CN104955035B - Based on the symmetric encryption method of the artificial base band noise of digital baseband signal - Google Patents
Based on the symmetric encryption method of the artificial base band noise of digital baseband signal Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
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Abstract
The invention provides a kind of symmetric encryption method of the artificial base band noise based on digital baseband signal, Mr. becomes artificial base band noise signal sequence; Then the encryption of artificial base band noise is carried out at legal transmitting terminal; The algorithm of last intersection mutual correlation comparison in the data mining of legitimate receipt end carries out location and the deciphering of artificial base band noise.The completely random that the present invention directly does man-made noise baseband signal sequence on the digital baseband signal of legal transmitting terminal is disturbed arbitrarily/is encrypted, and utilize algorithm to go interference/deciphering at legitimate receipt end, owing to being direct interference and design on digital baseband signal, of the prior artly simulating signal interference is utilized so can well solve, need the problem that signal can not be synchronous in different hardware equipment, this just greatly makes the present invention not be subject to hardware limitations, and the environment constraint that coded signal is launched, make it to be common to wireless network transmissions environment, there is real actual deployment ability.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to the safety of physical layer solution field of wireless network communication, be specially a kind of symmetric encryption method of the artificial base band noise based on digital baseband signal.
Background technology
In the safe and secret technology of existing radio network information, the symmetry/rivest, shamir, adelman in contemporary cryptology still occupies dominant position.By adopting symmetrical (such as: DES, AES etc.) or asymmetric (such as: RSA, DSA etc.) cryptographic algorithm to wireless network upper strata, guarantee the safeguard protection to transmitted information.In general, because eavesdropping/attacker does not know the key that enciphered message is used, crack or forge encrypted cipher text for eavesdropping/attacker can become very difficult.Unfortunately, along with the development of cryptanalysis (technology of decoding), particularly brute force attack (brute-forceattacks) cracks the proposition of method, the file that symmetry/rivest, shamir, adelman is encrypted finally can be cracked, and just cracks the exponential growth that required amount of calculation (computationalpower) may be key length.But along with the potential effect of the sustainable growth of computer disposal speed, particularly quantum calculation, this simple to guarantee that the cryptographic algorithm of Information Security is just becoming by computation complexity (computationalcomplex) more and more unreliable.
For the problems referred to above, ClaudeShannon proposed the cryptographic system concept that an Information theoretical secure (Information-theoreticsecrecy) communicates in 1949: when not knowing encryption key, even if having unlimited computing capability (unlimitedcomputingpower) and unlimited many encrypted cipher text (unlimitedciphertext), also complete cleartext information (allowing to leak part information) can not be obtained by cryptanalysis.What is interesting is, the information perfact secrecy (perfectsecrecy) thereupon proposed can be regarded as a special case of Information theoretical secure, only the leakage of perfact secrecy to cleartext information has more strict requirement: except length expressly, can not leak any about information expressly.Corresponding with perfact secrecy is exactly famous this (one-timepad) encryption principle of disposal password.It's a pity, because disposal password is originally very difficult to generate in actual applications, (in ciphering process expressly, same password can only use once, and encrypts expressly carrying out full text with large-scale use.), the existing anti-cryptanalysis algorithm of major part still proposed based on Information theoretical secure.
1975, A.D.Wyner proposed and establishes the networked physics layer safety theory (physicallayersecurity) based on Information theoretical secure.Wherein, Wyner make use of classical Alice – Bob – Eve network communication models and illustrates: if the signal to noise ratio (SNR) of legitimate correspondence channel (Alice – Bob channel) is higher than the signal to noise ratio of attack channel (Alice – Eve channel), so legitimate channel can ensure the Information theoretical secure of the communication information, and assailant (Eve) cannot obtain complete cleartext information from intercepted communication.The proposition of this theory make information transmission security in a network, particularly information transmission security in the wireless network had a brand-new solution party to.Therefore, the scholar of domestic and international research network security transmission a large amount of in recent years all many research to networked physics layer input for safety, creates such as chnnel coding; Modulation signal redesigns (SignalDesign); The safety of physical layer implementation in man-made noise (ArtificialNoise) 3 directions.
Safety of physical layer scheme based on chnnel coding (ChannelCoding):
The main purpose of chnnel coding prevents the eavesdropping of packet (interception) and anti-interference (anti-jamming).Wherein, the most famous chnnel coding safety approach is exactly code division multiple access (CodeDivisionMultipleAccess, CDMA).By pseudo noise code (PseudoNoisecode, PNcode), transmission information is encrypted, the ciphertext transmitted in network can only be had the validated user of correct PN code decipher.Meanwhile, because PN code has certain redundancy properties, code division multiple access also can resist the noise jamming of attacker in certain degree.But due in the code division multiple access protocol of standard, its programmable PN code length is certain, which results in the reduction of its supported number of users and fail safe.In order to address this problem, the people such as Li propose a kind of AES-CDMA safety approach based on AES (advancedencryptionstandard) symmetry algorithm.The PN code design length (128,192 and 256 bit) that article proposes 3 kinds of different length promotes the computation complexity of its scheme.It's a pity, the same with its chnnel coding safety approach, owing to can not meet legitimate channel signal to noise ratio that Wyner proposes higher than this necessary condition of attack channel signal to noise ratio, the AES-PN code designed by it still can be cracked by cryptanalysis; In addition, due in channel coding design scheme, chnnel coding all can produce certain coding redundancy, although this can resist certain noise jamming, and, this result also in the reduction of goodput in network (networkgoodput).
