CN104143996A - Radio communication devices and methods for controlling a radio communication device - Google Patents
Radio communication devices and methods for controlling a radio communication device Download PDFInfo
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- CN104143996A CN104143996A CN201410194258.XA CN201410194258A CN104143996A CN 104143996 A CN104143996 A CN 104143996A CN 201410194258 A CN201410194258 A CN 201410194258A CN 104143996 A CN104143996 A CN 104143996A
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 44
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- 230000011664 signaling Effects 0.000 claims description 8
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 claims description 5
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 11
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 8
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 6
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 5
- 241001269238 Data Species 0.000 description 3
- 230000008878 coupling Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000010168 coupling process Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000005859 coupling reaction Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 2
- VCGRFBXVSFAGGA-UHFFFAOYSA-N (1,1-dioxo-1,4-thiazinan-4-yl)-[6-[[3-(4-fluorophenyl)-5-methyl-1,2-oxazol-4-yl]methoxy]pyridin-3-yl]methanone Chemical compound CC=1ON=C(C=2C=CC(F)=CC=2)C=1COC(N=C1)=CC=C1C(=O)N1CCS(=O)(=O)CC1 VCGRFBXVSFAGGA-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
- KVCQTKNUUQOELD-UHFFFAOYSA-N 4-amino-n-[1-(3-chloro-2-fluoroanilino)-6-methylisoquinolin-5-yl]thieno[3,2-d]pyrimidine-7-carboxamide Chemical compound N=1C=CC2=C(NC(=O)C=3C4=NC=NC(N)=C4SC=3)C(C)=CC=C2C=1NC1=CC=CC(Cl)=C1F KVCQTKNUUQOELD-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/72—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
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- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Mathematical Physics (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Telephone Function (AREA)
Abstract
The invention relates to radio communication devices and methods for controlling a radio communication device. A radio communication device is described comprising: a transceiver circuit configured to communicate wirelessly with another device; a tamper-proof circuit connected to the transceiver circuit; and a processor connected to the tamper-proof circuit and configured to exchange data with the transceiver circuit via the tamper-proof circuit.
Description
the cross reference of related application
The application requires in the rights and interests of the U.S. Provisional Patent Application 61/821,428 of submission on May 9th, 2013, and its full content is incorporated herein by reference for all objects.
Technical field
The disclosure relates generally to radio communications set and for controlling the method for radio communications set.
Background technology
NFC(near-field communication) in mobile device, just obtaining widely approval and therefore, NFC wireless device is included in increasing consumer devices, such as but not limited to smart phone, panel computer and super.Thereby, can there are the needs for anti-tamper NFC reader.
Accompanying drawing explanation
In the drawings, in whole different views, similarly reference symbol refers generally to identical parts.Figure not necessarily draws in proportion, and emphasis is generally placed in explanation principle of the present disclosure on the contrary.In the following description, various aspects are described with reference to following figure, wherein:
Fig. 1 illustrates exemplary NFC(near-field communication) framework.
Fig. 2 illustrates according to the radio communications set of the various aspects of the disclosure.
Fig. 3 illustrates flow chart, and its diagram is used for controlling the method for radio communications set according to the various aspects of the disclosure.
Fig. 4 illustrates the anti-tamper NFC framework according to the various aspects of the disclosure.
Embodiment
Following detailed description, it illustrates specific detail and the aspect that wherein can put into practice the disclosure of the present invention by illustrated mode.Can utilize other aspects, and can make structure, logic and electric change and not depart from scope of the present invention.Because new aspect can be combined to form with one or more other aspects of the disclosure in some aspects of the disclosure, the various aspects of the disclosure are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Term " coupling " or " connection " regulation are for comprising respectively directly " coupling " or directly " connection " and " coupling " or indirectly " connection " indirectly.
Word " exemplary " is in this article for representing the meaning of " serving as example, example or explanation ".Herein, being described as the disclosure of " exemplary " or any aspect of design is not necessarily interpreted as than other aspects of the disclosure or design more preferably or more favourable.
Radio communications set can comprise memory, and it can for example use in the processing of being implemented by radio communications set.Memory can be: volatile memory, for example DRAM(dynamic random access memory); Or nonvolatile memory, for example PROM(programmable read only memory), the erasable PROM of EPROM(), EEPROM(electric erasable PROM); Or flash memory, for example floating-gate memory, charge capturing memory, MRAM(magnetoresistive RAM) or PCRAM(phase change random access memory devices).
