CN105871929A - Wireless sensor network anonymity communication method - Google Patents
Wireless sensor network anonymity communication method Download PDFInfo
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- CN105871929A CN105871929A CN201610452120.4A CN201610452120A CN105871929A CN 105871929 A CN105871929 A CN 105871929A CN 201610452120 A CN201610452120 A CN 201610452120A CN 105871929 A CN105871929 A CN 105871929A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0407—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
- H04L63/0421—Anonymous communication, i.e. the party's identifiers are hidden from the other party or parties, e.g. using an anonymizer
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/068—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/18—Self-organising networks, e.g. ad-hoc networks or sensor networks
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Abstract
The invention relates to a wireless sensor network anonymity communication method, and belongs to the technical field of wireless communication. The wireless sensor network anonymity communication method comprises the following steps that a bilinear pair function, a hash function or exclusive or operation are adopted for design, a session key is calculated and generated by nodes without exposing real identity ID information of the nodes in a wireless sensor network in a session key negotiation period of the nodes, and moreover mutual authentication of only legal nodes of the nodes can be accepted; after establishing a security communication link among the nodes of the wireless sensor network, a source node and a target node in the network respectively communicate with respective pseudonym identity ID information instead of real identity ID information in the data communication process, and message load is encrypted by using the session key. By adopting the method, source node anonymity, target node anonymity and anonymity of communication relationship in the wireless sensor network can be effectively ensured, and the situation that sensitive information in wireless sensor network messages is analyzed by using a method of flow analysis and the like by an attacker can be effectively prevented.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to wireless communication technology field, relate to a kind of wireless sensor network anonymous communication method.
Background technology
Wireless sensor network is to be made up of many microsensor nodes, the wireless self-organization network of oriented mission.These joints
Point by dense deployment to specifying region, the multi-hop wireless network formed by Ad hoc mode, be used for gathering, perception and process are supervised
Survey the environmental information in region and target data, and the information gathered and perceive and data are sent in terminal use or monitoring
The heart, cooperated specifying of task.Wireless sensor network is as one of 21 century technology with strongest influence power, emerging in many
The application in field has the advantage that conventional information technology can not be compared, along with the development of information technology, wireless sensor network
Will produce the most important impact in the social life of the mankind, particularly it is as the key component of Internet of Things, more
Show immeasurable development prospect.
From the architectural framework of wireless sensor network self, sensor node is severe in deployed environment, and radio communication channel is opened
Putting property, node self calculates and storage resource-constrained cannot load complicated security and privacy Preservation tactics, and these factors are all held
Be easily caused wireless sensor network node and be susceptible to the potential safety hazards such as privacy leakage, therefore secret protection be one extremely important
Because usually guaranteeing the secure communication of wireless sensor network, especially it is applied to military field and complex environment when wireless sensor network
The special applications such as safety monitoring.
At present the secret protection technology of wireless sensor network is by the approach of privacy leakage, communication process can be divided into communication entity,
Communication mechanism and data three part, corresponding privacy is entity privacy, communication privacy and data-privacy.Wherein entity privacy is main
Refer to the privacy informations such as the node identification relevant to node self, node location, call duration time;Communication privacy is primarily referred to as data
The privacy of the correspondence such as source node, destination node and routing procedure in repeating process;Data-privacy is primarily referred to as between node
The data content etc. of transmission.
Anonymous communication technology is as a kind of important secret protection technological means, a focus of always secret protection research field
Problem, has important practical significance and is widely applied prospect.The research the earliest of anonymous communication technology is by David Chaum
Putting forward in the Mix-Net cryptographic system proposed, it is obscured center formed by a series of.Sender disappears to be sent
Cease after encryption, be sent to this locality obscure center, obscure center and again message be encrypted after receiving message and send out
Going, the message so sent is obscured after center obscures by this locality, and sender originally just cannot be with the message sent
Keep in touch, thus reach to hide the purpose of sender.Later, researcher was gradually incorporated into this anonymous communication thought wireless
In sensor network, wherein having a class can be summarized as resisting the false flow technology of flow analysis, such as A.Durresi proposes
Sensor network layering Protocol for Anonymous Communication (HACP), this method is guarantee the anonymity of communication node, needs to logical
Letter node sends the packet of falseness to hide real packet to reach the purpose of anonymous communication, but this method is given logical
Communication network brings taking of huge communication energy consumption and the communication resource.Also have a class can be summarized as based on the anonymity forwarded to lead to
Letter mechanism, reaches, by rebuilding of routed path, the purpose that sender anonymity and recipient are anonymous, such as Ozturk and
The phantom Routing Protocol that Kamat et al. proposes, by a pseudo-source node in message walk random to network in this agreement, then
From pseudo-source node, message is routed to Sink node, and this method have employed flooding technology, makes assailant be difficult to collect information
Positional information, but this method brings taking of huge energy consumption and the communication resource to communication network.
