CN105162797A - Bidirectional authentication method based on video surveillance system - Google Patents
Bidirectional authentication method based on video surveillance system Download PDFInfo
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- CN105162797A CN105162797A CN201510616278.6A CN201510616278A CN105162797A CN 105162797 A CN105162797 A CN 105162797A CN 201510616278 A CN201510616278 A CN 201510616278A CN 105162797 A CN105162797 A CN 105162797A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
- H04L9/3249—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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Abstract
The invention relates to the field of secure identity authentication, in particular to a bidirectional authentication method based on a video surveillance system. When a user accesses a video surveillance device (VSD) to acquire video resources by using a visitorial device (VD), bidirectional identity authentication needs to be performed between the VD and the VSD. The method comprises the following steps that: secure authentication devices (Ukeys) are inserted into the VD and the VSD, wherein the Ukeys consist of random number generating programs, RSA encrypting and decrypting programs, RSA private keys and RSA public keys; the VD generates a random number with the Ukey, encrypts the random number with the RSA public key, and transmits the encrypted random number to the VSD; the VSD decrypts the encrypted random number with the RSA private key, signs the decrypted random number with the RSA private key, and sends back the signed random number to the VD; the VD decrypts the signed random number with the RSA public key, and judges whether the decrypted random number is an original random number or not; and the VSD authenticates the VD by the same method. The method is easy to operate, easy to develop, high in safety coefficient and low in module cost, and can be widely applied to other systems
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to safety identification authentication field, more specifically, relate to a kind of mutual authentication method based on video monitoring system.
Background technology
Video monitoring is the important component part of safety and protection system, and it is the integrated system that a kind of prevention ability is stronger, video monitoring is directly perceived with it, accurately, in time and the information content abundant and extensively should based on many occasions.In recent years, along with the develop rapidly of computer, network and image procossing, transmission technology, Video Supervision Technique there has also been significant progress.
Video monitoring system has developed short twenties years, from simulation monitoring the earliest to digital supervision Network Video Surveillance till now again, there occurs earth-shaking change.In any case but change, while video monitoring brings the sense of security, also there is a little hidden danger.Verification System imperfect between most video monitoring equipments and access equipment, the situation that malice accessing video watch-dog causes video resource to leak is of common occurrence, therefore have very exigence at access equipment safe outpost of the tax office together with setting up between video monitoring equipment, improve Verification System, improve probability level.
Summary of the invention
The present invention, for overcoming the incomplete defect of Verification System described in above-mentioned prior art, provides a kind of mutual authentication method based on video monitoring system, effectively can reduce the probability of malice accessing video watch-dog.
For solving the problems of the technologies described above, technical scheme of the present invention is as follows:
Based on a mutual authentication method for video monitoring system, described video monitoring system comprises access equipment and video monitoring equipment, it is characterized in that: described method comprises the steps:
S1: user inserts safety certificate equipment Ukey1 on the access device, inserts safety certificate equipment Ukey2 simultaneously on video monitoring equipment, and sets up access connection application by access equipment;
S2: access equipment generates one group of random number A by Ukey1, and public key encryption is carried out to random number A send to video monitoring equipment;
S3: video monitoring equipment carries out public key decryptions by Ukey2 to the ciphertext received and obtains random number A;
S4: video monitoring equipment sends to access equipment after being signed by the random number A after deciphering by Ukey2;
S5: access equipment carries out signature verification by Ukey1 to the signature received, if the result and random number A completely the same, then access equipment success identity video monitoring equipment, perform S6; Otherwise authentification failure, access reject;
S6: video monitoring equipment generates one group of random number B by Ukey2, and send to access equipment after public key encryption is carried out to random number B;
S7: access equipment carries out public key decryptions by Ukey1 to the ciphertext received and obtains random number B;
S8: access equipment sends to video monitoring equipment after being signed by the random number B after deciphering by Ukey1;
S9: the signature that video monitoring equipment is received by Ukey2 carries out signature verification, if the result and random number B completely the same, then video monitoring equipment success identity access equipment, access allow; Otherwise authentification failure, access reject.
Further, described access equipment is the equipment that Built In Operating System, set up applications possess display translation simultaneously, and described access equipment is connected by network with between video monitoring equipment.
