CN105704160B - Vehicle-mounted data real-time computing technique - Google Patents
Vehicle-mounted data real-time computing technique Download PDFInfo
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- CN105704160B CN105704160B CN201610223729.4A CN201610223729A CN105704160B CN 105704160 B CN105704160 B CN 105704160B CN 201610223729 A CN201610223729 A CN 201610223729A CN 105704160 B CN105704160 B CN 105704160B
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- vehicle
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- cloud platform
- virtual name
- local authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of vehicle-mounted data real-time computing techniques, this method comprises: vehicle-mounted node obtains the identity of itself, certificate and password from control cloud platform；Vehicle-mounted node applies for virtual name from local authentication end, is in communication with each other between vehicle-mounted node using the virtual name.The invention proposes one kind to be based on vehicle-mounted data real-time computing technique, is attacked applied in the car networking system under cloud platform, preventing malicious node from invading in vehicle-mounted cloud platform, enhances the security and privacy of car networking.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to car networking, in particular to a kind of vehicle-mounted data real-time computing technique.
Background technique
Car networking combine calculate with the mobile property of the communication technology and motor vehicles, therefore it is in addition to there is general wireless network
Outside the intrinsic problem of network, also due to itself unique mobile network's characteristic faces lot of challenges, the space benefit including self-organizing network
Not high with rate, network topology change is fast, and wireless channel is unstable and security and privacy is protected.Especially exist in car networking
A variety of security and privacies threaten, and the possible modification information content of attacker is to responsibility in fraud of law；Broadcast to possible high-frequency with
Occupy bandwidth；Deceptive information may be manufactured to meet number one；May by eavesdrop and analyze the message in wireless channel with
With the stroke etc. of track other vehicles.Since car networking is communicated by wireless channel, many prestige are inevitably faced
The side of body and attack.For transmitting the car networking of security information, these are threatened and attack will cause terrible consequences.
Summary of the invention
To solve the problems of above-mentioned prior art, the invention proposes a kind of vehicle-mounted data real-time computing technique,
Include:
Vehicle-mounted node obtains the identity of itself, certificate and password from control cloud platform；
Vehicle-mounted node applies for virtual name from local authentication end,
It is in communication with each other between vehicle-mounted node using the virtual name.
Preferably, the vehicle-mounted node obtains itself identity from control cloud platform, before certificate and password, also wraps
Include, local authentication end and control cloud platform be mutually authenticated, the certification specifically includes the following steps:
After the letter of identity of the public key encryption oneself of local authentication end LC application control cloud platform CC and time stamp TLCEncapsulation,
It is then transmit to CC；
Authentication center positioned at control cloud platform CC is by receiving time stamp TLCTo check the out-of-service time of message；If
Effectively, then operation, then the certificate by verifying local authentication end LC is decrypted in authentication center's application control cloud platform private key
CertLCTo confirm that local authentication end LC is the legal person in system；Then control cloud platform is by the certificate of oneself and random
The virtual name collection of selection is packaged encryption, and is sent to the local authentication end LC by certification；All virtual names are passed through
Authentication center is set as possessing specific life cycle；
The same received message of LC and the out-of-service time T for checking control cloud platformcc；If TccIt is that effectively, LC is applied certainly
Operation is decrypted to verify Cert in the private key of bodycc；Meanwhile it will be from the virtual name of the virtual name library PP of control cloud platform
It is stored in the virtual name certificate database PCD of LC；
As a vehicle-mounted node VAWhen requesting to service to local authentication end LC, it firstly generates a pair for anonymous communication
Interim public and private key pair；VAUse password PWAIts identifier, certificate and temporary public key are subjected to symmetric cryptography, reapplied interim
Ciphertext after private key pair encryption carries out asymmetric encryption, then will ultimately generate ciphertext and be attached to time identifier TAEncapsulation is sent to
LC；
Local authentication end LC detects TA, decrypted if effectively using the private key of itself, then with control cloud platform CC
