CN103997405B - A kind of key generation method and device - Google Patents
A kind of key generation method and device Download PDFInfo
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- CN103997405B CN103997405B CN201410232624.6A CN201410232624A CN103997405B CN 103997405 B CN103997405 B CN 103997405B CN 201410232624 A CN201410232624 A CN 201410232624A CN 103997405 B CN103997405 B CN 103997405B
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Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of key generation method and device, and the safety issue existed is applied to solve key in commercial secret signalling.The inventive method includes：Determine the security module mark and user password of user equipment (UE)；The corresponding initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the security module of UE mark, initial key for the corresponding transmission keys of the UE to be encrypted is selected from the initial key group according to the user password of the UE, wherein, the transmission key is used to the corresponding session keys of the UE are encrypted.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the communications field, more particularly to a kind of key generation method and device.
Background technology
As the large-scale application of 4G networks and the policy of virtual operator are implemented, for high-end business, client provides secrecy
Communication is a kind of market potential demand.
According to the ciphersuite negotiation principle between terminal, existing commercial secret signalling can be divided into three kinds：The first
It is the end-to-end commercial secret signalling that fixed key is used between terminal；It is for second between terminal using dynamic key association
The end-to-end secret signalling of business opportunity；The third is the end-to-end guarantor for terminal dynamically distributes key by KMC
Close communication system.These three systems are described below：
The first：The end-to-end commercial secret signalling of fixed key is used between terminal.
Between terminal using end-to-end Principle of Communication schematic diagram in the end-to-end commercial secret signalling of fixed key such as
Shown in Fig. 1, in such a system, terminal is realized in communication process using fixed password algorithm and fixed key (sessionKey)
The encryption and decryption of the business data flows such as voice flow, short message.
Second：The end-to-end secret signalling of dynamic key negotiation mechanism is used between terminal.
Using end-to-end Principle of Communication signal in the end-to-end secret signalling of dynamic key negotiation mechanism between terminal
Figure is as shown in Fig. 2 when needing to carry out secret communication between terminal, on the basis of call routing has built up between the terminals, lead to
The end-to-end key agreement mechanisms crossed between terminal, inform opposite end, so as to set up terminal by this communication key each enabled
Between encryption and decryption communication port.
The third：By the end-to-end secret signalling that KMC is terminal dynamically distributes key.
It is end-to-end Principle of Communication in the end-to-end secret signalling of terminal dynamically distributes key by KMC
Schematic diagram is as shown in figure 3, in such a system, when setting up secret communication between each terminal, key management system (Key
Manager System, KMC) to participate in the session key (sessionKey) that the calling and called terminal distribution of secret communication is interim,
The interim conversation key that calling and called terminal is distributed according to KMC carries out secret communication.
Above-mentioned three kinds commercial secret signallings, although ensure that the secret communication between terminal will to a certain extent
Ask, but still there is following technological deficiency：
Not enough, cause the security of security service reduces the security of key in itself in secret signalling：Terminal it
Between using fixed key end-to-end commercial secret signalling in, due between terminal during each secret communication use phase
Same key carries out encryption and decryption to voice flow, causes the cryptographic key existence cycle long, is easily cracked by premeditated, there is secret telephony quilt
The risk that eavesdropping, private data are stolen.
The security of terminal in itself is low, causes the reduction of secret signalling security：Dynamic key is used between the terminals
In the end-to-end secret signalling of negotiation mechanism, although the key dynamic negotiation that terminal is used, once lost terminal key, close
Key negotiation mechanism and cryptographic algorithm will be revealed, due to lacking the protection mechanism of cryptosystem, so that whole secrecy can be caused logical
Key used is compromised in letter system.
The imperfection of the Secrecy system of secret signalling, causes commercial security service to promote resistance big：Above-mentioned existing
Three kinds of commercial secret signallings in, very high for the security requirements of terminal, the security performance of terminal in itself is whole industry
The key link that business system is maintained safely；But due to the flexibility and personalization of business terminal, cause the secrecy of terminal will unavoidably
Ask and do not reach system secrecy requirement, thus the very big resistance of secure traffic popularization is just become to the high request of terminal user
Power.
In summary, there is the security of key in itself not enough in existing commercial secret signalling, cause security service
Security reduction；The security of terminal in itself is low, causes the reduction of secret signalling security；The secrecy of secret signalling
The imperfection of system, causes commercial security service to promote the defects such as resistance is big.
The content of the invention
The present invention provides a kind of key generation method and device, is deposited to solve key application in commercial secret signalling
Safety issue.
The embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of key generation method, and this method includes：
Determine the security module mark and user password of user equipment (UE)；
The corresponding initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the security module of UE mark, according to the user password of the UE from first
Selected in beginning key group for the corresponding initial keys that are encrypted of transmission key of the UE, wherein, transmission key is used for pair
The corresponding session keys of the UE are encrypted.
From the above as can be seen that by determining that the security module of user equipment (UE) is identified and user password；According to guarantor
Close module id generates the corresponding initial key groups of the UE, is selected to be used for UE correspondences from initial key group according to user password
The initial key that is encrypted of transmission key, and then the guarantor in commercial secret signalling can be carried out using the key of generation
Close communication so that key application possesses security and flexibility in commercial secret signalling, improves commercial secret communication system
The simple operation of the security service of system, so that efficiently solving key in commercial secret signalling applies the security existed
Problem.
It is preferred that this method also includes：
By rear, the corresponding transmission keys of the UE are being generated to UE security module certification, it is corresponding initial using the UE
Key transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted, and the transmission key after encryption is sent into the UE.
So, Encrypt and Decrypt is carried out to session key so that later use transmits key.
