CN105721417A - Honeypot apparatus carried in industrial control system, and industrial control system - Google Patents
Honeypot apparatus carried in industrial control system, and industrial control system Download PDFInfo
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- CN105721417A CN105721417A CN201510784429.9A CN201510784429A CN105721417A CN 105721417 A CN105721417 A CN 105721417A CN 201510784429 A CN201510784429 A CN 201510784429A CN 105721417 A CN105721417 A CN 105721417A
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- industrial control
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- honey jar
- jar device
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
- H04L41/06—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications
- H04L41/0631—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications using root cause analysis; using analysis of correlation between notifications, alarms or events based on decision criteria, e.g. hierarchy, tree or time analysis
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1491—Countermeasures against malicious traffic using deception as countermeasure, e.g. honeypots, honeynets, decoys or entrapment
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
- G05B19/00—Programme-control systems
- G05B19/02—Programme-control systems electric
- G05B19/418—Total factory control, i.e. centrally controlling a plurality of machines, e.g. direct or distributed numerical control [DNC], flexible manufacturing systems [FMS], integrated manufacturing systems [IMS], computer integrated manufacturing [CIM]
- G05B19/4185—Total factory control, i.e. centrally controlling a plurality of machines, e.g. direct or distributed numerical control [DNC], flexible manufacturing systems [FMS], integrated manufacturing systems [IMS], computer integrated manufacturing [CIM] characterised by the network communication
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Selective Calling Equipment (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses a honeypot apparatus carried in an industrial control system. The honeypot apparatus is carried on each industrial control network node according to needs and comprises an interface module which is provided with a standard interface needed for interconnection by an industrial control network grade which the honeypot apparatus is currently disposed in; and instruction receiving module which is used for receiving an instruction of a last-grade industrial control device and simulating submission of feedback data by use of a signal submission module; the signal submission module which is used for simulating signal features of various industrial devices and sending data which is similar to yet is distinguishable from other devices to the last-grade industrial control device; and a behavior recording module which is used for recording attack behavior data and giving an alarm timely when the honeypot apparatus is under an attack threat. According to the invention, the honeypot apparatus, through simulating the industrial devices carried in an industrial control network, attracts various malicious attacks, records the malicious attack behavior data and issues an early warning so as to discover threats timely and avoid greater damage caused by the malicious attacks to the industrial controls system.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to industry control security technology area, particularly relate to a kind of carry honey jar device in industrial control system and industrial control system.
Background technology
Industrialization and informationization are the main flows of modern social development, at present already more than the field of 80% at industrial circle and achieve Automated condtrol, industrial control system has become as the important component part of country's critical infrastructures, and the security relationship of industrial control field is to national strategic security.
In recent years, the vigilant and concern of the industry control more and more managed department of safety and each manufacturer.The feature that industry control presents safely includes: system requirements high availability, high real-time, high controllability；With conventional information safely compared with, industry control does not obtain enough concerns safely；Relative to conventional internet safety, the threat that industrial control field is subject to will produce more substantial serious consequence.
Therefore, it is possible to the threat found in time in industrial control system and invasion destruction become more and more important, more and more urgently.
Summary of the invention
The invention provides a kind of carry honey jar device in industrial control system, by simulating the feature of various industrial control equipment, thus causing the attention of malicious attacker, after described honey jar device suffers malicious attack, then record its attack mode and attack characteristics, and send warning in time.It is possible not only to the security threat finding exist in industry control network quickly, it is possible to carry out the defense work in later stage for the attack characteristics of its record, it is possible to better ensure that the safety of industrial control system.
Present invention firstly provides a kind of carry honey jar device in industrial control system, described honey jar device carry as required on each industry control network node, including:
Interface module, possesses the standard interface that industry control network rank interconnection residing for current honey jar device is required；
Command reception module, for receiving the instruction of the other industrial control equipment of upper level, and utilizes signal to submit to module simulation to submit feedback data to；
Signal submits module to, for simulating the signal characteristic of various industrial control equipment, sends and other unit affinities but differentiable data to the other industrial control equipment of upper level；
Behavior record module, is used for, when the threat under attack of described honey jar device, recording aggressive behavior data and alarm.
Further, when industry control network rank residing for current honey jar device is upper network, then also include: instruction issuing module, for simulating the instruction type of industry control network level device residing for honey jar device, send control instruction to the other industrial control equipment of next stage.
Further, when industry control network rank residing for current honey jar device is upper network, then the standard interface needed for described interconnection includes: 485, CAN, MODBUS or Ethernet.
Further, when industry control network rank residing for current honey jar device is undernet, described signal submits module to, for simulating the signal characteristic of various industrial control equipment, including: temperature controller signal characteristic, converter signal characteristic or PLC device signal characteristic.
