CN105931679A - One-out-of-two conformation maintenance bypass device of reactor protection system - Google Patents
One-out-of-two conformation maintenance bypass device of reactor protection system Download PDFInfo
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- CN105931679A CN105931679A CN201610328639.1A CN201610328639A CN105931679A CN 105931679 A CN105931679 A CN 105931679A CN 201610328639 A CN201610328639 A CN 201610328639A CN 105931679 A CN105931679 A CN 105931679A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21C—NUCLEAR REACTORS
- G21C7/00—Control of nuclear reaction
- G21C7/36—Control circuits
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- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21C—NUCLEAR REACTORS
- G21C7/00—Control of nuclear reaction
- G21C7/06—Control of nuclear reaction by application of neutron-absorbing material, i.e. material with absorption cross-section very much in excess of reflection cross-section
- G21C7/08—Control of nuclear reaction by application of neutron-absorbing material, i.e. material with absorption cross-section very much in excess of reflection cross-section by displacement of solid control elements, e.g. control rods
- G21C7/20—Disposition of shock-absorbing devices ; Braking arrangements
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
- Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin
- Y02E30/30—Nuclear fission reactors
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Abstract
The invention discloses a one-out-of-two conformation maintenance bypass device of a reactor protection system. The one-out-of-two conformation maintenance bypass device comprises the reactor protection system and a 2/3 conformation logic bypass unit. The 2/3 conformation logic bypass unit comprises a rotary switch S with four gear contacts, and further comprises 12 relays, wherein the 12 relays are normally open relays, every four of the 12 relays form a set, the input ends of the input loops of the four relays in the first set are connected to the first-gear contact, the input ends of the input loops of the four relays in the second set are connected to the second-gear contact, and the input ends of the input loops of the four relays in the third set are connected to the third-gear contact. The bypass device is arranged between a safety monitoring device and a safety logic device, and the function of protecting the maintenance bypass is increased. On-line maintenance and tests of equipment are achieved, the probability of non-planned shut-down caused by equipment failures is reduced, the performability of the reactor is improved, and the productivity effect is guaranteed.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to reactor protection system safety control technology, particularly relate to reactor protection system two and take one and meet maintenance bypass device.
Background technology
The overall upper 2/3(two from three of reactor protection system emergency shut-down unit) combination of channels; the structure that the version that local 2/3 meets, three-channel safe logic assembly and scram breaker composition multichannel overall 2/3 meet is used in each security logic combination of channels.
The signal of safety monitoring assembly monitoring is measured parameter, process measurement parameter, protection system equipment status and four kinds of signal types of system power supply state 24 kinds protection input signal by core and is formed.24 kinds of protection signals of feeding safe logic assembly are met mode by " 2/3 logic meets " and " 1/2 logic meets " two kinds of local and form.
Safe logic assembly accepts the contact signal of safety monitoring assembly output, and under reactor normal power runs, contact is completely in Guan Bi conducting state, and the signal of transmission is logical one signal.
nullAs shown in Figure 1，The structure of reactor protection system includes the safety monitoring assembly A being positioned at A channel、It is positioned at the safety monitoring assembly B of channel B、It is positioned at the safety monitoring assembly C of C-channel，Also include the safe logic assembly A being positioned at A channel、It is positioned at the safe logic assembly B of channel B、It is positioned at the safe logic assembly C of C-channel，Safety monitoring assembly A exports protected signal A1、Protection signal A2、Protection signal A3，Safety monitoring assembly B exports protected signal B1、Protection signal B2、Protection signal B3，Safety monitoring assembly C exports protected signal C1、Protection signal C2、Protection signal C3，Safe logic assembly A receives protection signal A1、Protection signal B1、Protection signal C1，Safe logic assembly B receives protection signal A2、Protection signal B2、Protection signal C2，Safe logic assembly C receives protection signal A3、Protection signal B3、Protection signal C3.
During reactor operation; the unplanned shutdown caused due to safety monitoring assembly equipment fault reduces the performability of reactor; in order to realize under Power operation operating mode the replacing of safety monitoring assembly faulty equipment, overhaul, verify or calibrate; need to cancel artificially behavior and the measure of one or more functions of the equipments in protection system; i.e. maintenance bypass; in the prior art, related data is not found.