The safety of physical layer scheme of (SignalDesign) is redesigned based on modulation signal:
In networked physics layer safety, newer research direction is belonged to the redesign of modulation signal.By to the redesign of digital signal planisphere (signalconstellationmapping) after modulation, make attacker cannot the digital signal that receives of demodulation, and cause the rising of the error rate (biterrorrate, BER).A largest benefit of this kind of physical layer is: it can accomplish the perfact secrecy to information.Owing to substituted for modulation system completely, so opposite side long message can very simply be accomplished to encrypt completely.In 2011, the people such as P ¨ opper proposed a kind of safety approach simply modulation numerical chracter (datasymbol) planisphere being carried out to simple angle rotation.Because rotated angle only has validated user just to know, calculate so attacker cannot carry out a reversion to the digital constellation symbols received, thus ensure the perfact secrecy to institute's transmission of information.But, in this scheme, because institute's anglec of rotation is a definite value to each digital constellation symbols, assailant can carry out planisphere arrangement to received digital signal easily and cause brute force attack to crack out the anglec of rotation, thus cracks new digital modulation safety approach.
Safety of physical layer scheme based on man-made noise (ArtificialNoise):
In the safety of physical layer theory (physicallayersecurity) that Wyner proposes, necessary condition is that the signal to noise ratio of legitimate correspondence channel is higher than the signal to noise ratio of attack channel.Theoretical based on this, a large amount of research work is attempted designing new safety of physical layer scheme from artificial angle of adding channel noise.Sperandio and Flikkema proposed a kind of safety of physical layer scheme based on analog signal self-interference in 2002.By adding artificial multiple orthogonal simulaed interference signal (multipleorthogonalartificialnoise) to analog signal, at validated user end, these multiple orthogonal simulaed interference signals can should be multipath (multi-path) transmission effects of wireless network and oneself offsets.But attacker because its geographical position and hardware condition never may be perfect consistent with validated user, multiple orthogonal interference analog signal oneself can not be offset by multipath transmission effect, thus the condition that the signal to noise ratio reaching legitimate correspondence channel is better than the signal to noise ratio of attack channel.In this safety approach, legitimate receipt end does not need to know any information about multiple orthogonal interference analog signal, legal transmitting terminal estimates channel parameter by itself and the channel estimating bag of legitimate receipt end, thus oneself produces the multiple orthogonal interference signal that can cancel out each other.It's a pity, because multipath transmission effect is very unpredictable and estimation, this safety approach present stage is only present in theoretical proof.And, even if channel parameter and multipath input effect can be assessed out completely, this also requires that legitimate sender and recipient can not move and receive the impact of any external environment at communication process, otherwise estimated channel parameter and multipath transmission effect parameter can produce greatest differences, the oneself that multiple orthogonal interference signal can not be correct is caused to offset.
The people such as Jorgensen proposed a kind of safety approach sending man-made noise based on trust the 3rd side (trustedthirdparty) in 2007.Wherein, connected together by wired by the 3rd side that trusts and legitimate sender, when legitimate sender sends wireless signal, can be sent by the 3rd side trusted the reception that synchronous manual simulation's interference signal comes interference attack side.Because the 3rd side can shift to an earlier date, man-made noise analog signal is informed legitimate receipt side, so legitimate receipt side is easy to calculate non-interference signal, thus obtain real signal transmission.Safe capacity (secrecycapacity) concept that Jorgensen also utilizes Wyner to propose in its scheme demonstrates Information theoretical secure (Information-theoreticsecrecy) property of its scheme at the transmission information of some special scenes.It's a pity, due to by the position relationship of trust the 3rd side, the Information theoretical secure of this scheme may lose that (such as monitoring side is very near legal transmitting terminal, at this moment, even if there is the 3rd side to send interference signal, the signal to noise ratio of legitimate correspondence channel also can not be higher than the signal to noise ratio of attack channel).And the 3rd side need and transmitting terminal signal carry out synchronously could sending artificial interference signal, this also significantly limit the feasibility of scheme.
Lai and Gamal proposed a kind of modified version to Jorgensen scheme in 2008.By trusting the anti-Human disturbance signal (anti-artificialnoise) that the 3rd side sends, legitimate receipt end can receive the signal transmission of high s/n ratio.Simultaneously due at transmitting terminal, Human disturbance signal is directly attached on signal transmission, Human disturbance signal experiences identical channel exhaustion by with signal transmission, thus the situation that the noise avoiding the signal to noise ratio legitimate correspondence channel of the attack channel caused due to attacker present position is high, ensure that the Information theoretical secure of transmission information, the change in geographical position can not be should be and lost efficacy.It's a pity, although this scheme compensate for the shortcoming of some Jorgensen schemes, offset Human disturbance signal because needs the 3rd side produces, it is to legal transmitting terminal, and there is strict restriction the position of legitimate receipt end and trust the 3rd side.Therefore, in present stage, this safety approach is also be difficult to be deployed in practical application.
