CN104883681B - A kind of mobile RFID mutual authentication method based on Dynamic-shared key - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention discloses a two-way authentication method of a random dynamic shared key for mobile radio frequency identification, which is used to solve the security update of the dynamic shared key and the synchronization problem after being attacked in the radio frequency identification authentication method, as well as the vulnerability other security threats. The technical solution improves the traditional method of only using random numbers for identity authentication, not only makes the random number generated by the tag serve as a parameter for mutual authentication between the tag and the background database, but also makes it a means for the background database, reader and tag to dynamically update the shared key. Seeds to achieve shared key security and random dynamic update; the scheme adopts the method of storing historical shared keys in separate tables in the background database and dynamically adding and deleting them, so as to ensure that the shared keys between readers, tags and the background database are protected after being attacked. keys are kept in sync. The invention can prevent multiple security attacks aimed at the mobile RFID system, and has high efficiency in key label performance.

Description

A Mobile RFID Two-way Authentication Method Based on Dynamic Shared Key

technical field

The invention relates to radio frequency identification technology, in particular to a safety authentication method based on random dynamic shared key related to mobile radio frequency identification.

Background technique

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is one of the key implementation technologies of the Internet of Things. While RFID is promoting the rapid development of the Internet of Things, it is accompanied by serious security threats. The two most important aspects are identity authentication and privacy protection. In the mobile RFID system, the mobile reader communicates with the background database, the mobile reader and the tag in an unsafe open channel in the form of wireless signals. Therefore, the security risks faced by mobile RFID systems are more serious and diverse.

Among the authentication methods proposed by scholars at home and abroad, most of them are designed for traditional RFID systems. These methods are based on the premise that the fixed reader is connected to the background database with a cable and performs secure communication, so it cannot be applied to the reader and the background database. Mobile RFID systems that communicate insecurely by means of signals. In the mobile RFID authentication method, the mechanism of dynamically updating the shared key can effectively solve the difficult problem of key management, but there is a very important data synchronization problem: the tag key stored in the background database must be the same as that stored in the tag The key in is updated synchronously. However, in the RFID system, low-cost tags rely on external electromagnetic induction to supply energy. Once power failure or communication blockage occurs, the shared key between the background database and the tag will be inconsistent, making it impossible for the legitimate tag to pass in the next authentication process. Authentication and identification. In addition, if the parameters for updating the shared key are not confidential, so that the updated key is calculated by intercepting the data transmitted in the insecure channel, there will be a risk of key leakage. Therefore, the secure synchronous update of the key and the synchronization mechanism after being attacked have become difficult problems for this type of mobile RFID authentication protocol.

The current authentication methods can only prevent desynchronization attacks to a certain extent, and cannot prevent more than two consecutive desynchronization attacks; there are other authentication methods when the forged label and the corresponding legal label are covered by the wireless signal of the reader. When within the range, the adversary can deceive the legitimate reader to unlock and display the information of the legal tag through the forged third-party forged tag, so it cannot prevent tag forgery and there are man-in-the-middle attack and replay attack vulnerabilities, nor can it prevent tag forgery and replay attack.

Contents of the invention

In order to solve the problem that the mobile RFID authentication method using the dynamic shared key cannot completely prevent desynchronization attacks, the dynamic shared key cannot be safely updated, and is vulnerable to various security attacks, the present invention proposes a dynamic shared key-based The mobile RFID two-way authentication method has high tag performance while preventing security attacks against mobile RFID.