Summary of the invention
Object of the present invention is to provide a kind of provides the reactor protection system two of by-pass collar to take one and meet maintenance bypass device to reactor protection system, this system takes one for the two of protection input signal and meets mode, devise bypass mode, by this by-pass collar is arranged between safety monitoring assembly and safe logic assembly, add the function of protection system maintenance bypass, realize on-line maintenance and the test of equipment, reduce the unplanned shutdown probability caused because of equipment fault, both the operation safety of reactor had been ensured, ensure again the seriality of operation test, improve the performability of reactor.
For solving disadvantages mentioned above, technical scheme is as follows:
Reactor protection system two takes one and meets maintenance bypass device,
Including reactor protection system; reactor protection system includes being positioned at the safety monitoring assembly A of A channel, being positioned at the safety monitoring assembly B of channel B; also include being positioned at the safe logic assembly A of A channel, being positioned at the safe logic assembly B of channel B; safety monitoring assembly A exports protected signal A1, protection signal A2; safety monitoring assembly B exports protected signal B1, protection signal B2; safe logic assembly A receives protection signal A1, protection signal B1, safe logic assembly B receive protection signal A2, protection signal B2；
Logic bypass block is met including 1/2,1/2 meets the rotary switch S that logic bypass block includes having three gear contacts, rotary switch S has 0 gear contact, 1 gear contact, 2 gear contacts, and the action cutter-contact point of rotary switch S is connected to power supply, and the 0 gear contact of rotary switch S is unsettled；
1/2 meets logic bypass block also includes 6 relays, 6 relays are normally opened relay, in 6 relays, every 3 is one group, the input of the input circuit of 3 relays of first group is all connected to 1 gear contact, outfan all ground connection of the input circuit of 3 relays of first group, the input of the input circuit of 3 relays of second group is all connected to 2 gear contacts, outfan all ground connection of the input circuit of 3 relays of second group；
3 relays of first group are A channel relay group, and 3 relays of second group are channel B relay group；
The outfan of the output loop of each relay in A channel relay group all possesses 2 signalling contacts, the input termination high level of its output loop, A channel relay group possesses 6 signalling contacts altogether, in 6 signalling contacts of A channel relay group, 2 signalling contacts are had to collect composition bypass signal contact A passage BP1, 2 signalling contacts are separately had to collect composition bypass signal contact A passage BP2, separately there are 2 signalling contacts to collect and go to light warning signaling system, bypass signal contact A passage BP1 is in parallel with protection signal A1, bypass signal contact A passage BP2 is in parallel with protection signal A2；
The outfan of the output loop of each relay in channel B relay group all possesses 2 signalling contacts, the input termination high level of its output loop, channel B relay group possesses 6 signalling contacts altogether, in 6 signalling contacts of channel B relay group, 2 signalling contacts are had to collect composition bypass signal contact channel B BP1, 2 signalling contacts are separately had to collect composition bypass signal contact channel B BP2, separately there are 2 signalling contacts to collect and go to light warning signaling system, bypass signal contact channel B BP1 is in parallel with protection signal B1, bypass signal contact channel B BP2 is in parallel with protection signal B2.
