CN104363092A - Fixed-range device authentication based on audio physical fingerprints - Google Patents
Fixed-range device authentication based on audio physical fingerprints Download PDFInfo
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- CN104363092A CN104363092A CN201410500058.2A CN201410500058A CN104363092A CN 104363092 A CN104363092 A CN 104363092A CN 201410500058 A CN201410500058 A CN 201410500058A CN 104363092 A CN104363092 A CN 104363092A
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Abstract
The invention discloses fixed-range device authentication based on audio physical fingerprints and particularly discloses a fixed-range device authentication protocol based on wireless device audio hardware (a loudspeaker and a microphone) physical fingerprints. According to the protocol, after audio handshake of both sides for authentication, firstly, mixed-frequency audio signals are generated at a transmitting end, and the transmitting end transmits the mixed-frequency audio signals to a receiving end by the aid of the loudspeaker; secondly, the receiving end receives the mixed-frequency audio signals by the aid of the microphone and extracts physical fingerprints; finally, the receiving end makes matching analysis on the collected fingerprints and fingerprints in a fingerprint database by the aid of a fingerprint matching algorithm based on bias ratio. The designed authentication protocol has the advantages of high efficiency, low energy consumption, simplicity and convenience in operation, high transportability and the like.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to wireless security field, more specifically say, relate to the device authentication based on audio hardware physical fingerprint under certification distance rigid condition.
Background technology
In recent years, researcher finds to utilize the physical message of wireless network can realize various certification.This authentication method has a wide range of applications scene, such as information anti-fake, the attack detecting of identity-based, access control, fault detect, and target tracking etc.According to the difference of the physical message utilized, the method can be divided into: based on the certification of software fingerprinting; Based on the certification of channel or location fingerprint; Based on the certification of hardware fingerprint.
Certification based on software fingerprinting is that the inherent characteristic utilizing software or agreement to run on equipment carries out certification.Modal is utilize medium access control (MAC) agreement of IEEE 802.11 standard to carry out device authentication.Its principle comprises: due to the huge and specification of complexity of this agreement, the implementation of usually different equipment manufacturers and Driver Development personnel is different; Due to chipset, the various combination of firmware and device driver, therefore, each device body reveals the behavior of different MAC layer.But the shortcoming based on software fingerprinting comprises: well can not distinguish the different physical equipments using identical software; Opponent by the behavior of observational learning to validated user, and can imitate the behavior of validated user by the device driver changing self.
Certification based on wireless channel or location fingerprint is realized by the position feature of path loss (Path Loss) and channel fading (Channel Fading).The physical quantity of reaction radio channel characteristic comprises the signal strength signal intensity (Received Signal Strength, RSS) of channel situation information (Channel State Information, CSI) and reception.Wherein, CSI is the fine-grained description of channel characteristics, and RSS is the description of channel characteristics coarseness.Because under existing hardware, the measurement of CSI is more difficult, therefore cannot well promote based on the authentication method of CSI.Existing wireless device can obtain RSS value easily, but due to RSS accurate not to the description of channel, be therefore easily subject to pretending to be attack.In a word, the existing authentication protocol based on wireless channel or location fingerprint or have special requirement to hardware, or there are security breaches.
Consider the commercialization day by day of voice communication (comprising the near-field communication based on audio frequency), and existing wireless device is mostly equipped with the audio hardware such as micro-phone transducer, the present invention devises a device authentication agreement based on audio hardware physical fingerprint under certification is apart from fixing condition.This agreement utilizes wireless device microphone and loud speaker to the physics nonclonability of frequency response, by extracting audio radio-frequency microphone and loud speaker to the frequency response of different frequency as physical fingerprint, this agreement can be widely used in the authentication of the various equipment with audio hardware under the fixing condition of certification distance.
Summary of the invention
The object of the invention is to the safety issue overcoming the existing equipment identities certification based on cryptography method.Meanwhile, the existing equipment identities based on physical layer of device fingerprint is eliminated to the rigors of hardware.
To achieve these goals, the present invention is based on the set a distance device authentication of audio hardware physical fingerprint, it is characterized in that, comprising: mixed audio signals generates and sending module, carry out learning for equipment and certification time audio signal generation; Audio frequency apparatus physical fingerprint extraction module, for extracting frequency domain character at receiving terminal to mixed frequency signal preliminary treatment; An audio physical fingerprint matching module, for mating with the data in fingerprint base the audio-frequency fingerprint obtained when device authentication.