In 2011, the people such as the Katabi of MIT proposed one and have achieved physical layer man-made noise safety approach.Similar with the scheme that Jorgensen proposes, Katabi also utilizes the man-made noise on trust the 3rd side generation signal, but relative to anti-Human disturbance signal being informed legitimate receipt end, Katabi proposes the method utilizing the mode of redundancy to rebuild complete data packet.Because same packet can send several times, and the man-made noise interference of every order 3 sides only can disturb the diverse location of same packet, by extracting these identical data packet not by the part of Human disturbance, thus sets up the packet of a prosthetic interference.Owing to not needing exact figure signal synchronous, this scheme is extremely convenient to realize in actual deployment.It's a pity, its safety approach is probably because the side of monitoring is too cracked near transmit leg.And consider that identical data packet needs repeatedly to transmit, this scheme can reduce the goodput of network.The almost same time, Katabi also been proposed the wireless security scheme of a full duplex.By realizing the full duplex of wireless network card, thus the 3rd side is integrated into legitimate receipt end.And its article is pointed out, these schemes also can realize the process to unauthorized bag.By giving the 3rd side or external equipment the transfer of responsibilities of authentication of users, by checking packet can very effective by the 3rd side send man-made noise disturb, avoid the unnecessary loss that legitimate receiver produces owing to being subject to unauthorised data bag.More outstanding contribution is, Katabi working group not only proposes wireless network safety of physical layer scheme, but also with hardware implementing in kind such as USRP their scheme.Although their scheme also comes with some shortcomings (safety approach is probably because the side of monitoring is too cracked near transmit leg).But relative to being only limitted to the safety of physical layer scheme of theoretical research, the feasibility that more can embody its safety approach of building and complete of full-scale investigation platform is worth.
Meanwhile, some domestic scholars are also in the possibility inquiring into wireless network safety of physical layer scheme.In 2011, the people such as the Luo Wenyu of information engineering university proposed one is analyzed safety of physical layer theory analysis based on inproperly posed theory.Subsequently in 2013, the people such as Wei Hongquan propose the safety of physical layer model that is applicable to frequency selective fading environments.Unfortunately these are also only limited to the safety of physical layer research of basic theory, cannot be deployed in practical application.
2010, the people such as the Mu Pengcheng of Xi'an Communications University proposed the safe transmission method of physical layer of the random transmit antenna array of use based on MISO.Due to transmit leg stochastic transformation antenna when launching each numerical chracter, will cause the random Rapid Variable Design of the channel of eavesdropping side, therefore listener-in cannot pass through blind equalization algorithm demodulation, thus ensure that the safety of information.Then in 2013, the people such as Li Mingliang propose the safety of physical layer algorithm of the empty scrambling of associating frequently based on MIMO.By constructing multiple antennas random weighting Masker on each subcarrier, the projection of random weighting Masker on legitimate channel of structure is made to be equal to the reference variable become soon with OFDM symbol; Because validated user can know the weighting Masker reference variable of subcarrier by the assessment of channel estimating bag, make validated user can the Received signal strength of correct its remaining sub-carriers of demodulation; And eavesdropping side cannot obtain useful reference information, thus cannot demodulated received signal.Although above 2 kinds of safety of physical layer schemes propose concrete applicable scene, but, can be known by its security protocol, while calculating man-made noise, need a large amount of channel estimating bags to carry out precise evaluation legitimate channel parameter, this can not reach in the wireless network of present stage.Therefore, do not possess the network design of reality, its feasibility can only be proved in theory deduction aspect.
Can be found that by analysis above these domestic and international achievements in research existing otherwise just carry out analyzing and realizing for certain special scenes accomplish the information transmission security of special scenes; Or propose a plan and be only limitted to theory analysis, be not suitable for actual wireless network deployment in the short time.
Summary of the invention
The technical problem to be solved in the present invention is: the symmetric encryption method providing a kind of artificial base band noise based on digital baseband signal, compensate for the deficiency of domestic and international existing physically based deformation layer communication security scheme.
The present invention for solving the problems of the technologies described above taked technical scheme is: a kind of symmetric encryption method of the artificial base band noise based on digital baseband signal, is characterized in that: it comprises the following steps:
S1, generate artificial base band noise signal sequence:
First: produce symmetrical bit password, legal transmitting terminal and legitimate receipt end privacy amplify the artificial base band noise signal that one-way hash function produces plural number;
Other: when legal transmitting terminal receives the confirmation ACK bag from legitimate receipt end, utilize the digital baseband signal block of random selecting last time, amplify one-way hash function by privacy and produce next artificial base band noise signal;
S2, legal transmitting terminal carry out artificial base band noise encryption:
In the physical layer of legal transmitting terminal, random selecting continuous length is the complex base band signal block of L, and the position of this complex base band signal block is any does not know per capita; Go to disturb this digital baseband signal block with the artificial base band noise signal that S1 generates, obtain the synthesis complex base band signal after encrypting;
S3, carry out location and the deciphering of artificial base band noise at legitimate receipt end:
When legitimate receipt end receives the signal from legal transmitting terminal by wireless network, in the physical layer of legitimate receipt end, after synchronous, the A/D conversion of analog signal, sampling, obtain the digital baseband signal after encrypting, confirm by the position of the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining;
Acknowledgement bit postpone, by vector fractional integration series from mode, be separated artificial base band noise signal and digital baseband signal, obtain disturb digital baseband signal; Or by assessing to the received signal, calculating channel fading coefficient, then the digital baseband signal after encryption being removed to the subtraction of artificial base band noise signal, obtain the data complex baseband signal disturbed;
Legitimate receipt end sends to legal transmitting terminal and confirms ACK bag.