The design principle of said system is: when the action cutter-contact point of rotary switch S is placed in 0 gear contact, represent and do not put into by-pass collar, when the action cutter-contact point of rotary switch S is placed in 1 gear contact, represent that this bypass signal enters A logical channel and puts into bypass, when the action cutter-contact point of rotary switch S is placed in 2 gear contact, represent that this bypass signal enters B logic passage and puts into bypass；When bypassing if desired for a certain signalling channel 1/2 logic met, being rotated to the gear contact of respective channel by corresponding rotary switch S, now this road signal is bypassed.nullSuch as，When the safety monitoring assembly A in A channel breaks down or other situations，Need safety monitoring assembly A is carried out bypass process，The most now，The action cutter-contact point of rotary switch S is placed in 1 gear contact by us，Now safety monitoring assembly A is bypassed，Simultaneously，The input circuit of all relays in A channel relay group is switched on，Relay in A channel relay group is started working，The output loop of all relays in A channel relay group is connected，I.e. 6 signalling contacts in A channel relay group are all access in high level，Therefore，Bypass signal contact A passage BP1、Bypass signal contact A passage BP2 all connects high level，Due to bypass signal contact A passage BP1、Bypass signal contact A passage BP2 and the protection signal A1 from safety monitoring assembly A、Protection signal A2 one_to_one corresponding is in parallel，Form "or" logical relation，Therefore，No matter protect signal A1、Protection signal A2 input high level or input low level，And corresponding safe logic assembly receives to being high level all the time，This will make bypassed fault-signal passage be considered as sending normal signal，This bypass line is considered as normally，The signal that another safety monitoring assembly sends then is depended in now safeguard protection，Reach the purpose that safety monitoring assembly A is carried out to be bypassed，Such as，We assume that safety monitoring assembly A fault，Need safety monitoring assembly A is carried out bypass process，Now，Rotary switch S is placed in 1 gear contact by us，Relay in A channel relay group is started working，High level is exported to safety monitoring assembly A after bypass signal contact A passage BP1 is in parallel with protection signal A1，High level is exported to safety monitoring assembly B after bypass signal contact A passage BP2 is in parallel with protection signal A2，Therefore in maintenance process，What protection signal A1 and protection signal A2 was considered as output all the time is high level，The protection signal B1 sent with safety monitoring assembly B and protection signal B2 is depended in safeguard protection now，When protecting signal B1 and protection signal B2 is normal high level，Its protection system is failure to actuate，When protecting signal B1 and protection signal B2 is abnormal low level，It protects system acting.nullSame，When the safety monitoring assembly B in channel B breaks down or other situations，Need safety monitoring assembly B is carried out bypass process，The most now，The action cutter-contact point of rotary switch S is placed in 2 gear contacts by us，Now safety monitoring assembly B is bypassed，Simultaneously，The input circuit of all relays in channel B relay group is switched on，Relay in channel B relay group is started working，The output loop of all relays in channel B relay group is connected，I.e. 6 signalling contacts in channel B relay group are all connect high level，Therefore，Bypass signal contact channel B BP1、Bypass signal contact channel B BP2 all connects high level，Due to bypass signal contact channel B BP1、Bypass signal contact channel B BP2 and the protection signal B1 from safety monitoring assembly B、Protection signal B2 one_to_one corresponding series connection，Form "or" logical relation，Therefore，Protection signal B1、Protection signal B2 is all driven high，Safety monitoring assembly B now is considered as exporting high level，Reach the purpose that safety monitoring assembly B is carried out to be bypassed，The protection signal A1 sent with safety monitoring assembly A and protection signal A2 is depended in safeguard protection now，When protecting signal A1 and protection signal A2 is normal high level，Its protection system is failure to actuate，When protecting signal A1 and protection signal A2 is abnormal low level，It protects system acting.
Preferably, due in said system, the choosing of bypass signal contact uses random chooses mode, therefore, its embodiment exists and chooses formation bypass signal contact after 2 signalling contacts on the output loop of same relay collect, it is therefore assumed that this relay breaks down, then can not close the output loop changing relay, therefore cannot be carried out bypass to process, bypass system at this moment is insecure.Therefore, the present invention is in order to avoid the appearance of above-mentioned situation, use the following line plan of establishment, the output loop i.e. using any one relay chooses a signalling contact, a contact is chosen again on the output loop of another one relay, these 2 signalling contacts are collected formation bypass signal contact, after so arranging, can reach to increase the purpose of bypass signal stability, even if a relay fault, but owing to there is the bypass signal contact that the signalling contact of 2 different relays is constituted, its bypass signal contact is the most effectively.
Based on above-mentioned preferred design principle, preferably, 3 relays of A channel relay group are respectively as follows: relay K 1, relay K 2, relay K 4, the outfan of the output loop of relay K 1 possesses signalling contact K1-1 and signalling contact K1-2, the outfan of the output loop of relay K 2 possesses signalling contact K2-1 and signalling contact K2-2, the outfan of the output loop of relay K 4 possesses signalling contact K4-1 and signalling contact K4-2, and the output loop of relay K 4 is connected on light warning signaling system；Signalling contact K1-1 and signalling contact K2-1 collects composition bypass signal contact A passage BP1, signalling contact K1-2 and signalling contact K2-2 and collects composition bypass signal contact A passage BP2.
