CN104883681B - A kind of mobile RFID mutual authentication method based on Dynamic-shared key - Google Patents
A kind of mobile RFID mutual authentication method based on Dynamic-shared key Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN104883681B CN104883681B CN201510222060.2A CN201510222060A CN104883681B CN 104883681 B CN104883681 B CN 104883681B CN 201510222060 A CN201510222060 A CN 201510222060A CN 104883681 B CN104883681 B CN 104883681B
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- reader
- label
- tag
- shared key
- tables
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired - Fee Related
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of mutual authentication method of the stochastic and dynamic shared key for mobile wireless radio frequency identification, stationary problem for the Dynamic-shared key security update for solving to face in radio frequency identification authentication method and after being attacked and other security threats being subject to.Technical solution improves tradition and only carries out identity authentication method using random number, not only make the random number that label produces as the parameter being mutually authenticated between label and background data base, it is updated the seed of shared key as background data base, reader and label dynamic, realize shared key safety and stochastic and dynamic renewal；Scheme uses the method that background data base divides table storage history shared key to go forward side by side Mobile state addition and deletion, ensures make the holding of the shared key between reader, label and background data base synchronous after being attacked.The present invention can take precautions against the multinomial security attack for mobile RFID system, and have very high efficiency in terms of crucial tag performance.
Description
Technical field
It is related based on motor-driven more particularly to mobile wireless radio frequency identification the present invention relates to radio RF recognition technology
The safety certifying method of state shared key.
Background technology
Radio frequency identification (Radio Frequency Identification, RFID) is the Key Implementation skill of Internet of Things
One of art.RFID is while promoting Internet of Things fast-developing with serious security threat, the aspect of most important one two
It is authentication and secret protection.In mobile RFID system, move reader and background data base, removable reader with
Communicate between label in a manner of wireless signal in unsafe open channel.Therefore the safety that mobile RFID system faces
Risk also more serious and variation.
In the authentication method that at home and abroad scholar proposes, most of be designed for traditional RFID system, these
Method is not applied for reader by fixed reader wired connection background data base and premised on securely communicating
The mobile RFID system of insecure communication is carried out in a manner of wireless signal with background data base.In mobile RFID authentication method,
Cipher key management difficult can effectively be solved the problems, such as using the mechanism of dynamic renewal shared key, but it is extremely important there are one
Data synchronization problems：The label key preserved in background data base must carry out more with the key synchronization of storage in the label
Newly.But in RFID system, inexpensive label is by external electromagnetic sensing supply energy, once there is power down or communication resistance
Plug, the shared key that will result between background data base and label are inconsistent so that the legal mark in verification process next time
Label can not pass through certification and identification.In addition, if the parameter of renewal shared key does not have confidentiality so that uneasy by intercepting and capturing
The data transmitted in full tunnel and then the key after renewal is calculated, then the risk that key can be brought to leak.Therefore, the peace of key
Full synchronized update and the synchronization mechanism after being attacked become the problem of such mobile RFID authentication protocol.
Current authentication method can only take precautions against desynchronization attack to a certain extent, and cannot take precautions against to recur and exceed
The desynchronization attack of more than 2 times；Authentication method also, which is worked as, forges label and corresponding legitimate tag in reader wireless communication
When in number coverage, opponent, which can be forged label by the third party of forgery and cheat legal reader, unlock and show legitimate tag
Information, therefore label cannot be taken precautions against and forged and there are man-in-the-middle attack and Replay Attack loophole, label forgery can not be taken precautions against
And Replay Attack.
The content of the invention
To solve thoroughly take precautions against desynchronization attack in the mobile RFID authentication method using Dynamic-shared key, moving
State shared key can not security update problem, and be subject to various security attack problems, the present invention proposes a kind of based on dynamic
The mobile RFID mutual authentication method of shared key, while the security attack for mobile RFID is taken precautions against, has higher
Tag performance.