Further, described safety certificate equipment is a kind of portable plug-in type hardware device, has globally unique sequence number.
Further, described safety certificate equipment safety is equipped with random number generator, rsa encryption program and RSA decrypted program;
Described access equipment generates one group of random number A by the random number generator of Ukey1, and sending to video monitoring equipment after rsa encryption being carried out to random number A by the rsa encryption program of Ukey1, described video monitoring equipment carries out RSA deciphering by the RSA decrypted program of Ukey2 to the ciphertext received and obtains random number A;
Described video monitoring equipment generates one group of random number B by the random number generator of Ukey2, and sending to access equipment after rsa encryption being carried out to random number B by the rsa encryption program of Ukey2, described access equipment carries out RSA deciphering by the RSA decrypted program of Ukey1 to the ciphertext received and obtains random number B.
Further, described safety certificate equipment is also packaged with safely RSA signature procedure and RSA signature verification program;
Described video monitoring equipment sends to access equipment after the random number A after deciphering being carried out RSA signature by the RSA signature procedure of Ukey2, and described access equipment carries out RSA signature verification by the RSA signature verification program of Ukey1 to the signature received;
Described access equipment sends to video monitoring equipment after the random number B after deciphering being carried out RSA signature by the RSA signature procedure of Ukey1, and described video monitoring equipment carries out RSA signature verification by the RSA signature verification program of Ukey2 to the signature received.
Further, in described step S1, when setting up access connection application by access equipment, the PIN code first inputting Ukey1 carries out certification, and described PIN code can pass through user's free setting.
Further, random number generator in described safety certificate equipment, rsa encryption program, RSA decrypted program, RSA signature procedure and RSA signature verification program are finished writing before safety certificate equipment is issued, and described random number generator, rsa encryption program, RSA decrypted program, RSA signature procedure and RSA signature verification program are modified by providing the video monitoring developer of video monitoring equipment.
Further, described safety certificate equipment Ukey1 and Ukey2 comprises RSA PKI and RSA private key, described rsa encryption program adopts RSA PKI to be encrypted, described RSA decrypted program adopts RSA private key to be decrypted, described RSA signature procedure adopts RSA private key to sign, and described RSA signature verification program adopts RSA PKI to carry out signature verification.Suppose that video monitoring operator is distributed to the RSA key of access equipment to being VD.pubkey and VD.prikey, be distributed to the RSA key of video monitoring equipment to being VSD.pubkey and VSD.prikey, wherein VD.pubkey, VSD.pubkey are RSA PKI, VD.prikey, VSD.prikey are RSA private key, that deposit in the safety certificate equipment Ukey1 inserted so on the access device is VSD.pubkey and VD.prikey, and that deposit in the Ukey2 that video monitoring equipment inserts is VD.pubkey and VSD.prikey.
The present invention compared with prior art, there is following beneficial effect: the mutual authentication method that the present invention is based on video monitoring system, conduct interviews between access equipment and video monitoring equipment to connect and need authentication each other, the legal safety certificate equipment issued by video monitoring operation developer is inserted with in access equipment and video monitoring equipment, related content in the safety certificate equipment used when two-way authentication cannot be revised arbitrarily, can only run developer modify by video monitoring.Therefore; when there is no safety certificate equipment; or have safety certificate equipment but built in content is not inconsistent; do not know user's PIN code etc.; these situations all will cause access reject; this just greatly reduces the possibility of malice accessing video watch-dog, effectively prevent the criminal offence of stealing video, protects the personal secrets of video content.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is the decomposition module figure of safety certificate equipment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is the mutual authentication method flow chart based on video monitoring system in the present invention.
Embodiment
Accompanying drawing, only based on exemplary illustration, can not be interpreted as the restriction to this patent; To those skilled in the art, in accompanying drawing, some known features and explanation omission thereof are understandable.
Below in conjunction with drawings and Examples, technical scheme of the present invention is described further.
