CN105071987B - Refined net path quality analysis method based on flow analysis - Google Patents
Refined net path quality analysis method based on flow analysis Download PDFInfo
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- CN105071987B CN105071987B CN201510448753.3A CN201510448753A CN105071987B CN 105071987 B CN105071987 B CN 105071987B CN 201510448753 A CN201510448753 A CN 201510448753A CN 105071987 B CN105071987 B CN 105071987B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
- H04L43/08—Monitoring or testing based on specific metrics, e.g. QoS, energy consumption or environmental parameters
- H04L43/0823—Errors, e.g. transmission errors
- H04L43/0829—Packet loss
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0485—Networking architectures for enhanced packet encryption processing, e.g. offloading of IPsec packet processing or efficient security association look-up
Abstract
The refined net path quality analysis method based on flow analysis that the invention discloses a kind of, including：A, the arbitrary intermediate node during selection encryption network communication is measurement point, acquires network flow；B, the encrypted data packet that measurement point receives is analyzed, obtain the source address on the heads IP, destination address, the heads IPsec SPI, above-mentioned triple determines a session.C, all data packets for analyzing same session count number of dropped packets according to the sequence number information in data packet IPsec protocol headers, finally calculate the packet loss index of whole link.This method can obtain the quality information in IPsec coded communications path by the encrypted data packets of analyzing IP sec.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to network path quality analysis method technical fields, more precisely in refined net traffic conditions
Under the refined net path quality analysis method based on flow analysis.
Background technology
Currently, domestic network coverage face constantly expands, while the average speed of network is also constantly promoted.For user
For, it is meant that the quality of service of network is good.In most cases, network improves really, but this and not equal to user
Online experience becomes good, as it is possible that encountering network congestion, causes the network performance of user's indirect abnormal.It rapidly to detect
It has the failure caused by the factors such as network line, congestion, it, at present can be by measuring technique below come real by years of researches
It is existing：
（1）Actively measure.By being influenced on network suffered by probe data packet by the analysis of occurrence features variation, network is obtained
The parameters such as state and performance.Such as ICMP type data packets are sent, network round-trip time delay, packet loss and connectivity etc. can be obtained
Parameter.If to network transmission data packet and transmission rate is continuously improved until network saturation, the maximum load of network can measure
Ability.Actively measuring can be carried out by the intention of gauger, and the controllability of measurement process is relatively high, and operation is flexible, motor-driven.
（2）Using the means of flow analysis, the intermediate node in end to end network path acquires and analyzes flow.Such as：
Publication No. CN102868576A, publication date are that Chinese patent literature disclosed in 9 days January in 2013 discloses a kind of broadband networks use
Family access link downlink packet loss rate measurement method, including：A, the arbitrary intermediate node for choosing server end and client is to measure
Point；B, the TCP message that client is issued to the server end that measurement point receives is analyzed, and counts TCP message header message,
The sequence number and payload length information carried according to TCP message predicts the next TCP reports that will be received of measurement point
Literary serial number；C, when next TCP message arrives, the TCP message serial number of arrival is compared with the TCP message serial number predicted,
Judge whether the link that packet loss and packet loss occur is server side or client access link, then finally obtains user's
The foundation of the performance indicators such as downlink packet loss index and time delay.This method can be in the arbitrary intermediate node acquisition user of local side and interconnection
Communication flows between net is broadband networks by calculating the analysis of flow the downlink packet loss index of user's access link
Operation, quality assurance, fault diagnosis provide supporting method.
However, with the rapid development of Internet, internet security problem also rises many network security protocol prevalences
Come, IPsec agreements are exactly one of them.IPsec is IETF（Internet Engineering Task Force, Internet
Engineering task force）IPsec groups establish one group of IP security protocol collection.IPsec defines the safety clothes used in network layer
Business, function include data encryption, the access control to network element, data source address verification, data integrity inspection and prevent
Only Replay Attack.