As stated above, when legal transmitting terminal carries out the encryption of artificial base band noise, after going to disturb this digital baseband signal block with the artificial base band noise signal that S1 generates, energy normalized process is carried out to the digital baseband signal of artificial base band noise jamming.
As stated above, when confirming by the position of the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference, crosscorrelation property coefficient is calculated with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining, the crosscorrelation property coefficient obtained is normalized, crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized and the threshold value preset are compared, if the crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized is greater than default threshold value, then confirm to have found the position by the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference.
Based on the encryption system that the symmetric encryption method of the above-mentioned artificial base band noise based on digital baseband signal realizes, it is characterized in that: it comprises:
Artificial base band noise signal sequence generating module, for first: produce symmetrical bit password, legal transmitting terminal and legitimate receipt end privacy amplify the artificial base band noise signal that one-way hash function produces plural number; Other number of times: when legal transmitting terminal receives the confirmation ACK bag from legitimate receipt end, utilize the digital baseband signal block of random selecting last time, amplifies one-way hash function by privacy and produces next artificial base band noise signal;
Carry out artificial base band noise encrypting module at legal transmitting terminal, for the physical layer at legal transmitting terminal, random selecting continuous length is the complex base band signal block of L, and the position of this complex base band signal block is any does not know per capita; Go to disturb this digital baseband signal block with the artificial base band noise signal generated, obtain the synthesis complex base band signal after encrypting;
Artificial base band noise location and deciphering module is carried out at legitimate receipt end, for when legitimate receipt end receives the signal from legal transmitting terminal by wireless network, in the physical layer of legitimate receipt end, after synchronous, the A/D conversion of analog signal, sampling, obtain the digital baseband signal after encrypting, confirm by the position of the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining; Acknowledgement bit postpone, by vector fractional integration series from mode, be separated artificial base band noise signal and digital baseband signal, obtain disturb digital baseband signal; Or by assessing to the received signal, calculating channel fading coefficient, then the digital baseband signal after encryption being removed to the subtraction of artificial base band noise signal, obtain the data complex baseband signal disturbed; Legitimate receipt end sends to legal transmitting terminal and confirms ACK bag.
By said system, carry out artificial base band noise encrypting module at legal transmitting terminal and also comprise energy normalized processing module, for after going to disturb this digital baseband signal block with the artificial base band noise signal generated, energy normalized process is carried out to the digital baseband signal of artificial base band noise jamming.
By said system, artificial base band noise location and deciphering module is carried out when confirming the position of the complex base band signal block disturbed by artificial base band noise signal at legitimate receipt end, crosscorrelation property coefficient is calculated with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining, the crosscorrelation property coefficient obtained is normalized, crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized and the threshold value preset are compared, if the crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized is greater than default threshold value, then confirm to have found the position by the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference.
The legal transmitting terminal that a kind of symmetric encryption method based on the above-mentioned artificial base band noise based on digital baseband signal realizes, it is characterized in that: after physical layer obtains digital baseband signal, set up encrypting module, for the complex base band signal block that random selecting continuous length is L, the position of this complex base band signal block is any does not know per capita; Go to disturb this digital baseband signal block with the artificial base band noise signal generated, obtain the synthesis complex base band signal after encrypting;
Also comprising artificial base band noise signal update module, for producing symmetrical bit password first, amplifying by privacy the artificial base band noise signal that one-way hash function produces plural number; When receiving the confirmation ACK bag from legitimate receipt end, utilizing the digital baseband signal block of random selecting last time, amplifying one-way hash function by privacy and producing next artificial base band noise signal.
By above-mentioned legal transmitting terminal, after encrypting module, set up energy normalized processing module, for carrying out energy normalized process to the digital baseband signal of artificial base band noise jamming.
Based on the legitimate receipt end that the symmetric encryption method of the above-mentioned artificial base band noise based on digital baseband signal realizes, it is characterized in that: after obtaining the digital baseband signal after encrypting, set up deciphering module, deciphering module comprises
Interference/encrypted location confirms module, for utilizing known artificial base band noise signal, confirms by the position of the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining;
Data separating module, in acknowledgement bit postpone, by vector fractional integration series from mode, be separated artificial base band noise signal and digital baseband signal, obtain the digital baseband signal disturbed; Or by assessing to the received signal, calculating channel fading coefficient, then the digital baseband signal after encryption being removed to the subtraction of artificial base band noise signal, obtain the data complex baseband signal disturbed;
Artificial base band noise signal update module, for producing symmetrical bit password first, amplifies by privacy the artificial base band noise signal that one-way hash function produces plural number; When sending to legal transmitting terminal to confirm ACK bag, the digital baseband signal block disturbed by artificial base band noise signal utilizing decrypted last time, amplifies one-way hash function by privacy and produces next artificial base band noise signal.
By above-mentioned legitimate receipt end, described location confirmation module comprises normalized module and threshold value comparison module, wherein
Normalized module is used for calculating crosscorrelation property coefficient with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining, is normalized the crosscorrelation property coefficient obtained;
Threshold value comparison module is used for the crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized and the threshold value preset to compare, if the crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized is greater than default threshold value, then confirm to have found the position by the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference.
