CN105049197B - Challenge model library method for building up in quantum cryptographic protocols - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses the challenge model library method for building up in a kind of quantum cryptographic protocols, it includes intercepting and capturing replay attack model, random replacement challenge model, the General Aggression Model, Trojan horse attack model and invisible photon challenge model, the intercepting and capturing replay attack model：Sender is by sequence AiIt is transferred in channel, its whole is intercepted and captured and randomly chooses measurement base by listener-in, each photon is measured and records result Ei；When all photons are all measured, listener-in obtains a new sequence Ei ', and sends recipient to, and recipient obtains result Bi.The model library that this method is established, which includes, intercepts and captures replay attack model, random replacement challenge model, the General Aggression Model, Trojan horse attack model and invisible photon challenge model, the process of five kinds of attack patterns of accurate description, suitable for a kind of communication protocol with similar quality, eavesdropping can be effectively detected, ensures communication security.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the challenge model library method for building up in a kind of quantum cryptographic protocols.
Background technology
The development of network is increasingly sophisticated, ensures the safety of information network and has become the core content of national information strategy,
Under specific network environment, the threat stolen secret information by any special measures is increasingly severe, and private information is in dissemination channel process
In, if channel is dangerous, listener-in can steal information from channel, threaten to information security.That eavesdrops is most main
Syllabus is to obtain the secret information transmitted between legal user, and it is exactly its safety that quantum cryptographic protocols are most important
Property, the mode of attack quantum communication process has very much.A kind of method of model inspection is now proposed to come in quantum cryptographic protocols
Eavesdropping modeled.When the security property of an agreement needs verification, directly carried out using the model having had built up
Detection.
Invention content
It is an object of the invention to overcome the deficiencies of the prior art and provide the challenge model libraries in a kind of quantum cryptographic protocols
Method for building up, the model library that this method is established, which includes, to be intercepted and captured replay attack model, random replacement challenge model, generally attacks mould
Type, Trojan horse attack model and invisible photon challenge model, the process of five kinds of attack patterns of accurate description, suitable for one
Class has the communication protocol of similar quality, can effectively detect eavesdropping, ensures communication security.
The purpose of the present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions：Challenge model library in quantum cryptographic protocols is established
Method, it includes intercepting and capturing replay attack model, random replacement challenge model, the General Aggression Model, Trojan horse attack model
With invisible photon challenge model；
The intercepting and capturing replay attack model is：Sender is by sequence AiIt is transferred in channel, listener-in all cuts it
It obtains and randomly chooses measurement base, each photon is measured and record result Ei；When all photons are all measured, surreptitiously
Hearer obtains a new sequence Ei ', and sends recipient to, and recipient obtains result Bi；
The random replacement challenge model is：Sender is by sequence AiIt is transferred in channel, listener-in all cuts it
It obtains and randomly chooses measurement base, each photon is measured and record result Ei, then generation one is new at random by listener-in
Sequence Ei ' ', and recipient is transferred to, recipient obtains result Bi；
The General Aggression Model is：For each photon that sender sends out, listener-in is cut with probability P ROB selections
Obtain replay attack or with probability 1-PROB selection random replacement attacks；
The Trojan horse attack model is：Listener-in intercepts and captures the signal transmitted between the sender and the recipient,
Then the photon of a forgery is inserted into the signal that listener-in is transmitted between the sender and the recipient, then listener-in cuts again
The signal in channel is obtained, obtains the forgery photon after being operated by recipient, obtains whole letters that recipient measures and operates
Breath；
The invisible photon challenge model is：Listener-in is firstly generated to the detector of sender and recipients not
Sensitive photon, is then sent to sender by photon, after sender operates and sends, listener-in from channel acquisition this
Invisible photon, the operation then eavesdropped obtain all information of sender's operation.
The eavesdropping state branch mode of the intercepting and capturing replay attack model includes：Listener-in selects measurement base, shape first
State becomes ' 11 ' from ' 10 ', and then listener-in measures the photon intercepted and captured, state transition to ' 12 ' at this time, when listener-in is measured
When as a result, state becomes ' 13 ', and when listener-in is by data transmission letter in reply road, state returns to ' 10 '.
