CN105959117A - Vehicle-mounted ad hoc network security authentication method based on Cuckoo filter - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention discloses a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network security authentication method based on a Cuckoo filter. The method comprises the following two steps: 1) identity authentication between a vehicle and an infrastructure (V2I), wherein the step comprises the following four specific processes: system initialization, initial handshake, message signature and massage authentication; and 2) identity authentication between vehicles (V2V), wherein the step comprises three specific processes: group key generation, group message signature and group massage authentication. The method is realized based on software without depending on any other specific hardware equipment; an unparalleled linear pairing method is adopted in the authentication phase, and the unparalleled linear pairing authentication method is suitable for both V2I and V2V authentication, so that the method has efficient computing power and lower cost; and in the batch certification phase, the Cuckoo filter and the binary search technique are adopted to detect whether signature is effective, so that efficiency of the authentication phase is improved to a great extent.

Description

Vehicular ad hoc network safety certifying method based on Cuckoo filter

Technical field

The present invention relates to car connected network communication security fields, be specifically related to a kind of vehicular ad hoc based on Cuckoo filter Network security certification method.

Background technology

VANETs is the network of a kind of self assembly, the network being made up of the vehicle that is mutually related, and main purpose is for protecting The safety of card driver and convenience.The function of each car is all equivalent to a router, it is possible to outside by Wireless Telecom Equipment Boundary's transmission information.A kind of typical VANETs has two kinds of node types, and one is the pre-mobile communications nodes being contained on vehicle, vehicle-mounted Unit (OBU), two is large scale deployment infrastructure in road on both sides of the road, roadside unit (RSU).

Communication mode in VANETs is divided into two kinds, vehicle and vehicle communication (V2V) and vehicle and infrastructure-based communication (V2I), the communication of both types by short range wireless communication protocol control, referred to as DSRC (DSRC) agreement.At V2V Communication in, single unit vehicle, as a router, has corresponding informed source and destination.Therefore, Big challenge, is the legitimacy of the message that checking is most recently received.In the communication of V2I, can more easily verify message, Because roadside unit is concentration of local, it can follow the tracks of and participate in receive the message of vehicle, then the disappearing of centralized broadcast vehicle Breath.

The safety of message exchange plays pivotal role in VANETs.Because the mode of radio communication, opponent couple It is the most relatively easy that VANETs controls communication channels, and opponent can intercept, revises, message of resetting.Therefore, take action further taking Before, vehicle or OBU must verify that effectiveness and the integrity of the message received, to prevent opponent from changing or to revise original disappearing Cease or imitate the message of some vehicles broadcast mistake.Because the telecommunication flow information of these mistakes may make traffic control center do The decision made mistake, causes the generation of vehicle accident.

In addition, in VANETs, privacy is another major issue in recent years.Car owner may be not intended to others and know his Itinerary.But opponent by following the tracks of the message that vehicle sends, and then can know the itinerary of car owner.Therefore, in order to Solving privacy concern, anonymous communication is a need for.Meanwhile, the true identity of vehicle, also should be credible when being necessary Mechanism can trace back to.Such as, when having crime or accident occurs, it is possible to trace back to malice vehicle and the people of action thereof, and allow It is punished severely accordingly.

In recent years, the scheme (SPECS) that reinforcement safety communicated with privacy proposes a kind of concentration between vehicle and communicates. SPECS provides a solution based on software and meets privacy requirements.But this scheme is quickly proved to be permissible It is hacked.Soon, the weakness in SPECS scheme can be overcome at VANET batch anonymous Identity checking (b-SPECS+), meet Safety and the demand of privacy.But b-SPECS+ scheme does not the most propose testing for group communication (vehicle and vehicle communication) Card, and there is no any lifting in terms of checking expense yet.

Summary of the invention

Goal of the invention: it is an object of the invention to solve technical problem present in prior art, it is provided that a kind of based on The vehicular ad hoc network safety certifying method of Cuckoo filter, the present invention realizes based on software, and it is any special not rely on Hardware device；Use a kind of based on the scheme without Bilinear Pairing, this checking without Bilinear map in the message authentication stage Method is applicable not only to V2I, is also applied in the checking of V2V, so having efficient computing capability and relatively low expense cost； The skill using Cuckoo filter and binary search in message criticizes certification changes the hashed value of notification message, retrieves signature The most effective so that message overhead significantly reduces, improve the efficiency of Qualify Phase.