Beneficial effect of the present invention is:
1, the completely random that the present invention directly does man-made noise baseband signal sequence on the digital baseband signal of legal transmitting terminal is disturbed arbitrarily/is encrypted, and utilize algorithm to go location and deciphering at legitimate receipt end, owing to being direct interference and design on digital baseband signal, of the prior artly simulating signal interference is utilized so can well solve, need the problem that signal can not be synchronous in different hardware equipment, this just greatly makes the present invention not be subject to hardware limitations, and the environment constraint that coded signal is launched, make it to be common to wireless network transmissions environment, there is real actual deployment ability, and at receiving terminal, the method (cross-correlation) of the intersection mutual correlation comparison during usage data excavates finds to be hidden in the man-made noise baseband signal in digital baseband signal and natural wireless environment noise, like this, the transmission being encrypted baseband signal when not needing to know encrypted location is just made, because the present invention does not have particular/special requirement to interference/encryption method, therefore the elongated man-made noise baseband signal sequence (base band interference sequence variable-length) based on packet change can be used, relative to the fixed length encryption method used in encryption now, this method more increases the difficulty that attacker manufactures false add ciphertext data, and, used in the present invention is man-made noise baseband signal, and the unit alterable degree of this man-made noise baseband signal is greatly better than bit.
2, by carrying out energy normalized process to the digital baseband signal after interference/encryption, monitoring side can be avoided by energy identification interference/non-interference baseband signal, even if use simple baseband signal plural number to add and encryption method, above-mentioned said encryption in physical layer effect also can be reached.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is the schematic diagram of one embodiment of the invention.
Fig. 2 is the baseband signal schematic diagram of plural pattern.
Fig. 3 is the legal sending end structure schematic diagram of one embodiment of the invention.
Fig. 4 is the legitimate receipt end structure schematic diagram of one embodiment of the invention.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing and instantiation, the present invention will be further described.
Based on a symmetric encryption method for the artificial base band noise of digital baseband signal, as shown in Figure 1, it comprises the following steps its principle:
S1, generate artificial base band noise signal sequence: first: produce symmetrical bit password, legal transmitting terminal and legitimate receipt end privacy amplify the artificial base band noise signal that one-way hash function (privacyamplificationwithone-wayhashfunction) produces plural number; Other: when legal transmitting terminal receives the confirmation ACK bag from legitimate receipt end, utilize the digital baseband signal block of random selecting last time, amplify one-way hash function by privacy and produce next artificial base band noise signal.
S2, legal transmitting terminal carry out artificial base band noise encryption: in the physical layer of legal transmitting terminal, random selecting continuous length is the complex base band signal block of L, and the position of this complex base band signal block is any does not know per capita; Go to disturb this digital baseband signal block with the artificial base band noise signal that S1 generates, obtain the synthesis complex base band signal after encrypting.
Artificial base band noise signal is that a sequence of complex numbers is expressed as key
j(0<j<L, L are produced artificial base band noise signal length, and for different digital baseband signal bags, the length of L can be different).
In the wireless network, when after data to physical layer, bit finally all can be adjusted to the digital baseband signal m of the pattern of pluralizing
i, as shown in Figure 1.The present invention's simple plural number adds and calculates, produce by artificial base band noise jamming/encrypted baseband signal
(E representative encryption interference/cryptographic calculation, with artificial base band noise signal key
jremove interference/enciphered digital baseband signal m
i), wherein,
Can be seen by Fig. 1, synthesis complex base band signal
energy likely than the baseband signal m of real transmission
igreatly, preferably, for avoiding monitoring side by energy identification interference/non-interference baseband signal, invention also uses normalization algorithm to artificial base band noise jamming/encrypted baseband signal
carry out energy normalized process.It is expressed as
In formula, θ is normalized parameter.
The complex base band signal block of data base-band signal selected in the present invention to be continuous length be L.But this data base-band signal is optional at random soon, and its position (does not comprise legitimate receipt end known to all other men.)
Last artificial base band noise jamming/encrypted that baseband signal is sent to D/A, becomes analog signal and passes through wireless transmission.
Legal transmitting terminal at this time waits for that the confirmation ACK of legitimate receipt end wraps, after receiving ACK bag, produce new with just now being amplified one-way hash function (privacyamplificationwithone-wayhashfunction) by the data base-band signal chosen arbitrarily at random by privacy, next artificial base band noise signal sequence.
S3, legitimate receipt end carry out artificial base band noise location and deciphering: when receiving the signal from legal transmitting terminal when legitimate receipt end by wireless network, in the physical layer of legitimate receipt end, after synchronous, the A/D conversion of analog signal, sampling, obtain the digital baseband signal after encrypting, confirm by the position of the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining; Acknowledgement bit postpone, by vector fractional integration series from mode, be separated artificial base band noise signal and digital baseband signal, obtain disturb digital baseband signal; Or by assessing to the received signal, calculating channel fading coefficient, then the digital baseband signal after encryption being removed to the subtraction of artificial base band noise signal, obtain the data complex baseband signal disturbed; Legitimate receipt end sends to legal transmitting terminal and confirms ACK bag.
Preferably, when confirming by the position of the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference, crosscorrelation property coefficient is calculated with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining, the crosscorrelation property coefficient obtained is normalized, crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized and the threshold value preset are compared, if the crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized is greater than default threshold value, then confirm to have found the position by the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference.