Based on above-mentioned preferred design principle, preferably, 3 relays of channel B relay group are respectively as follows: relay K 5, relay K 6, relay K 8, the outfan of the output loop of relay K 5 possesses signalling contact K5-1 and signalling contact K5-2, the outfan of the output loop of relay K 6 possesses signalling contact K6-1 and signalling contact K6-2, the outfan of the output loop of relay K 8 possesses signalling contact K8-1 and signalling contact K8-2, and the output loop of relay K 8 is connected on light warning signaling system；Signalling contact K5-1 and signalling contact K6-1 collects composition bypass signal contact channel B BP1, and signalling contact K5-2 and signalling contact K6-2 collects composition bypass signal contact channel B BP2.
Preferably, described safe logic assembly A, safe logic assembly B, safe logic assembly C include that 1/2 meets logical block.
Preferably, the input circuit of each relay is parallel with diode, forms control module after the input circuit of relay and diodes in parallel, and the input of this control module connects with corresponding gear contact, the output head grounding of this control module.
Preferably, 1 gear contact is also in series with diode VD13, and 2 gear contacts are also in series with diode VD14, ground connection after diode VD13, diode VD14 series resistor R, light emitting diode H simultaneously.
Effect of the invention is that: the present invention, by being arranged between safety monitoring assembly and safe logic assembly by this by-pass collar, adds the function of protection system maintenance bypass.After applying this maintenance bypass device, on the premise of ensureing that protection systemic-function normally plays, it is achieved the on-line maintenance of equipment and test, reduce the unplanned shutdown probability caused because of equipment fault, improve the performability of reactor, ensured productivity effect.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is the structural representation of reactor protection system.
Fig. 2 is 1/2 circuit diagram meeting logic bypass block.
Fig. 3 is that safe logic assembly A accesses bypass signal contact and the logic connectivity diagram of protection signalling contact.
Fig. 4 is the structural representation of the signalling contact composition bypass signal contact of 1/2 output loop meeting logic each relay of bypass block.
Detailed description of the invention
Below in conjunction with embodiment and accompanying drawing thereof, the present invention is described in further detail, but embodiments of the present invention are not limited to this.
Embodiment
1
As shown in Figures 1 to 4.
Reactor protection system two takes one and meets maintenance bypass device,
Including reactor protection system; reactor protection system includes being positioned at the safety monitoring assembly A of A channel, being positioned at the safety monitoring assembly B of channel B; also include being positioned at the safe logic assembly A of A channel, being positioned at the safe logic assembly B of channel B; safety monitoring assembly A exports protected signal A1, protection signal A2; safety monitoring assembly B exports protected signal B1, protection signal B2; safe logic assembly A receives protection signal A1, protection signal B1, safe logic assembly B receive protection signal A2, protection signal B2；
Logic bypass block is met including 1/2,1/2 meets the rotary switch S that logic bypass block includes having three gear contacts, rotary switch S has 0 gear contact, 1 gear contact, 2 gear contacts, and the action cutter-contact point of rotary switch S is connected to power supply, and the 0 gear contact of rotary switch S is unsettled；
1/2 meets logic bypass block also includes 6 relays, 6 relays are normally opened relay, in 6 relays, every 3 is one group, the input of the input circuit of 3 relays of first group is all connected to 1 gear contact, outfan all ground connection of the input circuit of 3 relays of first group, the input of the input circuit of 3 relays of second group is all connected to 2 gear contacts, outfan all ground connection of the input circuit of 3 relays of second group；
3 relays of first group are A channel relay group, and 3 relays of second group are channel B relay group；
The outfan of the output loop of each relay in A channel relay group all possesses 2 signalling contacts, the input termination high level of its output loop, A channel relay group possesses 6 signalling contacts altogether, in 6 signalling contacts of A channel relay group, 2 signalling contacts are had to collect composition bypass signal contact A passage BP1, 2 signalling contacts are separately had to collect composition bypass signal contact A passage BP2, separately there are 2 signalling contacts to collect and go to light warning signaling system, bypass signal contact A passage BP1 is in parallel with protection signal A1, bypass signal contact A passage BP2 is in parallel with protection signal A2；
The outfan of the output loop of each relay in channel B relay group all possesses 2 signalling contacts, the input termination high level of its output loop, channel B relay group possesses 6 signalling contacts altogether, in 6 signalling contacts of channel B relay group, 2 signalling contacts are had to collect composition bypass signal contact channel B BP1, 2 signalling contacts are separately had to collect composition bypass signal contact channel B BP2, separately there are 2 signalling contacts to collect and go to light warning signaling system, bypass signal contact channel B BP1 is in parallel with protection signal B1, bypass signal contact channel B BP2 is in parallel with protection signal B2.