As used herein, " circuit " (it also can be described as parts) can be regarded as the logic realization entity of any kind, and it can be the processor that special circuit or execution are stored in software, firmware or its any combination in memory.In addition, " circuit " can be hard-wired logic or such as Programmable Logic Device such as programmable processors, for example microprocessor (for example complex instruction set computer (CISC) (CISC) processor or Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) processor)." circuit " can also be executive software (such as the computer program of any kind, such as example as the computer program of the virtual machine codes such as Java) processor.By below in greater detail the realization of any other kind of corresponding function also can be regarded as " circuit ".Also can understand the circuit of any two (or more) one-tenth capable of being combined in the circuit of description.
The description of generator, and the description of supplying method.The fundamental property of understanding these devices is also applicable to these methods, and vice versa.Therefore, for simplicity, can omit being repeated in this description of such character.
Any character that understanding is described specific device is herein also applicable to any device described herein.Any character that understanding is described ad hoc approach is herein also applicable to any method described herein.
NFC(near-field communication) in mobile device, just obtaining widely approval and therefore, NFC wireless device is included in increasing consumer devices, such as but not limited to smart phone, panel computer and super.NFC technology is very flexibly and has the ability for countless objects.Many in service condition are for convenience (just making useful or interesting thing occur as long as click) and do not need high level of security.Yet many service conditions need high level of security really, especially when the value of the information association that exists and become available by NFC interface.For example: non-contact credit card, contactless identity card, contactless access card (physics and logic) can comprise the information that can be utilized by fraudulent mean by malice third party.The method addressing this problem (it has been common method) is the NFC terminal equipment with special high safety, its guarantee information when for example, accessing from NFC label, contactless card or NFC device (, smart phone) by safe handling (and never being revealed).Yet the method is because terminal is special and special purpose device but costliness.Because consumer devices expands their ability year in year out, there is at present the possibility that regulates the machine NFC ability of NFC device to replace special terminal, but being consumer devices, problem is not designed to high safety the same as special terminal.
In data, directly send to application processor (wherein malice SW(software) and can tackle it) time, some in usual means do not provide any protection to sensitive data.Preferably technical scheme is in application processor, to use credible execution environment (TEE) to protect it when entering application processor environment at sensitive data, but TEE is not anti-tamper.Finally, the NFC controller firmware version that some other technologies schemes rely on NFC controller itself and operation to revise is managed sensitive data, but again, NFC controller is not anti-tamper.
Fig. 1 illustrates exemplary NFC framework 100.The in the situation that of this exemplary architecture, it is centered by NFC controller (NFCC) 102, and this is obvious.NFC controller 102 is centers of Star topology, wherein Apps(application) processor 106(connects 114 via I2C) and safety element (SE; For example adopt eSE(embedded-type security element) 110 and/or UICC(Universal Integrated Circuit Card) 112 form) both are directly connected to NFCC 102(for example via SWP(single-wire-protocol) connect 118 or 122).This is that sensitive data need to be adopted and protects by some way in order to avoid when data for example, receive by non-contact interface (using antenna 104), at NFCC 102 places or by credible execution environment (TEE), at AP 106 places, be subject on application processor (AP) 106 reason of impact of the potential malice SW of operation.As described herein, the inferior position of these methods is that they do not provide anti-tampering protection and so satisfied safety requirements for extremely sensitive data processing service condition of those technical schemes.
In addition, as illustrated in fig. 1, AP 106 can be connected to modulator-demodulator 108, for example, via between HSIC(high-speed chip) connect 116.Modulator-demodulator 108 can be connected to UICC via ISO 7816 connections 120.
According to the various aspects of the disclosure, can for example, by creating anti-tamper subsystem in the device of NFC ability (, smart phone, panel computer, super, etc.) and provide having to the technical scheme of above-mentioned problem.Typical NFC subsystem can have so needed parts of environment of establishment but their current mutual modes need to change.
Fig. 2 illustrates the radio communications set 200 according to the various aspects of the disclosure.This radio communications set 200 can comprise transceiver circuit 202, and it is configured to and another device (not shown) radio communication.Radio communications set 200 can comprise tamperproof circuit 204, and it is connected to transceiver circuit 202.Radio communications set 200 can further comprise processor 206, CPU for example, and it is connected to tamperproof circuit 204 and is configured to via tamperproof circuit 204 and transceiver circuit 202 swap datas.Transceiver circuit 202 can be for example via being for example connected 208(with tamperproof circuit 204, and light connects or is electrically connected to, for example cable or computer bus) or coupled to each otherly via any other applicable electrical connection carry out switching telecommunication number.Tamperproof circuit 204 can be for example via being for example connected 210(with processor 206, and light connects or is electrically connected to, for example cable or computer bus) or coupled to each otherly via any other applicable electrical connection carry out switching telecommunication number.