In the wireless network, at legitimate receipt end, after synchronous, the A/D conversion of analog signal, sampling, the baseband signal of the random interference/encryption arbitrarily by wireless channel obtained.Because legitimate receipt end only knows artificial base band noise sequence of complex numbers, do not know interference/encrypted location, so, need the interference/encrypted location confirming artificial base band noise sequence of complex numbers block with the method cross-correlation algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining.Its mathematical formulae can be expressed as:
In formula, C (iLk) is crosscorrelation property coefficient (i is expressed as the position of doing now the comparison of fork mutual correlation, and L, K are length L and K the encryption baseband data packet of artificial base band noise sequence of complex numbers used),
by the conjugate complex number (relative to K packet) of use artificial base band noise sequence of complex numbers, y
kfor legitimate receipt side receive be interfered/encrypt after digital baseband signal.
Here in order to simply find encrypted location i, we can be normalized the C calculated (iLK), then with the C processed (iLK), (this threshold value is preset value in 0.95, the size of this value can be adjusted according to actual conditions, usually between 0.5 to 1) compare, when C (iLK) >0.95 time, we just think have found artificial base band noise sequence of complex numbers the position of arbitrarily encryption at random.
After the interference/encrypted location confirming artificial base band noise sequence of complex numbers, there are 2 kinds of modes can go interference/deciphering: (1) is owing to having confirmed the interference/encrypted location of artificial base band noise sequence of complex numbers block in legitimate receipt side, and be aware of reception with interference/encryption baseband signal, can by vector fractional integration series from mode, be separated artificial base band noise and data base-band signal, obtain the data base-band signal disturbing/decipher.(2) by the assessment to acknowledge(ment) signal, calculate channel fading coefficient, then remove the subtraction of artificial base band noise to what receive with the baseband signal of interference/encryption, obtain the authentic data complex base band signal of artificial base band noise.
These 2 kinds of methods can obtain disturbing/data base-band signal of deciphering, just can obtain data bit bag as long as remaining by standard demodulation module.
After obtaining data bit bag, packet can detect through the CRC of standard, and the Data Detection bag passed through can be used to the update algorithm module exciting artificial base band noise.
Because the packet detected by CRC can be identical with the packet that transmit leg sends, and legitimate receipt side had confirmed the interference/encrypted location of artificial base band noise sequence of complex numbers block just now.Like this, can calculate just now by the data base-band signal sequence chosen arbitrarily at random in legitimate receipt side, produce new being amplified one-way hash function (privacyamplificationwithone-wayhashfunction) by privacy, next artificial base band noise signal sequence.At this moment, legitimate sender and legal reciever are all simultaneously with new artificial base band noise signal sequence newly.Ensure that the interference/encryption of next packet, go the consistency disturbed/decipher.
Based on the encryption system that the symmetric encryption method of the above-mentioned artificial base band noise based on digital baseband signal realizes, it comprises:
Artificial base band noise signal sequence generating module, for first: produce symmetrical bit password, legal transmitting terminal and legitimate receipt end privacy amplify the artificial base band noise signal that one-way hash function produces plural number; Other number of times: when legal transmitting terminal receives the confirmation ACK bag from legitimate receipt end, utilize the digital baseband signal block of random selecting last time, amplifies one-way hash function by privacy and produces next artificial base band noise signal;
Carry out artificial base band noise encrypting module at legal transmitting terminal, for the physical layer at legal transmitting terminal, random selecting continuous length is the complex base band signal block of L, and the position of this complex base band signal block is any does not know per capita; Go to disturb this digital baseband signal block with the artificial base band noise signal generated, obtain the synthesis complex base band signal after encrypting;
Artificial base band noise location and deciphering module is carried out at legitimate receipt end, for when legitimate receipt end receives the signal from legal transmitting terminal by wireless network, in the physical layer of legitimate receipt end, after synchronous, the A/D conversion of analog signal, sampling, obtain the digital baseband signal after encrypting, confirm by the position of the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining; Acknowledgement bit postpone, by vector fractional integration series from mode, be separated artificial base band noise signal and digital baseband signal, obtain disturb digital baseband signal; Or by assessing to the received signal, calculating channel fading coefficient, then the digital baseband signal after encryption being removed to the subtraction of artificial base band noise signal, obtain the data complex baseband signal disturbed; Legitimate receipt end sends to legal transmitting terminal and confirms ACK bag.
Preferably, carry out artificial base band noise encrypting module at legal transmitting terminal and also comprise energy normalized processing module, for after going to disturb this digital baseband signal block with the artificial base band noise signal generated, energy normalized process is carried out to the digital baseband signal of artificial base band noise jamming.
Preferably, artificial base band noise location and deciphering module is carried out when confirming the position of the complex base band signal block disturbed by artificial base band noise signal at legitimate receipt end, crosscorrelation property coefficient is calculated with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining, the crosscorrelation property coefficient obtained is normalized, crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized and the threshold value preset are compared, if the crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized is greater than default threshold value, then confirm to have found the position by the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference.
The legal transmitting terminal that a kind of symmetric encryption method based on the above-mentioned artificial base band noise based on digital baseband signal realizes, as shown in Figure 3, encrypting module is set up after physical layer obtains digital baseband signal, for the complex base band signal block that random selecting continuous length is L, the position of this complex base band signal block is any does not know per capita; Go to disturb this digital baseband signal block with the artificial base band noise signal generated, obtain the synthesis complex base band signal after encrypting;
Also comprising artificial base band noise signal update module, for producing symmetrical bit password first, amplifying by privacy the artificial base band noise signal that one-way hash function produces plural number; When receiving the confirmation ACK bag from legitimate receipt end, utilizing the digital baseband signal block of random selecting last time, amplifying one-way hash function by privacy and producing next artificial base band noise signal.