Technical scheme: a kind of based on Cuckoo filter the vehicular ad hoc network safety certifying method of the present invention, bag Containing following steps:

(1) authentication procedures between vehicle and the infrastructure of VANETs based on Cuckoo filter is followed successively by: System initialization, shake hands for the first time, information signature and message authentication；

(2) authentication procedures between vehicle and the vehicle of VANETs based on Cuckoo filter is followed successively by: group is close Key generation, group's information signature and group's message authentication.

Further, the system initialization process in described step (1) comprises the following steps:

1) systematic parameter generation phase: TA initializes systematic parameter, calculates system PKI, and TA is trust authority, concrete mistake Journey is described as follows:

According to given nonsingular elliptic curve (P, p, q, G, E), TA selects a random numberAs system, master is close Key, and calculate P_Pub=s P is as system PKI；

2) vehicle true identity and password pre-allocation stage, detailed process is described as follows:

After vehicle first enters into network, TA is each vehicle distribution true identity RID and equipment password PWD；

3) common parameter launch phase: the entity in VANETs obtains public system parameter, it is thus achieved that system PKI；Concrete mistake Journey is described as follows:

Systematic parameter (P, p, q, E, G, h₁,h₂,P_Pub) each entity of being published in network, wherein, two safety are unidirectional Hash function,Vehicle and RSU can obtain.

Further, in the authentication procedures between described vehicle and infrastructure, it is respectively RSU and vehicle by TA Between, set up shared secret between TA and vehicle；TA calculates and verification public keyVehicle is that each session makes The privacy of oneself is protected with different anonymous Identity；The RSU with efficient computing capability is utilized to assist the message authentication of vehicle； By the hashed value of Cuckoo filter replacement notification message, retrieve signature the most effective；Searched by binary search technology Invalid signature in batch signature；When disputable occur time, trust authority TA can uniquely trace back to the true identity of vehicle；

The detailed process of described message authentication is followed successively by: RSU receives the signature information of vehicle；RSU verifies current time Stamp is in the range of transmission delay；Judge whether signature closes by the cryptographic Hash of signature existing in Cuckoo filter and message Method；RSU checks that PKI and shared key are in storage list；The integrity of RSU certification message and information source.

Further, the detailed process of the information signature of described RSU is as follows:

1) vehicle first calculates assumed name ID_i=(ID_i1,ID_i2), its computing formula is as follows, ID_i1=r_i·P_pub,Wherein r_iIt it is a random number；

2) above-mentioned generation ID is utilized_i1And ID_i2To message M_iSigning, its concrete signature formula is as follows,

${\mathrm{\σ}}_i=r_i+\frac{m_i{h}_2\left({\mathrm{ID}}_i\right|\left|M_i\right|\left|T_i\right)}{s}$

Wherein h (.) is safe one-way Hash function, T_iThe current time stamp sent for message, after having signed, vehicle V_i Send (ID_i,M_i,σ_i,T_i)。

Further, the detailed process of the message authentication of described RSU is as follows:

1) RSU receives range of information (ID_i,M_i,σ_i,T_i), i ∈ (1,2,3 ..., n), wherein, ID_iIt is hideing of vehicle Name；M_iIt is the vehicle message received, σ_iIt is the signature of this message, T_iIt it is current time stamp；

2) RSU first checks for current time stamp T_i.Assuming that the time T received_RSU, △ T is predefined acceptable transmission Postpone, if △ were T >=T_RSU-T_iSet up, enter next step, be false on the contrary, just signature is directly abandoned；

3) if the data signed in Cuckoo filter, RSU has only to the cryptographic Hash of checking signature and message and is No in positive and negative filter, i.e. can determine whether to sign the most effectively (detailed process is shown in generation notification message), if now filter It is empty or has been updated to sky it is necessary to enter next step；

4) RSU needs to go to verify vehicle V_iPKI VPK_iWith shared key m_i, check (the VPK of storage_i,m_i) meet equationIf equation is set up enters next step, if be false, just signature is stored in negative filtration In device；

