CN104468585A - Proxy-based user equipment trusted access authentication method - Google Patents

Proxy-based user equipment trusted access authentication method Download PDF

Info

Publication number
CN104468585A
CN104468585A CN201410765889.2A CN201410765889A CN104468585A CN 104468585 A CN104468585 A CN 104468585A CN 201410765889 A CN201410765889 A CN 201410765889A CN 104468585 A CN104468585 A CN 104468585A
Authority
CN
China
Prior art keywords
subscriber equipment
packet
authentication
certificate server
father node
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
CN201410765889.2A
Other languages
Chinese (zh)
Other versions
CN104468585B (en
Inventor
庞辽军
曹潮
赵颖
曲志华
谭示崇
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Xidian University
Original Assignee
Xidian University
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Xidian University filed Critical Xidian University
Priority to CN201410765889.2A priority Critical patent/CN104468585B/en
Publication of CN104468585A publication Critical patent/CN104468585A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CN104468585B publication Critical patent/CN104468585B/en
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0884—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities by delegation of authentication, e.g. a proxy authenticates an entity to be authenticated on behalf of this entity vis-à-vis an authentication entity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a proxy-based user equipment trusted access authentication method. The method mainly solves the problems that in the prior art, the authentication time of user equipment is too long, the coverage of a wireless network is small, and the security of the wireless network cannot be guaranteed. According to the technical scheme, user equipment seeks an authentication server, the user equipment and the authentication server perform bidirectional identity authentication if the user equipment can find the authentication server, and the user equipment and a father node perform authority judgment if the user equipment cannot find the authentication server; if the father node is an authenticated node, the user equipment and the father node perform bidirectional identity authentication; if the father node is an unauthenticated node, the father node repeats the seeking and authentication processes of the user equipment and then executes authentication with the user equipment, so that trusted access authentication is completed. According to the proxy-based user equipment trusted access authentication method, the authentication time is shortened, the coverage of the wireless network is expanded, and the security of the network is improved. Accordingly, the method can be used for guaranteeing network security.