That is to say, processor 206 can be configured to specially via tamperproof circuit 204 and transceiver circuit 202 swap datas (secure data for example; All data for example).That is to say all routes via tamperproof circuit 204 of communicating by letter between transceiver circuit 202 and processor 206.That is to say, the direct communication of may having no idea of transceiver circuit 202 and processor 206, but carry out all communication via tamperproof circuit 204.That is to say do not have (directly) physical data to be connected between transceiver circuit 202 and processor 206.
Processor 206 can be in the situation that not having direct physical signaling between processor 206 and transceiver circuit 202 and transceiver circuit 202 swap datas.
Radio communications set 200 can further comprise the first interface (for example, for being connected 208) between transceiver circuit 202 and tamperproof circuit 204.
First interface can comprise it can being maybe single-wire-protocol interface.
Radio communications set 200 can further comprise the second interface (for example, for being connected 210) between tamperproof circuit 204 and processor 206.
The second interface can comprise it can being maybe serial peripheral interface.
Radio communication can not have the interface between transceiver circuit 202 and processor 206.
Tamperproof circuit 204 is deal with data safely.
Tamperproof circuit 204 can comprise it can being maybe safety element.
Radio communications set 200 can further comprise safety element, it comprise (or) tamperproof circuit 204.
Tamperproof circuit 204 can comprise it can being maybe embedded-type security element.
Radio communications set 200 can further comprise embedded-type security element, it comprise (or) tamperproof circuit 204.
Tamperproof circuit 204 can comprise it can being maybe subscriber identity module.
Radio communications set 200 can further comprise subscriber identity module, it comprise (or) tamperproof circuit 204.
Tamperproof circuit 204 can comprise it can being maybe Universal Integrated Circuit Card.
Radio communications set 200 can further comprise Universal Integrated Circuit Card, it comprise (or) tamperproof circuit 204.
Transceiver circuit 202 can comprise it can being maybe near-field communication controller.
Radio communications set 200 can further comprise near-field communication controller, it comprise (or) transceiver circuit 202.
Processor 204 can comprise it can being maybe application processor.
Radio communications set 200 can further comprise application processor, it comprise (or) processor 204.
Radio communications set 200 can be contactless card (maybe can be included in wherein).
Radio communications set 200 can be non-contact credit card (maybe can be included in wherein).
Radio communications set 200 can be NFC label (maybe can be included in wherein).
Radio communications set 200 can be NFC device (maybe can be included in wherein).
Radio communications set 200 can be the transfer point (maybe can be included in wherein) of point-of-sale terminal.
Radio communications set 200 can be payment processes device (maybe can be included in wherein).
Radio communications set 200 can be NFC reader (maybe can be included in wherein).
Fig. 3 illustrates flow chart 300, and its diagram is used for controlling the method for radio communications set according to the various aspects of the disclosure.The method can comprise that (as diagram in 302) provides transceiver circuit and another device wireless transmission data.The method can comprise that (as diagram in 304) makes processor (for example CPU) be coupled in tamperproof circuit, and (as diagram in 306) makes this tamperproof circuit be coupled in transceiver circuit.In 308, radio communications set can be via tamperproof circuit swap data between processor and transceiver circuit.
Processor can be in the situation that do not have the direct physical signaling and transceiver circuit swap data between processor and transceiver circuit.
Radio communications set can comprise the first interface between transceiver circuit and tamperproof circuit.
First interface can comprise it can being maybe single-wire-protocol interface.
Radio communications set can comprise the second interface between tamperproof circuit and processor.
The second interface can comprise it can being maybe serial peripheral interface.
Radio communications set can not have the interface between transceiver circuit and processor.
Tamperproof circuit is deal with data safely.
Tamperproof circuit can comprise it can being maybe safety element.
Radio communications set can comprise safety element, it comprise (or) tamperproof circuit.
Tamperproof circuit can comprise it can being maybe embedded-type security element.
Radio communications set can comprise embedded-type security element, it comprise (or) tamperproof circuit.
Tamperproof circuit can comprise it can being maybe subscriber identity module.
Radio communications set can comprise subscriber identity module, it comprise (or) tamperproof circuit.
Tamperproof circuit can comprise it can being maybe Universal Integrated Circuit Card.
Radio communications set can comprise Universal Integrated Circuit Card, it comprise (or) tamperproof circuit.
Transceiver circuit can comprise it can being maybe near-field communication controller.
Radio communications set can comprise near-field communication, it comprise (or) transceiver circuit.
Processor can comprise it can being maybe application processor.
Radio communications set can comprise application processor, it comprise (or) processor.
Radio communications set can be contactless card (maybe can be included in wherein).