5) RSU randomly chooses vector v={ v₁,v₂,...v_n, v here_iBe one [1,2^tLittle Stochastic in the range of], T is a integer the least, and RSU carries out batch certification to the signature in above-mentioned message, if following batch of certification equation is set up, says This message bright is complete, and the sender of message is also legal, legal signature is stored in positive filter simultaneously, right Next step binary search batch processing (detailed process is shown in binary search batch processing) is carried out in illegal signature,

$(\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\Σ}}{v}_i\·{\mathrm{\σ}}_i)\·P_{pub}=\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\Σ}}(v_i\·{\mathrm{ID}}_{i1})+\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\Σ}}(v_i\·h_i\·m_i)\·P.$

Further, in the message authentication of described RSU, by the hashed value of Cuckoo filter replacement notification message, Retrieve signature the most effectively (detailed process is shown in generation notification message)；Effective and invalid information signature is put into by RSU respectively Detailed process in positive filter and negative filter is as follows:

1) Cuckoo filter storage signature sigma_iWith message M_iCryptographic Hash (fingerprint) f=Fingerprint being mapped to (x), wherein x=(ID_i1||M_i)；

2) Cuckoo filter is each data item x by hash scheme, and the index calculating two candidate bucket is as follows:

i₁=hash (x) mod M

$i_2=(i_1\⊕hash(Fingerpr\mathrm{int}\left(x\right)\left)\right)\mathrm{mod}M$

Wherein M is the barrelage mesh upper limit；

3) if candidate bucket has one to be empty, then fingerprint is stored in free bucket by us.If two candidate bucket are all Not having space, we can only select a candidate bucket, mobile off-the-shelf item, reinserts candidate bucket to this project, wherein i₁ And i₂Refer to two candidate bucket respectively.

Further, message criticizes the certification hashed value by Cuckoo filter replacement notification message, and retrieving signature is The detailed process of no effectively (generation notification message) is as follows:

If vehicle V_iWant to verify V_jMessage M_jIn signature sigma_j, it is necessary first to calculate hash function value f= Fingerprint (x), wherein x=(ID_j||M_j), the index value i of two positions is then obtained according to hash function₁And i₂, point Do not go positive filter and negative filter search whether to there is corresponding cryptographic Hash, four kinds of results can be obtained as shown in table 1:

Four kinds of probable values of table 1Cuckoo filter

For first two situation, the result determined can be obtained；For the 3rd kind of situation, V_jCryptographic Hash occur in two mistakes In filter, the most so-called false positive, the method for the present invention is in the range of △ T, occurs that the probability of this situation is almost nil, So being directly entered authentication；For last a kind of situation, it is meant that in the range of △ T, the most authenticated signature of RSU σ_j, so being directly entered the authentication stage.

Further, in the message authentication of described RSU, in a collection of thousands of signature, the most several Invalid signature, in order to avoid all abandoning, invalid signature that is two point searched in batch signature by binary search technology are searched The detailed process of rope batch processing is as follows:

1) a collection of signature sigma to be verified₁,σ₂,...σ_nThere is n；

2) intermediate point of n signature is found out

3) carry out batch at first half and latter half to verify, in the event of invalid signature, continuing above Process, repeats binary search.

Further, the generation of the group cipher in described step (2) process comprises the following steps:

1) group's request: vehicle V_iInitiate group's request, request message and corresponding signature have been sent to RSU, and ask RSU Broadcast；

2) group agrees to: any vehicle V_jReceive vehicle V_iRequest message, whether first check for the assumed name of oneself at it In, if, then vehicle V_jTransmission is receiveed the response M_j={ GPAGR, ID_j, and the signature of oneself is sent to RSU；

3) group criticizes after certification: RSU receives above-mentioned signature, and this approval and sign name carries out batch certification；At this point for any vehicle V_xSignature be effective；RSU is the most public and private key of this all living creatures to TA request；This group cipher is encrypted and is sent to RSU by TA； RSU broadcast and signature information；

4) group sets up: vehicle receives above-mentioned message and signature, after certification is passed through, it is thus achieved that the group private key CGS of self；Group's private key Shared key is utilized to encrypt, so only member can decipher in group.

