CN104518868A - QKD (quantum key distribution) system capable of resisting wavelength attack - Google Patents
QKD (quantum key distribution) system capable of resisting wavelength attack Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a QKD (quantum key distribution) system capable of resisting wavelength attack. A receiving party of the QKD system comprises a primary light filter device, a secondary light filter device, a beam splitter, a receiving unit, a synchronous light detector, an attack light detector and a data processing unit. Camouflage of signal light can be separated from the signal light by the primary light filter device, camouflage of synchronous light can be separated from the synchronous light by the secondary light filter device, and the QKD system is combined with a conformity removal technology, so that the wavelength attack can be effectively resisted. The QKD system can appropriately judge the wavelength attack when under the wavelength attack, so that alarm signals can be generated to indicate that the system is under the wavelength attack, the system can normally run even when the QKD system is under the attack, and codes can be safely formed; existing mainstream QKD systems can be modified easily and feasibly, and accordingly the QKD system is low in cost and easy to popularize.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to field of quantum secure communication, in particular, provide a kind of QKD system resisted wavelength and attack.
Background technology
Quantum key distribution (QKD, Quantum Key Distribution) technology is a kind of new type key distribution technology occurred in recent years, it is according to specific agreement, and utilize the quantum state coded message in single photon level, communicating pair can share a large amount of random keys.Because in physical principle, single photon is indivisible, and quantum state can not be cloned, and therefore quantum key distribution can not be eavesdropped in physical principle, has theoretic absolute safety.
Although based on BB84 agreement (Quantum cryptography:public-keydistribution and coin tossing.Proceedings of the IEEE InternationalConference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India, QKD prototype 1984:175-179) has been proved to be safe in theory, but its requirement has four primary conditions: (1) transmit leg uses perfect single-photon source; (2) detection efficient of recipient is 100%; (3) quantum channel does not have loss; (4) the measurement basic vector of communicating pair remains consistent.These conditions still cannot meet at present in real world.The also requirement of its Implicit Conditions, transmit leg (recipient) selects the behavior of modulation (measurements) basic vector to have true randomness, this point also due to device some real parameter limit and there is the possible of inefficacy.Two during the last ten years, and the QKD scheme of many improvement versions is suggested, and makes up, and demonstrate the fail safe of scheme to the reality deficiency of four primary conditions.Therefore, the Continual Improvement at present for QKD scheme mainly concentrates on, under real world conditions to the lifting of communication efficiency, with to the various defence utilizing equipment leak to attack or eavesdrop.
Be published in for the end of the year 2011 in one section of article on PRA and propose a kind of novel attack option for QKD system under current conditions (Attacking a practical quantum keydistribution system with wavelength-dependent beam-splitter andmultiwavelength sources, Physical Review A, 84:062308, 2011), this attack option utilizes fused tapered (FBT) beam splitter (BS) to the leak of wavelength dependency, the main flow QKD System Implementation wavelength attack that Stochastic choice measures basic vector is carried out to using FBT beam splitter.
At present, based on the quantum key distribution system of BB84 agreement, the selection locating basic vector recipient is passive, namely locates to adopt beam splitter that the photon received is divided into two bundles recipient, then carries out follow-up process, reach the object that Stochastic choice measures basic vector.Described beam splitter can adopt Retardation Sheets or fused tapered.Fused tapered beam splitter is the most frequently used product of fiber beam splitting, and cost and stability are all fine, but its splitting ratio is with wavelength generation sinusoidal variations, if wavelength chooses is suitable, when photon is by beam splitter, two exports the beam splitting that will be 1:1.At above-mentioned article (Physical Review A, 84:062308,2011) point out in, for the FBT beam splitter that centre wavelength is 1550nm, the photon of 1550nm wavelength is had to the beam splitting of 1:1, needs recipient Stochastic choice in desirable QKD scheme can be met and measure the requirement of basic vector; And the photon to 1470nm wavelength (1290nm wavelength), by have an appointment 99% photon by port one (port 2) outgoing of this beam splitter.Like this, assailant or listener-in can adopt the strategy of intercepting-repeating transmission, according to intercept and the quantum state information that sends of the transmit leg measured, again photon is prepared, again according to recipient use the wavelength characteristic of beam splitter, by selecting suitable wavelength, this heavy freshly prepd photon is sent to recipient, reach the object that the beam splitter controlling recipient exports (namely measuring the selection of basic vector), finally realize eavesdropping.