Preferably, after encrypting module, set up energy normalized processing module, for carrying out energy normalized process to the digital baseband signal of artificial base band noise jamming.
Based on the legitimate receipt end that the symmetric encryption method of the above-mentioned artificial base band noise based on digital baseband signal realizes, as shown in Figure 4, after obtaining the digital baseband signal after encrypting, set up deciphering module, deciphering module comprises
Interference/encrypted location confirms module, for utilizing known artificial base band noise signal, confirms by the position of the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining;
Data separating module, in acknowledgement bit postpone, by vector fractional integration series from mode, be separated artificial base band noise signal and digital baseband signal, obtain the digital baseband signal disturbed; Or by assessing to the received signal, calculating channel fading coefficient, then the digital baseband signal after encryption being removed to the subtraction of artificial base band noise signal, obtain the data complex baseband signal disturbed;
Artificial base band noise signal update module, for producing symmetrical bit password first, amplifies by privacy the artificial base band noise signal that one-way hash function produces plural number; When sending to legal transmitting terminal to confirm ACK bag, the digital baseband signal block disturbed by artificial base band noise signal utilizing decrypted last time, amplifies one-way hash function by privacy and produces next artificial base band noise signal.
Preferably, described location confirmation module comprises normalized module and threshold value comparison module, wherein
Normalized module is used for calculating crosscorrelation property coefficient with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining, is normalized the crosscorrelation property coefficient obtained;
Threshold value comparison module is used for the crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized and the threshold value preset to compare, if the crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized is greater than default threshold value, then confirm to have found the position by the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference.
The present invention completes a complete special characteristics by wireless network physical layer transmission, the radio baseband signal that transmits physical layer carries out the interference/encryption arbitrarily at random of artificial base band noise, physical layer combines with MAC layer, has the wireless security communication system of Information theoretical secure (Information-theoreticsecrecy).
Because wherein produced artificial base band noise sequence is similar with the natural noise of wireless communication channel, and, artificial base band noise sequence and real digital baseband signal experienced by identical fading channel, and monitoring side cannot pick out artificial base band noise sequence.And, because the new next one artificial base band noise sequence is produced by the update algorithm module of a upper packet by artificial base band noise.As long as monitoring side misses an encrypted packets, then the wireless security communication of what later all encrypted packets can be natural enter into Information theoretical secure.
Above embodiment is only for illustration of design philosophy of the present invention and feature, and its object is to enable those skilled in the art understand content of the present invention and implement according to this, protection scope of the present invention is not limited to above-described embodiment.So all equivalent variations of doing according to disclosed principle, mentality of designing or modification, all within protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1., based on a symmetric encryption method for the artificial base band noise of digital baseband signal, it is characterized in that: it comprises the following steps:
S1, generate artificial base band noise signal sequence:
First: produce symmetrical bit password, legal transmitting terminal and legitimate receipt end privacy amplify the artificial base band noise signal that one-way hash function produces plural number;
Other: when legal transmitting terminal receives the confirmation ACK bag from legitimate receipt end, utilize the digital baseband signal block of random selecting last time, amplify one-way hash function by privacy and produce next artificial base band noise signal;
S2, legal transmitting terminal carry out artificial base band noise encryption:
In the physical layer of legal transmitting terminal, random selecting continuous length is the complex base band signal block of L, and the position of this complex base band signal block is any does not know per capita; Go to disturb this digital baseband signal block with the artificial base band noise signal that S1 generates, obtain the synthesis complex base band signal after encrypting;
S3, carry out location and the deciphering of artificial base band noise at legitimate receipt end:
When legitimate receipt end receives the signal from legal transmitting terminal by wireless network, in the physical layer of legitimate receipt end, after synchronous, the A/D conversion of analog signal, sampling, obtain the digital baseband signal after encrypting, confirm by the position of the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining;
Acknowledgement bit postpone, by vector fractional integration series from mode, be separated artificial base band noise signal and digital baseband signal, obtain disturb digital baseband signal; Or by assessing to the received signal, calculating channel fading coefficient, then the digital baseband signal after encryption being removed to the subtraction of artificial base band noise signal, obtain the data complex baseband signal disturbed;
Legitimate receipt end sends to legal transmitting terminal and confirms ACK bag;
The mathematical formulae of the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in described data mining is expressed as:
In formula, C (iLk) is crosscorrelation property coefficient, and i is expressed as the position of doing now the comparison of fork mutual correlation, and L, K are length L and K the encryption baseband data packet of artificial base band noise sequence of complex numbers used;
by the conjugate complex number of use artificial base band noise sequence of complex numbers, relative to K packet; y
kfor legitimate receipt side receive be interfered/encrypt after digital baseband signal.
2. the symmetric encryption method of the artificial base band noise based on digital baseband signal according to claim 1, it is characterized in that: when legal transmitting terminal carries out the encryption of artificial base band noise, after going to disturb this digital baseband signal block with the artificial base band noise signal that S1 generates, energy normalized process is carried out to the digital baseband signal of artificial base band noise jamming.