Further, during described group cipher generates, the detailed process that group criticizes certification is as follows:

1) RSU is the most public and private key of this all living creatures to TA request；

2) TA chooses random number rr, calculates group cipher CGS=s × rr；TA utilizes m_x, generate group PKI GPK_x=m_xP；

3) TA is encrypted ENC to this group cipher_tx(CGS) it is sent to RSU；

4) RSU broadcastAnd sign Name message

Further, the group's information signature in described step (2) and group's message authentication process comprise the following steps:

1) group's information signature: as vehicle V_iWhen sending group's message, needing to sign message, group here disappears Breath signature is with above-mentioned information signature process；Vehicle V_iTo message M_iSign, produce signature sigma_iThe most above-mentioned message of particular content Described in signature process；Vehicle is by message { ID_i,ENC_CGS(GPK_i||ID_i),M_i,σ_iBe broadcasted；

2) group's message authentication: after receiving above-mentioned message, in group, member is to from vehicle V_iMessage M_iIn signature sigma_iEnter Row certification；First, vehicle is by judging △ T >=T_RSU-T_iWhether set up, set up and then carry out next step；Here △ T is system The acceptable transmission delay set, T_RSUFor receiving the vehicle receiver time to message；

3) vehicle passes through group's private key to ENC_CGS(GPK_i||ID_i) be decrypted, it is thus achieved that GPK_iAnd ID_i, before comparison The M received_rDetermine whether member in group；If it is determined that this member is member in group, then message is verified, checking public affairs Formula is:

σ_iP_pub=ID_i1+h₂(ID_i||M_i||T_i)GPK_i。

Beneficial effect: compared with prior art, the invention have the advantages that

(1) present invention is the solution realized based on software, does not relies on any special hardware device, is ensureing group On the basis of interior member security communication, testing vehicle register authentication function, information completely sexual function can be met.

(2) present invention uses a kind of based on the scheme without Bilinear Pairing in message authentication process, this without Bilinear map Proof scheme be applicable not only to V2I, be also applied in the checking of V2V, so having efficient computing capability and relatively low opening Pin cost.

(3) by the hashed value of the skill replacing notification message of Cuckoo filter and binary search in the present invention, retrieve Effective and invalid signature so that message overhead significantly reduces, improves the efficiency of Qualify Phase.

Accompanying drawing explanation

Fig. 1 is the system structure schematic diagram of the present invention；

Fig. 2 is the FB(flow block) of the present invention；

Fig. 3 is the schematic flow sheet of testing vehicle register certification in the present invention；

Fig. 4 is message authentication process flow chart in the present invention；

Fig. 5 is the schematic flow sheet that in the present invention, group built by vehicle；

Fig. 6 is communication overhead comparison diagram in the present invention.

Detailed description of the invention

Below technical solution of the present invention is described in detail, but protection scope of the present invention is not limited to described enforcement Example.

As it is shown in figure 1, a kind of based on Cuckoo filter the vehicular ad hoc network safety certifying method of the present invention is drawn It is divided into 2 layers: top layer is whole nation trust authority TA, is connected with RSU by safe channel；Bottom has RSU and vehicle (or OBU) group Becoming, the communication between them is based on DSRC (DSRC) agreement；TA is always on, credible, and never compromises, TA Can uniquely confirm the true identity of vehicle；RSU is believable, for OBU, has higher computing capability.

As in figure 2 it is shown, a kind of based on Cuckoo filter the vehicular ad hoc network safety certifying method of the present invention is altogether Have two steps, respectively: (1) is the authentication of (V2I) between vehicle and infrastructure, this step include system initialization, Shake hands for the first time, information signature and message authentication Four processes；(2) authentication of (V2V) between vehicle and vehicle, this step bag Include group cipher generation, group's information signature and three processes of group's message authentication.

Authentication procedures between vehicle and infrastructure is as it is shown on figure 3, vehicle passes through RSU by true identity and mouth What the ciphertext of order was safe is sent to TA；By TA respectively between RSU and vehicle, between TA and vehicle, set up shared secret.This In embodiment, it is embodied as step as follows:

(1) in system initialisation phase, all vehicles and RSU can obtain the open parameter of the system that produced by TA (P, p, q, E,G,h₁,h₂,P_Pub)；

(2) vehicle V_i, i ∈ 1,2,3 ..., when n} enters the communication range of certain RSU for the first time, vehicle is wanted to be obtained by RSU Obtain the predistribution of TA, first with the private key of selfRID and PWD is signedThen TA is utilized PKI PK_TAAbove-mentioned data are encrypted, produce ciphertextCar By RSU this ciphertext safety is sent to TA；