For achieving above object, the technical scheme that the present invention adopts is as follows:

1. Initialization stage: The background database sets four data tables to store the shared key and identity information of the tag and the reader and the background database. The current information table Tag_c_au of the tag stores the tag ID, the current shared key, and the tag ID The Hash code with the current key as a parameter; the tag ID, the tag history shared key, and the hash code of the tag ID with the historical shared key as a parameter are stored in the tag's historical information table Tag_h_au; the reader's current information table Reader_c_au stores the reader Identity and current key; reader identity and historical key are stored in reader history information table Reader_h_au; each tag stores a shared key with the background database, and contains a one-way Hash function and a pseudo-random number generator ;The reader stores the shared key with the background database, and contains the same Hash function and pseudo-random number generator;

2. Certification stage:

Step 1: The reader sends an authentication request Query to the tag;

Step 2: The tag generates a random number S _t and calculates a one-way hash function and pseudorandom numbers followed by and sent to the reader, where ID _t is the ID of the tag, is the current shared key of the tag and background database, is the updated shared key between the label and the background database, It is the current shared key between the reader and the background database;

Step 3: The reader generates a random number S _r and calculates followed by and S _r and Send to the background database, where ID _r is the ID of the reader;

Step 4: The background database authenticates the reader and the tag respectively;

1) Reader authentication: the background database traverses the Reader_c_au data table and _calculates each and then receive the For comparison, if there is a consistency, the reader passes the authentication; if there is no consistency, traverse the Reader_h_au data table to calculate each and received Compare, if there is a consistency, the reader passes the authentication; if there is no consistency in the two traversals, the reader is illegal and the authentication fails;

2) Tag authentication: when the reader authentication is passed, the background database will Query the Tag_c_au data table: (1) If the result is found in the Tag_c_au table, take it out and then receive the XOR operation is performed to get then proceed operation, and and the received Compare, if they are consistent, the tag has passed the authentication, if not, the tag is illegal, and the authentication is over; (2) If the result cannot be found in the Tag_c_au data table, then traverse the Tag_h_au data table for query, if the result is found, take out then proceed and operation, and and the received Compare, if consistent, the tag passes the authentication, if inconsistent, the tag is illegal, and the authentication ends; 3) If no result can be found in both the Tag_c_au table and the Tag_c_au table, it means the tag is illegal and the authentication fails;

3) In the case where both the reader and the tag are certified:

(1) Background database calculation And update the current shared key corresponding to ID _r in Reader_c_au to The background database judges and operates according to the source data table for consistency comparison in the fourth step of the reader authentication process: if it is the Reader_c_au data table, the background database deletes the data corresponding to the reader in the Reader_h_au data table, and then and ID _r are added to the Reader_h_au data table; if it is the Reader_h_au data table, no operation is performed on the Reader_h_au data table;

(2) Background database calculation And update the current shared key corresponding to ID _t in Tag_c_au to The hash code of the tag ID is updated as Then judge and calculate according to the source data table of ID _t queried in the fourth step of the tag authentication process: if it is the Tag_c_au data table, the background database deletes the data corresponding to the tag in the Tag_h_au data table, and then ID _t and Add to the Tag_h_au data table; if it is the Tag_h_au data table, do not perform any operations on the Tag_h_au data table;

4) The background database uses the shared key with the reader Encryption Computing Symmetric Encryption Algorithm followed by and forwarded to the reader;

Step 5: The reader uses the shared key with the background database to decrypt the received calculate Then compare the obtained S _r with the original random number S _r , if they are consistent, the background database passes the authentication, and the reader uses the obtained S _t to update the shared key then send Give the label; if the comparison is inconsistent, the authentication will fail.

Step 6: After the tag receives the data, calculate and received Make a comparison, if the comparison is inconsistent, the authentication fails; if they are consistent, the reader is legal, and the tag updates the shared key Beneficial effects of the present invention:

After adopting the present invention, multiple security threats such as location tracking, replay attack, desynchronization attack and man-in-the-middle attack against the RFID system can be prevented during authentication, and the security defects existing in similar RFID authentication methods can be made up.

In addition, the present invention can also realize the random dynamic security update of the shared key, and cannot be deduced through the data in the authentication process, and the tag efficiency performance is better.

Description of drawings

Fig. 1 is the basic flowchart of the authentication of the present invention.