In prior art, for the QKD system of passive selection basic vector, recipient locates beam splitter and adopts Retardation Sheets or fused tapered beam splitter.When using fused tapered beam splitter, because it has the characteristic of splitting ratio with wavelength generation sinusoidal variations, being therefore likely utilized thus realizing wavelength and attacking.
Summary of the invention
For solving the problem, the present invention proposes a kind of QKD system resisted wavelength and attack, this system compensate for the security breaches of fused tapered beam splitter, the system that can detect in time receives wavelength and attacks, provide alarm signal, and the key refining safety can be continued when flashlight is under attack.
The present invention solves the problems of the technologies described above by the following technical solutions:
The recipient of QKD system comprises first order optical filter part, second level optical filter part, beam splitter, receiving element, synchronizable optical detector, attack photo-detector and data processing unit, the centre wavelength of first order optical filter part is signal light wavelength, the centre wavelength of second level optical filter part is synchronizable optical wavelength, flashlight is successively through first order optical filter part, receiving element is exported to after beam splitter, attack light and synchronizable optical are successively through first order optical filter part, export to respectively after the optical filter part of the second level and attack photo-detector and synchronizable optical detector, synchronizable optical detector exports result of detection to data processing unit and receiving element respectively, attack photo-detector and export result of detection to data processing unit, after receiving element is measured flashlight, export measurement result to data processing unit, when detecting attack light, data processing unit sends alarm signal, indication mechanism receives wavelength and attacks.
Further, described data processing unit comprises to be attacked light analytic unit and meets removal unit, described attack light analytic unit receives synchronizable optical detector and attacks the result of detection of photo-detector, obtain the time information of synchronizable optical, and under respective record, attack the time information of light, and this information is sent to meets removal unit, the described removal unit that meets is according to the information of attacking the transmission of light analytic unit, the flashlight detected engraved when correspondence is attacked light is removed, and residual signal light continues the follow-up flow process participating in QKD.
Further, the filter plate that a slice is same with wherein cardiac wave appearance is increased after described first order optical filter part, flashlight exports beam splitter to successively after first order optical filter part, described filter plate, and makes with the light of light disposable box process by described filter plate filtering.
Preferably, described first order optical filter part and second level optical filter part are dense wave division multiplexer.
Preferably, described attack photo-detector and synchronizable optical detector are common photoelectric tube.
Preferably, described data processing unit is programmable logic device.
Beneficial effect of the present invention comprises:
The invention provides a kind of QKD system effectively can resisted wavelength and attack, the system that can detect in time receives wavelength and attacks, and provides alarm signal.This system compensate for the security breaches of fused tapered beam splitter, attacks and defends, attack was lost efficacy, and can continue the key refining safety when flashlight is under attack to utilizing the wavelength of this leak.In addition, the change of the present invention to current main flow QKD system is simple, and cost is low, is easy to promote.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is that the present invention is for resisting recipient's system block diagram of the QKD system of wavelength attack;
Fig. 2 is the schematic diagram meeting removal;
Wherein, the 1, first signal pulse, 2, secondary signal light pulse, the 3, the 3rd signal pulse.
Embodiment
By the description carried out its exemplary embodiment below in conjunction with accompanying drawing, the above-mentioned feature and advantage of the present invention will become apparent and easy understand.
QKD system in the present embodiment, adopts the QKD scheme of BB84 agreement, polarization encoder.The transmit leg of QKD system sends synchronizable optical and flashlight, and synchronizable optical and flashlight are by the recipient of same Optical Fiber Transmission to QKD system.Wherein flashlight is the flashlight of correspondence four kinds of polarization states prepared by transmit leg Stochastic choice horizontal vertical base (H, V) and 45 degree of diagonal angles base (P, N), is expressed as H, V, P and N.
As shown in Figure 1, attack for resisting wavelength, the recipient of QKD system comprises first order optical filter part, second level optical filter part, beam splitter, receiving element, synchronizable optical detector, attacks photo-detector and data processing unit.The centre wavelength of described first order optical filter part is signal light wavelength (being 1550nm in the present embodiment), and its effect is the light of separation signal light and other wavelength.When there being attack light to exist, the light of other wavelength described refers in particular to synchronizable optical and attacks light.Flashlight exports beam splitter to after first order optical filter part, is randomized into two light paths, exports receiving element to by beam splitter.