(3) RSU is only responsible for middle transmission, and TA utilizes private key SK_TADeciphering, and utilize the PKI of vehicleTest Card；TA randomly selects a t_i, as a shared secret between vehicle；TA calculates verification public key TA randomly selects number m_i, as RSU and vehicle V_iBetween shared secret；TA utilizes the PKI of vehicle and the PKI of RSU PK_RAbove-mentioned data are encrypted generation ciphertextWithTA is by array (RID, t_i,m_i) carry out corresponding storage；Then by ciphertext Y RSU is sent to by safety chain with Z；

(4) RSU receives ciphertext Y and Z, utilizes own private key SK_RCiphertext Z is decrypted, it is thus achieved that verification public key VPK_i、 Share parameter m_iAnd signatureThe PKI utilizing TA is authenticated, after certification is passed through, and corresponding storage (VPK_i, m_i), and ciphertext Y is transmitted to vehicle V_i；

(5)V_iAfter receiving Y, utilizeCiphertext Y is decrypted, it is thus achieved that s, VPK_i,(s,VPK_i) and m_i,After being verified, utilizeCalculate and obtain t_i；Then V_iStorage (VPK_i,s,m_i,t_i)。

As shown in Figure 4, RSU receives the signature information of vehicle to the idiographic flow of message authentication；RSU checking signature and message Whether cryptographic Hash is in positive and negative filter；RSU checking current time is stabbed in the range of transmission delay；RSU checks PKI and shares Key is in storage list；The integrity of RSU certification message and information source.In the present embodiment, it is embodied as step as follows:

(1) RSU receives range of information (ID_i,M_i,σ_i,T_i), i ∈ (1,2,3 ..., n), wherein, ID_iIt is hideing of vehicle Name；M_iIt is the vehicle message received, σ_iIt is the signature of this message, T_iIt it is current time stamp；

(2) RSU first checks for current time stamp T_i.Assuming that the time T received_RSU, △ T is predefined acceptable biography Defeated delay.If △ were T >=T_RSU-T_iSet up, enter next step, be false on the contrary, just signature is directly abandoned；

(3) if the data signed in Cuckoo filter, RSU has only to the cryptographic Hash of checking signature and message and is No in positive and negative filter, i.e. can determine whether to sign the most effective, if now filter be empty or be updated to sky it is necessary to Enter next step；

(4) RSU needs to go to verify vehicle V_iPKI VPK_iWith shared key m_i, check (the VPK of storage_i,m_i) the fullest Foot equationIf equation is set up enters next step, if be false, just signature is stored in In negative filter；

(5) RSU randomly chooses vector v={ v₁,v₂,...v_n, v here_iBe one [1,2^tLittle random finger in the range of] Number, t is a integer the least, and RSU carries out batch certification to the signature in above-mentioned message, if following batch of certification equation becomes Vertical, illustrate that this message is complete, the sender of message is also legal, legal signature is stored in positive filter simultaneously In, illegal signature is carried out to next step binary search batch processing.

$(\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\Σ}}{v}_i\·{\mathrm{\σ}}_i)\·P_{pub}=\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\Σ}}(v_i\·{\mathrm{ID}}_{i1})+\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\Σ}}(v_i\·h_i\·m_i)\·P$

Vehicle builds the detailed process of group as it is shown in figure 5, in the present embodiment, be embodied as step as follows:

(1) group's request: vehicle V_iInitiate group's request, by message M_i={ GPREQ, ID₁,...ID_i-1,ID_i+1,...,ID_n} With corresponding signatureIt is sent to RSU, and broadcasts its message；

(2) group agrees to: any vehicle V_jReceive vehicle V_iRequest message, whether first check for the assumed name of oneself at it In；If, then vehicle V_jTransmission is receiveed the response M_j={ GPAGR, ID_j}；Same, utilize the side during information signature Above-mentioned message is signed by formulaAnd signature is sent to RSU；

(3) group criticizes after certification: RSU receives above-mentioned signature, and this approval and sign name carries out batch certification；To any vehicle V_xLabel Name is effective；RSU is the most public and private key of this all living creatures to TA request；TA chooses random number rr, calculates group's private key CGS=s × rr； TA utilizes m_x, generate group PKI GPK_x=m_xP；This group of private keys are encrypted by TA, obtain ciphertextAnd be sent to RSU；RSU broadcastAnd signature disappears Breath

(4) group sets up: vehicle receives above-mentioned message and signature, after certification is passed through, it is thus achieved that the group private key CGS of self；Because Group's private key utilizes shared key to encrypt, so only member can decipher in group.