Along with the application of wireless sensor network is more and more extensive, for present stage wireless sensor network anonymous communication technology not
Foot, the anonymous communication method finding more highly effective and safe is significantly.
Summary of the invention
In view of this, it is an object of the invention to provide a kind of wireless sensor network anonymous communication method, the method can be effective
Ensure that source node is anonymous, destination node is anonymous and the anonymity of correspondence in network in wireless sensor network, can be effective
Resist assailant and go out the sensitive information in wireless sensor network message by methods analysts such as flow analyses.
For reaching above-mentioned purpose, the present invention provides following technical scheme:
A kind of wireless sensor network anonymous communication method, the method uses Bilinear map function, hash function and XOR to enter
Row design, in the session key agreement stage of node, the node in wireless sensor network calculates and generates session key and do not expose
True identity id information each other between node, and node the most legal between node could pass through to be mutually authenticated;Wireless
After between sensor network nodes, secure communications links has been set up, source node and destination node in network are carrying out data communication
Cheng Zhong, uses respective pseudonym identity id information to replace true identity id information to communicate respectively, and uses session key pair
Message load is encrypted.
Further, the method specifically includes following steps:
S1: in an initial condition, base station, as the security management center of wireless sensor network, generates for each sensor node
And distribute an identity id information as unique real identity, and generate a corresponding secret according to each node ID
Parameter;
S2: the node i in network utilizes the parameter received from base station to (IDi,Pi) calculate the corresponding PKI PK of generation respectivelyiAnd private
Key SKi;
S3: the node in network in the cipher key agreement process that conversates, utilize oneself PKI and private key calculate generate node it
Between session key, carry out between node being mutually authenticated and not true identity information each other between exposed node;
S4: nodes sets up request stage and response phase in secure communications links, calculates respectively and generates source node and purpose
The pseudonym identity information of node also replaces the true identity information of each of which, and make node after secure communications links is set up,
The most legal source node and destination node could mutually deduce true identity information each other;
S5: source node in network and destination node, during carrying out data transmission, use respective pseudonym identity information respectively
Replace true identity to communicate, and use session key that message load is encrypted;
S6: the node in network regularly updates session key and the pseudonym identity information of oneself.
Further, in step s 4, specifically include: network to carry out safety with destination node j by the source node i of certification
During data communication, first source node i constructs secure communications links and sets up request packet and send;When nodes is received
After setting up request packet to secure communications links, first determine whether whether oneself is destination node, if judging oneself is purpose joint
Point, then need to reply secure communications links to source node i and set up response message bag;When in network, source node i and destination node j exist
During setting up secure communications links, the most legal source node and destination node could mutually deduce true identity letter each other
Breath, intermediary routing node pushes away the real information not measuring source node and destination node.
The beneficial effects of the present invention is:
The present invention proposes the anonymous communication method of a kind of wireless sensor network, by using any third party of this method to be all difficult to
Infer in wireless sensor network heavier by sender and the recipient of information bag in the method tracking networks such as flow analysis
Node (such as leader cluster node, the gateway node etc.) information wanted, prevents assailant from launching a offensive important node, therefore reaches
The transmission mode of anonymous communication.Source node in network and destination node, during carrying out secure data communication, use each respectively
From pseudonym identity ID replace true identity ID to communicate ensureing in wireless sensor network that source node is anonymous, destination node
The anonymity of correspondence in anonymity and network.The method can effectively meet resists spoof attack in wireless sensor network, worm
The important demands for security such as hole attack, selective forwarding attack, information Tampering attack.It is described as follows:
1) spoof attack: in spoof attack, assailant disguise oneself as the legitimate node in network send in network falseness data
Bag is attacked, and reaches destroy the verity of packet in network and make the purpose that network is saturated with this.Proposed at us
A kind of wireless sensor network anonymous communication method in, in network, all of node is all by anonymous authentication, and camouflage is attacked
The person of hitting is due to not over certification, so spoof attack can not be initiated in network.