It is preferred that this method also includes：
When the UE initiates session establishment request as calling UE, generate at random between calling UE and called UE
The session key that the conversation message transmitted in conversation procedure is encrypted, using the corresponding transmission key of calling UE to session key
It is encrypted and the session key after encryption is sent to calling UE, session key is entered using called UE corresponding transmission key
Row is encrypted and the session key after encryption is sent into called UE.
So, so that calling UE and called UE are carried out using session key to the conversation message transmitted during secret communication
Encrypt and Decrypt.
It is preferred that after the corresponding transmission keys of the UE are generated, this method also includes：
The corresponding relation set up between transmission key UE corresponding with transmission key user's mark；
Using the user password of the UE, transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted, and the transmission preserved after encryption is close
Key and corresponding relation.
So, so as to subsequently according to the corresponding transmission key of UE user's identifier lookup UE.
It is preferred that the corresponding initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the security module of UE mark, including：
According to security module mark the first random array of generation, and the UE corresponding first is generated according to the first random array
Initial key group；
Set up the first initial key group UE corresponding with the first initial key group security module mark between it is corresponding
Relation；
Using the user password of the UE, each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted respectively, and protects
Deposit the first initial key group and corresponding relation after encryption.
So, so as to subsequently according to the corresponding initial key group of the UE security module identifier lookup UE.
It is preferred that this method also includes：
The second random array of random generation, and the corresponding second initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the second random array,
The quantity of random number is identical with the quantity of random number in the first random array in wherein second random array；
The first initial key group is replaced with the second initial key group；
The second random array is encrypted using the corresponding transmission keys of the UE, and by the second random array after encryption
The UE is sent to, to update the corresponding initial key groups of the UE.
So, by updating the corresponding initial key groups of UE, the security of the corresponding initial key groups of UE is improved.
It is preferred that after the corresponding transmission keys of the UE are generated, this method also includes：
The corresponding transmission keys of the UE after the encryption that network side equipment is sent are received, the corresponding initial keys of the UE are utilized
Transmission key after encryption is decrypted；
Using the user password of the UE, the transmission key after decryption is encrypted, and preserves the transmission key after encryption.
So, so that session key is decrypted later use transmission key.
It is preferred that the corresponding initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the security module of UE mark, including：
According to security module mark the first random array of generation, and the UE corresponding first is generated according to the first random array
Initial key group；
Using the user password of the UE, each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted respectively, and protects
Deposit the first initial key group after encryption.
So, so that the user password according to UE selects initial key from initial key group.
It is preferred that this method also includes：
The second random array after the encryption that network side equipment is sent is received, the corresponding transmission key pair encryptions of the UE are utilized
The second random array afterwards is decrypted, wherein the quantity of random number and random number in the first random array in the second random array
Quantity it is identical；
The corresponding second initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the second random array after decryption；
The first initial key group is replaced with the second initial key group.
So, by updating the corresponding initial key groups of UE, the security of the corresponding initial key groups of UE is improved.
It is preferred that being selected to enter for transmission key corresponding to the UE from initial key group according to the user password of the UE
The initial key of row encryption, including：
According to the user password of the UE, the corresponding Key Sequence Number of an initial key in initial key group is determined；
An initial key in initial key group is determined according to Key Sequence Number.
So, so as to utilize initial key it is corresponding to the UE transmission key carry out Encrypt and Decrypt.
The embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of key generating device, and the device includes：
Information determination unit, for determining that the security module of user equipment (UE) is identified and user password；
Key generating unit, for generating the corresponding initial key groups of the UE according to the security module of UE mark, according to
The user password of the UE selects the initial key for the corresponding transmission keys of the UE to be encrypted from initial key group, its
In, transmission key is used to the corresponding session keys of the UE are encrypted.
It is preferred that Key generating unit is additionally operable to：
By rear, the corresponding transmission keys of the UE are being generated to UE security module certification, it is corresponding initial using the UE
Key transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted, and the transmission key after encryption is sent into the UE.
So, so that session key is encrypted later use transmission key.
It is preferred that Key generating unit is additionally operable to：
When the UE initiates session establishment request as calling UE, generate at random between calling UE and called UE
The session key that the conversation message transmitted in conversation procedure is encrypted, using the corresponding transmission key of calling UE to session key
It is encrypted and the session key after encryption is sent to calling UE, session key is entered using called UE corresponding transmission key
Row is encrypted and the session key after encryption is sent into called UE.
So, so that calling UE and called UE are carried out using session key to the conversation message transmitted during secret communication
Encrypt and Decrypt.
It is preferred that Key generating unit is additionally operable to after the corresponding transmission keys of the UE are generated：
The corresponding relation set up between transmission key UE corresponding with transmission key user's mark；
Using the user password of the UE, transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted, and the transmission preserved after encryption is close
Key and corresponding relation.
So, so as to subsequently according to the corresponding transmission key of UE user's identifier lookup UE.
It is preferred that Key generating unit is generating the corresponding initial key groups of the UE according to the security module of UE mark
When, specifically for：
According to security module mark the first random array of generation, and the UE corresponding first is generated according to the first random array
Initial key group；
Set up the first initial key group UE corresponding with the first initial key group security module mark between it is corresponding
Relation；
Using the user password of the UE, each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted respectively, and protects
Deposit the first initial key group and corresponding relation after encryption.
So, to be selected from initial key group for the corresponding initial keys that are encrypted of transmission key of UE.
It is preferred that Key generating unit is additionally operable to：
The second random array of random generation, and the corresponding second initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the second random array,
The quantity of random number is identical with the quantity of random number in the first random array in wherein second random array；
The first initial key group is replaced with the second initial key group；
The second random array is encrypted using the corresponding transmission keys of the UE, and by the second random array after encryption
The UE is sent to, to update the corresponding initial key groups of the UE.