To achieve the above objectives, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows：
First, initial phase：Back-end data lab setting four opens tables of data and is used to store label and reader and back-end data
Tag ID, current shared are stored in the current information table Tag_c_au of the shared key and identification information in storehouse, wherein label
The Hash codes of key, tag ID using current key as parameter；Tag ID, label are stored in the history information table Tag_h_au of label
The Hash codes of history shared key, tag ID using history shared key as parameter；In reader current information table Reader_c_au
Store reader identity and current key；Reader identity is stored in reader history information table Reader_h_au
With history key；Storage and the shared key of background data base in each label, and comprising an One-way Hash function and it is pseudo- with
Machine number maker；Reader stores and the shared key of background data base, and is given birth to comprising same Hash functions and pseudo random number
Grow up to be a useful person；
2nd, authentication phase：
The first step：Reader sends certification request Query to label；
Second step：Label produces random number StAnd calculate one-way Hash functionAnd pseudo random numberThen willWithIt is sent to reader, wherein IDtIdentified for the ID of label,For the current shared key of label and background data base,Shared key after being updated for label and background data base,
For the current shared key of reader and background data base；
3rd step：Reader generation random number Sr, calculateThen will
And SrAndIt is sent to background data base, wherein IDrIdentified for the ID of reader,；
4th step：Background data base is respectively authenticated reader and label；
1) reader authentication：The S that background data base traversal Reader_c_au tables of data and basis receiverCalculate eachThen and receiveIt is compared, if existing unanimously, reader passes through certification；If no
There are consistent, then travel through Reader_h_au tables of data calculate it is eachAnd and receiveCarry out
Compare, if existing unanimously, reader passes through certification；Unanimous circumstances are not present if traveling through twice, reader is illegal, recognizes
Card failure；
2) smart-tag authentication：In reader authentication in the case of, background data base according toInquire about Tag_c_au
Tables of data：(1) if Tag_c_au tables inquire as a result, if take outThen and receiveCarry out XOR operation,
It can obtainThen carry outComputing, and and receiveIt is compared, if unanimously,
Then label is by certification, if inconsistent, label is illegal, and certification terminates；(2) if being inquired about in Tag_c_au tables of data less than knot
Fruit, then travel through Tag_h_au tables of data and inquired about, if inquired as a result, taking outThen carry out
WithComputing, and and receiveIt is compared, if unanimously, label is by certification, if inconsistent,
Then label is illegal, and certification terminates；If 3) inquired about less than as a result, care label is illegal in Tag_c_au tables and Tag_c_au tables,
Authentification failure；
3) in the case where reader and label are by certification：
(1) background data base calculatesAnd by ID in Reader_c_aurCorresponding current shared key
It is updated toBackground data base is carried out according to the derived data table that comparison of coherence is carried out during the 4th step reader authentication
Judge and operate：If Reader_c_au tables of data, then background data base deletes the reading in Reader_h_au tables of data
The corresponding data of device, then willAnd IDrIt is added in Reader_h_au tables of data；If Reader_h_au tables of data,
Then any operation is not carried out to Reader_h_au tables of data；
(2) background data base calculatesAnd by ID in Tag_c_autCorresponding current shared key is more
It is newlyThe Hash codes of tag ID are updated toThen according to inquiring ID during the 4th step smart-tag authenticationt
Source data table is judged and is calculated：If Tag_c_au tables of data, background data base is deleted should in Tag_h_au tables of data
The corresponding data of label, then willIDtWithIt is added in Tag_h_au tables of data；If Tag_h_au data
Table, then do not carry out any operation to Tag_h_au tables of data；
4) background data base uses the shared key with readerComputations symmetric encipherment algorithmSo
Afterwards willWithIt is transmitted to reader；
5th step：Reader uses what is received with the decryption of the shared key of background data baseCalculateThen according to the S of acquisitionrWith original random number SrIt is compared, if unanimously, background data base leads to
Certification is crossed, reader uses the S obtainedtUpdate shared keyThen sendTo mark
Label；If less consistent, authentification failure.
6th step：After label receives data, calculateAnd and receiveCompared
Compared with, if less consistent, authentification failure；If consistent, reader is legal, tag update shared key
Beneficial effect of the present invention：
After applying the present invention, in certification, location tracking, Replay Attack, desynchronization for RFID system can be taken precautions against
The multinomial security threat such as attack, man-in-the-middle attack, makes up safety defect existing for similar RFID authentication method.
In addition, the present invention can also realize shared key stochastic and dynamic security update, and cannot be by verification process
Data are derived, and label efficiency performance is more preferable.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the certification basic flow chart of the present invention.
Embodiment
Symbol description
1 symbol description of table
The present invention is described in further detail below in conjunction with attached drawing.
Initial phase：During system initialization, back-end data lab setting four opens tables of data and is used to store label and reader
With the shared key and identification information of background data base.Label is stored in the wherein current information table Tag_c_au of label
The Hash codes of ID, current shared key, tag ID using current key as parameter；Stored in the history information table Tag_h_au of label
The Hash codes of tag ID, label history shared key, tag ID using history shared key as parameter；Reader current information table
Reader identity and current key are stored in Reader_c_au；Store and read in reader history information table Reader_h_au
Read device identity and history key.Storage and the shared key of background data base in each label, and it is unidirectional comprising one
Hash functions and pseudo-random number generator；Reader stores and the shared key of background data base, and includes same Hash letters
Number and pseudo-random number generator.