The eavesdropping state branch mode of the random replacement challenge model includes：Listener-in selects measurement base, shape first
State becomes ' 21 ' from ' 20 ', and then listener-in measures the photon intercepted and captured, state transition to ' 22 ', when listener-in obtains measurement result
When, state becomes ' 23 ', and listener-in generates a new sequence, state transition to ' 24 ', when listener-in returns data transmission at random
In channel, state returns to ' 20 '.
The eavesdropping state branch mode of the General Aggression Model includes：Original state is ' 30 ', and listener-in selects to survey
After measuring base, state transition to ' 31 ', the photon that then listener-in's measurement is intercepted and captured, state transition to ' 32 ', when listener-in is surveyed
When measuring result, state becomes ' 33 ', and then listener-in selects attack pattern, and state becomes ' 34 ', when listener-in is by data transmission
Into channel, state returns to ' 30 '.
The eavesdropping state branch mode of the Trojan horse attack model includes：Original state is ' 40 ', is being eavesdropped
After person generates forgery photon, state transition to ' 41 ', when these photons are sent to recipient by listener-in, state becomes
' 42 ', after listener-in obtains the forgery photon after recipient operates, state becomes ' 43 ' from ' 42 ', finally eavesdrops
Person obtains information, and module status returns to ' 40 '.
The invisible photon challenge model eavesdropping state branch mode includes：Original state is ' 50 ', listener-in's life
Into forge photon after, state transition to ' 51 ', then listener-in by forgery photon be sent to sender, state becomes ' 52 ', when
Listener-in is obtained after the forgery photon that sender operates, and state becomes ' 53 ', finally, after listener-in obtains information, shape
State returns to ' 50 '.
The challenge model library is modeled using probabilistic model checking tool PRISM.
The beneficial effects of the invention are as follows：The present invention provides the challenge model library foundation sides in a kind of quantum cryptographic protocols
Method, the model library that this method is established, which contains, intercepts and captures replay attack model, random replacement challenge model, the General Aggression Model, spy
Her Trojan attack model of Lip river and invisible photon challenge model, the accurate description process of five kinds of attack patterns, suitable for one kind
Communication protocol with similar quality can effectively detect eavesdropping, ensure communication security.
Description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is intercepts and captures replay attack state transition graph；
Fig. 2 attacks state transition graph for random replacement；
Fig. 3 is general attack state transition graph；
Fig. 4 is Trojan horse attack state transition graph；
Fig. 5 attacks state transition graph for invisible photon；
Fig. 6 is sender's state transition graph in BB84 agreements；
Fig. 7 is recipient's state transition graph in BB84 agreements；
Fig. 8 is communication channel state transition diagram in BB84 agreements；
Fig. 9 is listener-in's state transition graph in BB84 agreements；
Figure 10 is sender's state transition graph in " Ping-Pong " agreement；
Figure 11 is recipient's state transition graph in " Ping-Pong " agreement；
Figure 12 is communication channel state transition diagram in " Ping-Pong " agreement；
Figure 13 is listener-in's state transition graph in " Ping-Pong " agreement；
Figure 14 is that replay attack, random replacement attack and general attack verification the verifying results figure are intercepted and captured under BB84 agreements；
Figure 15 is that Trojan horse attack and invisible photon attack verification the verifying results figure under " Ping-Pong " agreement.
Specific embodiment
Technical scheme of the present invention is described in further detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, but protection scope of the present invention is not limited to
It is as described below.
As shown in Figure 1, the challenge model library method for building up in quantum cryptographic protocols, it include intercepting and capturing replay attack model,
Random replacement challenge model, the General Aggression Model, Trojan horse attack model and invisible photon challenge model；
The intercepting and capturing replay attack model is：Sender is by sequence AiIt is transferred in channel, listener-in all cuts it
It obtains and randomly chooses measurement base, each photon is measured and record result Ei；When all photons are all measured, surreptitiously
Hearer obtains a new sequence Ei ', and sends recipient to, and recipient obtains result Bi.As shown in Figure 1, listener-in selects first
Measurement base is selected, state becomes ' 11 ' from ' 10 ', and then listener-in measures the photon intercepted and captured, state transition to ' 12 ' at this time, when surreptitiously
When hearer obtains measurement result, state becomes ' 13 ', and when listener-in is by data transmission letter in reply road, state returns to ' 10 '.