So, by updating the corresponding initial key groups of UE, the security of the corresponding initial key groups of UE is improved.
It is preferred that Key generating unit is additionally operable to after the corresponding transmission keys of the UE are generated：
The corresponding transmission keys of the UE after the encryption that network side equipment is sent are received, the corresponding initial keys of the UE are utilized
Transmission key after encryption is decrypted；
Using the user password of the UE, the transmission key after decryption is encrypted, and preserves the transmission key after encryption.
So, so that session key is decrypted later use transmission key.
It is preferred that Key generating unit is generating the corresponding initial key groups of the UE according to the security module of UE mark
When, specifically for：
According to security module mark the first random array of generation, and the UE corresponding first is generated according to the first random array
Initial key group；
Using the user password of the UE, each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted respectively, and protects
Deposit the first initial key group after encryption.
So, so as to subsequently according to the corresponding initial key group of the UE security module identifier lookup UE.
It is preferred that Key generating unit is additionally operable to：
The second random array after the encryption that network side equipment is sent is received, the corresponding transmission key pair encryptions of the UE are utilized
The second random array afterwards is decrypted, wherein the quantity of random number and random number in the first random array in the second random array
Quantity it is identical；
The corresponding second initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the second random array after decryption；
The first initial key group is replaced with the second initial key group.
So, by updating the corresponding initial key groups of UE, the security of the corresponding initial key groups of UE is improved.
It is preferred that Key generating unit selects to be used for this UE pairs in the user password according to the UE from initial key group
During the initial key that the transmission key answered is encrypted, specifically for：
According to the user password of the UE, the corresponding Key Sequence Number of an initial key in initial key group is determined；
An initial key in initial key group is determined according to Key Sequence Number.
So, so as to utilize initial key it is corresponding to the UE transmission key carry out Encrypt and Decrypt.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the Principle of Communication schematic diagram of the end-to-end commercial secret signalling using fixed key；
Fig. 2 is the Principle of Communication schematic diagram of the end-to-end secret signalling using dynamic key negotiation mechanism；
Fig. 3 is to be shown by the Principle of Communication for the end-to-end secret signalling that KMC is terminal dynamically distributes key
It is intended to；
Fig. 4 is a kind of key generation method schematic flow sheet provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 5 is the update method schematic flow sheet of initial key group provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 6 is the destroying method schematic flow sheet of initial key group provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 7 is the transmission mechanism schematic flow sheet provided in an embodiment of the present invention for transmitting key；
Fig. 8 is the destroying method schematic flow sheet provided in an embodiment of the present invention for transmitting key；
Fig. 9 is encryption VoIP operation flow schematic diagrames provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Figure 10 is a kind of encryption instant messaging schematic flow sheet provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Figure 11 is a kind of key generating device structural representation provided in an embodiment of the present invention.
Embodiment
The present invention provides a kind of key generation method and device, is deposited to solve key application in commercial secret signalling
Safety issue.
As shown in figure 4, the embodiments of the invention provide a kind of key generation method, this method includes：
S41, the security module mark and user password for determining user equipment (UE)；
S42, the corresponding initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the security module of UE mark, according to the user password of the UE
The initial key for the corresponding transmission keys of the UE to be encrypted is selected from initial key group, wherein, transmission key is used
It is encrypted in the corresponding session keys of the UE.
It is preferred that after step S42, this method also includes：
By rear, the corresponding transmission keys of the UE are being generated to UE security module certification, it is corresponding initial using the UE
Key transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted, and the transmission key after encryption is sent into the UE.
It is preferred that after step S42, this method also includes：
When the UE initiates session establishment request as calling UE, generate at random between calling UE and called UE
The session key that the conversation message transmitted in conversation procedure is encrypted, using the corresponding transmission key of calling UE to session key
It is encrypted and the session key after encryption is sent to calling UE, session key is entered using called UE corresponding transmission key
Row is encrypted and the session key after encryption is sent into called UE.
It is preferred that after the corresponding transmission keys of the UE are generated, this method also includes：
The corresponding relation set up between transmission key UE corresponding with transmission key user's mark；
Using the user password of the UE, transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted, and the transmission preserved after encryption is close
Key and corresponding relation.
It is preferred that the corresponding initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the security module of UE mark, including：
According to security module mark the first random array of generation, and the UE corresponding first is generated according to the first random array
Initial key group；
Set up the first initial key group UE corresponding with the first initial key group security module mark between it is corresponding
Relation；
Using the user password of the UE, each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted respectively, and protects
Deposit the first initial key group and corresponding relation after encryption.
It is preferred that this method also includes：
The second random array of random generation, and the corresponding second initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the second random array,
The quantity of random number is identical with the quantity of random number in the first random array in wherein second random array；
The first initial key group is replaced with the second initial key group；
The second random array is encrypted using the corresponding transmission keys of the UE, and by the second random array after encryption
The UE is sent to, to update the corresponding initial key groups of UE.
It is preferred that after the corresponding transmission keys of the UE are generated, this method also includes：
The corresponding transmission keys of the UE after the encryption that network side equipment is sent are received, the corresponding initial keys of the UE are utilized
Transmission key after encryption is decrypted；
Using the user password of the UE, the transmission key after decryption is encrypted, and preserves the transmission key after encryption.
It is preferred that the corresponding initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the security module of UE mark in step S42, including：
According to security module mark the first random array of generation, and the UE corresponding first is generated according to the first random array
Initial key group；
Using the user password of the UE, each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted respectively, and protects
Deposit the first initial key group after encryption.