Public key encryption and encrypted result is transmitted to CC；
Control cloud platform CC detection time TLCIf TLCIt is effectively, then CC is decrypted and verifies vehicle-mounted node VA
Identity legitimacy；If VABe it is legal, CC will utilize TLCAnd the letter of identity at local authentication end is VAIt generates in one
Between key；
The out-of-service time T of local authentication end LC detection control cloud platformcc；If TccEffective then local authentication end LC is obtained
Above-mentioned intermediate key, and the temporary public key of encryption is sent to VA；
Vehicle-mounted node VAInformation is decrypted using temporary private, obtain intermediate key and verifies the identity of local authentication end LC
Certificate encrypts the request of virtual name collection using intermediate key, the password of intermediate key reply data is sent to and is locally recognized
Demonstrate,prove end LC；
Local authentication end LC application intermediate key is decrypted, and randomly chooses from virtual name certificate database PCD certain
Then the virtual name and public and private key pair of quantity generate corresponding certificate, and send certificate back to VA；
Finally, vehicle-mounted node VAIt is decrypted using intermediate key, obtains required information after the certificate of verifying LC, wrapped
Include virtual name, corresponding virtual name certificate and private key, then in the virtual name certificate database of oneself generate one about
The virtual name of own and the mapping table of certificate, to manage all virtual name certificate and public, private key pair.
The present invention compared with prior art, has the advantage that
The invention proposes a kind of vehicle-mounted data real-time computing techniques to prevent applied in the car networking system under cloud platform
Only malicious node invades is attacked in vehicle-mounted cloud platform, enhances the security and privacy of car networking.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the flow chart of vehicle-mounted data real-time computing technique according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
Retouching in detail to one or more embodiment of the invention is hereafter provided together with the attached drawing of the diagram principle of the invention
It states.The present invention is described in conjunction with such embodiment, but the present invention is not limited to any embodiments.The scope of the present invention is only by right
Claim limits, and the present invention covers many substitutions, modification and equivalent.Illustrate in the following description many details with
Just it provides a thorough understanding of the present invention.These details are provided for exemplary purposes, and without in these details
Some or all details can also realize the present invention according to claims.
An aspect of of the present present invention provides a kind of vehicle-mounted data real-time computing technique.Fig. 1 is according to an embodiment of the present invention
Vehicle-mounted data real-time computing technique flow chart.
The invention proposes a kind of car networking layer architectures based on cloud, include vehicle-mounted cloud platform, road cloud platform and control
Three levels of cloud platform processed pass through relative loose combination side wherein vehicle-mounted cloud platform is made of vehicle-mounted node between vehicle-mounted node
Formula, mutually shared computing resource and storage resource；Road cloud platform is made of road circuit node, and road cloud platform includes wireless access
Module and local server have relatively stable and sufficient bandwidth between the adjacent local server of physical logic, can be by this
A little resources are combined into more close and stable service providing platform, its computing resource and storage resource both can be to vehicle-mounted
The open access of terminal user open to service provider can also access；Control cloud platform can be it is multiple, wherein towards intelligence
The control cloud platform of energy traffic is then made of traffic control department data center server, and car-mounted terminal user can be logical by cellular radio
Letter or WIFI simultaneously control cloud platform by Internet access, the calculating and storage resource provided using control cloud platform.
Deployment and management aspect in cloud system, vehicle-mounted cloud platform use self-organizing configuration and management mode, that is to say by
Car-mounted terminal user in its neighbours' vehicle by approach to cooperation between node, create vehicle-mounted cloud platform and realize cloud resource from group
Knit management；Road cloud platform is then created in a manner of local authentication end and is managed independently by road circuit node, is provided the vehicle of process
Cloud service；It controls cloud platform and cloud system is created in data center using the cloud system deployment way of existing relative maturity.