Description

Based on the credible access authentication method of subscriber equipment of agency
Technical field
The invention belongs to radio network technique field, particularly the credible access authentication method of subscriber equipment, can be used for protecting network safety.
Background technology
In the last few years, radio network technique is rapidly developed, the new type of skill and application model emerge in an endless stream, the Intranet of service as ecommerce, E-Government, audio frequency and video business and enterprises and institutions in a large number towards communication network environment builds etc., can be used widely under wireless network environment.Wireless network has great convenience, user only needs a mobile device just can access network whenever and wherever possible, thus increase work efficiency greatly, but due to shortcomings such as mobile device computing capability are more weak, limited storage space, wireless signal are are easily intercepted and captured, there is also great potential safety hazard.For wireless network environment, smell spy, the attack pattern such as eavesdropping, identity are pretended to be, distributed denial of service is conventional means, after mobile device is under attack, sensitive data leakage may be caused, facility information is tampered, invader obtains network management authority etc. serious consequence by wireless network.
Potential safety hazard under the wireless network environment, traditional thinking of resolving safely may be unsatisfactory, and such as fire compartment wall does not play effect to wireless communication, and anyone can intercepted data within wireless signal coverage; Due to the restriction of volume and transmittability, the encryption/decryption algorithm that amount of calculation is large is not suitable for mobile device etc.Under this background, authentic authentication technology, as the new approaches for wireless network and mobile device security threat, becomes the focus that industry is paid close attention to.Authentic authentication is a kind of method of by cryptographic technique, user identity being carried out to two-way authentication, constructs network in this way, to the illegal node refusal access of forged identity, thus can guarantee that the subscriber equipment of access network is all believable.In the verification process of reality, due to the border uncertainty of wireless network and the mobility of subscriber equipment, the authentication request packet that subscriber equipment may be made to send cannot arrive certificate server, thus cause subscriber equipment authenticated time long, even cannot access network, and the fail safe of wireless network also can not be guaranteed.
Summary of the invention
The object of the invention is to propose a kind of credible access authentication method of subscriber equipment based on agency, long to solve prior art subscriber equipment authenticated time, wireless network coverage is little, and the fail safe of wireless network can not get the problem of guarantee.
The main thought realizing the object of the invention is: to be sent to certificate server by subscriber equipment and seek request data package, if certificate server receives and seeks request data package from subscriber equipment, then reply to subscriber equipment and seek response data packet; If subscriber equipment receives and seeks response data packet from certificate server, then subscriber equipment sends authentication request packet to carry out bidirectional identity authentication to certificate server; If subscriber equipment does not receive and seeks response data packet from certificate server, then subscriber equipment should send authentication request packet to its father node, if father node is authentication node, then subscriber equipment carries out bidirectional identity authentication with father node; If father node is unverified node, then it repeats the seeking and verification process of previous step subscriber equipment, to perform oneself bidirectional identity authentication with certificate server, then the bidirectional identity authentication of execution and subscriber equipment.After subscriber equipment certification completes, it has just accessed trustable network.
According to above thinking, performing step of the present invention is as follows:
(1) subscriber equipment A seeks certificate server R:
When subscriber equipment A needs access network, first send to the certificate server R in network and seek request data package, certificate server R receive from subscriber equipment A seek request data package after, reply to subscriber equipment A and seek response data packet, if subscriber equipment A receives and seeks response data packet from certificate server R, then seek process normal termination, perform step (2); If subscriber equipment A does not receive and seeks response data packet from certificate server R, then seek process exception and terminate, perform step (3);
(2) bidirectional identity authentication of three-way handshake is carried out between subscriber equipment A and certificate server R;
(3) authority judgement is carried out between subscriber equipment A and father node B:
Subscriber equipment A constructs authentication request packet, and by authentication request Packet Generation to father node B, after father node B receives authentication request packet, judge self to be whether authentication node: if, then perform step (4), if not, then perform step (5);
(4) bidirectional identity authentication of three-way handshake is carried out between subscriber equipment A and father node B;
(5) the seeking and verification process of father node B duplicate customer device A, to perform the bidirectional identity authentication of oneself and certificate server R, then performs and the bidirectional identity authentication of subscriber equipment A.
The present invention compared with prior art tool has the following advantages:
1., because the present invention uses credible access authentication technique, therefore can ensure that the subscriber equipment of access network is all believable, if set up network with the present invention, then can construct credible radio local network environment;
2. because the present invention uses father node authentication mechanism, if the while of therefore having a large amount of new user during access network, then the certification pressure of certificate server can be alleviated, makes new user be able to fast access into network;