It is preferred that this method also includes：
The second random array after the encryption that network side equipment is sent is received, the corresponding transmission key pair encryptions of the UE are utilized
The second random array afterwards is decrypted, wherein the quantity of random number and random number in the first random array in the second random array
Quantity it is identical；
The corresponding second initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the second random array after decryption；
The first initial key group is replaced with the second initial key group.
It is preferred that being selected in step S42 according to the user password of the UE from initial key group for corresponding to the UE
The initial key that transmission key is encrypted, including：
According to the user password of the UE, the corresponding Key Sequence Number of an initial key in initial key group is determined；
An initial key in initial key group is determined according to Key Sequence Number.
Secret signalling in the embodiment of the present invention devises three kinds of keys, respectively initial key, transmission key with
And session key, describe the secret communication system that the embodiment of the present invention is proposed in detail with reference to the specific embodiment of these three keys
Network side equipment in system, the embodiment of the present invention includes key management system (Key Manager System, KMC) and maintained secrecy many
Media communication system (Secret Multimedia Communication System, SMCS).
Embodiment one：Effect, generation, renewal and destruction of the initial key in secret signalling.
The effect of initial key：For carrying out Encrypt and Decrypt to the corresponding transmission keys of UE, to improve transmission key in transmission
During security.
The generating process of initial key：
Network side equipment：UE is in registration, and its security module needs to be initialized in KMC sides.Now, KMC is according to UE
Security module mark one random array (the i.e. first random array) of generation, and it is corresponding using the random array to generate the UE
One initial key group (i.e. the first initial key group)；
Due to the corresponding initial key group of the security module that multiple UE are preserved in KMC, to ensure that KMC can during follow-up use
With the security module identifier lookup according to UE to the corresponding initial key groups of the UE, KMC sets up the first initial key group and first
Corresponding relation between the corresponding UE of initial key group security module mark；To improve the security of key storage, this is utilized
UE user password, each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted respectively, and KMC preserves first after encryption
It is corresponding between initial key group and the first initial key group UE corresponding with the first initial key group security module mark
Relation, the first initial key group is stored in KMC with ciphertext form；
To UE security module certification, by rear, KMC is used for according to UE according to UE user password by using with UE
User password determine the corresponding Key Sequence Number identical preset algorithm of an initial key in initial key group, it is determined that initial close
The corresponding Key Sequence Number of an initial key in key group, and according to the Key Sequence Number determine in initial key group one it is initial close
Key, the initial key is the corresponding initial keys of UE.
Wherein, the verification process that KMC is carried out to UE security module is, and what KMC received UE transmissions carries the UE
User mark and security module identify security module authentication request message after, pass through user's identifier lookup locally preserve should
User identifies corresponding security module mark, and the security module mark and the security module authentication request of UE transmissions of comparison query
The security module carried in message is identified whether unanimously；If consistent, security module certifications of the KMC to UE passes through；Otherwise KMC
To UE security module authentification failure.
UE sides：UE determines that the method for initial key and network side equipment determine the method class of the corresponding initial keys of the UE
Seemingly, i.e. UE is according to one random array of its security module mark generation (the i.e. first random array, the with network side equipment generation
One random array is identical), and using with KMC be used for according to random array generate initial key group identical algorithm, using this with
Machine array generates the corresponding initial key group of the UE (i.e. the first initial key group)；
UE utilizes its user password, and each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted respectively, and preserves
The first initial key group after encryption, the first initial key group is stored in UE with ciphertext form；
To UE security module certification, by rear, UE is used for according to UE's according to its user password by using with KMC
User password determines the corresponding Key Sequence Number identical preset algorithm of an initial key in initial key group, determines initial key
The corresponding Key Sequence Number of an initial key in group, and an initial key in initial key group is determined according to the Key Sequence Number,
The initial key is the corresponding initial keys of UE.
The renewal process of initial key：In order to ensure the security of secret signalling, it is necessary to when UE security module is pacified
When full property is low (administrative staff carry out safe sex determination to UE security module) or periodically to UE and network side equipment
The initial key group preserved in KMC enters Mobile state renewal.As shown in figure 5, the initial key group preserved in UE and KMC is updated
Journey is as follows：
S501, KMC generate the second random array at random；
Wherein, the quantity of random number is identical with the quantity of random number in the first random array in the second random array；
The second random array is encrypted using the corresponding transmission keys of the UE by S502, KMC；
S503, the initial key for carrying the second random array after encryption is updated into request UE is transmitted to by SMCS；
S504, UE are received after the initial key renewal request for carrying the second random array after encryption, utilize the UE
Second random array is decrypted corresponding transmission key；
S505, UE generate the corresponding second initial key groups of the UE according to the second random array after decryption, and UE utilizes it
User password, each initial key in the second initial key group is encrypted respectively, and initial close with second after encryption
Key group replaces the first initial key group after encryption；
Initial key is updated response message and is transmitted to KMC by SMCS by S506, UE；
S507, KMC receive initial key and updated after response message, and the UE corresponding the is generated according to the second random array
Two initial key groups, preserve pair between the second initial key group UE corresponding with the second initial key group security module mark
It should be related to, using the user password of the UE, each initial key in the second initial key group is encrypted respectively, KMC is used
The second initial key group after encryption replaces the first initial key group after encryption.
Wherein, KMC uses identical for generating the corresponding second initial key groups of the UE according to the second random array with UE
Algorithm, the corresponding second initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the second random array.
After step S507, UE will initiate security module identifying procedure to network side equipment, to obtain new this UE pairs
The transmission key answered.
The Destruction of initial key group：If UE security module is under insecure environments, system can be to UE in KMC
Corresponding encryption initial password group and the encryption initial password group of UE sides carry out remote destroying.