The centre wavelength of described second level optical filter part is synchronizable optical wavelength (being 1570nm in the present embodiment), and its effect is the light being separated synchronizable optical and its commplementary wave length.In the present invention, the light of its commplementary wave length described refers in particular to wavelength and attacks the attack light used.The attack light exported after first order optical filter part and synchronizable optical, then after the optical filter part of the second level, separate two-way output, wherein a road exports synchronizable optical, exports data processing unit and receiving element after synchronizable optical detector to; Another road exports attacks light, after attacking photo-detector, export data processing unit to.In the present embodiment, described attack photo-detector and synchronizable optical detector are common photoelectric tube.
Described receiving element receives the output signal of synchronizable optical detector, obtain the time information of synchronizable optical, vertical base (the H of usage level accordingly, V) and 45 degree of diagonal angle base (P, N) this two covers measurement basic vector is measured flashlight, and often cover is measured on basic vector two kinds of measurement results, always total H, V, P and N tetra-kinds of measurement results, each measurement should obtain the one in these four kinds of results, and measurement result is sent to data processing unit.
When detecting attack light, data processing unit sends alarm signal, and indication mechanism receives wavelength and attacks.
Further, described data processing unit comprises attack light analytic unit and meets removal unit.Described attack light analytic unit receives synchronizable optical detector and attacks the output signal of photo-detector, obtains the time information of synchronizable optical, and attacks the time information of light under respective record, and this information is sent to and meets removal unit.
The described removal unit that meets is according to the result of attacking light analytic unit, and the flashlight detected engraved when correspondence is attacked light is removed, and residual signal light continues the follow-up flow process participating in QKD.Meet the principle of removal as shown in Figure 2, while first signal pulse 1 and the 3rd signal pulse 3 are detected, have also discovered and attacked light existence, shown may comprise unsafe information in these two flashlights, so need to be removed, namely do not participate in follow-up one-tenth code.And secondary signal light pulse 2, while being detected, do not attack light, so should retain.
In the present embodiment, the function of described data processing unit realizes in the programmable logic device.
In the present embodiment, that described first order optical filter part and second level optical filter part adopt is dense wave division multiplexer (DWDM).The window width of DWDM filter plate is generally within 20nm, and the isolation of window outer rim is greater than 25dB.Generally from window more away from isolation better, wavelength attacks 1290nm, 1470nm wavelength of using all away from the window of flashlight 1550nm, synchronizable optical 1570nm, therefore all can have good isolation at first order optical filter part, optical filter part place, the second level.Analyze with conservative estimation 45dB, if listener-in intercepts flashlight-retransmits, adopt 1290nm, 1470nm wavelength to implement wavelength and attack, then the counting rate of recipient will drop to original 3 × 10
-5(corresponding 45dB), this attenuation degree will cause dark counting and so on ratio to rise in actual QKD system because counting rate is too low, the error rate is too high, causes becoming code.Therefore, if listener-in attempts to maintain original Effect on Detecting in recipient's optical path, must working strength be original 3 × 10
5light pulse doubly.The light pulse of this intensity uses more common photoelectric tube efficiently to detect, if detectivity reaches 100%, then all attack examples can be detected, eavesdropping complete failure.
Further, in order to improve the isolation of first order optical filter part, the filter plate that a slice is same with wherein cardiac wave appearance is increased after first order optical filter part, flashlight exports beam splitter to successively after first order optical filter part, described filter plate, through the light of described filter plate filtering by the process of light disposable box.The decay of filter plate window center is less than 1dB usually, and the flashlight that therefore increase filter plate causes loses also little.The isolation of present hypothesis first order optical filter part has brought up to X dB (X>45), can select rational X according to the detection performance attacking photo-detector.If X=90, then the side of eavesdropping uses the multi-sending attack light of which kind of intensity all can not successfully eavesdrop.
If eavesdropping side attempts to use other wavelength to attack, " sacrifice " controls the ideal of beam splitter and reduces first order optical filter part to the isolation attacking light, and this attack does not have effect in this QKD system.Because the isolation of first order optical filter part is insensitive to the wavelength outside window, and the splitting ratio of fused tapered beam splitter wants responsive many to wavelength, therefore, even if eavesdropping side sacrifices very large degree of control, how many impacts can not be caused on the isolation of first order optical filter part.
In sum, the QKD system that the present invention proposes uses two stage filter device recipient, and the camouflage to flashlight is isolated in first order filtering, and the camouflage to synchronizable optical is isolated in second level filtering, and combination meets removal technology, wavelength is attacked and has carried out effective defence.When being subject to wavelength and attacking, QKD system can make appropriate judgement, provides alarm signal, and indication mechanism receives wavelength and attacks, and system also can normally be run time under attack, can become code safely.The change of the present invention to current main flow QKD system is simple, with low cost, is easy to promote.