Above two is directed to the network path quality analysis method of public network for refined net, all no longer suitable
With.The reason is as follows that：（1）Flow in refined net is by encryption.IPsec is the third layer for being operated in osi model
Network security protocol, the loading section of IP data packets or entire data packet are encrypted by protocol requirement.Therefore, it is impossible to by dividing
Transmission Control Protocol stem and load in IP data packets are analysed to obtain network path quality；（2）In refined net, in order to improve peace
Quan Xing, the host in network often forbid various active measurement data packets, the ICMP generated such as ping orders.
Therefore, to the end-to-end path quality detection of refined net, there has been no good solutions at present.
Invention content
The present invention is directed to existing for the above-mentioned prior art defects and deficiency, provide a kind of adding based on flow analysis
Close network path quality analysis method, this method can be realized by the analysis to the encrypted data packet headers of IPsec to network
The calculating of end-to-end path packet loss, and then obtain the path quality of refined net.
The present invention is realized by using following technical proposals：
A kind of refined net path quality analysis method based on flow analysis, it is characterised in that steps are as follows：
A, arbitrary intermediate node during encryption network communication acquires network flow；
B, with AH agreements and the encrypted data packet of ESP agreements, in encrypted data packet the heads AH and the heads ESP carry out
Analysis, and to session into line trace；
C, the sequence number in the heads AH and the heads ESP is extracted, packet loss is calculated.
In step A, the arbitrary intermediate node during the encryption network communication specifically refers to：Road in refined net
By any position in the equipment connecting link such as device, interchanger, bridge.
The step B is specifically referred to：For with AH agreements and the encrypted data packet of ESP agreements, it is inserted into corresponding AH agreements
With the head of ESP agreements, SPI fields are equipped in head for identifying an end-to-end session, using source IP address, Target IP
The SPI fields three elements of location, the heads AH or the heads ESP are one per one kind as the classification foundation for identifying encrypted data packet
Session is indicated with Si.
The step C is specifically referred to：With AH agreements and the encrypted data packet of ESP agreements, corresponding protocol headers are equipped with one
A sequence-number field is used to identify the encrypted data packet of difference in same session, and often sends an encrypted data packet,
Sequence number adds 1；Therefore, for an end-to-end session, it is only necessary to analyze all encrypted data that source is sent to destination
The sequence number of packet, so that it may which to know which sequence number has arrived at, which sequence number has been lost, and the sequence number lost regards
For a packet loss；For the encrypted data packet of each of same encryption session, in the heads AH or the heads ESP that check data packet
Sequence-number field, and to determine whether there is packet loss compared with the sequence number of the previous data packet received.
It is described " for the encrypted data packet of each of same encryption session, in the heads AH or the heads ESP that check data packet
Sequence-number field, and to determine whether there is packet loss compared with the sequence number of the previous data packet received " specific step
Suddenly it is：
1）The encrypted data packet received is analyzed, the encrypted data packet is determined in the way of step B
Affiliated session, and set the Serial No. P of the encrypted data packet；For session Si, multiple counter records its states is designed：
COUNTi indicates that the data packet sum that the session Si is received, MISSi indicate the number of dropped packets of the session Si, and MAXi is as institute
The maximum sequence number in data packet in session Si is stated, if the data packet received is not belonging to any already present session,
COUNTi=0, MISSi=0, MAXi=P；Otherwise MISSi and COUNTi are determined by analyzing MAXi and P, point or less 3 kinds of feelings
Condition：
（A）If packet loss does not occur in P=MAXi+1, data calculation formula is utilized：COUNTi=COUNTi+1, MAXi=
P；
（B）If P>MAXi+1 then shows packet loss or Out-of-sequence packets occurred, temporarily all as packet loss processing：It calculates
This number of dropped packets found is updated individual count device using following calculation formula:COUNTi=COUNTi+P-MAXi,
MISSi=MISSi+P-MAXi-1, MAXi=P；
（C）If P<MAXi then shows that data packet occur transmits out-of-sequence, step（B）Out-of-sequence as once losing
Packet, then need pair（B）In calculating data be adjusted, method of adjustment be MISSi=MISSi-1.