3. because the present invention uses father node authentication mechanism, if when therefore subscriber equipment cannot communicate with the certificate server in network, also by sending the mode access network of authentication request to its father node, so, just greatly reducing the subscriber equipment that causes because of the mobility of equipment and the uncertainty of wireless network coverage cannot the situation of access network.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is of the present invention realizes general flow chart;
Fig. 2 subscriber equipment and certificate server carry out the sub-process figure of bidirectional identity authentication;
Fig. 3 subscriber equipment and father node carry out the sub-process figure of bidirectional identity authentication.
Embodiment
With reference to Fig. 1, performing step of the present invention is as follows:
Step 1, optimum configurations
Key generation centre Trent chooses Big prime q, wherein a q>2 according to security parameter z z, the addition cyclic group G on structure q rank 1with a q factorial method cyclic group G 2;
Construct a bilinear map e:G 1× G 1→ G 2;
From group G 1upper random selecting generator P;
Generate subscriber equipment identity ID a, certificate server identity ID r, father node identity ID b;
Choose a kind of signature algorithm Sig, as RSA Algorithm etc.;
Generate the signature private key SK of subscriber equipment A a, certificate server R signature private key SK r, father node B signature private key SK b;
Choose password one-way Hash function h (x).
Step 2, subscriber equipment A seeks certificate server R.
When subscriber equipment A needs access network, first send to the certificate server R in network and seek request data package;
Certificate server R receive from subscriber equipment A seek request data package after, reply to subscriber equipment A and seek response data packet: if subscriber equipment A receives and seeks response data packet from certificate server R, then seek process normal termination, perform step 3; If subscriber equipment A does not receive and seeks response data packet from certificate server R, then seek process exception and terminate, perform step 4;
Step 3, carries out the bidirectional identity authentication of three-way handshake between subscriber equipment A and certificate server R.
With reference to Fig. 2, this step is implemented as follows:
3a) carry out first time between subscriber equipment A and certificate server R to shake hands:
3a1) subscriber equipment A chooses X aR∈ z q *temporary private is exchanged as DH, then by formula Y aR=X aRp calculates DH and exchanges temporary public key Y aR, subscriber equipment A generates random number N aR;
3a2) subscriber equipment A uses signature algorithm Sig to the identity ID of subscriber equipment A a, certificate server R identity ID r, random number N aR, DH exchanges temporary public key Y aRcalculate, generate signature Sig aR;
3a3) subscriber equipment A constructs authentication request packet P 1, and by authentication request packet P 1be sent to certificate server R, authentication request packet P 1content comprise:
ID afield: the identity of subscriber equipment A;
ID rfield: the identity of certificate server R;
N aRfield: the random number that subscriber equipment A generates;
Y aRfield: the DH that subscriber equipment A chooses exchanges temporary public key;
Sig aRfield: subscriber equipment A uses self signature private key SK ato ID afield, ID rfield, N aRfield, Y aRthe signature of field;
3a4) when certificate server R receives authentication request packet P 1time, certifying signature Sig aRcorrectness: if incorrect, then abandon authentication request packet P 1if correctly, then perform step 3b).
3b) carry out second handshake between subscriber equipment A and certificate server R:
3b1) certificate server R chooses X rA∈ z q *temporary private is exchanged as DH, then by formula Y rA=X rAp calculates DH and exchanges temporary public key Y rA, certificate server R generates random number N rA;
3b2) certificate server R uses the signature private key SK of self rto the identity ID of certificate server R r, subscriber equipment A identity ID a, random number N rA, random number N aR, DH exchanges temporary public key Y rAcalculate, generate signature Sig rA;
3b3) certificate server R exchanges temporary private X according to DH rAwith authentication request packet P 1in DH exchange temporary public key Y aR, by formula MK rA=e (X rA, Y aR) calculate the master key MK communicated between R and A rA;
3b4) certificate server R uses formula MIC rA=h (MK rA|| ID r|| ID a|| N rA|| N aR|| Y rA) calculate message integrity check code MIC rA;
3b5) certificate server R constructs authentication response packet P 2, and by authentication response packet P 2be sent to subscriber equipment A, authentication response packet P 2content comprise:
ID afield: the identity of subscriber equipment A;
ID rfield: the identity of certificate server R;
N rAfield: the random number that certificate server R generates;
N aRfield: the authentication request packet P that certificate server R receives 1in random number N aR;
Y rAfield: the DH that certificate server R chooses exchanges temporary public key;
Sig rAfield: certificate server R uses self signature private key SK rto ID rfield, ID afield, N rAfield, N aRfield, Y rAthe signature of field;
MIC rAfield: certificate server R is to MK rAfield, ID rfield, ID afield, N rAfield, N aRfield, Y rAthe message integrity check code that field calculates;
3b6) when subscriber equipment A receives authentication response packet P 2after, judge authentication response packet P 2in N aRfield whether with authentication request packet P 1in N aRidentical: if different, then to abandon authentication response packet P 2if, identical, then perform 3b7);
3b7) subscriber equipment A exchanges temporary private X to DH aRwith authentication response packet P 2in DH exchange temporary public key Y rAuse formula MK aR=e (X aR, Y rA) calculate the master key MK communicated between A and R aR;