3. the symmetric encryption method of the artificial base band noise based on digital baseband signal according to claim 1, it is characterized in that: when confirming by the position of the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference, crosscorrelation property coefficient is calculated with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining, the crosscorrelation property coefficient obtained is normalized, crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized and the threshold value preset are compared, if the crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized is greater than default threshold value, then confirm to have found the position by the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference.
4., based on the encryption system that the symmetric encryption method of the artificial base band noise based on digital baseband signal according to claim 1 realizes, it is characterized in that: it comprises:
Artificial base band noise signal sequence generating module, for first: produce symmetrical bit password, legal transmitting terminal and legitimate receipt end privacy amplify the artificial base band noise signal that one-way hash function produces plural number; Other number of times: when legal transmitting terminal receives the confirmation ACK bag from legitimate receipt end, utilize the digital baseband signal block of random selecting last time, amplifies one-way hash function by privacy and produces next artificial base band noise signal;
Carry out artificial base band noise encrypting module at legal transmitting terminal, for the physical layer at legal transmitting terminal, random selecting continuous length is the complex base band signal block of L, and the position of this complex base band signal block is any does not know per capita; Go to disturb this digital baseband signal block with the artificial base band noise signal generated, obtain the synthesis complex base band signal after encrypting;
Artificial base band noise location and deciphering module is carried out at legitimate receipt end, for when legitimate receipt end receives the signal from legal transmitting terminal by wireless network, in the physical layer of legitimate receipt end, after synchronous, the A/D conversion of analog signal, sampling, obtain the digital baseband signal after encrypting, confirm by the position of the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining; Acknowledgement bit postpone, by vector fractional integration series from mode, be separated artificial base band noise signal and digital baseband signal, obtain disturb digital baseband signal; Or by assessing to the received signal, calculating channel fading coefficient, then the digital baseband signal after encryption being removed to the subtraction of artificial base band noise signal, obtain the data complex baseband signal disturbed; Legitimate receipt end sends to legal transmitting terminal and confirms ACK bag.
5. encryption system according to claim 4, it is characterized in that: carry out artificial base band noise encrypting module at legal transmitting terminal and also comprise energy normalized processing module, for after going to disturb this digital baseband signal block with the artificial base band noise signal generated, energy normalized process is carried out to the digital baseband signal of artificial base band noise jamming.
6. encryption system according to claim 4, it is characterized in that: carry out artificial base band noise location and deciphering module when confirming the position of the complex base band signal block disturbed by artificial base band noise signal at legitimate receipt end, crosscorrelation property coefficient is calculated with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining, the crosscorrelation property coefficient obtained is normalized, crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized and the threshold value preset are compared, if the crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized is greater than default threshold value, then confirm to have found the position by the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference.
7. the legal transmitting terminal of the realization of the symmetric encryption method based on the artificial base band noise based on digital baseband signal according to claim 1, it is characterized in that: after physical layer obtains digital baseband signal, set up encrypting module, for the complex base band signal block that random selecting continuous length is L, the position of this complex base band signal block is any does not know per capita; Go to disturb this digital baseband signal block with the artificial base band noise signal generated, obtain the synthesis complex base band signal after encrypting;
Also comprising artificial base band noise signal update module, for producing symmetrical bit password first, amplifying by privacy the artificial base band noise signal that one-way hash function produces plural number; When receiving the confirmation ACK bag from legitimate receipt end, utilizing the digital baseband signal block of random selecting last time, amplifying one-way hash function by privacy and producing next artificial base band noise signal.
8. legal transmitting terminal according to claim 7, is characterized in that: after encrypting module, set up energy normalized processing module, for carrying out energy normalized process to the digital baseband signal of artificial base band noise jamming.
9. based on the legitimate receipt end that the symmetric encryption method of the artificial base band noise based on digital baseband signal according to claim 1 realizes, it is characterized in that: after obtaining the digital baseband signal after encrypting, set up deciphering module, deciphering module comprises
Interference/encrypted location confirms module, for utilizing known artificial base band noise signal, confirms by the position of the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining;
Data separating module, in acknowledgement bit postpone, by vector fractional integration series from mode, be separated artificial base band noise signal and digital baseband signal, obtain the digital baseband signal disturbed; Or by assessing to the received signal, calculating channel fading coefficient, then the digital baseband signal after encryption being removed to the subtraction of artificial base band noise signal, obtain the data complex baseband signal disturbed;
Artificial base band noise signal update module, for producing symmetrical bit password first, amplifies by privacy the artificial base band noise signal that one-way hash function produces plural number; When sending to legal transmitting terminal to confirm ACK bag, the digital baseband signal block disturbed by artificial base band noise signal utilizing decrypted last time, amplifies one-way hash function by privacy and produces next artificial base band noise signal.
10. legitimate receipt end according to claim 9, is characterized in that: described location confirmation module comprises normalized module and threshold value comparison module, wherein
Normalized module is used for calculating crosscorrelation property coefficient with the algorithm of the intersection mutual correlation comparison in data mining, is normalized the crosscorrelation property coefficient obtained;
Threshold value comparison module is used for the crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized and the threshold value preset to compare, if the crosscorrelation property coefficient after normalized is greater than default threshold value, then confirm to have found the position by the complex base band signal block of artificial base band noise signal interference.
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