In above-mentioned analysis, the case where P=MAXi is not present, because MAXi indicates to have been received by the maximum sequence number of data packet,
Sender can not possibly repeat to send the message of the same sequence number, it is impossible to receive the data of Serial No. MAXi again
Packet.
2）Calculating the packet loss formula that some encrypts session is, calculate whole encrypted communications link
Packet loss is。
Compared with prior art, the advantageous effect of the invention reached is：Under IPsec refined net environment, using this
" arbitrary intermediate node acquisition network flows of A. during encryption network communication of method；" can collect it is upper in link
Row and all data packets of downlink.Meanwhile step A is the basis that step C calculates packet loss using data packet header sequence number.Using
This method " B. analyzes the data packet header in refined net；" can effectively obtain in IPsec refined nets
The key messages such as encryption type and the security strategy index that data packet uses, and then obtain the session belonging to encrypted data packet.
Using " sequence number of C. extraction data packets, calculating packet loss of this method；" can according to the sequence number of encrypted data packet come
The packet loss of each session in analyzing IP sec refined nets, and then obtain the path quality in refined net environment.
Description of the drawings
ESP and AH protocol headers involved in the present invention are made further specifically below in conjunction with Figure of description
It is bright, wherein：
Fig. 1 is the data packet format schematic diagram for using AH agreements in a transmission mode；
Fig. 2 is the mode data packet schematic diagram that AH agreements are used under tunnel mode；
Fig. 3 is the data packet format schematic diagram for using ESP agreements in a transmission mode；
Fig. 4 is the mode data packet schematic diagram that ESP agreements are used under tunnel mode；
Fig. 5 is -1 ESP protocol header encapsulating structure schematic diagrames of code；
Fig. 6 is -2 AH protocol header encapsulating structure schematic diagrames of code.
Specific implementation mode
As the preferred forms of the present invention, content includes：End to end in IPsec refined nets, IPsec
Consultation is using Encryption Algorithm to being verified, being encrypted from upper layer forward data packet, encapsulated again.Therefore, data packet can be utilized
In IP headers analyze data packet.ESP agreements or AH agreements are either utilized, all can again be added before data packet
One IP head --- external IP head.In the present invention, the source address of data packet external IP head, purpose are received by parsing measurement point
SPI information in address and IPsec determines the affiliated session of the data packet.
The IPsec heads that IPsec cryptographic protocols are inserted into when being verified, being encrypted to data packet provide for the analysis of the present invention
Foundation.There are one unidirectionally incremental Counter Values in consensus standard, it is specified that in IPsec（32 bit fields）, for preventing
Only Replay Attack.No matter whether recipient needs end to end, this field can be added in sender in the data packet of transmission.
So in the encrypted networks of IPsec, the sequence number in the heads of the IPsec in the data packet can be analyzed to determine data packet
Sum and packet loss.
The preferred plan of this technology：
It is measurement point that this patent, which chooses the arbitrary intermediate node during encryption network communication, during encryption network communication
Arbitrary intermediate node specifically refer to：Arbitrary position in the equipment connecting links such as router, interchanger, bridge in refined net
It sets.Acquire network flow；The encrypted data packet that measurement point receives is analyzed, source address, the purpose on the heads IP are obtained
The SPI of address, the heads IPsec, above-mentioned triple determine a session.All data packets for analyzing same session, according to data
The sequence number information in IPsec protocol headers is wrapped, number of dropped packets is counted, finally calculates the packet loss index of whole link.Specifically
Steps are as follows：
Arbitrary intermediate node during encryption network communication acquires network flow, and the flow of uplink and downlink can
It collects；
Data packet header in refined net is analyzed.With AH agreements and the encrypted data packet of ESP agreements, can insert
Enter corresponding AH agreements and ESP protocol headers（As shown in the picture）, have in head SPI fields for identify one it is end-to-end
Session.This patent is using source IP address, target ip address, the SPI fields of AH or ESP protocol headers this three elements conducts as a result,
It identifies that the classification foundation of data packet, all identical data packet of three elements are a session, is indicated with Si.