The design principle of said system is: when the action cutter-contact point of rotary switch S is placed in 0 gear contact, represent and do not put into by-pass collar, when the action cutter-contact point of rotary switch S is placed in 1 gear contact, represent that this bypass signal enters A logical channel and puts into bypass, when the action cutter-contact point of rotary switch S is placed in 2 gear contact, represent that this bypass signal enters B logic passage and puts into bypass；When bypassing if desired for a certain signalling channel 1/2 logic met, being rotated to the gear contact of respective channel by corresponding rotary switch S, now this road signal is bypassed.nullSuch as，When the safety monitoring assembly A in A channel breaks down or other situations，Need safety monitoring assembly A is carried out bypass process，The most now，The action cutter-contact point of rotary switch S is placed in 1 gear contact by us，Now safety monitoring assembly A is bypassed，Simultaneously，The input circuit of all relays in A channel relay group is switched on，Relay in A channel relay group is started working，The output loop of all relays in A channel relay group is connected，I.e. 6 signalling contacts in A channel relay group are all access in high level，Therefore，Bypass signal contact A passage BP1、Bypass signal contact A passage BP2 all connects high level，Due to bypass signal contact A passage BP1、Bypass signal contact A passage BP2 and the protection signal A1 from safety monitoring assembly A、Protection signal A2 one_to_one corresponding is in parallel，Form "or" logical relation，Therefore，No matter protect signal A1、Protection signal A2 input high level or input low level，And corresponding safe logic assembly receives to being high level all the time，This will make bypassed fault-signal passage be considered as sending normal signal，This bypass line is considered as normally，The signal that another safety monitoring assembly sends then is depended in now safeguard protection，Reach the purpose that safety monitoring assembly A is carried out to be bypassed，Such as，We assume that safety monitoring assembly A fault，Need safety monitoring assembly A is carried out bypass process，Now，Rotary switch S is placed in 1 gear contact by us，Relay in A channel relay group is started working，High level is exported to safety monitoring assembly A after bypass signal contact A passage BP1 is in parallel with protection signal A1，High level is exported to safety monitoring assembly B after bypass signal contact A passage BP2 is in parallel with protection signal A2，Therefore in maintenance process，What protection signal A1 and protection signal A2 was considered as output all the time is high level，The protection signal B1 sent with safety monitoring assembly B and protection signal B2 is depended in safeguard protection now，When protecting signal B1 and protection signal B2 is normal high level，Its protection system is failure to actuate，When protecting signal B1 and protection signal B2 is abnormal low level，It protects system acting.nullSame，When the safety monitoring assembly B in channel B breaks down or other situations，Need safety monitoring assembly B is carried out bypass process，The most now，The action cutter-contact point of rotary switch S is placed in 2 gear contacts by us，Now safety monitoring assembly B is bypassed，Simultaneously，The input circuit of all relays in channel B relay group is switched on，Relay in channel B relay group is started working，The output loop of all relays in channel B relay group is connected，I.e. 6 signalling contacts in channel B relay group are all connect high level，Therefore，Bypass signal contact channel B BP1、Bypass signal contact channel B BP2 all connects high level，Due to bypass signal contact channel B BP1、Bypass signal contact channel B BP2 and the protection signal B1 from safety monitoring assembly B、Protection signal B2 one_to_one corresponding series connection，Form "or" logical relation，Therefore，Protection signal B1、Protection signal B2 is all driven high，Safety monitoring assembly B now is considered as exporting high level，Reach the purpose that safety monitoring assembly B is carried out to be bypassed，The protection signal A1 sent with safety monitoring assembly A and protection signal A2 is depended in safeguard protection now，When protecting signal A1 and protection signal A2 is normal high level，Its protection system is failure to actuate，When protecting signal A1 and protection signal A2 is abnormal low level，It protects system acting.