Accompanying drawing explanation
In order to be illustrated more clearly in the technical scheme in the embodiment of the present invention, below the accompanying drawing used required in describing embodiment is briefly described, apparently, accompanying drawing in the following describes is only some embodiments of the present invention, for those of ordinary skill in the art, under the prerequisite not paying creative work, other accompanying drawing can also be obtained according to these accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 is identifying procedure figure of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is the protocol frame figure proposed in the present invention.
Embodiment
The invention process provides a kind of set a distance equipment identities authentication protocol based on audio hardware physical fingerprint.For making goal of the invention of the present invention, feature, advantage can be more obvious and understandable, below in conjunction with the accompanying drawing in the embodiment of the present invention, certificate scheme in the embodiment of the present invention is clearly and completely described, obviously, described example is only that major part of the present invention does not contain all details.
Fig. 1 is the identifying procedure figure of this agreement.
The method authentication framework is as follows: first the promoter Alice (brief note A) of certification is shaken hands by audio frequency with authenticator Bob (referred to as B) and connect; Secondly, A produces a section audio mixed frequency signal, and is sent to B by loud speaker; Again, after B utilizes microphone to receive audio signal, extract the audio frequency apparatus physical fingerprint of A and B; Finally, under mode of learning, the physical fingerprint of acquisition associates with the ID of A and stores by B; Under certification mode, the fingerprint of the A that the fingerprint collected stores with this locality is done to mate by B, if the match is successful, by certification, otherwise, authentification failure.
Fig. 2 is the protocol frame figure of this agreement.Wherein the step that performs of transmitting terminal and receiving terminal is as follows.
Transmitting terminal: (1) connects, obtains receiving terminal ID; (2) mixed frequency signal is produced; (3) signal is sent.
Receiving terminal: (1) connects, sends the machine ID, obtains the other side ID; (2) Received signal strength; (3) FFT conversion and logarithm process are carried out to the signal received; (4) judge it is study or certification.If certification, jump to step 5, if study then preserves learning files; (5) read the finger print data of transmit leg in fingerprint base, calculate bias ratio; (6) bias ratio and threshold value are compared, judge whether authentication success.
Below each module instance in agreement is set forth.
Mixed audio signals generates and sending module: in order to get rid of the interference of ambient noise, and improve authentication efficiency, the source signal adopted here is by the frequency compounding of 4000Hz-20000Hz frequency range (taking 400Hz as step-length) together, that is:
Wherein Sound (A) is mixed frequency signal, sin (β
i) for frequency be the sinusoidal simple signal of 4000+ Δ * (i-1), β
i=2* π * (4000+ Δ * (i-1)) * T.It should be noted that and get Δ=400Hz, n=41 in systems in practice, sending duration is T=2 second, and it is identical with the volume sent under certification mode to be defined in mode of learning.
Audio-frequency fingerprint extracts and matching module:
1. utilize FFT the audio signal of time domain to be converted to audio signal in frequency, and amplitude is done to the numerical value process of 20log (), as the audio-frequency fingerprint that this obtains, referred to as: O
a=(ξ
1..., ξ
n);
2., under mode of learning, this fingerprint is associated with the ID of A by B, and by sample fingerprint stored in fingerprint base;
3., under certification mode, B recalls the sample fingerprint be associated with the ID of A from fingerprint base, and this sample fingerprint is designated as: O '
a=(ξ '
1..., ξ '
n), and call the matching algorithm DR-MA based on deviation ratio, if DR-MA is (Γ, Δ, O
a, O '
aitem the match is successful in)=1; Otherwise, authentification failure.
Wherein, DR-MA algorithm is as follows: set two threshold value Γ and Δ (in systems in practice, getting Γ=8, Δ=0.5).Initialization S=0; T=0, for each i (i=1 ..., n), do following circulation: if | ξ
i-ξ '
i|≤Γ, then S=S+1; Otherwise, T=T+1; I=i+1; Circulation terminates.Finally, bias ratio is calculated: DR (O
a, O '
a)=T/S.If DR is (O
a, O '
a)≤Δ, then export 1; Otherwise, export 0.