It is deployed in the authentication center of remote control cloud platform, completes the certification of vehicle identification, the preservation of vehicle identity information
With management, the management in virtual name library for anonymous communication, the certification of local authentication end identity, the preservation of local authentication client information
With management, the distribution of public information, the generation of masked list and distribution, the execution of security strategy and monitoring, the scale of the module
It is determined with element by the scale of car networking:
A. when at car networking initial stage, networking vehicle is less, and road number of nodes scale is smaller, locally recognize within the scope of major region
It is few to demonstrate,prove end quantity, when controlling cloud platform coverage area broadness, authentication center can be a server group；
B. when car networking enters period of expansion, vehicle-mounted node, road circuit node, local authentication looking somebody up and down grade greatly improve, occur each
Class public cloud, local authentication end and mixed cloud, after the control cloud platform regionalization based on intelligent transportation service, authentication center
It can be the distributed center an of tree, root certificate authority is hereinafter, the administrative area of each subcertification authority can be with me
State's traffic Administration partition combines, and forms an abstract powerful authentication center, and some additional functionalities can be added such as
The functions such as mobile certificate distribution and then the large-scale application for improving anonymous authentication.On condition that each local and regional intersection
It is deployed with circuit node, and authentication center possesses sufficiently large storage capacity, and the ability with powerful defence invasion.
Local authentication end module and authentication center are interconnected by cable network, complete the generation and distribution, association of vehicle certificate
The synchronization of the identity, masked list that disclose malice vehicle and the certification of regional broadcast, offer vehicle virtual name certificate are provided.It is local
The virtual name certificate that certification end is signed and issued is legal only in affiliated authentication center location.When the difference of car networking deployment
Phase, local authentication end generates the virtual name certificate for distributing certain radix according to security strategy, and states certificate life span.
It is deployed in the protective module of vehicle-mounted node, can be in communication with each other by it between vehicle-mounted node, traffic information is shared,
Improve driving experience.In distributed virtual name administrative mechanism, vehicle-mounted node is with preset frequency replacement virtual name certificate to outgoing
The information of cloth and receive the masked list that local authentication end is distributed.When virtual name certificate life cycle time-out, vehicle-mounted node warp
Request updates virtual name certificate when the circuit node of passageway, and the quantity of update should ensure that secret protection water of the vehicle in certificate life cycle
It is flat to reach certain standard.
In the virtual name Managed Solution based on car networking cloud framework, entity includes a plurality of vehicles such as v={ V1, V2...,
Vs, a plurality of local authentication end LC such as l={ LC1, LC2..., LCwIncluding multiple groups road circuit node such as r={ Rl,
R2..., RtIt is located at the reliable authentication center for controlling cloud platform and multiple virtual name t={ PNi}.If a vehicle-mounted section
Point is found to be malice, its real identity will be disclosed for, while its virtual name collection will be put into control cloud and put down
The masked list control cloud platform of platform, which compresses masked list, generates blacklist, and is sent to all local authentication ends and vehicle-mounted section
Point.
The generating process of virtual name collection is related to three kinds of entity objects, that is, vehicle, the sheet for being deployed in local authentication end LC
Ground certification end and positioned at control cloud platform CC authentication center.One vehicle-mounted node VAIdentity information is registered in and is located at control cloud
In the customer data base of platform, and obtain the unique identities certificate Cert of authentication center's offerAAnd a string of password PWA.Wherein,
Letter of identity CertABy using vehicle-mounted node VAIdentifier, public key, signature the date, life cycle set answered as message
With being generated after rivest, shamir, adelman, and password PWAPass through vehicle-mounted node VAIdentifier and random number N hash operations result
Value, random number N are the random big numbers having more than 100 bit lengths that authentication center's secret is elected.In this way, even if vehicle its
In password it is stolen, it can execute associated shield process to authentication center's request for a report, and can pass through new password application
New virtual name collection.Similar, local authentication end LC obtains their certificate Cert from believable control cloud platform CCLC, with
And unique identification number IDLC.It include three registration, communication and shielding courses of work in scheme proposed by the present invention.
In registration process, vehicle-mounted node VAThe identity of itself, certificate and password are obtained from control cloud platform.It is first
First, local authentication end LC and control cloud platform CC are mutually authenticated, and specific step is as follows.
Step 1: after the letter of identity of the public key encryption oneself of local authentication end LC application CC and time stamp TLCEncapsulation, so
After be transmitted to CC.