3b8) subscriber equipment A is to MK aR, ID rfield, ID afield, N rAfield, N aRfield, Y rAfield uses formula MIC rA1=h (MK aR|| ID r|| ID a|| N rA|| N aR|| Y rA) calculate message integrity check code MIC rA1, checking MIC rA1whether with authentication response packet P 2in MIC rAidentical: if different, then to abandon authentication response packet P 2if, identical, then certifying signature Sig rAcorrectness: if incorrect, then abandon authentication response packet P 2if, correct just execution step 3c);
3c) carry out third time between subscriber equipment A and certificate server R to shake hands:
3c1) subscriber equipment A is to master key MK aR, subscriber equipment A identity ID a, certificate server R identity ID r, authentication response packet P 2in random number N rAuse formula MIC aR=h (MK aR|| ID a|| ID r|| N rA) calculate message integrity check code MIC aR;
3c2) subscriber equipment A constructs authenticate-acknowledge packet P 3, and by authenticate-acknowledge packet P 3be sent to certificate server R, authenticate-acknowledge packet P 3content comprise:
ID afield: the identity of subscriber equipment A;
ID rfield: the identity of certificate server R;
N rAfield: subscriber equipment A receives authentication response packet P 2in random number N rA;
MIC aRfield: subscriber equipment A is to MK aRfield, ID afield, ID rfield, N rAthe message integrity check code that field calculates;
3c3) when certificate server R receives authenticate-acknowledge packet P 3after, judge authenticate-acknowledge packet P 3in random number N rAwhether with authentication response packet P 2in random number N rAidentical: if different, then to abandon authenticate-acknowledge packet P 3if, identical, then perform 3c4);
3c4) certificate server R is to master key MK rA, ID rfield, ID afield, N rAfield uses formula MIC aR1=h (MK rA|| ID r|| ID a|| N rA) calculate message integrity check code MIC aR1, and verify MIC aR1whether with authenticate-acknowledge packet P 3in MIC aRidentical, if different, then abandon authentication response packet P 3if identical, then whole verification process completes.
Step 4, carries out authority judgement between subscriber equipment A and father node B.
Subscriber equipment A constructs authentication request packet, and by authentication request Packet Generation to father node B, after father node B receives authentication request packet, judges self to be whether authentication node: if then perform step 5, if not, then perform step 6;
Step 5, carries out the bidirectional identity authentication of three-way handshake between subscriber equipment A and father node B.
With reference to Fig. 3, this step is implemented as follows:
5a) carry out first time between subscriber equipment A and father node B to shake hands:
5a1) subscriber equipment A chooses X aB∈ z q *temporary private is exchanged as DH, then by formula Y aB=X aBp calculates DH and exchanges temporary public key Y aB, subscriber equipment A generates random number N aB;
5a2) subscriber equipment A uses signature algorithm Sig to the identity ID of subscriber equipment A a, father node B identity ID b, random number N aB, DH exchanges temporary public key Y aBcalculate, generate signature Sig aB;
5a3) subscriber equipment A constructs authentication request packet P 4, and by authentication request packet P 4be sent to certification father node B, authentication request packet P 4content comprise:
ID afield: the identity of subscriber equipment A;
ID bfield: the identity of father node B;
N aBfield: the random number that subscriber equipment A generates;
Y aBfield: the DH that subscriber equipment A chooses exchanges temporary public key;
Sig aBfield: subscriber equipment A uses self signature private key SK ato ID afield, ID bfield, N aBfield, Y aBthe signature of field;
5a4) when father node B receives authentication request packet P 4after, judge self to be whether authentication node: if not authentication node, then perform step 5, if authentication node, then certifying signature Sig aBcorrectness: if incorrect, then abandon authentication request packet P 4if correctly, then perform step 5b);
5b) carry out second handshake between subscriber equipment A and father node B:
5b1) father node B chooses X bA∈ z q *temporary private is exchanged as DH, then by formula Y bA=X bAp calculates DH and exchanges temporary public key Y bA, father node B generates random number N bA;
5b2) father node B uses the signature private key SK of self bto the identity ID of father node B b, subscriber equipment A identity ID a, random number N bA, random number N aB, DH exchanges temporary public key Y bAcalculate, generate signature Sig bA;
5b3) father node B exchanges temporary private X according to DH bAwith authentication request packet P 4in DH exchange temporary public key Y aB, by formula MK bA=e (X bA, Y aB) calculate the master key MK communicated between B and A bA;
5b4) father node B uses formula MIC bA=h (MK bA|| ID b|| ID a|| N bA|| N aB|| Y bA) calculate message integrity check code MIC bA;
5b5) father node B constructs authentication response packet P 5, and by authentication response packet P 5be sent to subscriber equipment A, authentication response packet P 5content comprise:
ID afield: the identity of subscriber equipment A;
ID bfield: the identity of father node B;
N bAfield: the random number that father node B generates;
N aBfield: the authentication request packet P that father node B receives 4in random number N aB;
Y bAfield: the DH that father node B chooses exchanges temporary public key;
Sig bAfield: father node B uses self signature private key SK bto ID bfield, ID afield, N bAfield, N aBfield, Y bAthe signature of field;
MIC bAfield: father node B is to MK bAfield, ID bfield, ID afield, N bAfield, N aBfield, Y bAthe message integrity check code that field calculates.
5b6) when subscriber equipment A receives authentication response packet P 5after, judge authentication response packet P 5in N aBfield whether with authentication request packet P 4in N aBidentical: if different, then to abandon authentication response packet P 5if, identical, then perform step 5b7);
5b7) subscriber equipment A exchanges temporary private X to DH aBwith authentication response packet P 5in DH exchange temporary public key Y bAuse formula MK aB=e (X aB, Y bA) calculate the master key MK communicated between A and B aB;
5b8) subscriber equipment A is to MK aB, ID bfield, ID afield, N bAfield, N aBfield, Y bAfield uses formula MIC bA1=h (MK aB|| ID b|| ID a|| N bA|| N aB|| Y bA) calculate message integrity check code MIC bA1, checking MIC bA1whether with authentication response packet P 5in MIC bAidentical: if different, then to abandon authentication response packet P 5if, identical, then certifying signature Sig bAcorrectness: if incorrect, then abandon authentication response packet P 5if, correct just execution step 5c);