As shown in fig. 6, the Destruction of initial key group is as follows：
Cipher key destruction request message is sent to UE by S601, KMC by SMCS, and being carried in the cipher key destruction request message should
UE user's mark and security module mark；
Specifically, if UE is registered, SMCS indicates that UE carries out cipher key destruction；If UE is canceled, SMCS feeds back to KMC
Registration failure order, KMC preserves the cipher key destruction request message of the UE；When the UE initiates identification log to KMC, KMC leads to again
Cross SMCS and cipher key destruction request message is sent to UE；
S602, UE are received after cipher key destruction request message, destroy the encryption initial key group locally preserved and encryption is passed
Defeated key；
S603, UE send cipher key destruction response message by SMCS to KMC；
S604, KMC are received after cipher key destruction response message, destroy the corresponding encryption initial keys of the UE locally preserved
Group and encrypted transmission key.
Embodiment two：Transmit effect, transmission mechanism and destruction of the key in secret signalling.
Transmit the effect of key：For the corresponding session keys of UE to be encrypted, to ensure that session key is being transmitted across
Safety in journey.
Transmit the transmission mechanism of key：As shown in fig. 7, transmitting key in secret signalling provided in an embodiment of the present invention
Transmission mechanism it is as follows：
S701, KMC, by rear, are generating corresponding transmission key in the UE registration periods to UE security module certification；
S702, KMC preserve the corresponding relation between transmission key UE corresponding with transmission key user's mark, utilize
UE user password, transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted, and preserves the transmission key after encryption；
S703, KMC are encrypted using the corresponding initial keys of UE transmission key corresponding to the UE；
Encrypted transmission key is sent to UE by S704, KMC by SMCS；
S705, UE are received after the corresponding encrypted transmission keys of the UE, close to transmitting using the corresponding initial keys of the UE
Key is decrypted, and using the user password of the UE, the transmission key after decryption is encrypted, and is preserved after this time encryption
Transmit key.
Transmit the Destruction of key：The Destruction of transmission key is divided into two kinds, and a kind of is when UE security module exists
Under insecure environments, the cipher key destruction process initiated from KMC to UE, specific cipher key destruction process are as shown in fig. 6, no longer go to live in the household of one's in-laws on getting married herein
State；Another is the cipher key destruction process actively initiated by UE, as shown in figure 8, transmission is close when UE initiates user log off flow
Key Destruction is as follows：
S801, UE send user log off request message to SMCS；
S802, SMCS send user log off response message to UE, to indicate that UE is transmitted cipher key destruction process；
S803, UE are received after user log off response message, destroy the encrypted transmission key locally preserved；
S804, SMCS send user log off request message to KMC, and the user log off request message carries UE user's mark
Know；
S805, KMC are received after user log off request message, this UE pairs locally preserved according to UE user's identifier lookup
The encrypted transmission key answered, and destroy；
S806, KMC return to user log off response message to SMCS；
S807, SMCS are received after user log off response message, and SMCS carries out user log off to UE, and discharges the phase of the UE
Answer resource.
Embodiment three：Effect of the session key in secret signalling, transmission mechanism, use and destroy.
The effect of session key：Business datum (audio medium stream) is carried out during for being conversated between UE
Encrypt and Decrypt, is the real work key of Business Stream.
As shown in figure 9, by encrypting IP-based voice transfer (Voice over IP, VoIP), operation flow is specifically
The transmission mechanism of bright session key, using and Destruction, encryption VoIP operation flows it is as follows：
S901, calling UE send encryption conversation request message by SMCS to KMC, and the encryption conversation request message is carried
User's mark of calling UE and the user of called UE identify；
S902, KMC are received after encryption conversation request message, are this encryption session generation session key；
S903, KMC are according to the corresponding transmission key of user's identifier lookup calling UE of calling UE, according to the user of called UE
The corresponding transmission key of identifier lookup called UE, and it is utilized respectively the corresponding transmission key of calling UE biography corresponding with called UE
Session key is encrypted defeated key；
S904, KMC send encryption conversational response message to calling UE and called UE respectively by SMCS；Wherein, to caller
UE send encryption conversational response message carry using calling UE it is corresponding transmission key encryption after session key, to be called
The encryption conversational response message that UE is sent, which is carried, utilizes the session key after the corresponding transmission key encryption of called UE；
S905, calling UE are received after encryption conversational response message, according to the transmission key pair encryption session key of local terminal
It is decrypted, obtains the session key of this encryption session, and preserves；
S906, called UE are received after encryption conversational response message, according to the transmission key pair encryption session key of local terminal
It is decrypted, obtains the session key of this encryption session, and preserves；
It is preferred that after step S905 and S906, calling UE and called UE can disappear to SMCS feedback encryptions conversational response
Breath, to indicate whether UE successfully obtains the session key of this encryption session；If SMCS does not receive master at the appointed time
The encryption conversational response message for making UE or called UE feed back, then SMCS is resend to calling UE or called UE carries encryption meeting
The encryption conversational response message of key is talked about, transmission times is repeated by default.
Business datum is encrypted using session key for S907, calling UE, and the business datum after encryption is sent to
Called UE；
S908, called UE receive the encrypted transaction data that calling UE is sent, and using session key to encrypted transaction data
It is decrypted, obtains this business datum；
The process that called UE sends business datum to calling UE is identical with step S907 and S908, and here is omitted.
S909, when this encryption conversation end, calling UE and called UE destroy the session key locally preserved；
S910, calling UE send encryption conversation end message by SMCS to KMC；
S911, KMC are received after encryption conversation end message, destroy the session key of this encryption session.