As shown in Figure 6, illustrating to calculate the message of BVMM (bulk messages checking) varying number of cost, the present invention is more Effectively with SPECS and b-SPECS+ in the quantity of BVMM stage different messages compared with.Wherein, SPECS and b-SPECS+ is Operation based on Bilinear Pairing, the present invention is based on the operation joined without bilinearity on elliptic curve (ECC), is embodied as meter Calculation comparison step is as follows:

For convenience's sake, we to define some semiology analysis times as follows.

T_bp≈ 4.2110: be the execution time of a Bilinear Pairing operation.

T_bp·m≈ 1.7090: be the execution time of a scalar multiplication relating to Bilinear Pairing operation.

T_bp·sm≈ 0.0535: be the execution time of a small-scale multiplication operation relating to Bilinear Pairing operation.

T_bp·a≈ 0.0071: be the execution time of a some add operation relating to Bilinear Pairing operation.

T_H≈ 4.406: be the execution time of a hash-to-point operation relating to Bilinear Pairing.

T_e·m≈ 0.4420: be the execution time of a scalar multiplication relating to ECC operation.

T_e·sm≈ 0.0138: be the execution time of a small-scale multiplication operation relating to ECC operation.

T_e·a≈ 0.0018: be the execution time of a some add operation relating to ECC operation.

T_h≈ 0.0001: be the execution time of an one-way Hash function operation.

AIDM: represent that anonymous Identity generates and information signature；SVOM: represent single information authentication；BVMM: represent that batch disappears Breath checking；GAIDM: represent that group's anonymous Identity generates and information signature；GMV: represent group's information authentication.

In the present invention, the AIDM stage uses and relates to two scalar multiplications operation of ECC operation and two one-way Hash function Operation, so the execution time of this step be: 2T_e·m+2T_h≈0.8842ms。

The SVOM stage uses two the scalar multiplication operations relating to ECC operation, an add operation and a unidirectional Kazakhstan Wish the operation of function, so the execution time of this step is: 2T_e·m+1T_e·a+1T_h≈0.8859ms。

The BVMM stage uses two scalar multiplications operation relating to ECC operation, the operation of (n) individual small-scale multiplication with, (n) The operation of individual add operation and (n) individual one-way Hash function, thus the execution time of this step be: 2T_e·m+nT_e·sm+nT_e·a+ nT_h≈(0.0157n+0.884)ms。

The GAIDM stage uses two scalar multiplication operations and the operation of two one-way Hash function relating to ECC operation So the execution time of this step is: 2T_e·m+2T_h≈0.8842ms。

The GMV stage uses two the scalar multiplication operations relating to ECC operation, an add operation and an one-way hash function The operation of function, thus the execution time of this step be: 2T_e·m+1T_ea+1T_h≈0.8859ms。

Analyze through above, it can be deduced that such as the calculating cost comparing result of table 2.

Table 2 calculates Cost comparisons's table

Claims (10)

1. a vehicular ad hoc network safety certifying method based on Cuckoo filter, it is characterised in that: comprise following step Rapid:

(1) authentication procedures between vehicle and the infrastructure of VANETs based on Cuckoo filter is followed successively by: system Initialize, shake hands for the first time, information signature and message authentication；

(2) authentication procedures between vehicle and the vehicle of VANETs based on Cuckoo filter is followed successively by: group cipher is raw One-tenth, group's information signature and group's message authentication.

Vehicular ad hoc network safety certifying method based on Cuckoo filter the most according to claim 1, its feature It is: the system initialization process in described step (1) comprises the following steps:

1) systematic parameter generation phase: TA initializes systematic parameter, calculates system PKI, and TA is trust authority, and detailed process is retouched State as follows:

According to given nonsingular elliptic curve (P, p, q, G, E), TA selects a random numberAs system master key, and Calculate P_Pub=s P is as system PKI；

2) vehicle true identity and password pre-allocation stage, detailed process is described as follows:

When vehicle first enters into network, TA is each vehicle distribution true identity RID and equipment password PWD；

3) common parameter launch phase: the entity in VANETs obtains public system parameter, it is thus achieved that system PKI；Detailed process is retouched State as follows:

Systematic parameter (P, p, q, E, G, h₁,h₂,P_Pub) each entity of being published in network, wherein, two safe one-way hash functions Function,Vehicle and RSU can obtain.