5c) carry out third time between subscriber equipment A and father node B to shake hands:
5c1) subscriber equipment A is to master key MK aB, subscriber equipment A identity ID a, father node B identity ID b, authentication response packet P 5in random number N bAuse formula MIC aB=h (MK aB|| ID a|| ID b|| N bA) calculate message integrity check code MIC aB;
5c2) subscriber equipment A constructs authenticate-acknowledge packet P 6, and by authenticate-acknowledge packet P 6be sent to father node B, authenticate-acknowledge packet P 6content comprise:
ID afield: the identity of subscriber equipment A;
ID bfield: the identity of father node B;
N bAfield: subscriber equipment A receives authentication response packet P 5in random number N bA;
MIC aBfield: subscriber equipment A is to MK aBfield, ID afield, ID bfield, N bAthe message integrity check code that field calculates;
5c3) when father node B receives authenticate-acknowledge packet P 6after, judge authenticate-acknowledge packet P 6in random number N bAwhether with authentication response packet P 5in random number N bAidentical: if different, then to abandon authenticate-acknowledge packet P 6if, identical, then perform step 5c4);
5c4) father node B is to master key MK bA, ID bfield, ID afield, N bAfield uses formula MIC aB1=h (MK bA|| ID b|| ID a|| N bA) calculate message integrity check code MIC aB1, and verify MIC aB1whether with authenticate-acknowledge packet P 6in MIC aBidentical: if different, then to abandon authentication response packet P 6if identical, then whole verification process completes.
Step 6, seeking and verification process of father node B duplicate customer device A, to perform the bidirectional identity authentication of oneself and certificate server R, then performs and the bidirectional identity authentication of subscriber equipment A.
Explanation of nouns
Trent: key generation centre;
Z: the security parameter that key generation centre Trent chooses;
Q: what key generation centre Trent chose is greater than 2 zbig prime;
G 1: the q rank addition cyclic group that key generation centre Trent chooses;
G 2: the q factorial method cyclic group that key generation centre Trent chooses;
E: the G that key generation centre Trent chooses 1and G 2on bilinear map, i.e. e:G 1× G 1→ G 2;
P:G 1on generator, by key generation centre Trent random selecting;
Z q *: based on the non-zero multiplicative group of prime number q;
ID a: the identity of the subscriber equipment A that key generation centre Trent generates;
ID r: the identity of the certificate server R that key generation centre Trent generates;
ID b: the identity of the father node B that key generation centre Trent generates;
SK a: the signature private key of subscriber equipment A;
SK r: the signature private key of certificate server R;
SK b: the signature private key of father node B;
X aR: the DH that subscriber equipment A chooses exchanges temporary private;
Y aR: subscriber equipment A is according to X aRthe DH calculated exchanges temporary public key, Y aR=X aRp;
X rA: the DH that certificate server R chooses exchanges temporary private;
Y rA: certificate server R is according to X rAthe DH calculated exchanges temporary public key, Y rA=X rAp;
X aB: the DH that subscriber equipment A chooses exchanges temporary private;
Y aB: subscriber equipment A is according to X aBthe DH calculated exchanges temporary public key, Y aB=X aBp;
X bA: the DH that father node B chooses exchanges temporary private;
Y bA: father node B is according to X bAthe DH calculated exchanges temporary public key, Y bA=X bAp;
N aR: the random number that subscriber equipment A generates, for being sent to certificate server R;
N rA: the random number that certificate server R generates, for being sent to subscriber equipment A;
N aB: the random number that subscriber equipment A generates, for being sent to father node B;
N bA: the random number that father node B generates, for being sent to subscriber equipment A;
Sig: the signature algorithm that key generation centre Trent chooses;
H (x): password one-way Hash function;
MK aR: the communication master key that subscriber equipment A calculates, MK aR=e (X aR, Y rA);
MK rA: the communication master key that certificate server R calculates, MK rA=e (X rA, Y aR);
MK aB: the communication master key that subscriber equipment A calculates, MK aB=e (X aB, Y bA);
MK bA: the communication master key that father node B calculates, MK bA=e (X bA, Y aB);
A||B: the cascade representing A and B, wherein A and B link gets up to be A||B, can obtain A and B by separating linked operation to A||B;
MIC rA: the message integrity check code that certificate server R calculates, for being sent to subscriber equipment A, wherein, MIC rA=h (MK rA|| ID r|| ID a|| N rA|| N aR|| Y rA);
MIC rA1: subscriber equipment A uses the message integrity check code that calculates of own public key, for verify whether with the message integrity check code MIC received rAidentical, wherein, MIC rA1=h (MK aR|| ID r|| ID a|| N rA|| N aR|| Y rA);
MIC aR: the message integrity check code that subscriber equipment A calculates, for being sent to certificate server R, wherein, MIC aR=h (MK aR|| ID a|| ID r|| N rA);
MIC aR1: certificate server R uses the message integrity check code that calculates of own public key, for verify whether with the message integrity check code MIC received aRidentical, wherein, MIC aR1=h (MK rA|| ID a|| ID r|| N rA);
MIC bA: the message integrity check code that father node B calculates, for being sent to subscriber equipment A, wherein, MIC bA=h (MK bA|| ID b|| ID a|| N bA|| N aB|| Y bA);
MIC bA1: subscriber equipment A uses the message integrity check code that calculates of own public key, for verify whether with the message integrity check code MIC received bAidentical, wherein, MIC bA1=h (MK aB|| ID b|| ID a|| N bA|| N aB|| Y bA);
MIC aB: the message integrity check code that subscriber equipment A calculates, for being sent to father node B, wherein, MIC aB=h (MK aB|| ID a|| ID b|| N bA);
MIC aB1: father node B uses the message integrity check code that calculates of own public key, for verify whether with the message integrity check code MIC received aBidentical, wherein, MIC aB1=h (MK bA|| ID a|| ID b|| N bA).