The random replacement challenge model is：Sender is by sequence AiIt is transferred in channel, listener-in all cuts it
It obtains and randomly chooses measurement base, each photon is measured and record result Ei, then generation one is new at random by listener-in
Sequence Ei ' ', and recipient is transferred to, recipient obtains result Bi.As shown in Fig. 2, listener-in selects measurement base first,
State becomes ' 21 ' from ' 20 ', and then listener-in measures the photon intercepted and captured, state transition to ' 22 ', when listener-in obtains measuring knot
During fruit, state becomes ' 23 ', and listener-in generates a new sequence, state transition to ' 24 ', when listener-in is data transmission at random
In letter in reply road, state returns to ' 20 '.
The General Aggression Model is：For each photon that sender sends out, listener-in is cut with probability P ROB selections
Obtain replay attack or with probability 1-PROB selection random replacement attacks.As shown in figure 3, original state is ' 30 ', listener-in's choosing
After selecting measurement base, state transition to ' 31 ', the photon that then listener-in's measurement is intercepted and captured, state transition to ' 32 ', when listener-in obtains
During to measurement result, state becomes ' 33 ', and then listener-in selects attack pattern, and state becomes ' 34 ', when listener-in is by data
It is transferred in channel, state returns to ' 30 '.
The Trojan horse attack model is：Listener-in intercepts and captures the signal transmitted between the sender and the recipient,
Then the photon of a forgery is inserted into the signal that listener-in is transmitted between the sender and the recipient, then listener-in cuts again
The signal in channel is obtained, obtains the forgery photon after being operated by recipient, obtains whole letters that recipient measures and operates
Breath.As shown in figure 4, original state is ' 40 ', after listener-in generates and forges photon, listener-in is worked as in state transition to ' 41 '
These photons are sent to recipient, state becomes ' 42 ', the forgery photon after listener-in obtains operating by recipient
Afterwards, state becomes ' 43 ' from ' 42 ', and last listener-in obtains information, and module status returns to ' 40 '.
The invisible photon challenge model is：Listener-in is firstly generated to the detector of sender and recipients not
Sensitive photon, is then sent to sender by photon, after sender operates and sends, listener-in from channel acquisition this
Invisible photon, the operation then eavesdropped obtain all information of sender's operation.As shown in figure 5, original state is
' 50 ', listener-in generate forge photon after, state transition to ' 51 ', then listener-in by forgery photon be sent to sender, shape
State becomes ' 52 ', and when listener-in is obtained after the forgery photon that sender operates, state becomes ' 53 ', finally, works as listener-in
After obtaining information, state returns to ' 50 '.
The challenge model library is modeled using probabilistic model checking tool PRISM.
Challenge model library established above can be verified by communication protocol, here using BB84 agreements and " ping-
The data transmission procedures of pong " agreements is verified.
BB84 agreements include communication channel module, sender's module, recipient's module and listener-in's module.Each module is again
It is divided into several states.
The state transfer of sender's module of BB84 agreements as shown in fig. 6, after sender has selected measurement base and data,
State becomes ' 101 ' from original state ' 100 ', and then sender generates photon, and state becomes ' 102 ', and then sender is by light
Son is transferred in channel, and state becomes ' 103 ', and after sender announces measurement base and data, state becomes ' 104 ', judges to pass
Whether defeated process terminates, if do not terminated, returns to ' 100 '；Otherwise become ' 105 ' end.