Embodiment
2
On the basis of embodiment 1, preferably, choosing to use and random choose mode due to the bypass signal contact in said system, therefore, its embodiment exists and chooses formation bypass signal contact after 2 signalling contacts on the output loop of same relay collect, it is therefore assumed that this relay breaks down, then can not close the output loop changing relay, therefore cannot be carried out bypass to process, bypass system at this moment is insecure.Therefore, the present invention is in order to avoid the appearance of above-mentioned situation, use the following line plan of establishment, the output loop i.e. using any one relay chooses a signalling contact, a contact is chosen again on the output loop of another one relay, these 2 signalling contacts are collected formation bypass signal contact, after so arranging, can reach to increase the purpose of bypass signal stability, even if a relay fault, but owing to there is the bypass signal contact that the signalling contact of 2 different relays is constituted, its bypass signal contact is the most effectively.
Based on above-mentioned preferred design principle, preferably, 3 relays of A channel relay group are respectively as follows: relay K 1, relay K 2, relay K 4, the outfan of the output loop of relay K 1 possesses signalling contact K1-1 and signalling contact K1-2, the outfan of the output loop of relay K 2 possesses signalling contact K2-1 and signalling contact K2-2, the outfan of the output loop of relay K 4 possesses signalling contact K4-1 and signalling contact K4-2, and the output loop of relay K 4 is connected on light warning signaling system；Signalling contact K1-1 and signalling contact K2-1 collects composition bypass signal contact A passage BP1, signalling contact K1-2 and signalling contact K2-2 and collects composition bypass signal contact A passage BP2.
Based on above-mentioned preferred design principle, preferably, 3 relays of channel B relay group are respectively as follows: relay K 5, relay K 6, relay K 8, the outfan of the output loop of relay K 5 possesses signalling contact K5-1 and signalling contact K5-2, the outfan of the output loop of relay K 6 possesses signalling contact K6-1 and signalling contact K6-2, the outfan of the output loop of relay K 8 possesses signalling contact K8-1 and signalling contact K8-2, and the output loop of relay K 8 is connected on light warning signaling system；Signalling contact K5-1 and signalling contact K6-1 collects composition bypass signal contact channel B BP1, and signalling contact K5-2 and signalling contact K6-2 collects composition bypass signal contact channel B BP2.
Preferably, described safe logic assembly A, safe logic assembly B, safe logic assembly C include that 1/2 meets logical block.
Preferably, the input circuit of each relay is parallel with diode, forms control module after the input circuit of relay and diodes in parallel, and the input of this control module connects with corresponding gear contact, the output head grounding of this control module.
Preferably, 1 gear contact is also in series with diode VD13, and 2 gear contacts are also in series with diode VD14, ground connection after diode VD13, diode VD14 series resistor R, light emitting diode H simultaneously.
Above-described embodiment is only the preferred embodiments of the present invention, not limiting the scope of the invention, as long as using the design principle of the present invention, and carries out non-creativeness work on this basis and the change made, within all should belonging to protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (6)
1. reactor protection system two takes one and meets maintenance bypass device, it is characterised in that:
Including reactor protection system; reactor protection system includes being positioned at the safety monitoring assembly A of A channel, being positioned at the safety monitoring assembly B of channel B; also include being positioned at the safe logic assembly A of A channel, being positioned at the safe logic assembly B of channel B; safety monitoring assembly A exports protected signal A1, protection signal A2; safety monitoring assembly B exports protected signal B1, protection signal B2; safe logic assembly A receives protection signal A1, protection signal B1, safe logic assembly B receive protection signal A2, protection signal B2；
Logic bypass block is met including 1/2,1/2 meets the rotary switch S that logic bypass block includes having three gear contacts, rotary switch S has 0 gear contact, 1 gear contact, 2 gear contacts, and the action cutter-contact point of rotary switch S is connected to power supply, and the 0 gear contact of rotary switch S is unsettled；
1/2 meets logic bypass block also includes 6 relays, 6 relays are normally opened relay, in 6 relays, every 3 is one group, the input of the input circuit of 3 relays of first group is all connected to 1 gear contact, outfan all ground connection of the input circuit of 3 relays of first group, the input of the input circuit of 3 relays of second group is all connected to 2 gear contacts, outfan all ground connection of the input circuit of 3 relays of second group；
3 relays of first group are A channel relay group, and 3 relays of second group are channel B relay group；
The outfan of the output loop of each relay in A channel relay group all possesses 2 signalling contacts, the input termination high level of its output loop, A channel relay group possesses 6 signalling contacts altogether, in 6 signalling contacts of A channel relay group, 2 signalling contacts are had to collect composition bypass signal contact A passage BP1, 2 signalling contacts are separately had to collect composition bypass signal contact A passage BP2, separately there are 2 signalling contacts to collect and go to light warning signaling system, bypass signal contact A passage BP1 is in parallel with protection signal A1, bypass signal contact A passage BP2 is in parallel with protection signal A2；
The outfan of the output loop of each relay in channel B relay group all possesses 2 signalling contacts, the input termination high level of its output loop, channel B relay group possesses 6 signalling contacts altogether, in 6 signalling contacts of channel B relay group, 2 signalling contacts are had to collect composition bypass signal contact channel B BP1, 2 signalling contacts are separately had to collect composition bypass signal contact channel B BP2, separately there are 2 signalling contacts to collect and go to light warning signaling system, bypass signal contact channel B BP1 is in parallel with protection signal B1, bypass signal contact channel B BP2 is in parallel with protection signal B2.