Claims (7)

1., based on the agency's credible access authentication method of subscriber equipment, comprise the steps:
(1) subscriber equipment A seeks certificate server R:
When subscriber equipment A needs access network, first send to the certificate server R in network and seek request data package, certificate server R receive from subscriber equipment A seek request data package after, reply to subscriber equipment A and seek response data packet, if subscriber equipment A receives and seeks response data packet from certificate server R, then seek process normal termination, perform step (2); If subscriber equipment A does not receive and seeks response data packet from certificate server R, then seek process exception and terminate, perform step (3);
(2) bidirectional identity authentication of three-way handshake is carried out between subscriber equipment A and certificate server R;
(3) authority judgement is carried out between subscriber equipment A and father node B:
Subscriber equipment A constructs authentication request packet, and by authentication request Packet Generation to father node B, after father node B receives authentication request packet, judge self to be whether authentication node: if, then perform step (4), if not, then perform step (5);
(4) bidirectional identity authentication of three-way handshake is carried out between subscriber equipment A and father node B;
(5) the seeking and verification process of father node B duplicate customer device A, to perform the bidirectional identity authentication of oneself and certificate server R, then performs and the bidirectional identity authentication of subscriber equipment A.
2. the credible access authentication method of subscriber equipment based on agency according to claim 1, the three-way handshake bidirectional identity authentication process of carrying out between the subscriber equipment A in wherein said step (2) and certificate server R, it is expressed as follows:
2a) subscriber equipment A constructs authentication request packet P 1, and by authentication request packet P 1be sent to certificate server R, when certificate server R receives authentication request packet P 1time, certifying signature Sig aRcorrectness: if incorrect, then abandon authentication request packet P 1if correctly, then perform step 2b);
2b) certificate server R constructs authentication response packet P 2, and by authentication response packet P 2be sent to subscriber equipment A, when subscriber equipment A receives authentication response packet P 2after, judge authentication response packet P 2in random number N aRfield whether with the authentication request packet P received 1in N aRfield is identical: if different, then abandon authentication response packet P 2if, identical, then perform step 2c);
2c) subscriber equipment A uses own public key calculating certificate server R to be sent to the message integrity check code MIC of subscriber equipment A rA1, and verify MIC rA1whether with the authentication response packet P received 2in message integrity check code MIC rAfield is identical: if different, then abandon authentication response packet P 2if, identical, then certifying signature Sig rAcorrectness: if incorrect, then abandon authentication response packet P 2if correctly, then perform step 2d);
2d) subscriber equipment A constructs authenticate-acknowledge packet P 3, and by authenticate-acknowledge packet P 3be sent to certificate server R, when certificate server R receives authenticate-acknowledge packet P 3after, judge authenticate-acknowledge packet P 3in random number N rAwhether with the authentication response packet P received 2in random number N rAidentical: if different, then to abandon authenticate-acknowledge packet P 3if, identical, then perform step 2e);
2e) certificate server R uses own public key calculating subscriber equipment A to be sent to the message integrity check code MIC of certificate server R aR1, and verify MIC aR1whether with the authenticate-acknowledge packet P received 3in message integrity check code MIC aRfield is identical: if different, then abandon authenticate-acknowledge packet P 3if identical, then whole verification process completes.
3. the credible access authentication method of subscriber equipment based on agency according to claim 1, the three-way handshake bidirectional identity authentication process of carrying out between the subscriber equipment A in wherein said step (4) and father node B, it is expressed as follows:
4a) subscriber equipment A constructs authentication request packet P 4, and by authentication request packet P 4be sent to father node B, when father node B receives authentication request packet P 4after, certifying signature Sig aBcorrectness: if incorrect, then abandon authentication request packet P 4if correctly, then perform step 4b);
4b) father node B constructs authentication response packet P 5, and by authentication response packet P 5be sent to subscriber equipment A, when subscriber equipment A receives authentication response packet P 5after, judge authentication response packet P 5in random number N aBfield whether with the authentication request packet P received 4in N aBfield is identical: if different, then abandon authentication response packet P 5if, identical, then perform step 4c);
4c) subscriber equipment A uses own public key calculating father node B to be sent to the message integrity check code MIC of subscriber equipment A bA1, and verify this MIC bA1code whether with the authentication response packet P received 5in message integrity check code MIC bAfield is identical: if different, then abandon authentication response packet P 5if, identical, then certifying signature Sig bAcorrectness: if incorrect, then abandon authentication response packet P 5if correctly, then perform step 4d);