The foregoing is only the preferred embodiment of the invention; not in order to limit the invention; the any amendment done within all spirit in the invention and principle, equivalently to replace and improvement etc., within the protection range that all should be included in the invention.
Claims (6)
1. the QKD system resisted wavelength and attack, it is characterized in that: the recipient of QKD system comprises first order optical filter part, second level optical filter part, beam splitter, receiving element, synchronizable optical detector, attack photo-detector and data processing unit, the centre wavelength of first order optical filter part is signal light wavelength, the centre wavelength of second level optical filter part is synchronizable optical wavelength, flashlight is successively through first order optical filter part, receiving element is exported to after beam splitter, attack light and synchronizable optical are successively through first order optical filter part, export to respectively after the optical filter part of the second level and attack photo-detector and synchronizable optical detector, synchronizable optical detector exports result of detection to data processing unit and receiving element respectively, attack photo-detector and export result of detection to data processing unit, after receiving element is measured flashlight, export measurement result to data processing unit, when detecting attack light, data processing unit sends alarm signal, indication mechanism receives wavelength and attacks.
2. as claimed in claim 1 a kind of resist wavelength attack QKD system, it is characterized in that: described data processing unit comprises to be attacked light analytic unit and meets removal unit, described attack light analytic unit receives synchronizable optical detector and attacks the result of detection of photo-detector, obtain the time information of synchronizable optical, and under respective record, attack the time information of light, and this information is sent to meets removal unit, the described removal unit that meets is according to the information of attacking the transmission of light analytic unit, the flashlight detected engraved when correspondence is attacked light is removed, residual signal light continues the follow-up flow process participating in QKD.
3. as claimed in claim 1 a kind of resist wavelength attack QKD system, it is characterized in that: after described first order optical filter part, increase the filter plate that a slice is same with wherein cardiac wave appearance, flashlight exports beam splitter to successively after first order optical filter part, described filter plate, and makes with the light of light disposable box process by described filter plate filtering.
4. as claimed in claim 1 a kind of resist wavelength attack QKD system, it is characterized in that: described first order optical filter part and second level optical filter part are dense wave division multiplexer.
5. as claimed in claim 1 a kind of resist wavelength attack QKD system, it is characterized in that: described attack photo-detector and synchronizable optical detector are common photoelectric tube.
6. as claimed in claim 1 or 2 a kind of resist wavelength attack QKD system, it is characterized in that: described data processing unit is programmable logic device.
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Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110535640A (en) * | 2019-08-21 | 2019-12-03 | 中国科学技术大学 | A kind of detection method and system of detector control attack |
| CN110830108A (en) * | 2019-10-31 | 2020-02-21 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Anti-attack detection method and device for laser transmitter of quantum secret communication system |
| CN112134683A (en) * | 2020-09-22 | 2020-12-25 | 中南大学 | Attack detection method of discrete variable quantum key distribution system |
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| CN1651947A (en) * | 2004-02-02 | 2005-08-10 | 中国科学技术大学 | Polarization control coding method coder and quantum key distributing system |
| CN102368705A (en) * | 2011-11-14 | 2012-03-07 | 中国科学技术大学 | Attacking method for polarization coded quantum key distribution system |
| CN103118308A (en) * | 2013-01-24 | 2013-05-22 | 浙江工业大学 | Optical access passive network supportive of quantum communication |
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Patent Citations (3)
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| CN1651947A (en) * | 2004-02-02 | 2005-08-10 | 中国科学技术大学 | Polarization control coding method coder and quantum key distributing system |
| CN102368705A (en) * | 2011-11-14 | 2012-03-07 | 中国科学技术大学 | Attacking method for polarization coded quantum key distribution system |
| CN103118308A (en) * | 2013-01-24 | 2013-05-22 | 浙江工业大学 | Optical access passive network supportive of quantum communication |
Cited By (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110535640A (en) * | 2019-08-21 | 2019-12-03 | 中国科学技术大学 | A kind of detection method and system of detector control attack |
| CN110830108A (en) * | 2019-10-31 | 2020-02-21 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Anti-attack detection method and device for laser transmitter of quantum secret communication system |
| CN110830108B (en) * | 2019-10-31 | 2021-03-19 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Anti-attack detection method and device for laser transmitter of quantum secret communication system |
| CN112134683A (en) * | 2020-09-22 | 2020-12-25 | 中南大学 | Attack detection method of discrete variable quantum key distribution system |
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