Detailed ways

Symbol Description

Table 1 Symbol description

The present invention will be described in further detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

Initialization stage: When the system is initialized, four data tables are set up in the background database to store the shared key and identification information of the tag and the reader and the background database. The tag's current information table Tag_c_au stores the tag ID, the current shared key, and the hash code of the tag ID with the current key as a parameter; the tag's history information table Tag_h_au stores the tag ID, the tag history shared key, and the tag ID with the history The shared key is the Hash code of the parameter; the reader identity and the current key are stored in the reader current information table Reader_c_au; the reader identity and the historical key are stored in the reader history information table Reader_h_au. Each tag stores the shared key with the background database, and contains a one-way Hash function and pseudo-random number generator; the reader stores the shared key with the background database, and contains the same Hash function and pseudo-random number generator .

Authentication phase:

Step 1: The reader sends an authentication request Query to the tag.

Step 2: The label generates a random number S _t and calculates and followed by and sent to the reader.

Step 3: The reader generates a random number S _r and calculates followed by and S _r and sent to the background database.

Step 4: The background database authenticates the reader and the tag respectively.

1) Reader authentication: the background database traverses the Reader_c_au data table and _calculates each and then receive the For comparison, if there is a consistency, the reader passes the authentication; if there is no consistency, traverse the Reader_h_au data table to calculate each and received For comparison, if there is a consistency, the reader passes the authentication; if there is no consistency in the two traversals, the reader is illegal and the authentication fails.

2) Tag authentication: when the reader authentication is passed, the background database will Traversing the Tag_c_au data table for query: (1) If the result is found in the Tag_c_au table, take out and then receive the XOR operation is performed to get then proceed operation, and and the received Comparing, if consistent, the label passes the authentication, if not, the label is illegal, and the authentication ends. (2) If no result can be found in the Tag_c_au data table, then traverse the Tag_h_au data table for query, if the result is found, take it out then proceed and operation, and and the received Comparing, if consistent, the label passes the authentication, if not, the label is illegal, and the authentication ends. 3) If no result can be found in both the Tag_c_au table and the Tag_c_au table, it means that the tag is illegal and the authentication fails.

3) In the case where both the reader and the tag are certified:

(1) Background database calculation And update the current shared key corresponding to ID _r in Reader_c_au to Then, the background database judges and operates according to the source data table for consistency comparison in the fourth step of the reader authentication process: if it is the Reader_c_au data table, the background database deletes the data corresponding to the reader in the Reader_h_au data table, and then and ID _r are added to the Reader_h_au data table; if it is the Reader_h_au data table, no operation is performed on the Reader_h_au data table.

(2) Background database calculation And update the current shared key corresponding to ID _t in Tag_c_au to The hash code of the tag ID is updated as Then judge and calculate according to the source data table of ID _t queried in the fourth step of the tag authentication process: if it is the Tag_c_au data table, the background database deletes the data corresponding to the tag in the Tag_h_au data table, and then ID _t and Add to the Tag_h_au data table; if it is a Tag_h_au data table, do not perform any operations on the Tag_h_au data table.

4) The background database uses the shared key with the reader encrypted computing followed by and forwarded to the reader.

Step 5: The reader uses the shared key with the background database to decrypt the received calculate Then compare the obtained S _r with the original random number S _r , if they are consistent, the background database passes the authentication, and the reader uses the obtained S _t to update the shared key then send Give the label; if the comparison is inconsistent, the authentication will fail.

After the tag receives the data, it calculates and received Make a comparison, if the comparison is inconsistent, the authentication fails; if they are consistent, the reader is legal, and the tag updates the shared key So far the certification is over.