Authentication phase：
The first step：Reader sends certification request Query to label.
Second step：Label produces random number StAnd calculateWithThen will WithIt is sent to reader.
3rd step：Reader generation random number Sr, calculateThen will
And SrAndIt is sent to background data base.
4th step：Background data base is respectively authenticated reader and label.
1) reader authentication：The S that background data base traversal Reader_c_au tables of data and basis receiverCalculate eachThen and receiveIt is compared, if existing unanimously, reader passes through certification；If do not deposit
Consistent, then travel through Reader_h_au tables of data calculate it is eachAnd and receiveCompared
Compared with if existing unanimously, reader passes through certification；Unanimous circumstances are not present if traveling through twice, reader is illegal, certification
Failure.
2) smart-tag authentication：In reader authentication in the case of, background data base according toTravel through Tag_c_au
Tables of data is inquired about：(1) if being inquired in Tag_c_au tables as a result, taking outThen and receiveCarry out different
Or computing, it can obtainThen carry outComputing, and and receiveIt is compared, if one
Cause, then label is by certification, if inconsistent, label is illegal, and certification terminates.(2) if Tag_c_au tables of data inquiry less than
As a result, then traversal Tag_h_au tables of data is inquired about, if inquired as a result, taking outThen carry out
WithComputing, and and receiveIt is compared, if unanimously, label is by certification, if inconsistent,
Then label is illegal, and certification terminates.If 3) inquired about less than as a result, care label is illegal in Tag_c_au tables and Tag_c_au tables,
Authentification failure.
3) in the case where reader and label are by certification：
(1) background data base calculatesAnd by ID in Reader_c_aurCorresponding current shared key
It is updated toThen, background data base is according to the derived data table that comparison of coherence is carried out during the 4th step reader authentication
Judged and operated：If Reader_c_au tables of data, then background data base is deleted in Reader_h_au tables of data and is somebody's turn to do
The corresponding data of reader, then willAnd IDrIt is added in Reader_h_au tables of data；If Reader_h_au data
Table, then do not carry out any operation to Reader_h_au tables of data.
(2) background data base calculatesAnd by ID in Tag_c_autCorresponding current shared key is more
It is newlyThe Hash codes of tag ID are updated toThen according to inquiring ID during the 4th step smart-tag authenticationt
Source data table is judged and is calculated：If Tag_c_au tables of data, background data base is deleted should in Tag_h_au tables of data
The corresponding data of label, then willIDtWithIt is added in Tag_h_au tables of data；If Tag_h_au data
Table, then do not carry out any operation to Tag_h_au tables of data.
4) background data base uses the shared key with readerComputationsThen will
WithIt is transmitted to reader.
5th step：Reader uses what is received with the decryption of the shared key of background data baseCalculateThen according to the S of acquisitionrWith original random number SrIt is compared, if unanimously, background data base leads to
Certification is crossed, reader uses the S obtainedtUpdate shared keyThen sendTo mark
Label；If less consistent, authentification failure.
After label receives data, calculateAnd and receiveIt is compared, if
It is less consistent, authentification failure；If consistent, reader is legal, tag update shared keySo far recognize
Card terminates.