4d) subscriber equipment A constructs authenticate-acknowledge packet P 6, and by authenticate-acknowledge packet P 6be sent to father node B, when father node B receives authenticate-acknowledge packet P 6after, judge authenticate-acknowledge packet P 6in random number N bAwhether with the authentication response packet P received 5in random number N bAidentical: if different, then to abandon authenticate-acknowledge packet P 6if, identical, then perform step 4e);
4e) father node B uses own public key calculating subscriber equipment A to be sent to the message integrity check code MIC of father node B aB1, and verify this MIC aB1code whether with the authenticate-acknowledge packet P received 6in message integrity check code MIC aBfield is identical: if different, then abandon authenticate-acknowledge packet P 6if identical, then whole verification process completes.
4. the three-way handshake bidirectional identity authentication process of carrying out between subscriber equipment A according to claim 2 and certificate server R, wherein said step 2c) in subscriber equipment A use own public key to calculate message integrity check code MIC that certificate server R is sent to subscriber equipment A rA1, undertaken by following formula:
MIC RA1＝h(MK AR||ID R||ID A||N RA||N AR||Y RA)
Wherein, h (x) is password one-way Hash function, MK aRfor the communication master key between subscriber equipment A and certificate server R, ID rfor the authentication response packet P that subscriber equipment A receives 2in certificate server identity field, ID afor the authentication response packet P that subscriber equipment A receives 2in subscriber equipment identity field, N rAfor the authentication response packet P that subscriber equipment A receives 2in certificate server R be sent to the random number field of subscriber equipment A, N aRfor the authentication response packet P that subscriber equipment A receives 2in subscriber equipment A be sent to random number field with certificate server R, Y rAfor the authentication response packet P that subscriber equipment A receives 2in certificate server public key field.
5. the three-way handshake bidirectional identity authentication process of carrying out between subscriber equipment A according to claim 2 and certificate server R, wherein said step 2e) in certificate server R use own public key to calculate message integrity check code MIC that subscriber equipment A is sent to certificate server R aR1, undertaken by following formula:
MIC AR1＝h(MK RA||ID R||ID A||N RA)
Wherein, h (x) is password one-way Hash function, MK rAfor the communication master key between certificate server R and subscriber equipment A, ID rfor the authenticate-acknowledge packet P that certificate server R receives 3in certificate server identity field, ID afor the authenticate-acknowledge packet P that certificate server R receives 3in user identity field, N rAfor the authenticate-acknowledge packet P that certificate server R receives 3in certificate server R be sent to the random number field of subscriber equipment A.
6. the three-way handshake bidirectional identity authentication process of carrying out between subscriber equipment A according to claim 3 and father node B, wherein said step 4c) in subscriber equipment A use own public key to calculate message integrity check code MIC that father node B is sent to subscriber equipment A bA1, undertaken by following formula:
MIC BA1＝h(MK AB||ID B||ID A||N BA||N AB||Y BA)
Wherein, h (x) is password one-way Hash function, MK aBfor the communication master key between subscriber equipment A and father node B, ID bfor the authentication response packet P that subscriber equipment A receives 5in father node identity field, ID afor the authentication response packet P that subscriber equipment A receives 5in subscriber equipment identity field, N bAfor the authentication response packet P that subscriber equipment A receives 5in father node B be sent to the random number field of subscriber equipment A, N aBfor the authentication response packet P received 5in subscriber equipment A be sent to the random number field of father node B, Y bAfor the authentication response packet P that subscriber equipment A receives 5in father node public key field.
7. the three-way handshake bidirectional identity authentication process of carrying out between subscriber equipment A according to claim 3 and father node B, wherein said step 4e) in father node B use own public key to calculate message integrity check code MIC that subscriber equipment A is sent to father node B aB1, undertaken by following formula:
MIC AB1＝h(MK BA||ID B||ID A||N BA)
Wherein, h (x) is password one-way Hash function, MK bAfor the communication master key between father node B and subscriber equipment A, ID bfor the authenticate-acknowledge packet P that father node B receives 6in father node identity field, ID afor the authenticate-acknowledge packet P that father node B receives 6in subscriber equipment identity field, N bAfor the authenticate-acknowledge packet P that father node B receives 6in father node B be sent to the random number field of subscriber equipment A.
CN201410765889.2A 2014-12-12 2014-12-12 The credible access authentication method of user equipment based on agency Active CN104468585B (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201410765889.2A CN104468585B (en) 2014-12-12 2014-12-12 The credible access authentication method of user equipment based on agency