Step S910 and S911 are optional step, when KMC does not preserve the session key of this encryption session, it is not necessary to
Carry out step S910 and S911.
Example IV：As shown in Figure 10, instant messaging flow is encrypted in secret signalling as follows：
S1001, when calling UE initiate instant messaging when, calling UE generates the first random number at random, and utilizes local terminal
It is corresponding transmission key the first random number is encrypted obtains encrypt the first random number, using local terminal it is corresponding transmission key and
Instant message is encrypted first random number obtains the first encryption instant message；
S1002, calling UE will encrypt the first random number and the first encryption instant message is sent to KMC by SMCS；
S1003, KMC receive the random number of encryption first and the first encryption instant message that calling UE is sent, and utilize calling UE
The corresponding transmission random number of key pair encryption first is decrypted, and utilizes the corresponding transmission key of calling UE and the first random number pair
First encryption instant message is decrypted, and obtains instant message；
S1004, KMC generate the second random number at random, and the second random number is entered using the corresponding transmission key of called UE
Row encryption is obtained encrypting the second random number, and instant message is added using the corresponding transmission key of called UE and the second random number
It is close to obtain the second encryption instant message；
S1005, KMC will encrypt the second random number by SMCS and the second encryption instant message is sent to called UE；
S1006, called UE receive the second random number of encryption and the second encryption instant message, close using the corresponding transmission of local terminal
The second random number of encryption is decrypted key, and the second encryption is disappeared immediately using the corresponding transmission key of local terminal and the second random number
Breath is decrypted, and obtains instant message.
Corresponding with the above method, as shown in figure 11, the embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of key generating device, the device
Including：
Information determination unit 111, for determining that the security module of user equipment (UE) is identified and user password；
Key generating unit 112, for generating the corresponding initial key groups of the UE, root according to the security module of UE mark
The initial key for the corresponding transmission keys of the UE to be encrypted is selected from initial key group according to the user password of the UE,
Wherein, transmission key is used to the corresponding session keys of the UE are encrypted.
It is preferred that Key generating unit 112 is additionally operable to：
By rear, the corresponding transmission keys of the UE are being generated to UE security module certification, it is corresponding initial using the UE
Key transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted, and the transmission key after encryption is sent into the UE.
It is preferred that Key generating unit 112 is additionally operable to：
When the UE initiates session establishment request as calling UE, generate at random between calling UE and called UE
The session key that the conversation message transmitted in conversation procedure is encrypted, using the corresponding transmission key of calling UE to session key
It is encrypted and the session key after encryption is sent to calling UE, session key is entered using called UE corresponding transmission key
Row is encrypted and the session key after encryption is sent into called UE.
It is preferred that Key generating unit 112 is additionally operable to after the corresponding transmission keys of the UE are generated：
The corresponding relation set up between transmission key UE corresponding with transmission key user's mark；
Using the user password of the UE, transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted, and the transmission preserved after encryption is close
Key and corresponding relation.
It is preferred that Key generating unit 112 is generating the corresponding initial keys of the UE according to the security module of UE mark
During group, specifically for：
According to security module mark the first random array of generation, and the UE corresponding first is generated according to the first random array
Initial key group；
Set up the first initial key group UE corresponding with the first initial key group security module mark between it is corresponding
Relation；
Using the user password of the UE, each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted respectively, and protects
Deposit the first initial key group and corresponding relation after encryption.
It is preferred that Key generating unit 112 is additionally operable to：
The second random array of random generation, and the corresponding second initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the second random array,
The quantity of random number is identical with the quantity of random number in the first random array in wherein second random array；
The first initial key group is replaced with the second initial key group；
The second random array is encrypted using the corresponding transmission keys of the UE, and by the second random array after encryption
The UE is sent to, to update the corresponding initial key groups of the UE.
It is preferred that Key generating unit 112 is additionally operable to after the corresponding transmission keys of the UE are generated：
The corresponding transmission keys of the UE after the encryption that network side equipment is sent are received, the corresponding initial keys of the UE are utilized
Transmission key after encryption is decrypted；
Using the user password of the UE, the transmission key after decryption is encrypted, and preserves the transmission key after encryption.
It is preferred that Key generating unit 112 is generating the corresponding initial keys of the UE according to the security module of UE mark
During group, specifically for：
According to security module mark the first random array of generation, and the UE corresponding first is generated according to the first random array
Initial key group；
Using the user password of the UE, each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted respectively, and protects
Deposit the first initial key group after encryption.
It is preferred that Key generating unit 112 is additionally operable to：
The second random array after the encryption that network side equipment is sent is received, the corresponding transmission key pair encryptions of the UE are utilized
The second random array afterwards is decrypted, wherein the quantity of random number and random number in the first random array in the second random array
Quantity it is identical；
The corresponding second initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the second random array after decryption；
The first initial key group is replaced with the second initial key group.
It is preferred that Key generating unit 112 selects to be used for this in the user password according to the UE from initial key group
During the initial key that the corresponding transmission keys of UE are encrypted, specifically for：
According to the user password of the UE, the corresponding Key Sequence Number of an initial key in initial key group is determined；
An initial key in initial key group is determined according to Key Sequence Number.
Specifically, information determination unit 111 and Key generating unit 112 can be by processors and the biography with transmission-receiving function
Defeated module realization, the transport module with transmission-receiving function equipment, this hair such as transport module can be special chip and antenna
The bright entity for being not limited to realize these units.
It should be understood by those skilled in the art that, embodiments of the invention can be provided as method, device or computer program
Product.Therefore, the present invention can be using the reality in terms of complete hardware embodiment, complete software embodiment or combination software and hardware
Apply the form of example.Moreover, the present invention can be used in one or more computers for wherein including computer usable program code
The shape for the computer program product that usable storage medium is implemented on (including but is not limited to magnetic disk storage and optical memory etc.)