Radio communications set can be non-contact credit card (maybe can be included in wherein).
Radio communications set can be NFC label (maybe can be included in wherein).
Radio communications set can be NFC device (maybe can be included in wherein).
Radio communications set can be the transfer point (maybe can be included in wherein) of point-of-sale terminal.
Radio communications set can be payment processes device (maybe can be included in wherein).
Radio communications set can be NFC reader (maybe can be included in wherein).
According to the radio communications set of the various aspects of the disclosure, can be for example anti-tamper NFC reader (or can for example be included in wherein).
Fig. 4 illustrates the anti-tamper NFC framework 400 according to the various aspects of the disclosure.The various parts of framework 400 shown in Figure 4 can be similar or identical with the part of framework 100 shown in Figure 1, the description that makes to use identical label and can omit repetition.
Anti-tamper parts (for example, safety element) 110 that can be based in framework center according to the device of the various aspects of the disclosure.In framework at this centered by anti-tamper, by removing data path between NFC controller 102 and application processor 106 (as 404 indicating by intersecting), NFC controller 102 and application processor 106(or host CPU)
physics (as with virtual relative) isolation.On the contrary, application processor 106 is connected to anti-tamper parts 110(for example via SPI(serial peripheral interface) connect 402) and anti-tamper parts (for example embedded-type security element (eSE) 110) and then be connected to NFC controller 118.Like this, the extremely sensitive data that receive by NFC interface directly and specially send to anti-tamper parts (for example eSE 110), the SW(software that wherein it can at any time not made such sensitive data directly be exposed to application processor 106 and move on it by safe handling) (it can be compromised and/or be maliciously).
According to the apparatus and method of the various aspects of the disclosure, provide because of their anti-tampering protection than the better technical scheme of common technology scheme.
According to the apparatus and method of the various aspects of the disclosure, provide NFC subsystem component how to interconnect to create the mode of NFC tamper-resistant environment.
In the framework aspect the disclosure various, anti-tamper parts be SE(for example, eSE or UICC) and insert between AP and NFCC, make any extremely sensitive data that receive by non-contact interface directly and be specially delivered to SE for safe handling.Because do not have direct physical to be connected between AP and NFCC, main frame SW(for example, Android, Windows etc.) can not access any in the sensitive data of SE outside.Because SW and HW(hardware) attack and all by SW and HW countermeasure, to alleviate; centralized anti-tampering protection can be so that this framework be sane, and wherein these SW and HW countermeasure can formally be assessed and guaranteed and be suitable for the high safety use case within payment industry (carry out and receive payment), mobile reservation management, Identity Management, strong authentication etc. by EMVco and/or sharing criterion standard schedule.
Although notice that current safety element is the anti-tamper framework of setting up piece, this idea is unknowable for the realization of anti-tamper parts.For example, anti-tampering protection can be integrated into SOC(system on chip) in chip technology, replace thus discrete SE now to be conducive to integrated technology scheme.
When the interface between application processor (host CPU) and NFC controller can be removed as described in framework in Fig. 4, SOC can have the direct connection to safety element.Can provide code (for example, as the small routine moving on safety element and as the middleware and the application code that move on application processor) to carry out the NFC reader mode of application safety.
In aspect the disclosure, can supplying method and device NFC interface in anti-tamper subsystem is for example isolated, with from outside NFC entity (, contactless (credit) card, NFC label, NFC device, sell transfer point (mPOS), payment processes device, secure NFC reader) read and process the extremely sensitive data from wherein, this outside NFC entity can provide tamper-resistant environment.
NFC controller and secure element chip can adopt embedded-type security element, UICC or SIM(subscriber identity module) card or the form of SD card provide.
In aspect the disclosure, for the equipment of radio communication, can comprise: near-field communication (NFC) module; Be connected to NFC module for receive safety element (SE) module of the first data from NFC module; Be connected to SE module for receive application processor (AP) module of the second data from SE module; Wherein AP module does not have the ability of the first data in access NFC module.
In aspect the disclosure, method can comprise: wireless receiving the first data are in near-field communication (NFC) module; By this first data transmission in safety element (SE) module; The first data in SE module are carried out to safety function and produce the second data; And this second transfer of data is arrived to application processor (AP) module.
In aspect the disclosure, computer-readable recording medium can comprise instruction, and it causes carrying out method described above when being carried out by one or more processors.
Following example is about other embodiment.
Example 1 is radio communications set, and it comprises: transceiver circuit, and it is configured to and another device wireless communication; Tamperproof circuit, it is coupled in this transceiver circuit; And processor, it is coupled in this tamperproof circuit and is configured to via tamperproof circuit and transceiver circuit swap data.