2) Worm-hole attack: Worm-hole attack can make to set up between the node of two multi-hops in network a cestode hole tunnel, makes them
Become neighbor node.In the anonymous communication method of a kind of wireless sensor network proposed at us, owing to assailant can not be led to
Crossing and be mutually authenticated, therefore assailant can not make oneself more can not forward the packet in network for the legitimate node in network,
So Worm-hole attack can not be initiated in network.
3) selective forwarding is attacked: in the wireless sensor network of multi-hop, usually assumes that the forwarding institute of intermediary routing node safety
The information received.In selective forwarding is attacked, malicious node refusal forwards certain specific network message, only forwards some nothings
Close critical message.In the anonymous communication method of a kind of wireless sensor network proposed at us, owing to assailant can not become
For intermediary routing node legal in network, therefore assailant can not initiate to abandon the selective forwarding of key message in network
Attack.
4) information Tampering attack: in information Tampering attack, malicious node is easy to change the packet content in network.Send out
Playing this attack, assailant is necessary for the legitimate node pretending to become in network, at a kind of wireless sensor network that we are proposed
In the anonymous communication method of network, the legitimate node in network can not be become due to assailant, so assailant can not send out in network
Play information Tampering attack.
Accompanying drawing explanation
In order to make the purpose of the present invention, technical scheme and beneficial effect clearer, the present invention provides drawings described below to illustrate:
Fig. 1 is wireless sensor network anonymous communication method network topology structure
Fig. 2 is that session key between nodes generates interaction figure;
Fig. 3 is that secure communications links sets up request process;
Fig. 4 is that secure communications links sets up response process.
Detailed description of the invention
Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing, the preferred embodiments of the present invention are described in detail.
The anonymous communication method of a kind of wireless sensor network that the present invention provides, wherein network topology structure of wireless sensor such as figure
Shown in 1, specifically include three below aspect:
(1) anonymous session key agreement
1), under network initial state, base station is as the security management center of wireless sensor network, and base station is each node in network
Generating and distribute identity ID and indicate as unique identities, create-rule is: Wherein n is the number of nodes, and H () represents a strong cipher Hash function.Base station is according to institute
The each node ID generated generates corresponding parameterWherein i=1,2 ..., n.S is only base
The random number that station is known.Base station is by every couple of parameter (IDi,Pi) it is handed down to corresponding node respectively.
2) for arbitrary node A in network, its identity id information is IDA, utilize the parameter received from base station to (IDA,PA) raw
Become corresponding PKI PKA=R IDAWith private key SKA=R PA=R s IDA=s R IDA=s PKA, wherein R is node A
In random number.For another node B in network, its public private key pair is (PKB,SKB), node A and node B consulting session
Key and do not expose its respective identity information, its interaction figure is as shown in Figure 2.
3) node A sends information M to node B1=PKA||R1, R1It is the random number of node A generation, | | it is connector operation.
4) node B receives information M1After, first with the private key SK of oneselfBPKI PK with node AACalculate and generateWhereinIt it is Bilinear map functional operation.Node B
Generate authentication code AUTBWith with KBAThe C of encryptiont, wherein AUTB=H (KBA||PKB||PKA||R1||T1), T1It is node B
Timestamp,R2It it is the random value of node B generation.Node B is to node A return information
M2=PKB||Ct1||AUTB。
5) node A receives information M2After, first with the private key SK of oneselfAPKI PK with node BBCalculate and generateUse KABDeciphering Ct1Obtain T1And R2, as deciphering does not becomes
Merit, then explanation node A is unsuccessful to node B authentication, and dropping packets such as successful decryption, and judges time stamp T1It is the most effective,
If time stamp T1Effectively, then identifying code AUT is calculatedA=H (KAB||PKA||PKB||R1||T1) and judge its whether with receive
AUTBEqual, if equal, then explanation node A is to node B authentication success, and generates authentication code
AUT′A=H (KAB||PKA||PKB||R2||T2) and use KABEncryptionGeneration information M3=AUT 'A||Ct2Send out
Give node B, wherein T2It it is the timestamp of node A generation.
6) node B receives information M3After, first with the K of oneselfBADeciphering obtains time stamp T2If deciphering unsuccessful,
Then explanation node B certification preliminary to node A is unsuccessful, and if dropping packets successful decryption, then judges time stamp T2Whether have
Effect, if time stamp T2Effectively, then identifying code AUT ' is calculatedB=H (KBA||PKB||PKA||R2||T2) and judge its whether with reception
The AUT ' arrivedAEqual, if equal, then explanation node B is to node A certification success.