Formula.
The present invention is the flow with reference to method according to embodiments of the present invention, equipment (device) and computer program product
Figure and/or block diagram are described.It should be understood that can be by every first-class in computer program instructions implementation process figure and/or block diagram
Journey and/or the flow in square frame and flow chart and/or block diagram and/or the combination of square frame.These computer programs can be provided
The processor of all-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, Embedded Processor or other programmable data processing devices is instructed to produce
A raw machine so that produced by the instruction of computer or the computing device of other programmable data processing devices for real
The device for the function of being specified in present one flow of flow chart or one square frame of multiple flows and/or block diagram or multiple square frames.
These computer program instructions, which may be alternatively stored in, can guide computer or other programmable data processing devices with spy
Determine in the computer-readable memory that mode works so that the instruction being stored in the computer-readable memory, which is produced, to be included referring to
Make the manufacture of device, the command device realize in one flow of flow chart or multiple flows and/or one square frame of block diagram or
The function of being specified in multiple square frames.
These computer program instructions can be also loaded into computer or other programmable data processing devices so that in meter
Series of operation steps is performed on calculation machine or other programmable devices to produce computer implemented processing, thus in computer or
The instruction performed on other programmable devices is provided for realizing in one flow of flow chart or multiple flows and/or block diagram one
The step of function of being specified in individual square frame or multiple square frames.
Obviously, those skilled in the art can carry out the essence of various changes and modification without departing from the present invention to the present invention
God and scope.So, if these modifications and variations of the present invention belong to the scope of the claims in the present invention and its equivalent technologies
Within, then the present invention is also intended to comprising including these changes and modification.
Claims (20)
1. a kind of key generation method, it is characterised in that this method includes：
Determine the security module mark and user password of user equipment (UE)；
The corresponding initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the security module of UE mark, according to the user password of the UE from it is described just
The initial key for the corresponding transmission keys of the UE to be encrypted is selected in beginning key group, wherein, the transmission key is used
It is encrypted in the corresponding session keys of the UE.
2. the method as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that this method also includes：
UE security module certification, by rear, is being generated by the corresponding transmission keys of the UE, the corresponding initial keys of the UE are utilized
Transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted, and the transmission key after encryption is sent into the UE.
3. method as claimed in claim 2, it is characterised in that this method also includes：
When the UE initiates session establishment request as calling UE, generate at random for the meeting between calling UE and called UE
The session key that the conversation message transmitted during words is encrypted, is entered using the corresponding transmission key of calling UE to session key
Row is encrypted and the session key after encryption is sent into calling UE, and session key is carried out using called UE corresponding transmission key
Encrypt and the session key after encryption is sent to called UE.
4. method as claimed in claim 2, it is characterised in that after the corresponding transmission keys of the UE are generated, this method is also
Including：
The corresponding relation set up between transmission key UE corresponding with transmission key user's mark；
Using the user password of the UE, it is corresponding to the UE transmission key be encrypted, and preserve encryption after transmission key, with
And the corresponding relation.
5. method as claimed in claim 2, it is characterised in that described that UE correspondences are generated according to the security module of UE mark
Initial key group, including：
According to security module mark the first random array of generation, and the UE corresponding first is generated according to the first random array
Initial key group；
The corresponding relation set up between the first initial key group UE corresponding with the first initial key group security module mark；
Using the user password of the UE, each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted respectively, and preservation adds
The first initial key group and the corresponding relation after close.
6. method as claimed in claim 5, it is characterised in that this method also includes：
The second random array of random generation, and the corresponding second initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the second random array, wherein
The quantity of random number is identical with the quantity of random number in the first random array in second random array；
The first initial key group is replaced with the second initial key group；
The second random array is encrypted using the corresponding transmission keys of the UE, and the second random array after encryption is sent
The UE is given, to update the corresponding initial key groups of the UE.
7. method as claimed in claim 6, it is characterised in that after the corresponding transmission keys of the UE are generated, this method is also
Including：
The corresponding transmission keys of the UE after the encryption that network side equipment is sent are received, are added using the corresponding initial keys pair of the UE
Transmission key after close is decrypted；
Using the user password of the UE, the transmission key after decryption is encrypted, and preserves the transmission key after encryption.
8. method as claimed in claim 7, it is characterised in that described that UE correspondences are generated according to the security module of UE mark
Initial key group, including：
According to security module mark the first random array of generation, and it is corresponding first initial according to the first random array to generate the UE
Key group；
Using the user password of the UE, each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted respectively, and preservation adds
The first initial key group after close.
9. method as claimed in claim 8, it is characterised in that this method also includes：
The second random array after the encryption that the network side equipment is sent is received, the corresponding transmission key pair encryptions of the UE are utilized
The second random array afterwards is decrypted, wherein the quantity of random number and random number in the first random array in the second random array
Quantity it is identical；
The corresponding second initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the second random array after decryption；
The first initial key group is replaced with the second initial key group.
10. the method as described in any one in claim 1,4,5,8 or 9, it is characterised in that the use according to the UE
Registered permanent residence order selects the initial key for the corresponding transmission keys of the UE to be encrypted from the initial key group, including：
According to the user password of the UE, the corresponding Key Sequence Number of an initial key in initial key group is determined；
An initial key in initial key group is determined according to the Key Sequence Number.
11. a kind of key generating device, it is characterised in that the device includes：
Information determination unit, for determining that the security module of user equipment (UE) is identified and user password；
Key generating unit, for generating the corresponding initial key groups of the UE according to the security module of UE mark, according to the UE
User password selected from the initial key group for the corresponding initial keys that are encrypted of transmission key of the UE, its
In, the transmission key is used to the corresponding session keys of the UE are encrypted.
