty, and
There is the session identification of coupling in service end, then service end is reused the session establishment corresponding with this mark and newly connected, and is responding
The upper session identification consistent with client of band in SeverHello message, otherwise service end produces a new session identification, uses
Set up a new session；
Cipher_suite is the cipher suite that service end is chosen from ClientHello message, for choosing in handshake procedure
The IBAKA_WITH_AES_CBC external member selected；During Session state reuse, this field is deposited and is reused the cipher suite that session uses；
Compression_method is the compression algorithm that service end is chosen from ClientHello message, Session state reuse
Time, this field is deposited and is reused the compression algorithm that session uses；
(3) service end has sent SeverHello message, according to KB=H2(e(QA,SB)) session key preserving；
(4) after client receives SeverHello message, according to KA=H2(e(SA,QB)) session key preserving；
Above handshake procedure should be carried out according to flow process order, otherwise will cause fatal mistake.
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| CN201610511378.7A CN105978906A (en) | 2016-07-01 | 2016-07-01 | Identity based communication handshake protocol |
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|---|---|---|---|
| CN201610511378.7A CN105978906A (en) | 2016-07-01 | 2016-07-01 | Identity based communication handshake protocol |
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Family
ID=56954602
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Cited By (8)
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| CN106788997A (en) * | 2016-12-08 | 2017-05-31 | 深圳奥联信息安全技术有限公司 | A kind of real-time multimedia encryption method based on id password |
| CN107241190A (en) * | 2017-08-04 | 2017-10-10 | 南京理工大学 | The key agreement construction method and the network platform of a kind of identity-based |
| CN107835196A (en) * | 2017-12-13 | 2018-03-23 | 成都长城开发科技有限公司 | A kind of safety communicating method based on HDLC |
| CN109617675A (en) * | 2018-11-15 | 2019-04-12 | 国网电动汽车服务有限公司 | Both sides' identification authentication method and system between a kind of charge-discharge facility and user terminal |
| CN109639426A (en) * | 2019-02-26 | 2019-04-16 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Bidirectional self-authentication method based on identification password |
| CN110324290A (en) * | 2018-03-30 | 2019-10-11 | 贵州白山云科技股份有限公司 | Method, network element device, medium and the computer equipment of network equipment certification |
| CN112768018A (en) * | 2020-12-15 | 2021-05-07 | 扬州大学 | Electronic medical record security sharing method based on integrated credit evaluation intelligent contract |
| US11134379B2 (en) | 2016-11-24 | 2021-09-28 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. | Identity authentication method, device, and system |
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Cited By (13)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US11134379B2 (en) | 2016-11-24 | 2021-09-28 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. | Identity authentication method, device, and system |
| CN106788997A (en) * | 2016-12-08 | 2017-05-31 | 深圳奥联信息安全技术有限公司 | A kind of real-time multimedia encryption method based on id password |
| CN106788997B (en) * | 2016-12-08 | 2019-07-12 | 深圳奥联信息安全技术有限公司 | A kind of real-time multimedia encryption method based on id password |
| CN107241190A (en) * | 2017-08-04 | 2017-10-10 | 南京理工大学 | The key agreement construction method and the network platform of a kind of identity-based |
| CN107835196A (en) * | 2017-12-13 | 2018-03-23 | 成都长城开发科技有限公司 | A kind of safety communicating method based on HDLC |
| CN107835196B (en) * | 2017-12-13 | 2020-10-27 | 成都长城开发科技有限公司 | HDLC-based secure communication method |
| CN110324290A (en) * | 2018-03-30 | 2019-10-11 | 贵州白山云科技股份有限公司 | Method, network element device, medium and the computer equipment of network equipment certification |
| CN110324290B (en) * | 2018-03-30 | 2022-02-01 | 贵州白山云科技股份有限公司 | Network equipment authentication method, network element equipment, medium and computer equipment |
| CN109617675A (en) * | 2018-11-15 | 2019-04-12 | 国网电动汽车服务有限公司 | Both sides' identification authentication method and system between a kind of charge-discharge facility and user terminal |
| CN109617675B (en) * | 2018-11-15 | 2024-02-06 | 国网电动汽车服务有限公司 | Method and system for authenticating identifiers of both sides between charge and discharge facility and user terminal |
| CN109639426A (en) * | 2019-02-26 | 2019-04-16 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Bidirectional self-authentication method based on identification password |
| CN109639426B (en) * | 2019-02-26 | 2022-03-01 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Bidirectional self-authentication method based on identification password |
| CN112768018A (en) * | 2020-12-15 | 2021-05-07 | 扬州大学 | Electronic medical record security sharing method based on integrated credit evaluation intelligent contract |
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