Secondly the present invention provides a kind of industrial control system, including: each industrial control equipment and arbitrary described honey jar device as above.
In sum, the invention provides a kind of carry honey jar device in industrial control system, described honey jar device can as required carry on each industry control network node, can be upper network or undernet, including: interface module, command reception module, signal submit module and behavior record module to.The interconnection with other industrial control equipments is completed in industry control network by interface module；The instruction of the other industrial control equipment of upper level is received by command reception module；Module simulation is submitted to complete to send data to the other industrial control equipment of upper level by signal；Aggressive behavior data are recorded, in order to post analysis uses by behavior record module.Honey jar device of the present invention is modeled to an industrial control equipment in industry control network, thus playing the effect of deliberate threat monitoring and early warning.The present invention gives a kind of industrial control system simultaneously, it is distinctive in that with tradition industrial control system, node place in many places is provided with described honey jar device wherein, it is likely located in upper network, it is likely located in undernet, for the feature difference of industrial control equipment in heterogeneous networks rank, honey jar device is set, thus more comprehensively defining industrial control system safety guard net, malicious attack can not only be attracted, thus avoiding other real industrial control equipments to be hacked, the data of the feature of malicious attack and behavior can be recorded, in order to subsequent analysis processes simultaneously.
Accompanying drawing explanation
In order to be illustrated more clearly that technical scheme, the accompanying drawing used required in embodiment will be briefly described below, apparently, the accompanying drawing that the following describes is only some embodiments recorded in the present invention, for those of ordinary skill in the art, under the premise not paying creative work, it is also possible to obtain other accompanying drawing according to these accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 is a kind of carry provided by the invention honey jar device example structure schematic diagram in industrial control system；
Fig. 2 is a kind of industrial control system example structure schematic diagram provided by the invention.
Detailed description of the invention
The present invention gives a kind of carry honey jar device in industrial control system and industrial control system embodiment, in order to make those skilled in the art be more fully understood that the technical scheme in the embodiment of the present invention, and it is understandable to enable the above-mentioned purpose of the present invention, feature and advantage to become apparent from, below in conjunction with accompanying drawing, the present invention is further detailed explanation:
First the present invention discloses a kind of carry honey jar device embodiment in industrial control system, and described honey jar device carry as required is on each industry control network node, as it is shown in figure 1, include:
Interface module 101, possesses the standard interface that industry control network rank interconnection residing for current honey jar device is required；Thus when rogue program is invaded, it is possible to receive identical rogue program according to communication protocol, lure that rogue program thinks that described honey jar device is real industrial control equipment into；
Command reception module 102, for receiving the instruction of the other industrial control equipment of upper level, and utilizes signal to submit to module 103 simulation to submit feedback data to；
Signal submits module 103 to, for simulating the signal characteristic of various industrial control equipment, sends and other unit affinities but differentiable data to the other industrial control equipment of upper level；Wherein it is possible to by adding the ID response code that can be used for distinguishing in the data；
Behavior record module 104, is used for, when the threat under attack of described honey jar device, recording aggressive behavior data and alarm.
Such as: the multiple industrial control equipments connected based on CAN mode are when normal operation, the temperature value of temperature acquisition equipment certain heater of continuous collecting, and it is sent to temperature control equipment, allow temperature control equipment understand the temperature conditions of whole firing equipment in real time, make control in time and process.Assume that the attack pattern of now malicious attack is by detecting Temperature sampler, and distort the temperature information that Temperature sampler sends, cause the control heating state that temperature controller can not be correct.
Now described honey jar device connects in access industry control network self by CAN, described signal is utilized to submit to module simulation to go out the signal characteristic of Temperature sampler, temperature correlation data are sent to the other control device of upper level, certainly these temperature correlation data can slightly deal with, the temperature correlation data that honey jar device sends will not be processed in controlled device reception, sending of this information can cause malicious attack process monitoring, and send attack to honey jar device, now this process will be caught by honey jar device, be simultaneously emitted by early warning.
Preferably, when industry control network rank residing for current honey jar device is upper network, then also include: instruction issuing module, for simulating the instruction type of industry control network level device residing for honey jar device, send control instruction to the other industrial control equipment of next stage.
Preferably, when industry control network rank residing for current honey jar device is upper network, then the standard interface needed for described interconnection includes: 485, CAN, MODBUS or Ethernet.
Preferably, when industry control network rank residing for current honey jar device is undernet, described signal submits module to, for simulating the signal characteristic of various industrial control equipment, including: temperature controller signal characteristic, converter signal characteristic or PLC device signal characteristic.
Wherein, owing to the most industrial control equipments in undernet are harvester, kind is complex various, and the honey jar device being thus in undernet needs to simulate the signal characteristic of multiple harvester；Simultaneously because the industrial control equipment of undernet is in the position of information and summarizing and reporting, does not therefore require nothing more than the honey jar device being in undernet and can simulate the signal characteristic of multiple industrial control equipment, and accept various control order.