Vehicular ad hoc network safety certifying method based on Cuckoo filter the most according to claim 1, its feature It is, in the authentication procedures between described vehicle and infrastructure, is respectively between RSU and vehicle by TA, TA and car Shared secret is set up between；TA calculates and verification public keyVehicle is that each session uses different anonymities Identity protects the privacy of oneself；The RSU with efficient computing capability is utilized to assist the message authentication of vehicle；By Cuckoo mistake The hashed value of notification message changed by filter, retrieves signature the most effective；Searched in batch signature by binary search technology Invalid signature；When disputable generation, trust authority TA can uniquely trace back to the true identity of vehicle；

The detailed process of described message authentication is followed successively by: RSU receives the signature information of vehicle；RSU checking current time stamp exists In the range of transmission delay；By signature existing in Cuckoo filter and the cryptographic Hash of message, it is judged that sign the most legal； RSU checks that PKI and shared key are in storage list；The integrity of RSU certification message and information source.

Vehicular ad hoc network safety certifying method based on Cuckoo filter the most according to claim 3, its feature Being, the detailed process of the information signature of described RSU is as follows:

1) vehicle V_iFirst calculate assumed name ID_i=(ID_i1,ID_i2), its computing formula is as follows, ID_i1=r_i·P_pub,Wherein r_iIt it is a random number；

2) above-mentioned generation ID is utilized_i1And ID_i2To message M_iSigning, its concrete signature formula is as follows,

${\mathrm{\σ}}_i=r_i+\frac{m_i{h}_2\left({\mathrm{ID}}_i\right|\left|M_i\right|\left|T_i\right)}{s}$

Wherein h () is one-way safety hash function, T_iThe current time stamp sent for message, m_iIt is that TA is RSU and vehicle is set up Shared key, σ_iIt is the signature of this message, after having signed, vehicle V_iBroadcast (ID_i,M_i,σ_i,T_i)。

Vehicular ad hoc network safety certifying method based on Cuckoo filter the most according to claim 3, its feature Being, the detailed process of the message authentication of described RSU is as follows:

1) RSU receives range of information (ID_i,M_i,σ_i,T_i), i ∈ (1,2,3 ..., n), wherein, ID_iIt it is the anonymity of vehicle；M_i It is the vehicle message received, σ_iIt is the signature of this message, T_iIt it is current time stamp；

2) RSU first checks for current time stamp T_i, it is assumed that the time T received_RSU, △ T is predefined acceptable transmission delay, If △ were T >=T_RSU-T_iSet up, enter next step, be false on the contrary, just signature is directly abandoned；

3) if the data signed in Cuckoo filter, whether RSU has only to the cryptographic Hash of checking signature and message and exists In positive and negative filter, i.e. can determine whether to sign the most effectively, if now filter is empty or has been updated to sky it is necessary to enter Next step；

4) RSU needs to go to verify vehicle V_iPKI VPK_iWith shared key m_i, check (the VPK of storage_i,m_i) whether meet equationIf equation is set up enters next step, if be false, just signature is stored in negative filtration In device；

5) RSU randomly chooses vector v={ v₁,v₂,...v_n, v here_iBe one [1,2^tLittle Stochastic in the range of], t is One integer the least, RSU carries out batch certification to the signature in above-mentioned message, if following batch of certification equation (1) is set up, says This message bright is complete, and the sender of message is also legal, legal signature is stored in positive filter simultaneously, right Binary search batch processing is carried out in illegal signature；

$(\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\mathrm{\Σ}}}{v}_i\·{\mathrm{\σ}}_i)\·P_{pub}=\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\Σ}}(v_i\·{\mathrm{ID}}_{i1})+\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\Σ}}(v_i\·h_i\·m_i)\·P---\left(1\right).$