In example 2, the purport of example 1 can comprise alternatively: processor is configured in the situation that there is no the direct physical signaling and transceiver circuit swap data between processor and transceiver circuit.
In example 3, example 1 or 2 purport can comprise alternatively: processor is configured to specially via tamperproof circuit and transceiver circuit swap data.
In example 4, the purport of any in example 1 to 3 can comprise the first interface between transceiver circuit and tamperproof circuit alternatively.
In example 5, the purport of any in example 1 to 4 can comprise alternatively: first interface comprises single-wire-protocol interface.
In example 6, the purport of any in example 1 to 5 can comprise alternatively: the second interface between tamperproof circuit and processor.
In example 7, the purport of example 6 can comprise alternatively: the second interface comprises serial peripheral interface.
In example 8, the purport of any in example 1 to 7 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set does not have the interface between transceiver circuit and processor.
In example 9, the purport of any in example 1 to 8 can comprise alternatively: tamperproof circuit is configured to deal with data safely.
In example 10, the purport of any in example 1 to 9 can comprise alternatively: tamperproof circuit comprises safety element.
In example 11, the purport of any in example 1 to 10 can comprise safety element alternatively, and it comprises tamperproof circuit.
In example 12, the purport of any in example 1 to 11 can comprise alternatively: tamperproof circuit comprises embedded-type security element.
In example 13, the purport of any in example 1 to 12 can comprise alternatively: embedded-type security element, it comprises tamperproof circuit.
In example 14, the purport of any in example 1 to 13 can comprise alternatively: tamperproof circuit comprises subscriber identity module.
In example 15, the purport of any in example 1 to 14 can comprise alternatively: subscriber identity module, it comprises tamperproof circuit.
In example 16, the purport of any in example 1 to 15 can comprise alternatively: tamperproof circuit comprises Universal Integrated Circuit Card.
In example 17, the purport of any in example 1 to 16 can comprise alternatively: Universal Integrated Circuit Card, it comprises tamperproof circuit.
In example 18, the purport of any in example 1 to 17 can comprise alternatively: transceiver circuit comprises near-field communication controller.
In example 19, the purport of any in example 1 to 18 can comprise alternatively: near-field communication controller, it comprises transceiver circuit.
In example 20, the purport of any in example 1 to 19 can comprise alternatively: processor comprises CPU.
In example 21, the purport of any in example 1 to 20 can comprise alternatively: CPU, it comprises processor.
In example 22, the purport of any in example 1 to 21 can comprise alternatively: processor comprises application processor.
In example 23, the purport of any in example 1 to 22 can comprise alternatively: application processor, it comprises processor.
In example 24, the purport of any in example 1 to 23 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is contactless card.
In example 25, the purport of any in example 1 to 24 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is non-contact credit card.
In example 26, the purport of any in example 1 to 25 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is NFC label.
In example 27, the purport of any in example 1 to 26 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is NFC device.
In example 28, the purport of any in example 1 to 27 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is the transfer point of point-of-sale terminal.
In example 29, the purport of any in example 1 to 28 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is payment processes device.
In example 30, the purport of any in example 1 to 29 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is NFC reader.
Example 31 is that the method comprises for controlling the method for radio communications set: transceiver circuit and another device wireless transmission data are provided; Make processor be coupled in anti-tamper parts; Make these anti-tamper parts be coupled in transceiver circuit; And via tamperproof circuit swap data between processor and transceiver circuit.
In example 32, the purport of example 31 can comprise alternatively: processor in the situation that there is no processor and transceiver circuit between direct physical signaling and transceiver circuit swap data.
In example 33, example 31 or 32 purport can comprise alternatively: processor specially via tamperproof circuit with transceiver circuit swap data.
In example 34, the purport of any in example 31 to 33 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set comprises the first interface between transceiver circuit and tamperproof circuit.
In example 35, the purport of example 34 can comprise alternatively: first interface comprises single-wire-protocol interface.
In example 36, the purport of any in example 31 to 35 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set comprises the second interface between tamperproof circuit and processor.
In example 37, the purport of example 36 can comprise alternatively: the second interface comprises serial peripheral interface.
In example 38, the purport of any in example 31 to 37 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set does not have the interface between transceiver circuit and processor.
In example 39, the purport of any in example 31 to 38 can comprise alternatively: tamperproof circuit is deal with data safely.
In example 40, the purport of any in example 31 to 39 can comprise alternatively: tamperproof circuit comprises safety element.
In example 41, the purport of any in example 31 to 40 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set comprises safety element, and it comprises tamperproof circuit.