Secondly the present invention provides a kind of industrial control system embodiment, as in figure 2 it is shown, include: each industrial control equipment and arbitrary described honey jar device as above.Wherein, each industrial control equipment type is arranged as required to, and the industrial control equipment of upper network is various control equipment, and the industrial control equipment of undernet can be various harvester, including: temperature controller, PCL, converter etc..
As it has been described above, embodiment of the present invention is different from network safety filed, adopts Ethernet form more the networking mechanism of conventional internet, and industry control network is various informative, including: 485, the form of CAN, MODBUS or Ethernet.Honey jar device described in the embodiment of the present invention can support multiple industry control protocol interconnection, it is possible to form as required is connected in industry control network.Described honey jar device is simulated in industry control network becomes a conventional industrial control equipment, it may be possible to controls device and is also likely to be harvester, thus attracting malicious attack to realize the purpose of timely early warning and record.Can not only be actively discovered and threaten and provide reference data to the defence layout in later stage, and can avoid further more serious security incident.The present invention gives the embodiment of a kind of industrial control system, the difference of described industrial control system and tradition industrial control system is, each rank industry control network is provided with multiple honey jar device such that it is able to the various attack of Initiative Defense threatens, and finds malicious attack in time and sends early warning signal.
Above example is in order to illustrative not limiting technical scheme.Without departing from any modification or partial replacement of spirit and scope of the invention, all should be encompassed in the middle of scope of the presently claimed invention.
Claims (5)
1. the carry honey jar device in industrial control system, it is characterised in that described honey jar device carry as required on each industry control network node, including:
Interface module, possesses the standard interface that industry control network rank interconnection residing for current honey jar device is required；
Command reception module, for receiving the instruction of the other industrial control equipment of upper level, and utilizes signal to submit to module simulation to submit feedback data to；
Signal submits module to, for simulating the signal characteristic of various industrial control equipment, sends and other unit affinities but differentiable data to the other industrial control equipment of upper level；
Behavior record module, is used for, when the threat under attack of described honey jar device, recording aggressive behavior data and alarm.
2. device as claimed in claim 1, it is characterized in that, when industry control network rank residing for current honey jar device is upper network, then also include: instruction issuing module, for simulating the instruction type of industry control network level device residing for honey jar device, send control instruction to the other industrial control equipment of next stage.
3. device as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that when industry control network rank residing for current honey jar device is upper network, then the standard interface needed for described interconnection includes: 485, CAN, MODBUS or Ethernet.
4. device as claimed in claim 1, it is characterized in that, when industry control network rank residing for current honey jar device is undernet, described signal submits module to, for simulating the signal characteristic of various industrial control equipment, including: temperature controller signal characteristic, converter signal characteristic or PLC device signal characteristic.
5. an industrial control system, it is characterised in that including: each industrial control equipment and honey jar device as described in as arbitrary in Claims 1-4.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201510784429.9A CN105721417A (en) | 2015-11-16 | 2015-11-16 | Honeypot apparatus carried in industrial control system, and industrial control system |
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201510784429.9A CN105721417A (en) | 2015-11-16 | 2015-11-16 | Honeypot apparatus carried in industrial control system, and industrial control system |
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| CN105721417A true CN105721417A (en) | 2016-06-29 |
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| CN201510784429.9A Withdrawn CN105721417A (en) | 2015-11-16 | 2015-11-16 | Honeypot apparatus carried in industrial control system, and industrial control system |
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Cited By (15)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN106506202A (en) * | 2016-10-31 | 2017-03-15 | 华中科技大学 | Half visual illustration verification platform and method towards industrial control system protecting information safety |
| CN107770199A (en) * | 2017-12-08 | 2018-03-06 | 东北大学 | It is a kind of towards industry internet with the industry control agreement honey jar of self-learning function and application |