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201410765889.2A CN104468585B (en) 2014-12-12 2014-12-12 The credible access authentication method of user equipment based on agency

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CN104468585A true CN104468585A (en) 2015-03-25
CN104468585B CN104468585B (en) 2017-10-24

Family

ID=52913957

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CN201410765889.2A Active CN104468585B (en) 2014-12-12 2014-12-12 The credible access authentication method of user equipment based on agency

Country Status (1)

Country Link
CN (1) CN104468585B (en)

Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN109639426A (en) * 2019-02-26 2019-04-16 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 Bidirectional self-authentication method based on identification password
CN112822214A (en) * 2021-02-09 2021-05-18 广州慧睿思通科技股份有限公司 Network attack defense method, device, system, storage medium and electronic equipment
CN113364807A (en) * 2021-06-30 2021-09-07 四川更元科技有限公司 Network node credibility authentication implementation method
CN114070568A (en) * 2021-11-04 2022-02-18 北京百度网讯科技有限公司 Data processing method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium

Citations (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7809941B1 (en) * 2005-09-09 2010-10-05 Rockwell Collins, Inc. Certifier hierarchy for public key infrastructure in an ad-hoc network
CN101883115A (en) * 2010-06-25 2010-11-10 北京交通大学 Access authentication method and system thereof
WO2010127684A1 (en) * 2009-05-05 2010-11-11 Nokia Siemens Networks Oy Topology based fast secured access
CN102612035A (en) * 2012-04-13 2012-07-25 北京工业大学 Energy-efficient identity authentication method in multi-level clustering wireless sensor network
US20120237033A1 (en) * 2011-03-16 2012-09-20 Yasuyuki Tanaka Node, a root node, and a computer readable medium
CN103813324A (en) * 2012-11-07 2014-05-21 中国移动通信集团公司 Node signature method and mobile node access method of hierarchical MIPv6

Patent Citations (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7809941B1 (en) * 2005-09-09 2010-10-05 Rockwell Collins, Inc. Certifier hierarchy for public key infrastructure in an ad-hoc network
WO2010127684A1 (en) * 2009-05-05 2010-11-11 Nokia Siemens Networks Oy Topology based fast secured access
CN101883115A (en) * 2010-06-25 2010-11-10 北京交通大学 Access authentication method and system thereof
US20120237033A1 (en) * 2011-03-16 2012-09-20 Yasuyuki Tanaka Node, a root node, and a computer readable medium
CN102612035A (en) * 2012-04-13 2012-07-25 北京工业大学 Energy-efficient identity authentication method in multi-level clustering wireless sensor network
CN103813324A (en) * 2012-11-07 2014-05-21 中国移动通信集团公司 Node signature method and mobile node access method of hierarchical MIPv6

Non-Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
LI,HX;YANG,YF;PANG,LJ: "An Efficient Autjentication Protocol with User Anonymity for Mobile Networks", 《IEEE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORKING CONFERENCE(WCNC)》 *
伍华凤，戴新发，陈鹏: "一种层次化移动IP接入认证机制", 《计算机工程》 *

Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN109639426A (en) * 2019-02-26 2019-04-16 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 Bidirectional self-authentication method based on identification password
CN109639426B (en) * 2019-02-26 2022-03-01 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 Bidirectional self-authentication method based on identification password
CN112822214A (en) * 2021-02-09 2021-05-18 广州慧睿思通科技股份有限公司 Network attack defense method, device, system, storage medium and electronic equipment
CN113364807A (en) * 2021-06-30 2021-09-07 四川更元科技有限公司 Network node credibility authentication implementation method
CN114070568A (en) * 2021-11-04 2022-02-18 北京百度网讯科技有限公司 Data processing method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN104468585B (en) 2017-10-24

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
CN110138538B (en) Smart grid security and privacy protection data aggregation method based on fog calculation
US11432150B2 (en) Method and apparatus for authenticating network access of terminal
CN105873031B (en) Distributed unmanned plane cryptographic key negotiation method based on credible platform
CN102983965A (en) Transformer substation quantum communication model, quantum secret key distribution center and model achieving method
Wang et al. A secure and efficient multiserver authentication and key agreement protocol for internet of vehicles
CN102752269A (en) Cloud computing-based method and system for identity authentication and cloud server
CN105577377A (en) Identity-based authentication method and identity-based authentication system with secret key negotiation
CN107094156A (en) A kind of safety communicating method and system based on P2P patterns
WO2021103772A1 (en) Data transmission method and apparatus
CN104468585A (en) Proxy-based user equipment trusted access authentication method
Premarathne et al. Secure and reliable surveillance over cognitive radio sensor networks in smart grid
Wazid et al. TACAS-IoT: trust aggregation certificate-based authentication Scheme for edge-enabled IoT systems
Tanveer et al. Towards a secure and computational framework for internet of drones enabled aerial computing
Li et al. Efficient and fault‐diagnosable authentication architecture for AMI in smart grid
Hussain et al. A security mechanism for IEEE C37. 118.2 PMU communication
CN108390866A (en) Trusted remote method of proof based on the two-way anonymous authentication of dual-proxy
US8954728B1 (en) Generation of exfiltration-resilient cryptographic keys
Lu et al. Modeling and verification of IEEE 802.11 i security protocol in UPPAAL for Internet of Things
Sani et al. SPrivAD: A secure and privacy-preserving mutually dependent authentication and data access scheme for smart communities
Dwivedi et al. Design of blockchain and ecc-based robust and efficient batch authentication protocol for vehicular ad-hoc networks
CN101888383B (en) Method for implementing extensible trusted SSH
CN115242412B (en) Certificateless aggregation signature method and electronic equipment
CN108601024B (en) A kind of Lightweight Identify Authentication and platform identify appraisal procedure
Patil et al. A Secure and Efficient Identity based Proxy Signcryption Scheme for Smart Grid Network.
CN114615006A (en) Edge layer data security protection method and system for power distribution Internet of things and storage medium

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
C06 Publication
PB01 Publication
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
GR01 Patent grant
GR01 Patent grant