The set a distance certification of inventing based on audio frequency apparatus physical fingerprint has following characteristics:
1) frequency mixing technique is utilized to produce mixed audio signals;
2) audio signal is converted to frequency-region signal extracts physical fingerprint;
3) the DR-MA algorithm based on side-play amount is proposed.
Above the equipment identities certification that the present invention is based on audio physical fingerprint is described in detail.In the present invention, concrete elaboration is done to the agreement proposed in invention; Based on the authentication protocol proposed in the present invention, those of ordinary skill in the art, not making the every other equipment identities authentication method based on audio physical fingerprint obtained under creative work prerequisite, belong to the scope of protection of the invention.
Claims (8)
1. the device authentication agreement based on audio hardware (loudspeaker and microphone) physical fingerprint under spacing condition, its feature comprises: first the promoter Alice (brief note A) of certification is shaken hands by audio frequency with authenticator Bob (referred to as B) and connect; Secondly, A produces one section of mixed audio signals by mixing schemes, and is sent to B by loud speaker; Again, after B receives mixed frequency signal, extract the physical fingerprint of A and B audio hardware; Finally, under mode of learning: the physical fingerprint of acquisition associates with the ID of A and stores by B; Under certification mode: the fingerprint of the A that the fingerprint collected stores with this locality is done to mate by B, if the match is successful, by certification, otherwise, authentification failure.
2. the promoter A of application claims certification and authenticator B remains unchanged in the distance of mode of learning and certification mode.
3. the generation method of mixed audio signals.
4. the method adopts 41 frequency compounding of 4000Hz-20000Hz frequency range (taking 400Hz as step-length) together, works out the audio signal for sending.
5. physical fingerprint feature extracting method.
6. the method does FFT process to audio signal, then does 20log () amplification process doubly to the frequency-region signal obtained, and obtains physical fingerprint data.
7. based on the matching algorithm DR-MA of deviation ratio.
8. first this algorithm calculates the bias ratio of fingerprint in the fingerprint and fingerprint base that authentication phase obtains, when bias ratio is less than certain threshold value, at authentication success; Otherwise, authentification failure.
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Cited By (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN107872429A (en) * | 2016-09-26 | 2018-04-03 | 中国电信股份有限公司 | The method and system that identity is examined is realized in VXLAN |
CN108510999A (en) * | 2018-02-09 | 2018-09-07 | 杭州默安科技有限公司 | The zero permission terminal device recognition methods based on audio-frequency fingerprint |
CN109861991A (en) * | 2019-01-11 | 2019-06-07 | 浙江大学 | A kind of device-fingerprint extracting method based on microphone nonlinear characteristic |
Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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CN102263643A (en) * | 2011-08-22 | 2011-11-30 | 盛乐信息技术(上海)有限公司 | Data communication system and method based on voiceprint recognition |
US20120308092A1 (en) * | 2004-04-16 | 2012-12-06 | Fred George Benkley | Method and apparatus for fingerprint image reconstruction |
CN103886169A (en) * | 2012-12-19 | 2014-06-25 | 电子科技大学 | Link prediction algorithm based on AdaBoost |
-
2014
- 2014-09-25 CN CN201410500058.2A patent/CN104363092B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20120308092A1 (en) * | 2004-04-16 | 2012-12-06 | Fred George Benkley | Method and apparatus for fingerprint image reconstruction |
CN102263643A (en) * | 2011-08-22 | 2011-11-30 | 盛乐信息技术(上海)有限公司 | Data communication system and method based on voiceprint recognition |
CN103886169A (en) * | 2012-12-19 | 2014-06-25 | 电子科技大学 | Link prediction algorithm based on AdaBoost |
Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN107872429A (en) * | 2016-09-26 | 2018-04-03 | 中国电信股份有限公司 | The method and system that identity is examined is realized in VXLAN |
CN108510999A (en) * | 2018-02-09 | 2018-09-07 | 杭州默安科技有限公司 | The zero permission terminal device recognition methods based on audio-frequency fingerprint |
CN108510999B (en) * | 2018-02-09 | 2020-07-14 | 杭州默安科技有限公司 | Zero-authority terminal equipment identification method based on audio fingerprints |
CN109861991A (en) * | 2019-01-11 | 2019-06-07 | 浙江大学 | A kind of device-fingerprint extracting method based on microphone nonlinear characteristic |
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