Claims (1)
1. a kind of mobile RFID authentication method based on stochastic and dynamic shared key, wherein mobile RFID system is by back-end data
Storehouse, mobile reader and label composition, it is characterised in that comprise the following steps：
First, initial phase：Back-end data lab setting four opens tables of data and is used to store label and reader and background data base
In the current information table Tag_c_au of shared key and identification information, wherein label store tag ID, current shared key,
Hash code of the tag ID using current key as parameter；Tag ID, label history are stored in the history information table Tag_h_au of label
The Hash codes of shared key, tag ID using history shared key as parameter；Stored in reader current information table Reader_c_au
Reader identity and current key；Reader identity is stored in reader history information table Reader_h_au and is gone through
History key；Storage and the shared key of background data base in each label, and include an One-way Hash function and pseudo random number
Maker；Reader stores and the shared key of background data base, and includes same Hash functions and pseudo-random number generator；
2nd, authentication phase：
The first step：Reader sends certification request Query to label；
Second step：Label produces random number StAnd calculate one-way Hash functionAnd pseudo random number
Then willWithIt is sent to reader, wherein IDtIdentified for the ID of label,Be label with after
The current shared key of platform database,Shared key after being updated for label and background data base,For reader and backstage
The current shared key of database；
3rd step：Reader generation random number Sr, calculateThen willAnd Sr
AndIt is sent to background data base, wherein IDrIdentified for the ID of reader；
4th step：Background data base is respectively authenticated reader and label；
1) reader authentication：The S that background data base traversal Reader_c_au tables of data and basis receiverCalculate eachThen and receiveIt is compared, if existing unanimously, reader passes through certification；If do not deposit
Consistent, then travel through Reader_h_au tables of data calculate it is eachAnd and receiveCompared
Compared with if existing unanimously, reader passes through certification；Unanimous circumstances are not present if traveling through twice, reader is illegal, certification
Failure；
2) smart-tag authentication：In reader authentication in the case of, background data base according toInquire about Tag_c_au data
Table：(1) if Tag_c_au tables inquire as a result, if take outThen and receiveXOR operation is carried out, can be obtainedThen carry outComputing, and and receiveIt is compared, if unanimously, label
By certification, if inconsistent, label is illegal, and certification terminates；(2) if Tag_c_au tables of data inquiry less than as a result, if time
Go through Tag_h_au tables of data to be inquired about, if inquired as a result, taking outThen carry outWithComputing, and and receiveIt is compared, if unanimously, label is by certification, if inconsistent,
Label is illegal, and certification terminates；If 3) inquired about less than as a result, care label is illegal in Tag_c_au tables and Tag_c_au tables, recognize
Card failure；
3) in the case where reader and label are by certification：
(1) background data base calculatesAnd by ID in Reader_c_aurCorresponding current shared key renewal
ForBackground data base is judged according to the derived data table that comparison of coherence is carried out during the 4th step reader authentication
And operation：If Reader_c_au tables of data, then background data base deletes the reader pair in Reader_h_au tables of data
The data answered, then willAnd IDrIt is added in Reader_h_au tables of data；If Reader_h_au tables of data, then not
Any operation is carried out to Reader_h_au tables of data；
(2) background data base calculatesAnd by ID in Tag_c_autCorresponding current shared key is updated toThe Hash codes of tag ID are updated toThen according to inquiring ID during the 4th step smart-tag authenticationtSource number
Judged according to table and calculated：If Tag_c_au tables of data, background data base deletes the label in Tag_h_au tables of data
Corresponding data, then willIDtWithIt is added in Tag_h_au tables of data；If Tag_h_au tables of data, then
Any operation is not carried out to Tag_h_au tables of data；
4) background data base uses the shared key with readerComputations symmetric encipherment algorithmThen willWithIt is transmitted to reader；
5th step：Reader uses what is received with the decryption of the shared key of background data baseCalculateThen according to the S of acquisitionrWith original random number SrIt is compared, if unanimously, background data base leads to
Certification is crossed, reader uses the S obtainedtUpdate shared keyThen sendTo mark
Label；If less consistent, authentification failure；
6th step：After label receives data, calculateAnd and receiveIt is compared,
If less consistent, authentification failure；If consistent, reader is legal, tag update shared key
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201510222060.2A CN104883681B (en) | 2015-05-04 | 2015-05-04 | A kind of mobile RFID mutual authentication method based on Dynamic-shared key |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201510222060.2A CN104883681B (en) | 2015-05-04 | 2015-05-04 | A kind of mobile RFID mutual authentication method based on Dynamic-shared key |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN104883681A CN104883681A (en) | 2015-09-02 |
| CN104883681B true CN104883681B (en) | 2018-05-01 |
Family
ID=53950981
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201510222060.2A Expired - Fee Related CN104883681B (en) | 2015-05-04 | 2015-05-04 | A kind of mobile RFID mutual authentication method based on Dynamic-shared key |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN104883681B (en) |