As shown in fig. 7, original state is ' 110 ', recipient selects to survey for the state transfer of recipient's module of BB84 agreements
Amount base simultaneously measures photon, and module status becomes ' 111 ' and ' 112 ', after recipient obtains measurement result, and state becomes ' 113 ', connects
Recipient announced to sender as a result, if sender and recipients' measurement base is different or measurement base and data it is all identical,
State becomes ' 114 ', if measurement base is identical but data differ, detects listener-in, and state becomes ' 116 ', judges to pass
It is defeated whether to terminate, if do not terminated, return to ' 110 '；If terminated, become ' 115 ', that is, without eavesdropping.
The state transfer of the communication channel module of BB84 agreements is as shown in figure 8, the original state of channel for ' 120 ', is sent
Photon is sent in channel by person, and state becomes ' 121 ', and when listener-in measures photon, state becomes ' 122 ', works as listener-in
It passes it to ' 123 ' in channel, after recipient obtains photon, state returns to ' 120 '.
Listener-in's module of BB84 agreements state transfer as shown in figure 9, listener-in select measurement base after, module status
Become ' 131 ' from ' 130 ', then listener-in measures photon, and state becomes ' 132 ', and listener-in obtains measurement result, and state becomes
' 133 ', finally, listener-in transfers back to data in channel, and state returns to ' 130 '.
" Ping-Pong " agreement also includes communication channel module, sender's module, recipient's module and listener-in's module.
The state transfer of sender's module of " Ping-Pong " agreement is as shown in Figure 10, and original state is ' 200 ', works as hair
The person of sending obtains the photon that recipient sends, and state becomes ' 201 ', and then sender decides whether to operate photon, state
' 202 ' are moved to, then judges whether to eavesdrop, if without eavesdropping, after photon is passed to channel by sender, is returned to
‘200’；If there is eavesdropping, then state becomes ' 203 ', that is, detects listener-in.
The state transfer of the recipient of " Ping-Pong " agreement is as shown in figure 11, and recipient generates photon, state by
' 210 ' become ' 211 ', and become ' 212 ' after recipient is sent it in channel, and then recipient obtains sender's transmission
The photon come, state become ' 213 ', judge whether transmission terminates, and do not terminate such as, then return to ' 210 '；Such as terminate, then move to
‘214’。
The state transfer of the communication channel of " Ping-Pong " agreement is as shown in figure 12, and channel original state is ' 220 ', is connect
Receipts person is after in photon transmission to channel, and state becomes ' 221 ', and then listener-in is forged in photon transmission to channel,
State becomes ' 222 ', and after sender obtains photon, state becomes ' 223 ', and sender transfers back to photon in channel, state
' 224 ' are moved to, after listener-in obtains his forgery photon, state becomes ' 225 ', finally, when recipient obtains his light
After son, state returns to ' 220 '.
The state transfer of listener-in's module of " Ping-Pong " agreement is as shown in figure 13, and photon is forged when listener-in generates
Afterwards, state becomes ' 231 ' from ' 230 ', will be forged after photon passed in channel in listener-in, state becomes ' 232 ', works as listener-in
After obtaining its forgery photon, state transition to ' 233 ', last listener-in obtains information, and state returns to ' 230 '.
Replay attack, random replacement attack and general attack, verification the verifying results such as Figure 14 institutes are intercepted and captured in verification under BB84 agreements
Show, when transmitting 50 photons, detect that the probability of eavesdropping is just substantially equal to 1.In these three attack patterns, to listener-in
For, intercepting and capturing-replay attack is best attack pattern.
Carry verification Trojan horse attack and the attack of invisible photon, verification the verifying results such as Figure 15 under " Ping-Pong " agreement
Shown, Trojan horse attack and the attack of invisible photon are much like, when transmitting 50 photons, detect the probability of eavesdropping just
It is substantially equal to 1.When transmission number of photons continues to increase, probability will continue to rise.
It can be obtained from result above, the challenge model library accurate description of the invention process of this five kinds of attack patterns.Such as
There is eavesdropping in fruit, with the increase of transmission number of photons, detect eavesdropping probability can curve level off to 1.