Reactor protection system two the most according to claim 1 takes one and meets maintenance bypass device; it is characterized in that: 3 relays of A channel relay group are respectively as follows: relay K 1, relay K 2, relay K 4; the outfan of the output loop of relay K 1 possesses signalling contact K1-1 and signalling contact K1-2; the outfan of the output loop of relay K 2 possesses signalling contact K2-1 and signalling contact K2-2; the outfan of the output loop of relay K 4 possesses signalling contact K4-1 and signalling contact K4-2, and the output loop of relay K 4 is connected on light warning signaling system；Signalling contact K1-1 and signalling contact K2-1 collects composition bypass signal contact A passage BP1, signalling contact K1-2 and signalling contact K2-2 and collects composition bypass signal contact A passage BP2.
Reactor protection system two the most according to claim 1 takes one and meets maintenance bypass device; it is characterized in that: 3 relays of channel B relay group are respectively as follows: relay K 5, relay K 6, relay K 8; the outfan of the output loop of relay K 5 possesses signalling contact K5-1 and signalling contact K5-2; the outfan of the output loop of relay K 6 possesses signalling contact K6-1 and signalling contact K6-2; the outfan of the output loop of relay K 8 possesses signalling contact K8-1 and signalling contact K8-2, and the output loop of relay K 8 is connected on light warning signaling system；Signalling contact K5-1 and signalling contact K6-1 collects composition bypass signal contact channel B BP1, and signalling contact K5-2 and signalling contact K6-2 collects composition bypass signal contact channel B BP2.
Reactor protection system two the most according to claim 1 takes one and meets maintenance bypass device, it is characterised in that: described safe logic assembly A, safe logic assembly B include that 1/2 meets logical block.
Reactor protection system two the most according to claim 1 takes one and meets maintenance bypass device; it is characterized in that: the input circuit of each relay is parallel with diode; control module is formed after the input circuit of relay and diodes in parallel; the input of this control module connects with corresponding gear contact, the output head grounding of this control module.
Reactor protection system two the most according to claim 1 takes one and meets maintenance bypass device; it is characterized in that: 1 gear contact is also in series with diode VD13; 2 gear contacts are also in series with ground connection after diode VD14, diode VD13, diode VD14 series resistor R, light emitting diode H simultaneously.
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| CN201610328639.1A CN105931679B (en) | 2016-05-18 | 2016-05-18 | Reactor protection system two takes one to meet maintenance bypass device |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN106782702A (en) * | 2016-12-28 | 2017-05-31 | 中核核电运行管理有限公司 | A kind of reactor protection system external output signal test loop method for designing |
| CN106782702B (en) * | 2016-12-28 | 2018-07-06 | 中核核电运行管理有限公司 | A kind of reactor protection system external output signal test loop design method |
| CN110120269A (en) * | 2019-05-29 | 2019-08-13 | 中国核动力研究设计院 | One kind effectively eliminating the extended shutdown design method of nuclear power plant's reactor rod drop time |
| CN110415850A (en) * | 2019-08-06 | 2019-11-05 | 中国核动力研究设计院 | A kind of design method reducing reactor protection system malfunction rate |
| CN114822884A (en) * | 2022-05-11 | 2022-07-29 | 中国核动力研究设计院 | Single-pile double-shutdown circuit breaker system and method thereof |
| CN114822884B (en) * | 2022-05-11 | 2024-04-09 | 中国核动力研究设计院 | Single-reactor double-shutdown circuit breaker system and method thereof |
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