Families Citing this family (9)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN105138937B (en) * | 2015-09-24 | 2018-02-13 | 北京芯联创展电子技术有限公司 | A kind of method and device of RF identifying safety demonstration |
| LU93024B1 (en) * | 2016-04-11 | 2017-11-08 | Phoenix Contact Gmbh & Co Kg Intellectual Property Licenses & Standards | Method and arrangement for establishing secure communication between a first network device (initiator) and a second network device (responder) |
| CN106446663B (en) * | 2016-08-30 | 2019-07-16 | 德阳市闪通思动科技有限责任公司 | A kind of label reader and database three-dimensional Verification System and method |
| CN106712962B (en) * | 2016-12-23 | 2019-12-24 | 西安电子科技大学 | Bidirectional authentication method and system for mobile RFID system |
| CN107147498B (en) * | 2017-05-15 | 2020-06-02 | 吉林大学 | Authentication method and encryption method for transmitting information in RFID authentication process |
| CN107480564B (en) * | 2017-07-11 | 2020-07-17 | 天津大学 | Improved RFID group authentication method |
| CN107403211B (en) * | 2017-08-03 | 2020-12-15 | 广东工业大学 | Method and system for mobile RFID authentication |
| CN108259485A (en) * | 2018-01-09 | 2018-07-06 | 殷周平 | Security protocol verification method based on mobile RFID system |
| CN110190965B (en) * | 2019-05-17 | 2021-10-26 | 西安电子科技大学 | RFID group label authentication protocol based on hash function |
Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20100045442A1 (en) * | 2008-08-22 | 2010-02-25 | Hong Kong R&D Centre for Logistics and Supply Chain Management Enabling Technologies Limited | RFID Privacy-Preserving Authentication System and Method |
| CN103177273A (en) * | 2013-02-08 | 2013-06-26 | 西北工业大学 | Low-cost tag based mobile radio frequency identification authentication method |
| CN103795543A (en) * | 2014-02-12 | 2014-05-14 | 中国石油大学(华东) | Bidirectional security authentication method for RFIP system |
-
2015
- 2015-05-04 CN CN201510222060.2A patent/CN104883681B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20100045442A1 (en) * | 2008-08-22 | 2010-02-25 | Hong Kong R&D Centre for Logistics and Supply Chain Management Enabling Technologies Limited | RFID Privacy-Preserving Authentication System and Method |
| CN103177273A (en) * | 2013-02-08 | 2013-06-26 | 西北工业大学 | Low-cost tag based mobile radio frequency identification authentication method |
| CN103795543A (en) * | 2014-02-12 | 2014-05-14 | 中国石油大学(华东) | Bidirectional security authentication method for RFIP system |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
| Title |
|---|
| 大规模RFID系统中一种能量有效的丢失标签快速检测算法;张士庚等;《计算机学报》;20140228;第37卷(第2期);全文 * |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN104883681A (en) | 2015-09-02 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN104883681B (en) | A kind of mobile RFID mutual authentication method based on Dynamic-shared key | |
| CN104184733B (en) | A kind of RFID lightweight mutual authentication methods encoded based on CRC | |
| CN105450673B (en) | Security protocol verification method based on mobile RFID system | |
| Lee et al. | A lightweight authentication protocol for internet of things | |
| CN100559393C (en) | RFID label and reader thereof, reading system and safety certifying method | |
| CN107959686B (en) | A kind of Internet of Things security certification system and authentication method | |
| CN106209768B (en) | A kind of expansible RFID mutual authentication method | |
| CN103413109B (en) | A kind of mutual authentication method of radio frequency identification system | |
| CN103391199B (en) | RFID (radio frequency identification device) authentication method and system based on PUFs (physical unclonable functions) | |
| CN106712962A (en) | Mobile RFID system bidirectional authentication method and system | |
| CN103020671A (en) | Radio frequency identification bidirectional authentication method based on hash function | |
| CN104115442B (en) | RFID bidirectional authentication method based on asymmetric secret key and Hash function | |
| CN101986641A (en) | Trusted computing platform chip applicable to mobile communication equipment and authentication method thereof | |
| CN103888938A (en) | PKI private key protection method of dynamically generated key based on parameters | |
| CN110190965A (en) | A kind of RFID cluster label authentication protocol based on hash function | |
| Chen et al. | The design of RFID access control protocol using the strategy of indefinite-index and challenge-response | |
| CN101895881A (en) | Method for realizing GBA secret key and pluggable equipment of terminal | |
| Lee et al. | Mutual authentication protocol for enhanced RFID security and anti-counterfeiting | |
| CN104333539A (en) | RFID security authentication method based on Chebyshev mapping | |
| CN103218633A (en) | Radio frequency identification (RFID) safety authentication method | |
| CN103152181B (en) | A kind of RFID data encryption method | |
| CN107423647A (en) | A kind of RFID Entrusted authentication methods towards smart home | |
| CN104700125A (en) | AES encryption and verification of ultra high frequency radio identification system | |
| Xiao et al. | Security Protocol for RFID System Conforming to EPC-C1G2 Standard. | |
| CN110392030A (en) | A kind of authentication based on biological characteristic, method for processing business and system |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| C06 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| C10 | Entry into substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| CF01 | Termination of patent right due to non-payment of annual fee | ||
| CF01 | Termination of patent right due to non-payment of annual fee |
Granted publication date: 20180501 Termination date: 20210504 |