Session key K is set up by above procedure, nodes A and node BAB, and do not expose its true body each other
Part information has also carried out two-way authentication.
(2) secure communications links builds
When source node A to carry out secure data communication with destination node B in network, between them, there is no the anonymity of a safety
Communication link, therefore, should set up an anonymous communication link by a series of intermediate node before a communication.Source node A
First structure secure communications links is set up request packet and sends.Set up when nodes receives this secure communications links
After request packet, first determine whether whether oneself is destination node B, if judging oneself is destination node B, then need to source
Node A replys secure communications links and sets up response message bag.The secure communications links of source node set up request process as it is shown on figure 3,
The secure communications links of destination node sets up response process as shown in Figure 4, and it is as follows that secure communications links foundation implements process.
1) source node A utilizes the private key SK of oneselfAAnd the PKI PK of destination nodeBCalculate and generateReplace
Oneself true identity information also updates oneself routing table.
2) source node A generation secure communications links is set up request packet M and is sent to next-hop node in oneself routing table, M bag
Concrete form is:
Wherein: tag# represents unique mark of this link request information bag;REP represents that decision node in the link response stage is
The no mark processing this link request information bag;Represent with the session between source node A and destination node B
Key KABThe true identity information of encryption destination node B and time stamp TA。
3) receive after this secure communications links sets up request packet M when node a certain in network, first check for node self road
By whether table exists link request mark tag#.If this node route list existing link request mark tag#, then it represents that this joint
Point had been received by this link request information bag M, and then discarded packets M;Otherwise, node is then the link response in information bag M
Process mark REP to be stored in routing table, and use oneself session secret key decryptionIf information can correctly be decrypted,
Then contrast true identity information and the ID decrypted in the routing table of oneselfBThe most equal, if equal, can determine whether it oneself is purpose
Node B.If time stamp TAEffectively, and from Bilinear map operational rule relevant knowledge
The PKI and the private key of oneself that then may utilize source node pass through to calculateDeduce
The true identity information of source node, and update self routing table information.If judging, receiving this communication link sets up the joint of request bag
Point is not destination node but intermediary routing node, then this node is transmitted to next-hop node in oneself routing table information bag M.
4) if receiving secure communications links and setting up after the node of request packet M judges oneself to be exactly destination node, then need
Carry out link response operation to the source node A communicated with oneself.The secure communications links response message bag lattice of destination node B structure
Formula is denoted as:
Choose the tag# ' unique mark as link response information bag, time stamp TBRepresent the timestamp of link response information bag.
Destination node is by calculating H (IDB||Random1) replace the true identity information of oneself and update self routing table information, its
In use different random number R andom to generate different pseudonym identity information with this for different source node.
4) after nodes receives this secure communications links response message bag M ', first check for whether self routing table deposits
Tag# ' is identified at link response.If there is link response mark tag# ', then can determine whether that this node had received link response letter
Breath bag, abandons this respond packet;Otherwise, then check in node self routing table that whether there is link response processes mark REP, if
Do not exist, then abandon this respond packet.If there is link response in node self routing table to process mark REP, then this node utilizes
Session key deciphering between oneself and destination nodeIf information can correctly be decrypted, then
This node provable is exactly source node, and obtains the assumed name information H (ID that destination node communicatesB||Random1) and update certainly
Information in body routing table.If this node fails correctly to decryptThen can determine whether to receive this
The node of secure communications links response message bag M ' is not source node but intermediary routing node, then this intermediary routing node is information
Bag M ' is sent to the next-hop node in self routing table and updates routing table.
(3) anonymous data transmission
When in network, source node A and destination node B set up request stage by secure communications links and response phase obtains respective
After pseudonym identity information, node can replace true identity information to carry out safe number by using the pseudonym identity information each produced
According to communication, reach the purpose of anonymous communication with this.Detailed process is described in detail below.
1) when a certain source node A in network to carry out data communication with destination node B, source node A is first by oneself
And the session key K between destination node BABThe data that will transmit are encrypted, and then use oneself assumed name information and mesh
The assumed name information of node message is sent, message format is as follows:
Routed path mark during wherein tag# represents this communication process,Represent in this communication process
The pseudonym identity information of source node, H (IDB||Random1) represent that the pseudonym identity of the destination node in this communication process is believed
Breath.
2) after the node in network receives this packet, first check for whether the routing table of self exists routed path mark
tag#.If exist, then can determine whether this node be not intermediary routing node be exactly destination node;If not existing, then abandon this message.