Vehicular ad hoc network safety certifying method based on Cuckoo filter the most according to claim 5, its feature Being: in the message authentication of described RSU, by the hashed value of Cuckoo filter replacement notification message, retrieving signature is No effectively；It is as follows that effective and invalid information signature is put into the detailed process in positive filter and negative filter by RSU respectively:

1) Cuckoo filter storage signature sigma_iWith message M_iCryptographic Hash f=Fingerprint (x), the i.e. fingerprint being mapped to Wherein x=(ID_i1||M_i)；

2) Cuckoo filter is each data item x by hash scheme, and the index calculating two candidate bucket is as follows:

i₁=hash (x) mod M

$i_2=(i_1\⊕hash(Fingerpr\mathrm{int}\left(x\right)\left)\right)\mathrm{mod}M$

Wherein M is the barrelage mesh upper limit；

3) if candidate bucket has one to be empty, then fingerprint is stored in free bucket, if two candidate bucket all do not have space, A candidate bucket, mobile off-the-shelf item can only be selected, reinsert candidate bucket to this project, wherein i₁And i₂Refer to two respectively Candidate bucket.

Vehicular ad hoc network safety certifying method based on Cuckoo filter the most according to claim 5, its feature It is, in the message authentication of described RSU, searches the invalid signature i.e. binary search in batch signature by binary search technology The detailed process of batch processing is as follows:

1) a collection of signature sigma to be verified₁,σ₂,...σ_nThere is n；

2) intermediate point of n signature is found out

3) carry out batch at first half and latter half to verify, in the event of invalid signature, continue process above, Repeat binary search.

Vehicular ad hoc network safety certifying method based on Cuckoo filter the most according to claim 1, its feature Being, the group cipher in described step (2) generates process and comprises the following steps:

1) group's request: vehicle V_iInitiate group's request, request message and corresponding signature have been sent to RSU, and ask RSU to broadcast Message；

2) group agrees to: any vehicle V_jReceive vehicle V_iRequest message, first check for the assumed name of oneself the most wherein, as Fruit exists, then vehicle V_jTransmission is receiveed the response M_j={ GPAGR, ID_j, and the signature of oneself is sent to RSU；

3) group criticizes after certification: RSU receives above-mentioned signature, and this approval and sign name carries out batch certification；At this point for any vehicle V_xLabel Name is effective；RSU is the most public and private key of this all living creatures to TA request；This group cipher is encrypted and is sent to RSU by TA；RSU is wide Broadcast message and signature information；

4) group sets up: vehicle receives above-mentioned message and signature, after certification is passed through, it is thus achieved that the group private key CGS of self；Group's private key is profit With shared key encryption, so only member can decipher in group.

Vehicular ad hoc network safety certifying method based on Cuckoo filter the most according to claim 8, its feature Being, during described group cipher generates, the detailed process that group criticizes certification is as follows:

1) RSU is the most public and private key of this all living creatures to TA request；

2) TA chooses random number rr, calculates group's private key CGS=s × rr；TA utilizes m_x, generate group PKI GPK_x=m_xP；

3) this group of private keys are encrypted by TAIt is sent to RSU；

4) RSU broadcastAnd signature disappears Breath

Vehicular ad hoc network safety certifying method based on Cuckoo filter the most according to claim 1, its feature Being, group's information signature and group's message authentication process in described step (2) comprise the following steps:

1) group's information signature: as vehicle V_iWhen sending group's message, need message is signed, group's message label here Name is with above-mentioned information signature process；Vehicle V_iTo message M_iSign, produce signature sigma_iThe most above-mentioned information signature of particular content Described in process；Vehicle is by message { ID_i,ENC_CGS(GPK_i||ID_i),M_i,σ_iBe broadcasted；

2) group's message authentication: after receiving above-mentioned message, in group, member is to from vehicle V_iMessage M_iIn signature sigma_iRecognize Card；First, vehicle is by judging △ T >=T_RSU-T_iWhether set up, set up and then carry out next step；Here △ T is default Acceptable transmission delay, T_RSUFor receiving the vehicle receiver time to message；

3) vehicle passes through group's private key to ENC_CGS(GPK_i||ID_i) be decrypted, it is thus achieved that GPK_iAnd ID_i, by receive before comparison M_rDetermine whether member in group；If it is determined that this member is member in group, then verifying message, checking formula is:

σ_iP_pub=ID_i1+h₂(ID_i||M_i||T_i)GPK_i。