Embodiment 1
A kind of mutual authentication method based on video monitoring system, described authentication method should based on video monitoring system, described video monitoring system comprises access equipment (VisitorialDevice, and video monitoring equipment (VideoSurveillanceDevice VD), VSD), user use access equipment VD to video monitoring equipment VSD conduct interviews obtain video resource time, need use safety authenticating device (Ukey) to carry out two-way authentication, certification is by can conduct interviews.Described VD be have operating system, can set up applications possess the equipment of high pixel display translation, the video monitoring equipment that described VSD provides for video monitoring exploitation operator, connected by network between described VD and described VSD.Described Ukey is a kind of portable plug-in type hardware device, there is globally unique hardware sequence number, as shown in Figure 1, wherein secure package random number generator, rsa encryption program, RSA decrypted program, RSA signature procedure and RSA signature verification program, and the RSA PKI had needed for RSA operation operation and RSA private key.
As shown in Figure 2, described authentication method comprises the following steps:
S0: user inserts Ukey1 on VD, and confirm that VSD is inserted with Ukey2 simultaneously; User operation VD sets up access connection application, and inputs PIN code and start to carry out two-way authentication.
PIN code described in step S0 is user's PIN code of Ukey1, and run developer when issuing Ukey by video monitoring and specify, after issuing, the amendment authority of described user's PIN code is reserved to user; If user forgets described user's PIN code, the authority resetting described user's PIN code is only reserved to video monitoring operation developer.
Mutual authentication method described in step S0 is based on RSA encryption and decryption, need to use the public and private key of RSA, RSA relative program and RSA PKI and RSA private key by secure package in Ukey, all finish writing when Ukey is distributed to user, amendment authority is only reserved to video monitoring operation developer.RSA PKI in same Ukey and RSA private key are not a pair.Suppose that described video monitoring operator is distributed to the RSA key of VD to being VD.pubkey and VD.prikey, be distributed to the RSA key of VSD to being VSD.pubkey and VSD.prikey, that deposit in the Ukey for the upper insertion of VSD.pubkey and VD.prikey, VSD deposited in the Ukey so VD inserted is VD.pubkey and VSD.prikey.
S1:VD generates one group of random number A by the random number generator in Ukey1.
S2:VD is sent to VSD after carrying out rsa encryption by the rsa encryption program of Ukey1 to random number A.
Described in step S2, rsa encryption uses VSD.pubkey.
S3:VSD carries out RSA deciphering by the RSA decrypted program of Ukey2 after receiving ciphertext, obtains random number A.
The deciphering of RSA described in step S3 uses VSD.prikey.
S4:VSD is sent to VD after random number A being carried out RSA signature by the RSA signature procedure of Ukey2.
The signature of RSA described in step S4 uses VSD.prikey.
S5:VD carries out RSA signature verification by the RSA signature verification program of Ukey1 after receiving signature, if the result and random number A completely the same, then VD success identity VSD, perform S6; Otherwise authentification failure, access reject.
The signature verification of RSA described in step S5 uses VSD.pubkey.
S6:VSD generates one group of random number B by the random number generator in Ukey2.
S7:VSD is sent to VD after carrying out rsa encryption by the rsa encryption program of Ukey2 to random number B.
Described in step S7, rsa encryption uses VD.pubkey.
S8:VD carries out RSA deciphering by the RSA decrypted program of Ukey2 after receiving ciphertext, obtains random number B.
The deciphering of RSA described in step S8 uses VD.prikey.
S9:VD is sent to VSD after random number B being carried out RSA signature by the RSA signature procedure of Ukey1.
The signature of RSA described in step S9 uses VD.prikey.
S10:VSD carries out RSA signature verification by the RSA signature verification program of Ukey2 after receiving signature, if the result and random number B completely the same, then VSD success identity VD, access allow; Otherwise authentification failure, access reject.
The signature verification of RSA described in step S10 uses VD.pubkey.
So far, achieve the two-way authentication between access equipment and video monitoring equipment in video monitoring system, if authentication success, then allow access; If certification is unsuccessful, then do not allow access.