Step 2: the authentication center positioned at control cloud platform CC is by receiving time stamp TLCWhen failure to check message
Between.If it is valid, operation is decrypted in authentication center's application control cloud platform private key, then pass through verifying CertLCIt should with confirmation
Local authentication end LC is the legal person in system.Then cloud platform is controlled by the certificate of oneself and the virtual name collection randomly selected
It is packaged encryption, and is sent to the local authentication end LC by certification.In addition, all virtual names oneself through passing through authentication center
It is arranged to possess specific life cycle.
The same received message of LC and the out-of-service time T for checking control cloud platformcc.If TccIt is that effectively, LC is applied certainly
Operation is decrypted to verify Cert in the private key of bodycc.Meanwhile virtual name will be stored in the virtual name certificate database PCD of LC
In.Virtual name library PP of all virtual names both from control cloud platform.
Step 3: when a vehicle-mounted node requests to service to local authentication end LC, it firstly generates a pair of interim public and private
Key pair is used for anonymous communication.VAUse password PWAIts identifier, certificate and temporary public key are subjected to symmetric cryptography, reapplied
Temporary private carries out asymmetric encryption to encrypted ciphertext, then will ultimately generate ciphertext and be attached to time identifier TAEncapsulation is sent
To LC.
Step 4: local authentication end LC detects TA, decrypted if effectively using the private key of itself, then use the public affairs of CC
Key encrypts and encrypted result is transmitted to CC.
Step 5: control cloud platform CC detects TLCIf TLCIt is effectively, CC is decrypted and verifies vehicle-mounted node VA
Identity legitimacy.If VABe it is legal, CC will utilize TLCAnd the letter of identity at local authentication end is VAIt generates in one
Between key.
Step 6: local authentication end LC receives information, and detects the out-of-service time T of control cloud platformcc.If TccHave
Then local authentication end LC obtains above-mentioned intermediate key to effect, and the temporary public key of encryption is sent to VA。
Step 7: vehicle-mounted node VAInformation is decrypted using temporary private, obtain intermediate key and verifies local authentication end
The letter of identity of LC.VAThe request of virtual name collection is encrypted using intermediate key, the password of intermediate key reply data is sent out
Give LC.
Step 8: LC application intermediate key is decrypted, and randomly chooses certain amount from virtual name certificate database PCD
Virtual name and public and private key pair, then generate corresponding certificate, and send certificate back to VA。
Finally, VAIt is decrypted using intermediate key, obtains required information after the certificate of verifying LC, including virtual
Name, corresponding virtual name certificate and private key.Then VAIn the virtual name certificate database of oneself generate one about it from
The mapping table of oneself virtual name and certificate, to manage all virtual name certificate and public, private key pair.
During anonymous communication, the virtual name of each vehicle is all optional close by local authentication end LC with a pair
Key is to matching.
When a vehicle-mounted node is wanted to communicate with local authentication end LC, it sends the virtual name being being currently used itself
Certificate and timestamp are to LC.The validity of LC Check-Out Time stamp first, then checked with its certificate.If both of which is
Effectively, LC receives the request of vehicle and is communicated.
In vehicle V1And V2During communication:
Step 1: before two cars are communicated, in V1And V2Middle record passes through the period setting signal of local authentication end LC1
Broadcast message is updated.
Step 2: if V1Desired and V2It is communicated, it sends the virtual name certificate being being currently used and time itself
It stabs to V2；
Step 3: V2Receive V1Information after first detection time stab TV1.If TV1It is effective, V2Key will be applied
It is decrypted to by message, then verifies V1Whether be system authorization legitimate user, and the virtual name collection of this system is by mistake
Filter.Then V2Its current virtual name certificate is sent back into V1；If V1Virtual name in blacklist, by V1It filters out, then V2
Refusal and V1It is communicated.
Step 4: V1According to the process verification V of step 32Information after, can communicate between them.
In car networking security system, shielding is to prevent a significant process of malice vehicle or road node attack.