12. device as claimed in claim 11, it is characterised in that the Key generating unit is additionally operable to：
UE security module certification, by rear, is being generated by the corresponding transmission keys of the UE, the corresponding initial keys of the UE are utilized
Transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted, and the transmission key after encryption is sent into the UE.
13. device as claimed in claim 12, it is characterised in that the Key generating unit is additionally operable to：
When the UE initiates session establishment request as calling UE, generate at random for the meeting between calling UE and called UE
The session key that the conversation message transmitted during words is encrypted, is entered using the corresponding transmission key of calling UE to session key
Row is encrypted and the session key after encryption is sent into calling UE, and session key is carried out using called UE corresponding transmission key
Encrypt and the session key after encryption is sent to called UE.
14. device as claimed in claim 12, it is characterised in that the Key generating unit is generating the corresponding transmission of the UE
After key, it is additionally operable to：
The corresponding relation set up between transmission key UE corresponding with transmission key user's mark；
Using the user password of the UE, it is corresponding to the UE transmission key be encrypted, and preserve encryption after transmission key, with
And the corresponding relation.
15. device as claimed in claim 12, it is characterised in that the Key generating unit is in the security module according to the UE
When mark generates the UE corresponding initial key groups, specifically for：
According to security module mark the first random array of generation, and the UE corresponding first is generated according to the first random array
Initial key group；
The corresponding relation set up between the first initial key group UE corresponding with the first initial key group security module mark；
Using the user password of the UE, each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted respectively, and preservation adds
The first initial key group and the corresponding relation after close.
16. device as claimed in claim 15, it is characterised in that the Key generating unit is additionally operable to：
The second random array of random generation, and the corresponding second initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the second random array, wherein
The quantity of random number is identical with the quantity of random number in the first random array in second random array；
The first initial key group is replaced with the second initial key group；
The second random array is encrypted using the corresponding transmission keys of the UE, and the second random array after encryption is sent
The UE is given, to update the corresponding initial key groups of the UE.
17. device as claimed in claim 16, it is characterised in that the Key generating unit is generating the corresponding transmission of the UE
After key, it is additionally operable to：
The corresponding transmission keys of the UE after the encryption that network side equipment is sent are received, are added using the corresponding initial keys pair of the UE
Transmission key after close is decrypted；
Using the user password of the UE, the transmission key after decryption is encrypted, and preserves the transmission key after encryption.
18. device as claimed in claim 17, it is characterised in that the Key generating unit is in the security module according to the UE
When mark generates the UE corresponding initial key groups, specifically for：
According to security module mark the first random array of generation, and it is corresponding first initial according to the first random array to generate the UE
Key group；
Using the user password of the UE, each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted respectively, and preservation adds
The first initial key group after close.
19. device as claimed in claim 18, it is characterised in that the Key generating unit is additionally operable to：
The second random array after the encryption that network side equipment is sent is received, after the corresponding transmission key pair encryptions of the UE
Second random array is decrypted, wherein in the second random array in the quantity of random number and the first random array random number number
Amount is identical；
The corresponding second initial key groups of the UE are generated according to the second random array after decryption；
The first initial key group is replaced with the second initial key group.
20. the device as described in any one in claim 11,14,15,18 or 19, it is characterised in that the key life
Select to be used for transmission key progress corresponding to the UE from the initial key group in the user password according to the UE into unit
During the initial key of encryption, specifically for：
According to the user password of the UE, the corresponding Key Sequence Number of an initial key in initial key group is determined；
An initial key in initial key group is determined according to the Key Sequence Number.
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| CN103986723B (en) * | 2014-05-28 | 2017-12-05 | 大唐移动通信设备有限公司 | A kind of secret communication control, secret communication method and device |
| CN108154038B (en) * | 2016-12-06 | 2022-04-26 | 北京京东尚科信息技术有限公司 | Data processing method and device |
| CN110166426A (en) * | 2019-04-11 | 2019-08-23 | 北京媒球信息科技有限公司 | Information sends terminal, receives terminal and its secret communication method, storage medium |
| CN111641636A (en) * | 2020-05-28 | 2020-09-08 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Method, system, equipment and storage medium for data security communication of Internet of things |
| CN112861116B (en) * | 2021-02-03 | 2022-12-27 | 浪潮云信息技术股份公司 | Method and tool for realizing dynamic password loading based on sidecar mode |
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| EP1204236A4 (en) * | 2000-06-15 | 2008-03-05 | Sony Corp | System and method for processing information using encryption key block |
| JP2006108903A (en) * | 2004-10-01 | 2006-04-20 | Hiromi Fukaya | Encryption data distribution method, encryption device, decryption device, encryption program, and decryption program |
| US7885412B2 (en) * | 2005-09-29 | 2011-02-08 | International Business Machines Corporation | Pre-generation of generic session keys for use in communicating within communications environments |
| CN102804676A (en) * | 2009-06-23 | 2012-11-28 | 松下电器产业株式会社 | Cryptogram-key distribution system |
| CN101635924B (en) * | 2009-08-27 | 2012-01-18 | 成都卫士通信息产业股份有限公司 | CDMA port-to-port encryption communication system and key distribution method thereof |
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| CN101471943A (en) * | 2007-12-20 | 2009-07-01 | 英特尔公司 | Methods for authenticating a hardware device and providing a secure channel to deliver data |
| CN103152362A (en) * | 2013-03-28 | 2013-06-12 | 胡祥义 | Cloud-computing-based encrypted transmission method for large data files |
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