| CN108600193A (en) * | 2018-04-03 | 2018-09-28 | 北京威努特技术有限公司 | A kind of industry control honey jar recognition methods based on machine learning |
| CN108712370A (en) * | 2018-04-02 | 2018-10-26 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | A kind of honey pot system |
| CN108833333A (en) * | 2018-04-12 | 2018-11-16 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | A kind of honey pot system based on DCS distributed AC servo system |
| CN109696892A (en) * | 2018-12-21 | 2019-04-30 | 上海瀚之友信息技术服务有限公司 | A kind of Safety Automation System and its control method |
| CN109818985A (en) * | 2019-04-11 | 2019-05-28 | 江苏亨通工控安全研究院有限公司 | A kind of industrial control system loophole trend analysis and method for early warning and system |
| GB2568667A (en) * | 2017-11-17 | 2019-05-29 | Arm Ip Ltd | Detecting unsanctioned messages in electronic networks |
| CN109981602A (en) * | 2019-03-07 | 2019-07-05 | 浙江大学 | Internet of Things security gateway system and means of defence |
| CN110351238A (en) * | 2019-05-23 | 2019-10-18 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | Industry control honey pot system |
| CN110865597A (en) * | 2018-12-18 | 2020-03-06 | 哈尔滨安天科技集团股份有限公司 | Industrial control system and safety protection method thereof |
| CN111404917A (en) * | 2020-03-11 | 2020-07-10 | 江苏亨通工控安全研究院有限公司 | Industrial control simulation equipment-based threat information analysis and detection method and system |
| CN111641634A (en) * | 2020-05-28 | 2020-09-08 | 东北大学 | Honey net based active defense system and method for industrial control network |
| CN112054996A (en) * | 2020-08-05 | 2020-12-08 | 杭州木链物联网科技有限公司 | Attack data acquisition method and device for honeypot system |
| US10924934B2 (en) | 2017-11-17 | 2021-02-16 | Arm Ip Limited | Device obfuscation in electronic networks |
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Cited By (23)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN106506202B (en) * | 2016-10-31 | 2017-12-29 | 华中科技大学 | Towards the half visual illustration verification platform and method of industrial control system protecting information safety |
| CN106506202A (en) * | 2016-10-31 | 2017-03-15 | 华中科技大学 | Half visual illustration verification platform and method towards industrial control system protecting information safety |
| GB2568667A (en) * | 2017-11-17 | 2019-05-29 | Arm Ip Ltd | Detecting unsanctioned messages in electronic networks |
| GB2568667B (en) * | 2017-11-17 | 2022-03-16 | Arm Ip Ltd | Detecting unsanctioned messages in electronic networks |
| US10924934B2 (en) | 2017-11-17 | 2021-02-16 | Arm Ip Limited | Device obfuscation in electronic networks |
| CN107770199A (en) * | 2017-12-08 | 2018-03-06 | 东北大学 | It is a kind of towards industry internet with the industry control agreement honey jar of self-learning function and application |
| CN108712370A (en) * | 2018-04-02 | 2018-10-26 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | A kind of honey pot system |
| CN108712370B (en) * | 2018-04-02 | 2020-05-29 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | Honeypot system |
| CN108600193A (en) * | 2018-04-03 | 2018-09-28 | 北京威努特技术有限公司 | A kind of industry control honey jar recognition methods based on machine learning |
| CN108600193B (en) * | 2018-04-03 | 2021-04-13 | 北京威努特技术有限公司 | Industrial control honeypot identification method based on machine learning |
| CN108833333A (en) * | 2018-04-12 | 2018-11-16 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | A kind of honey pot system based on DCS distributed AC servo system |
| CN108833333B (en) * | 2018-04-12 | 2020-07-10 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | Honeypot system based on DCS distributed control |
| CN110865597A (en) * | 2018-12-18 | 2020-03-06 | 哈尔滨安天科技集团股份有限公司 | Industrial control system and safety protection method thereof |
| CN109696892A (en) * | 2018-12-21 | 2019-04-30 | 上海瀚之友信息技术服务有限公司 | A kind of Safety Automation System and its control method |
| CN109981602A (en) * | 2019-03-07 | 2019-07-05 | 浙江大学 | Internet of Things security gateway system and means of defence |
| CN109818985A (en) * | 2019-04-11 | 2019-05-28 | 江苏亨通工控安全研究院有限公司 | A kind of industrial control system loophole trend analysis and method for early warning and system |
| CN109818985B (en) * | 2019-04-11 | 2021-06-22 | 江苏亨通工控安全研究院有限公司 | Industrial control system vulnerability trend analysis and early warning method and system |
| CN110351238A (en) * | 2019-05-23 | 2019-10-18 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | Industry control honey pot system |
| CN111404917A (en) * | 2020-03-11 | 2020-07-10 | 江苏亨通工控安全研究院有限公司 | Industrial control simulation equipment-based threat information analysis and detection method and system |
| CN111404917B (en) * | 2020-03-11 | 2022-10-04 | 江苏亨通工控安全研究院有限公司 | Industrial control simulation equipment-based threat information analysis and detection method and system |
| CN111641634B (en) * | 2020-05-28 | 2021-06-15 | 东北大学 | Honey net based active defense system and method for industrial control network |
| CN111641634A (en) * | 2020-05-28 | 2020-09-08 | 东北大学 | Honey net based active defense system and method for industrial control network |
| CN112054996A (en) * | 2020-08-05 | 2020-12-08 | 杭州木链物联网科技有限公司 | Attack data acquisition method and device for honeypot system |
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