Claims (1)

1. a kind of mobile RFID authentication method based on stochastic and dynamic shared key, wherein mobile RFID system is by back-end data Storehouse, mobile reader and label composition, it is characterised in that comprise the following steps：

First, initial phase：Back-end data lab setting four opens tables of data and is used to store label and reader and background data base In the current information table Tag_c_au of shared key and identification information, wherein label store tag ID, current shared key, Hash code of the tag ID using current key as parameter；Tag ID, label history are stored in the history information table Tag_h_au of label The Hash codes of shared key, tag ID using history shared key as parameter；Stored in reader current information table Reader_c_au Reader identity and current key；Reader identity is stored in reader history information table Reader_h_au and is gone through History key；Storage and the shared key of background data base in each label, and include an One-way Hash function and pseudo random number Maker；Reader stores and the shared key of background data base, and includes same Hash functions and pseudo-random number generator；

2nd, authentication phase：

The first step：Reader sends certification request Query to label；

Second step：Label produces random number S_tAnd calculate one-way Hash functionAnd pseudo random number Then willWithIt is sent to reader, wherein ID_tIdentified for the ID of label,Be label with after The current shared key of platform database,Shared key after being updated for label and background data base,For reader and backstage The current shared key of database；

3rd step：Reader generation random number S_r, calculateThen willAnd S_r AndIt is sent to background data base, wherein ID_rIdentified for the ID of reader；

4th step：Background data base is respectively authenticated reader and label；

1) reader authentication：The S that background data base traversal Reader_c_au tables of data and basis receive_rCalculate eachThen and receiveIt is compared, if existing unanimously, reader passes through certification；If do not deposit Consistent, then travel through Reader_h_au tables of data calculate it is eachAnd and receiveCompared Compared with if existing unanimously, reader passes through certification；Unanimous circumstances are not present if traveling through twice, reader is illegal, certification Failure；

2) smart-tag authentication：In reader authentication in the case of, background data base according toInquire about Tag_c_au data Table：(1) if Tag_c_au tables inquire as a result, if take outThen and receiveXOR operation is carried out, can be obtainedThen carry outComputing, and and receiveIt is compared, if unanimously, label By certification, if inconsistent, label is illegal, and certification terminates；(2) if Tag_c_au tables of data inquiry less than as a result, if time Go through Tag_h_au tables of data to be inquired about, if inquired as a result, taking outThen carry outWithComputing, and and receiveIt is compared, if unanimously, label is by certification, if inconsistent, Label is illegal, and certification terminates；If 3) inquired about less than as a result, care label is illegal in Tag_c_au tables and Tag_c_au tables, recognize Card failure；

3) in the case where reader and label are by certification：

(1) background data base calculatesAnd by ID in Reader_c_au_rCorresponding current shared key renewal ForBackground data base is judged according to the derived data table that comparison of coherence is carried out during the 4th step reader authentication And operation：If Reader_c_au tables of data, then background data base deletes the reader pair in Reader_h_au tables of data The data answered, then willAnd ID_rIt is added in Reader_h_au tables of data；If Reader_h_au tables of data, then not Any operation is carried out to Reader_h_au tables of data；

(2) background data base calculatesAnd by ID in Tag_c_au_tCorresponding current shared key is updated toThe Hash codes of tag ID are updated toThen according to inquiring ID during the 4th step smart-tag authentication_tSource number Judged according to table and calculated：If Tag_c_au tables of data, background data base deletes the label in Tag_h_au tables of data Corresponding data, then willID_tWithIt is added in Tag_h_au tables of data；If Tag_h_au tables of data, then Any operation is not carried out to Tag_h_au tables of data；

4) background data base uses the shared key with readerComputations symmetric encipherment algorithmThen willWithIt is transmitted to reader；

5th step：Reader uses what is received with the decryption of the shared key of background data baseCalculateThen according to the S of acquisition_rWith original random number S_rIt is compared, if unanimously, background data base leads to Certification is crossed, reader uses the S obtained_tUpdate shared keyThen sendTo mark Label；If less consistent, authentification failure；

6th step：After label receives data, calculateAnd and receiveIt is compared, If less consistent, authentification failure；If consistent, reader is legal, tag update shared key