Claims (2)
1. the challenge model library method for building up in quantum cryptographic protocols, it is characterised in that：It include intercepting and capturing replay attack model, with
Machine substitution attack model, the General Aggression Model, Trojan horse attack model and invisible photon challenge model；
The intercepting and capturing replay attack model is：Sender is by sequence AiBe transferred in channel, listener-in by its all intercept and capture and with
Machine selects measurement base, each photon is measured and records result Ei；When all photons are all measured, listener-in obtains
To a new sequence Ei ', and send recipient to, recipient obtains result Bi；
The random replacement challenge model is：Sender is by sequence AiBe transferred in channel, listener-in by its all intercept and capture and with
Machine selects measurement base, each photon is measured and records result Ei, then listener-in is random generates a new sequence
Ei ' ', and recipient is transferred to, recipient obtains result Bi；
The General Aggression Model is：For each photon that sender sends out, listener-in selects to intercept and capture weight with probability P ROB
Pass attack or with probability 1-PROB selection random replacement attacks；
The Trojan horse attack model is：Listener-in intercepts and captures the signal transmitted between the sender and the recipient, then
The photon of a forgery is inserted into the signal that listener-in is transmitted between the sender and the recipient, then listener-in intercepts and captures letter again
Signal in road obtains the forgery photon after being operated by recipient, obtains all information that recipient measures and operates；
The invisible photon challenge model is：Listener-in firstly generates insensitive to the detector of sender and recipients
Photon, photon is then sent to sender, after sender operates and sends, this can not from channel acquisition by listener-in
See photon, the operation then eavesdropped obtains all information of sender's operation；
The eavesdropping state branch mode of the intercepting and capturing replay attack model includes：First listener-in select measurement base, state by
' 10 ' become ' 11 ', and then listener-in measures the photon intercepted and captured, state transition to ' 12 ' at this time, when listener-in obtains measurement result
When, state becomes ' 13 ', and when listener-in is by data transmission letter in reply road, state returns to ' 10 '；
The eavesdropping state branch mode of the random replacement challenge model includes：First listener-in select measurement base, state by
' 20 ' become ' 21 ', the photon that then listener-in's measurement is intercepted and captured, state transition to ' 22 ', when listener-in obtains measurement result,
State becomes ' 23 ', and listener-in generates a new sequence, state transition to ' 24 ', when listener-in writes in reply data transmission at random
In, state returns to ' 20 '；
The eavesdropping state branch mode of the General Aggression Model includes：Original state is ' 30 ', and listener-in selects measurement base
Afterwards, state transition measures the photon intercepted and captured, state transition to ' 32 ', when listener-in obtains measuring knot to ' 31 ', then listener-in
During fruit, state becomes ' 33 ', and then listener-in selects attack pattern, and state becomes ' 34 ', when listener-in transfers data to letter
In road, state returns to ' 30 '；
The eavesdropping state branch mode of the Trojan horse attack model includes：Original state is ' 40 ', is given birth in listener-in
Into after forging photon, state transition to ' 41 ', when these photons are sent to recipient by listener-in, state becomes ' 42 ',
After listener-in obtains the forgery photon after recipient operates, state becomes ' 43 ' from ' 42 ', and last listener-in obtains letter
Breath, module status return to ' 40 '；
The invisible photon challenge model eavesdropping state branch mode includes：Original state is ' 50 ', and listener-in generates pseudo-
After making photon, state transition to ' 51 ', then listener-in by forge photon be sent to sender, state becomes ' 52 ', works as eavesdropping
Person is obtained after the forgery photon that sender operates, and state becomes ' 53 ', and finally, after listener-in obtains information, state is returned
To ' 50 '.
2. the challenge model library method for building up in quantum cryptographic protocols according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：The attack
Model library is modeled using probabilistic model checking tool PRISM.
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| CN104303449A (en) * | 2010-10-08 | 2015-01-21 | Id量子技术股份有限公司 | Apparatus and method for the detection of attacks taking control of the single photon detectors of a quantum cryptography apparatus by randomly changing their efficiency |
| CN102904726A (en) * | 2012-11-08 | 2013-01-30 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | Classical channel message authentication method and device for quantum key distribution system |
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