Continue in query node self routing table pseudonym identity information whether with H (IDB||Random1) equal, if both are equal, can be just
Step judges that this node is destination node.This node utilizes the data load of the session key deciphering encryption between source nodeIf data load can effectively be decrypted, then can determine whether that this node is exactly destination node, thus judged report
The correctness that literary composition sends, this node is by calculatingThe true identity of available source node
Information.If being shown that by judgement receive this packet is intermediary routing node, then packet is transmitted to by intermediary routing node
Next-hop node in oneself routing table, until the node receiving this packet is destination node.
Finally illustrating, preferred embodiment above is only in order to illustrate technical scheme and unrestricted, although by above-mentioned
The present invention is described in detail by preferred embodiment, it is to be understood by those skilled in the art that can in form and
In details, it is made various change, without departing from claims of the present invention limited range.
Claims (3)
1. a wireless sensor network anonymous communication method, it is characterised in that: the method uses Bilinear map function, Hash letter
Number and XOR are designed, and in the session key agreement stage of node, the node in wireless sensor network calculates and generates meeting
Words key and not true identity id information each other between exposed node, and node the most legal between node could pass through phase
Certification mutually;After between wireless sensor network node, secure communications links has been set up, source node and destination node in network exist
Carry out in data communication process, use respective pseudonym identity id information to replace true identity id information to communicate respectively, and
Use session key that message load is encrypted.
A kind of wireless sensor network anonymous communication method the most according to claim 1, it is characterised in that: the method is concrete
Comprise the following steps:
S1: in an initial condition, base station, as the security management center of wireless sensor network, generates for each sensor node
And distribute an identity id information as unique real identity, and generate a corresponding secret according to each node ID
Parameter;
S2: the node i in network utilizes the parameter received from base station to (IDi,Pi) calculate the corresponding PKI PK of generation respectivelyiAnd private
Key SKi;
S3: the node in network in the cipher key agreement process that conversates, utilize oneself PKI and private key calculate generate node it
Between session key, carry out between node being mutually authenticated and not true identity information each other between exposed node;
S4: nodes sets up request stage and response phase in secure communications links, calculates respectively and generates source node and purpose
The pseudonym identity information of node also replaces the true identity information of each of which, and make node after secure communications links is set up,
The most legal source node and destination node could mutually deduce true identity information each other;
S5: source node in network and destination node, during carrying out data transmission, use respective pseudonym identity information respectively
Replace true identity to communicate, and use session key that message load is encrypted;
S6: the node in network regularly updates session key and the pseudonym identity information of oneself.
A kind of wireless sensor network anonymous communication method the most according to claim 2, it is characterised in that: in step S4
In, specifically including: when network to carry out secure data communication with destination node j by the source node i of certification, source node i is first
First structure secure communications links is set up request packet and sends;Request is set up when nodes receives secure communications links
After information bag, first determine whether whether oneself is destination node, if judging oneself is destination node, then need to return to source node i
Multiple secure communications links sets up response message bag;When in network source node i and destination node j during setting up secure communications links,
Only having legal source node and destination node could mutually deduce true identity information each other, intermediary routing node pushes away and does not measures
Source node and the real information of destination node.
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CN108494555A (en) * | 2018-02-27 | 2018-09-04 | 深圳市海司恩科技有限公司 | Information encryption and decryption method and information encryption, decryption device |
CN108494555B (en) * | 2018-02-27 | 2024-05-24 | 洪贵顺 | Information encryption and decryption method and information encryption and decryption equipment |
CN109743728A (en) * | 2019-01-21 | 2019-05-10 | 常熟理工学院 | A kind of mobile agency meeting network route method of secret protection |
CN109743728B (en) * | 2019-01-21 | 2021-12-10 | 常熟理工学院 | Privacy-protecting mobile social network routing method |
CN113973300A (en) * | 2020-07-10 | 2022-01-25 | 中国电子技术标准化研究院 | Wireless sensor network anonymous communication method and device based on bilinear pairings |
CN113973300B (en) * | 2020-07-10 | 2023-11-03 | 中国电子技术标准化研究院 | Wireless sensor network anonymous communication method and device based on bilinear pairing |
CN114978781A (en) * | 2022-08-02 | 2022-08-30 | 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 | Tor network-oriented mixed anonymous link communication method and system |
CN114978781B (en) * | 2022-08-02 | 2022-11-11 | 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 | Tor network-oriented hybrid anonymous link communication method and system |
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