Once a vehicle-mounted node carries out certain malicious acts, the local of their locating ranges of other vehicle notifications of surrounding
Certification end LC.Since virtual name has uniqueness, the vehicle given notice can identify the vehicle of malice attack by virtual name
Carry node identities.Vehicle-mounted nodes records malicious event and pass through vehicle-mounted arithmetic element generate one malice report.
If local authentication end LC2Vehicle in range has been observed that uses a virtual name PNiVehicle disliked
Meaning behavior then has following shielding process.
Step 1: V3Using local authentication end LC2Public key the report of the malice of generation and the certificate of oneself are encrypted.Then
By after generation ciphertext and time identifier T3 be sent to local authentication end LC2。
Step 2: local authentication end LC2T3 is first checked for, the private key decryption of oneself is reapplied.In the V of certification3Virtual name card
After book is legal, LC2Start decryption malice to report, and by determining the attack after analyzing the report that other vehicles are attacked about this
The severity of behavior.Local authentication end LC2Check which road circuit node passed through virtual name certificate database PCD by this
Virtual name is assigned to the vehicle of malice.LC2Ciphertext is transmitted to local authentication end LC belonging to assumed name PNi1。
Step 3: local authentication end LC1Received message is decrypted to verify and decrypt above-mentioned evil again with the private key of oneself
Meaning report.Confirmation has virtual name PNiVehicle using the public key of control cloud platform CC carry out encryption and by encrypted result
It is sent to CC.
Step 4: control cloud platform CC searches mapping table in customer data base, then use in virtual name library with
PNiCorresponding key extracts the true identity of vehicle.Once malice vehicle is identified, all virtual name meetings of this malice vehicle
It is added in masked list, updates blacklist.
Step 5: control cloud platform CC deletes the legal identity of malice vehicle, and newest blacklist multi-point diffusion is arrived
In each local authentication end on network.
Step 6: the list upgraded is broadcast to all vehicles of communication range by the predefined period by local authentication end LC
On.One vehicle-mounted node once enters the coverage area of any local authentication end LC, then updates the record of itself.
One identical time window can be identified to by authentication center before distributing all virtual names to local authentication end
In all virtual names.Other than time window, all virtual names are invalid, and vehicle must be to the local authentication end where them
Apply for new virtual name.The more new technological process of virtual name contains two aspects.One is that its current virtual name is substituted by vehicle
On another, another point is exactly vehicle from the new virtual name of local authentication end application, and detailed process is as follows:
In registration process, authentication center can get the true identity of the vehicle A during application virtual name, further according to it
Previous virtual name integrates update status as VAVirtual name collection execute setting one deadline.Then, authentication center is by VATransmission
The mapping table of the suggestion update cycle and virtual name of virtual name certificate is generated to local authentication end.VACome according to the period of suggestion
Reasonably update virtual name.Authentication center sends local for the virtual name certificate of some vehicles duration of exceeding the time limit by multicast
In certification end, each local authentication end will propagate all durations of exceeding the time limit within the scope of their communication capacity, prompt vehicle more
New virtual name, the shielding for sending current virtual name collection first when updating request to pass this request to local authentication end LC, LC
To authentication center, and the local authentication end for distributing the virtual name collection will terminate current shielding.After this, vehicle was by registering
Journey applies for new virtual name collection.
In conclusion the invention proposes a kind of vehicle-mounted data real-time computing techniques, applied to the car networking under cloud platform
In system, prevents malicious node from invading and attacked in vehicle-mounted cloud platform, enhance the security and privacy of car networking.
Obviously, it should be appreciated by those skilled in the art, each module of the above invention or each steps can be with general
Computing system realize that they can be concentrated in single computing system, or be distributed in multiple computing systems and formed
Network on, optionally, they can be realized with the program code that computing system can be performed, it is thus possible to they are stored
It is executed within the storage system by computing system.In this way, the present invention is not limited to any specific hardware and softwares to combine.
It should be understood that above-mentioned specific embodiment of the invention is used only for exemplary illustration or explains of the invention
Principle, but not to limit the present invention.Therefore, that is done without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention is any
Modification, equivalent replacement, improvement etc., should all be included in the protection scope of the present invention.In addition, appended claims purport of the present invention
Covering the whole variations fallen into attached claim scope and boundary or this range and the equivalent form on boundary and is repairing
Change example.