In example 42, the purport of any in example 31 to 41 can comprise alternatively: tamperproof circuit comprises embedded-type security element.
In example 43, the purport of any in example 31 to 42 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set comprises embedded-type security element, and it comprises tamperproof circuit.
In example 44, the purport of any in example 31 to 43 can comprise alternatively: tamperproof circuit comprises subscriber identity module.
In example 45, the purport of any in example 31 to 44 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set comprises subscriber identity module, and it comprises tamperproof circuit.
In example 46, the purport of any in example 31 to 45 can comprise alternatively: tamperproof circuit comprises Universal Integrated Circuit Card.
In example 47, the purport of any in example 31 to 46 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set comprises Universal Integrated Circuit Card, and it comprises tamperproof circuit.
In example 48, the purport of any in example 31 to 47 can comprise alternatively: transceiver circuit comprises near-field communication controller.
In example 49, the purport of any in example 31 to 48 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set can comprise near-field communication controller, and it comprises transceiver circuit.
In example 50, the purport of any in example 31 to 49 can comprise alternatively: processor comprises CPU.
In example 51, the purport of any in example 31 to 50 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set comprises CPU, and it comprises processor.
In example 52, the purport of any in example 31 to 51 can comprise alternatively: processor comprises application processor.
In example 53, the purport of any in example 31 to 52 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set comprises application processor, and it comprises processor.
In example 54, the purport of any in example 31 to 53 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is contactless card.
In example 55, the purport of any in example 31 to 54 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is non-contact credit card.
In example 56, the purport of any in example 31 to 55 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is NFC label.
In example 57, the purport of any in example 31 to 56 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is NFC device.
In example 58, the purport of any in example 31 to 57 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is the transfer point of point-of-sale terminal.
In example 59, the purport of any in example 31 to 58 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is payment processes device.
In example 60, the purport of any in example 31 to 59 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is NFC reader.
Example 61 is radio communications sets, and it comprises: transceiver components, for another device wireless communication; Anti-tamper parts, it is coupled in transceiver components; And processing unit, its be coupled in these anti-tamper parts and for via anti-tamper parts with transceiver components swap data.
In example 62, the purport of example 61 can comprise alternatively: processing unit is used in the situation that there is no the direct physical signaling and transceiver components swap data between processing unit and transceiver components.
In example 63, the purport of any in example 61 or 62 can comprise alternatively: processing unit for specially via anti-tamper parts with transceiver components swap data.
In example 64, the purport of any in example 61 to 63 can comprise alternatively: the first interface parts between transceiver components and anti-tamper parts.
In example 65, the purport of example 64 can comprise alternatively: first interface parts comprise single-wire-protocol interface.
In example 66, the purport of any in example 61 to 65 can comprise alternatively: the second interface unit between anti-tamper parts and processing unit.
In example 67, the purport of example 66 can comprise alternatively: the second interface unit comprises serial peripheral interface.
In example 68, the purport of any in example 61 to 67 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set does not have the interface unit between transceiver components and processing unit.
In example 69, the purport of any in example 61 to 68 can comprise alternatively: anti-tamper parts are used for deal with data safely.
In example 70, the purport of any in example 61 to 69 can comprise alternatively: anti-tamper parts comprise safety element.
In example 71, the purport of any in example 61 to 70 can comprise alternatively: safety element, it comprises anti-tamper parts.
In example 72, the purport of any in example 61 to 71 can comprise alternatively: anti-tamper parts comprise embedded-type security element.
In example 73, the purport of any in example 61 to 72 can comprise alternatively: embedded-type security element, it comprises anti-tamper parts.
In example 74, the purport of any in example 61 to 73 can comprise alternatively: anti-tamper parts comprise subscriber identity module.
In example 75, the purport of any in example 61 to 74 can comprise alternatively: subscriber identity module, it comprises anti-tamper parts.
In example 76, the purport of any in example 61 to 75 can comprise alternatively: anti-tamper parts comprise Universal Integrated Circuit Card.
In example 77, the purport of any in example 61 to 76 can comprise alternatively: Universal Integrated Circuit Card, it comprises anti-tamper parts.
In example 78, the purport of any in example 61 to 77 can comprise alternatively: transceiver components comprises near-field communication controller.
In example 79, the purport of any in example 61 to 78 can comprise alternatively: near-field communication controller, it comprises transceiver components.
In example 80, the purport of any in example 61 to 79 can comprise alternatively: processor parts comprise CPU.
In example 81, the purport of any in example 61 to 80 can comprise alternatively: CPU, it comprises processing unit.
In example 82, the purport of any in example 61 to 81 can comprise alternatively: processing unit comprises application processor.