Trace analysis each encrypts all data packets that session Si is successively reached, and extracts the sequence number of data packet, calculating is lost
Packet rate.With AH agreements and the encrypted data packet of ESP agreements, all there are one sequence-number fields for identifying together for corresponding protocol headers
Different data packet in one session（As shown in the picture）, and an encrypted data packet is often sent, sequence number adds 1；Therefore, right
In an end-to-end session, flow analysis system only need trace analysis source be sent to destination all data packets sequence
Number, so that it may to know which sequence number has arrived at, which sequence number has been lost, and the sequence number lost, which is considered as, once to be lost
Packet.For the encrypted data packet of each of same encryption session, the sequence-number field in its head AH or the heads ESP is checked, and
With compared with the sequence number of the previous data packet received to determine whether there is packet loss.Judge encryption session Si packet drops
It comprises the concrete steps that：
The encrypted data packet received is analyzed, the affiliated session of the data packet is determined according to the method for step B,
And set the Serial No. P of the data packet；For session Si, the data packet sum that the session is received is indicated using COUNTi,
MISSi indicates the number of dropped packets of the session, and MAXi is as the maximum sequence number in data packet in the session.If the data packet received
It is not belonging to any already present session, then COUNTi=0, MISSi=0, MAXi=P；Otherwise it is determined by analyzing MAXi and P
MISSi and COUNTi, here will point 3 kinds of situation discussion：
If packet loss does not occur in P=MAXi+1, data calculation formula is utilized：COUNTi=COUNTi+1, MAXi=P；
If P>Then there is packet loss or data packet transmission delay in MAXi+1, then number of dropped packets is set as P-MAXi-1.According to calculating
Formula:COUNTi=COUNTi+P-MAXi, MISSi=MISSi+P-MAXi-1, MAXi=P.
If P<, then there is data packet transmission delay in MAXi, then needs pair（B）In calculating data be adjusted, formula
For MISSi=MISSi-1.
In above-mentioned analysis, the case where P=MAXi is not present, because MAXi indicates to have been received by the maximum sequence number of data packet,
Sender can not possibly repeat to send the message of the same sequence number, it is impossible to receive the data of Serial No. MAXi again
Packet.
Calculating the packet loss formula that some encrypts session is, calculate whole encrypted communications link
Packet loss is。
Claims (2)
1. a kind of refined net path quality analysis method based on flow analysis, it is characterised in that steps are as follows：
A, arbitrary intermediate node acquires network flow during encryption network communication；
B, with AH agreements and the encrypted data packet of ESP agreements, in encrypted data packet the heads AH and the heads ESP divide
Analysis, and to session into line trace；
C, the sequence number in the heads AH and the heads ESP is extracted, packet loss is calculated；
The step B is specifically referred to：For with AH agreements and the encrypted data packet of ESP agreements, it is inserted into corresponding AH agreements and ESP
The head of agreement is equipped with SPI fields in head for identifying an end-to-end session, using source IP address, target ip address, AH
Classification foundation of the SPI fields three elements on head or the heads ESP as identification data packet, is a session per one kind, with Si tables
Show；
The step C is specifically referred to：With AH agreements and the encrypted data packet of ESP agreements, corresponding protocol headers set that there are one sequences
Row field is used to identify the different data packet in same session, and often sends an encrypted data packet, and sequence number adds 1；
Therefore, for an end-to-end session, it is only necessary to analyze the sequence number that source is sent to all data packets of destination, so that it may with