Claims (1)
1. a kind of vehicle-mounted data real-time computing technique characterized by comprising
Vehicle-mounted node obtains the identity of itself, certificate and password from control cloud platform；
Vehicle-mounted node applies for virtual name from local authentication end,
It is in communication with each other between vehicle-mounted node using the virtual name；
The vehicle-mounted node obtains itself identity from control cloud platform, further includes local authentication before certificate and password
End and control cloud platform be mutually authenticated, the certification specifically includes the following steps:
After the letter of identity of the public key encryption oneself of local authentication end LC application control cloud platform CC and time stamp TLCEncapsulation, then
It is transmitted to CC；
Authentication center positioned at control cloud platform CC is by receiving time stamp TLCTo check the out-of-service time of message；If there is
Effect, then operation, then the certificate Cert by verifying local authentication end LC is decrypted in authentication center's application control cloud platform private keyLC
To confirm that local authentication end LC is the legal person in system；Then control cloud platform by oneself certificate and randomly selects
Virtual name collection is packaged encryption, and is sent to the local authentication end LC by certification；All virtual names are passed through in certification
The heart is set as possessing specific life cycle；
The same received message of LC and the out-of-service time T for checking control cloud platformcc；If TccIt is that effectively, LC applies itself
Operation is decrypted to verify Cert in private keycc；Meanwhile it will be stored from the virtual name of the virtual name library PP of control cloud platform
In the virtual name certificate database PCD of LC；
As a vehicle-mounted node VAWhen requesting to service to local authentication end LC, it firstly generates a pair of for the interim of anonymous communication
Public and private key pair；VAUse password PWAIts identifier, certificate and temporary public key are subjected to symmetric cryptography, reapply temporary private
Asymmetric encryption is carried out to encrypted ciphertext, ciphertext then will be ultimately generated and be attached to time identifier TAEncapsulation is sent to LC；
Local authentication end LC detects TA, decrypted if effectively using the private key of itself, then with the public key of control cloud platform CC
It encrypts and encrypted result is transmitted to CC；
Control cloud platform CC detection time TLCIf TLCIt is effectively, then CC is decrypted and verifies vehicle-mounted node VABody
Part legitimacy；If VABe it is legal, CC will utilize TLCAnd the letter of identity at local authentication end is VAIt is close to generate a centre
Key；
The out-of-service time T of local authentication end LC detection control cloud platformcc；If TccEffective then local authentication end LC is obtained among the above
Between key, and the temporary public key of encryption is sent to VA；
Vehicle-mounted node VAInformation is decrypted using temporary private, obtain intermediate key and verifies the letter of identity of local authentication end LC,
The request of virtual name collection is encrypted using intermediate key, the password of intermediate key reply data is sent to local authentication end
LC；
Local authentication end LC application intermediate key is decrypted, and randomly chooses certain amount from virtual name certificate database PCD
Virtual name and public and private key pair, then generate corresponding certificate, and send certificate back to VA；
Finally, vehicle-mounted node VAIt is decrypted using intermediate key, obtains required information, including void after the certificate of verifying LC
Quasi- name, corresponding virtual name certificate and private key, then generated in the virtual name certificate database of oneself one about it from
The mapping table of oneself virtual name and certificate, to manage all virtual name certificate and public, private key pair.
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| EP3454502B1 (en) | 2017-09-07 | 2020-08-05 | Nxp B.V. | Transceiver system |
| CN108668258B (en) * | 2018-05-09 | 2021-05-25 | 中国信息通信研究院 | V2X communication rapid identity authentication system and method |
| CN109788482B (en) * | 2019-02-26 | 2021-09-03 | 武汉大学 | Method and system for anonymous authentication of messages between vehicles in Internet of vehicles environment |
| CN110958607B (en) * | 2019-12-04 | 2021-09-24 | 大连理工大学 | Internet of vehicles certificate management method for preventing privacy disclosure |
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