In example 83, the purport of any in example 61 to 82 can comprise alternatively: application processor, it comprises processing unit.
In example 84, the purport of any in example 61 to 85 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is contactless card.
In example 85, the purport of any in example 61 to 84 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is non-contact credit card.
In example 86, the purport of any in example 61 to 85 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is NFC label.
In example 87, the purport of any in example 61 to 86 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is NFC device.
In example 88, the purport of any in example 61 to 87 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is the transfer point of point-of-sale terminal.
In example 89, the purport of any in example 61 to 88 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is payment processes device.
In example 90, the purport of any in example 61 to 89 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is NFC reader.
Example 91 is computer-readable mediums, it comprises program command, these program command impel processor to carry out for controlling the method for radio communications set when being carried out by processor, this computer-readable medium further comprises program command, and it impels processor to carry out when being carried out by processor: transceiver circuit and another device wireless transmission data are provided; Make processor be coupled in tamperproof circuit; Make this tamperproof circuit be coupled in transceiver circuit; And via tamperproof circuit swap data between processor and transceiver circuit.
In example 92, the purport of example 91 can comprise alternatively: processor in the situation that there is no processor and transceiver circuit between direct physical signaling and transceiver circuit swap data.
In example 93, example 91 or 92 purport can comprise alternatively: processor specially via tamperproof circuit with transceiver circuit swap data.
In example 94, the purport of any in example 91 to 93 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set comprises the first interface between transceiver circuit and tamperproof circuit.
In example 95, the purport of example 94 can comprise alternatively: first interface comprises single-wire-protocol interface.
In example 96, the purport of any in example 91 to 95 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set comprises the second interface between tamperproof circuit and processor.
In example 97, the purport of example 96 can comprise alternatively: the second interface comprises serial peripheral interface.
In example 98, the purport of any in example 91 to 97 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set does not have the interface between transceiver circuit and processor.
In example 99, the purport of any in example 91 to 98 can comprise alternatively: tamperproof circuit is deal with data safely.
In example 100, the purport of any in example 91 to 99 can comprise alternatively: tamperproof circuit comprises safety element.
In example 101, the purport of any in example 91 to 100 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set comprises safety element, and it comprises tamperproof circuit.
In example 102, the purport of any in example 91 to 101 can comprise alternatively: tamperproof circuit comprises embedded-type security element.
In example 103, the purport of any in example 91 to 102 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set comprises embedded-type security element, and it comprises tamperproof circuit.
In example 104, the purport of any in example 91 to 103 can comprise alternatively: tamperproof circuit comprises subscriber identity module.
In example 105, the purport of any in example 91 to 104 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set comprises subscriber identity module, and it comprises tamperproof circuit.
In example 106, the purport of any in example 91 to 105 can comprise alternatively: tamperproof circuit comprises Universal Integrated Circuit Card.
In example 107, the purport of any in example 91 to 106 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set comprises Universal Integrated Circuit Card, and it comprises tamperproof circuit.
In example 108, the purport of any in example 91 to 107 can comprise alternatively: transceiver circuit comprises near-field communication controller.
In example 109, the purport of any in example 91 to 108 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set can comprise near-field communication controller, and it comprises transceiver circuit.
In example 110, the purport of any in example 91 to 109 can comprise alternatively: processor comprises CPU.
In example 111, the purport of any in example 91 to 110 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set comprises CPU, and it comprises processor.
In example 112, the purport of any in example 91 to 111 can comprise alternatively: processor comprises application processor.
In example 113, the purport of any in example 91 to 112 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set comprises application processor, and it comprises processor.
In example 114, the purport of any in example 91 to 113 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is contactless card.
In example 115, the purport of any in example 91 to 114 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is non-contact credit card.
In example 116, the purport of any in example 91 to 115 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is NFC label.
In example 117, the purport of any in example 91 to 116 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is NFC device.
In example 118, the purport of any in example 91 to 117 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is the transfer point of point-of-sale terminal.
In example 119, the purport of any in example 91 to 118 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is payment processes device.
In example 120, the purport of any in example 91 to 119 can comprise alternatively: radio communications set is NFC reader.
Although described particular aspects, those skilled in that art should understand the spirit and scope that can make therein the various changes in form and details and not depart from the aspect of the disclosure limiting as the claim by enclosing.Thereby scope is changed by the institute in the claim indication of enclosing and the implication that is therefore intended to comprise the identity property that falls into claim and scope.
Claims (25)
1. a radio communications set, comprising:
Transceiver circuit, it is configured to and another device wireless communication;
Tamperproof circuit, it is coupled in described transceiver circuit; With
Processor, it is coupled in described tamperproof circuit and is configured to via described tamperproof circuit and described transceiver circuit swap data.