Provided by the invention a kind of based on the mutual authentication method in video monitoring system, based on the safety certificate equipment that access equipment and video monitoring equipment insert, safety certificate equipment Ukey is packaged with random number generator, rsa encryption program, RSA decrypted program, RSA signature procedure and RSA signature verification program, the signature and authentication that can realize between access equipment and video monitoring equipment by RSA Algorithm.Therefore; when there is no safety certificate equipment; or have safety certificate equipment but built in content is not inconsistent; do not know user's PIN code etc.; these situations all will cause access reject; this just greatly reduces the possibility of malice accessing video watch-dog, effectively prevent the criminal offence of stealing video, protects the personal secrets of video content.
Above-described embodiments of the present invention are only for invention example being clearly described, not forming limiting the scope of the present invention.For those of ordinary skill in the field, can also make other changes in different forms on the basis of the above description.Any amendment done within spiritual principles of the present invention, equivalent replacement and improvement etc., all should be included within claims of the present invention.
Claims (8)
1. based on a mutual authentication method for video monitoring system, described video monitoring system comprises access equipment and video monitoring equipment, it is characterized in that: described method comprises the steps:
S1: user inserts safety certificate equipment Ukey1 on the access device, inserts safety certificate equipment Ukey2 simultaneously on video monitoring equipment, and sets up access connection application by access equipment;
S2: access equipment generates one group of random number A by Ukey1, and public key encryption is carried out to random number A send to video monitoring equipment;
S3: video monitoring equipment carries out public key decryptions by Ukey2 to the ciphertext received and obtains random number A;
S4: video monitoring equipment sends to access equipment after being signed by the random number A after deciphering by Ukey2;
S5: access equipment carries out signature verification by Ukey1 to the signature received, if the result and random number A completely the same, then access equipment success identity video monitoring equipment, perform S6; Otherwise authentification failure, access reject;
S6: video monitoring equipment generates one group of random number B by Ukey2, and send to access equipment after public key encryption is carried out to random number B;
S7: access equipment carries out public key decryptions by Ukey1 to the ciphertext received and obtains random number B;
S8: access equipment sends to video monitoring equipment after being signed by the random number B after deciphering by Ukey1;
S9: the signature that video monitoring equipment is received by Ukey2 carries out signature verification, if the result and random number B completely the same, then video monitoring equipment success identity access equipment, access allow; Otherwise authentification failure, access reject.
2. the mutual authentication method based on video monitoring system according to claim 1, it is characterized in that: described access equipment is the equipment that Built In Operating System, set up applications possess display translation simultaneously, described access equipment is connected by network with between video monitoring equipment.
3. the mutual authentication method based on video monitoring system according to claim 1, is characterized in that: described safety certificate equipment is a kind of portable plug-in type hardware device, has globally unique sequence number.
4. the mutual authentication method based on video monitoring system according to claim 3, is characterized in that: described safety certificate equipment safety is equipped with random number generator, rsa encryption program and RSA decrypted program;
Described access equipment generates one group of random number A by the random number generator of Ukey1, and sending to video monitoring equipment after rsa encryption being carried out to random number A by the rsa encryption program of Ukey1, described video monitoring equipment carries out RSA deciphering by the RSA decrypted program of Ukey2 to the ciphertext received and obtains random number A;
Described video monitoring equipment generates one group of random number B by the random number generator of Ukey2, and sending to access equipment after rsa encryption being carried out to random number B by the rsa encryption program of Ukey2, described access equipment carries out RSA deciphering by the RSA decrypted program of Ukey1 to the ciphertext received and obtains random number B.
5. the mutual authentication method based on video monitoring system according to claim 4, is characterized in that: described safety certificate equipment is also packaged with safely RSA signature procedure and RSA signature verification program;
Described video monitoring equipment sends to access equipment after the random number A after deciphering being carried out RSA signature by the RSA signature procedure of Ukey2, and described access equipment carries out RSA signature verification by the RSA signature verification program of Ukey1 to the signature received;
Described access equipment sends to video monitoring equipment after the random number B after deciphering being carried out RSA signature by the RSA signature procedure of Ukey1, and described video monitoring equipment carries out RSA signature verification by the RSA signature verification program of Ukey2 to the signature received.
6. the mutual authentication method based on video monitoring system according to claim 1, is characterized in that: in described step S1, and when setting up access connection application by access equipment, the PIN code first inputting Ukey1 carries out certification.