Know which sequence number has arrived at, which sequence number has been lost, and the sequence number lost is considered as a packet loss；For same
One encryption each of session encrypted data packet, the heads AH for checking data packet or the sequence-number field in the heads ESP, and with it is preceding
The sequence number of one data packet received compares to determine whether there is packet loss；
Described " for the encrypted data packet of each of same encryption session, the heads AH for checking data packet or the sequence in the heads ESP
Row field, and to determine whether there is packet loss compared with the sequence number of the previous data packet received " comprises the concrete steps that：
1）The encrypted data packet received is analyzed, is determined in the way of step B belonging to the encrypted data packet
Session, and set the Serial No. P of the data packet；For session Si, multiple counter records its states is designed：COUNTi indicates institute
The data packet sum that session Si is received is stated, MISSi indicates the number of dropped packets of the session Si, and MAXi is as number in the session Si
According to the maximum sequence number in packet, if the data packet received is not belonging to any already present session, COUNTi=0, MISSi=0,
MAXi=P；Otherwise MISSi and COUNTi are determined by analyzing MAXi and P, point or less 3 kinds of situations：
（A）If packet loss does not occur in P=MAXi+1, data calculation formula is utilized：COUNTi=COUNTi+1, MAXi=P；
（B）If P>MAXi+1 then shows packet loss or Out-of-sequence packets occurred, temporarily all as packet loss processing：Calculate this
It was found that number of dropped packets, individual count device is updated using following calculation formula:COUNTi=COUNTi+P-MAXi, MISSi=
MISSi+P-MAXi-1, MAXi=P；
（C）If P<MAXi then shows that data packet occur transmits out-of-sequence, step（B）Out-of-sequence as a packet loss, then
It needs pair（B）In calculating data be adjusted, method of adjustment be MISSi=MISSi-1；
2）Calculating the packet loss formula that some encrypts session is, calculate the packet loss of whole encrypted communications link
Rate is。
2. the refined net path quality analysis method according to claim 1 based on flow analysis, it is characterised in that：A
In step, the arbitrary intermediate node during the encryption network communication specifically refers to：Router, exchange in refined net
Any position in the equipment connecting link such as machine, bridge.
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| US10476673B2 (en) | 2017-03-22 | 2019-11-12 | Extrahop Networks, Inc. | Managing session secrets for continuous packet capture systems |
| CN109428867B (en) * | 2017-08-30 | 2020-08-25 | 华为技术有限公司 | Message encryption and decryption method, network equipment and system |
| US9967292B1 (en) | 2017-10-25 | 2018-05-08 | Extrahop Networks, Inc. | Inline secret sharing |
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| US10742677B1 (en) | 2019-09-04 | 2020-08-11 | Extrahop Networks, Inc. | Automatic determination of user roles and asset types based on network monitoring |
| CN110932934B (en) * | 2019-11-21 | 2021-07-13 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Network packet loss detection method and device |
| CN111526100B (en) * | 2020-04-16 | 2021-08-24 | 中南大学 | Cross-network traffic identification method and device based on dynamic identification and path hiding |
| US11463466B2 (en) | 2020-09-23 | 2022-10-04 | Extrahop Networks, Inc. | Monitoring encrypted network traffic |
| EP4218212A1 (en) | 2020-09-23 | 2023-08-02 | ExtraHop Networks, Inc. | Monitoring encrypted network traffic |
| US11349861B1 (en) | 2021-06-18 | 2022-05-31 | Extrahop Networks, Inc. | Identifying network entities based on beaconing activity |
| US11296967B1 (en) | 2021-09-23 | 2022-04-05 | Extrahop Networks, Inc. | Combining passive network analysis and active probing |
| US11843606B2 (en) | 2022-03-30 | 2023-12-12 | Extrahop Networks, Inc. | Detecting abnormal data access based on data similarity |
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