2. radio communications set as claimed in claim 1,
Wherein said processor is configured in the situation that there is no the direct physical signaling and described transceiver circuit swap data between described processor and described transceiver circuit.
3. radio communications set as claimed in claim 1, wherein said processor is configured to specially via described tamperproof circuit and described transceiver circuit swap data.
4. radio communications set as claimed in claim 1 or 2, it further comprises:
First interface between described transceiver circuit and described tamperproof circuit.
5. radio communications set as claimed in claim 4,
Wherein said first interface comprises single-wire-protocol interface.
6. radio communications set as claimed in claim 1 or 2, it further comprises:
The second interface between described tamperproof circuit and described processor.
7. radio communications set as claimed in claim 6,
Wherein said the second interface comprises serial peripheral interface.
8. radio communications set as claimed in claim 1 or 2,
Wherein said radio communications set does not have the interface between described transceiver circuit and described processor.
9. radio communications set as claimed in claim 1 or 2,
Wherein said tamperproof circuit is configured to deal with data safely.
10. radio communications set as claimed in claim 1 or 2,
Wherein said tamperproof circuit comprises safety element.
11. radio communications sets as claimed in claim 1 or 2,
Wherein said tamperproof circuit comprises subscriber identity module.
12. radio communications sets as claimed in claim 1 or 2,
Wherein said transceiver circuit comprises near-field communication controller.
13. radio communications sets as claimed in claim 1 or 2,
Wherein said processor comprises application processor.
14. 1 kinds for controlling the method for radio communications set, and described method comprises:
Transceiver circuit and another device wireless transmission data are provided;
Make processor be coupled in tamperproof circuit;
Make described tamperproof circuit be coupled in described transceiver circuit; And
Via described tamperproof circuit swap data between described processor and described transceiver circuit.
15. methods as claimed in claim 14,
Wherein said processor in the situation that there is no described processor and described transceiver circuit between direct physical signaling and described transceiver circuit swap data.
16. methods as described in claims 14 or 15, wherein said processor specially via described tamperproof circuit with described transceiver circuit swap data.
17. methods as described in claims 14 or 15,
Wherein said radio communications set comprises the first interface between described transceiver circuit and described tamperproof circuit.
18. methods as described in claims 14 or 15,
Wherein said radio communications set comprises the second interface between described tamperproof circuit and described processor.
19. methods as described in claims 14 or 15,
Wherein said radio communications set does not have the interface between described transceiver circuit and described processor.
20. methods as described in claims 14 or 15,
Wherein said tamperproof circuit is deal with data safely.
21. methods as described in claims 14 or 15,
Wherein said tamperproof circuit comprises safety element.
22. methods as described in claims 14 or 15,
Wherein said tamperproof circuit comprises subscriber identity module.
23. methods as described in claims 14 or 15,
Wherein said transceiver circuit comprises near-field communication controller.
24. methods as described in claims 14 or 15,
Wherein said processor comprises application processor.
25. methods as described in claims 14 or 15,
Wherein said radio communications set comprises application processor, and it comprises described processor.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201610400589.3A CN105827666B (en) | 2013-05-09 | 2014-05-09 | Radio communication apparatus and method for controlling radio communication apparatus |
Applications Claiming Priority (4)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US201361821428P | 2013-05-09 | 2013-05-09 | |
| US61/821,428 | 2013-05-09 | ||
| US14/141,541 US9319088B2 (en) | 2013-05-09 | 2013-12-27 | Radio communication devices and methods for controlling a radio communication device |
| US14/141,541 | 2013-12-27 |
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| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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| CN201610400589.3A Division CN105827666B (en) | 2013-05-09 | 2014-05-09 | Radio communication apparatus and method for controlling radio communication apparatus |
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| CN104143996A true CN104143996A (en) | 2014-11-12 |
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| CN201410194258.XA Pending CN104143996A (en) | 2013-05-09 | 2014-05-09 | Radio communication devices and methods for controlling a radio communication device |
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| CN (1) | CN104143996A (en) |
| DE (1) | DE102014104303B4 (en) |
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| CN114286345A (en) * | 2021-12-27 | 2022-04-05 | 无锡融卡科技有限公司 | NFC communication device and method in intelligent terminal |
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| CN115014617B (en) * | 2022-06-21 | 2023-04-07 | 福州大学 | Cable-stayed bridge cable force synchronous monitoring method based on ground radar |
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Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
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| DE102014104303A1 (en) | 2014-11-13 |
| DE102014104303B4 (en) | 2024-05-23 |
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Application publication date: 20141112 |