7. the mutual authentication method based on video monitoring system according to claim 5, it is characterized in that: the random number generator in described safety certificate equipment, rsa encryption program, RSA decrypted program, RSA signature procedure and RSA signature verification program are finished writing before safety certificate equipment is issued, and described random number generator, rsa encryption program, RSA decrypted program, RSA signature procedure and RSA signature verification program are modified by providing the video monitoring developer of video monitoring equipment.
8. the mutual authentication method based on video monitoring system according to claim 5, it is characterized in that: described safety certificate equipment Ukey1 and Ukey2 comprises RSA PKI and RSA private key, described rsa encryption program adopts RSA PKI to be encrypted, described RSA decrypted program adopts RSA private key to be decrypted, described RSA signature procedure adopts RSA private key to sign, and described RSA signature verification program adopts RSA PKI to carry out signature verification.
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| CN105610837A (en) * | 2015-12-31 | 2016-05-25 | 上海交通大学 | Method and system for identity authentication between master station and slave station in SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system |
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| CN108282456A (en) * | 2017-12-08 | 2018-07-13 | 济南中维世纪科技有限公司 | The method that web camera mandate accesses |
| CN109618344A (en) * | 2019-01-25 | 2019-04-12 | 刘美连 | A kind of secure connection method and device of wireless monitoring equipment |
| CN109819217A (en) * | 2019-02-14 | 2019-05-28 | 上海图丽信息技术有限公司 | A kind of monitoring is mobile to have access to system |
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| CN105610837B (en) * | 2015-12-31 | 2018-12-18 | 上海交通大学 | For identity authentication method and system between SCADA system main website and slave station |
| CN105610837A (en) * | 2015-12-31 | 2016-05-25 | 上海交通大学 | Method and system for identity authentication between master station and slave station in SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system |
| CN108282456A (en) * | 2017-12-08 | 2018-07-13 | 济南中维世纪科技有限公司 | The method that web camera mandate accesses |
| CN108111497A (en) * | 2017-12-14 | 2018-06-01 | 深圳市共进电子股份有限公司 | Video camera and server inter-authentication method and device |
| CN109618344B (en) * | 2019-01-25 | 2020-06-23 | 广东省恒博信息有限公司 | Safe connection method and device of wireless monitoring equipment |
| CN109618344A (en) * | 2019-01-25 | 2019-04-12 | 刘美连 | A kind of secure connection method and device of wireless monitoring equipment |
| CN109819217A (en) * | 2019-02-14 | 2019-05-28 | 上海图丽信息技术有限公司 | A kind of monitoring is mobile to have access to system |
| CN110300289B (en) * | 2019-07-31 | 2020-08-21 | 北京中安国通科技有限公司 | Video safety management system and method |
| CN110324358B (en) * | 2019-07-31 | 2020-05-05 | 北京中安国通科技有限公司 | Video data management and control authentication method, module, equipment and platform |
| CN110324358A (en) * | 2019-07-31 | 2019-10-11 | 北京中安国通科技有限公司 | Video data manages authentication method, module, equipment and platform |
| CN110300289A (en) * | 2019-07-31 | 2019-10-01 | 北京中安国通科技有限公司 | Video security management system and method |
| CN110430204A (en) * | 2019-08-12 | 2019-11-08 | 徐州恒佳电子科技有限公司 | A kind of modified JSON safety communicating method based on third party's password book server |
| CN110995708A (en) * | 2019-12-05 | 2020-04-10 | 珠海市鸿瑞信息技术股份有限公司 | Public network communication data safety protection system |
| CN110995708B (en) * | 2019-12-05 | 2021-09-24 | 珠海市鸿瑞信息技术股份有限公司 | Public network communication data safety protection system |
| CN111600870A (en) * | 2020-05-13 | 2020-08-28 | 山东大学 | Bidirectional communication authentication method and system |
| CN111600870B (en) * | 2020-05-13 | 2021-08-03 | 山东大学 | Bidirectional communication authentication method and system |
| CN111901303A (en) * | 2020-06-28 | 2020-11-06 | 北京可信华泰信息技术有限公司 | Device authentication method and apparatus, storage medium, and electronic apparatus |
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