CN103916393B - Cloud data-privacy protection public's auditing method based on symmetric key - Google Patents
Cloud data-privacy protection public's auditing method based on symmetric key Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses the cloud data-privacy protection public's auditing method based on symmetric key, belongs to cloud computing security technology area.The method is comprised the following steps:(1)Generate the key stage:Four private keys are generated at random by data owner, two pairs of private keys pair are formed, shares another to private key pair by data owner and the shared one pair of which private key pair of Cloud Server, data owner and auditing by third party;(2)Calculate the signature stage:Private key and data block as input, are that each data block and its index calculate signature, signature are sent to Cloud Server by data owner;(3)The proof stage:After the challenge that the index and auditing by third party that Cloud Server receives data block from auditing by third party is generated at random, being calculated data integrity proves, data integrity is proved to be sent to auditing by third party, is verified by auditing by third party.The present invention is both to have saved calculating and storage overhead, the method that can provide public's audit and secret protection performance again.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to cloud computing security technology area, and in particular to it is a kind of for cloud data based on the hidden of symmetric key
Public's auditing method of private protection.
Background technology
Cloud computing is a kind of new memory module, data owner(DO)Data are outsourced to into Cloud Server(CS)To mitigate
Storage burden, accesses them by independent geographical position.But outer bag data causes the safety problem of data integrity,
Data owner's concern of data can be lost or change.Traditional data integrity verification method is that data owner downloads number
According to checked for integrity.But this will cause the high communication overhead of network, and the high computing cost of data owner.
To solve this problem, public's audit is preferably to select, auditing by third party(TPA)Instead of data owner
With a kind of easy method come verification of data integrity, data owner is not involved in public's audit phase.By this method, lead to
Letter expense and computing cost are all reduced.And by Audit Report, data owner can check data before data are accessed
Lose and distort, so as to assess the risk of the cloud data server that they each subscribe.
Under the framework of public's audit, a series of schemes are designed to complete different security performances, such as dynamic data
Operation support, secret protection, batch audit etc..However, they are the schemes based on public key, expense can be very big.It is existing to be based on
The audit program of symmetric key, it is impossible to while providing the security performance of public's audit and secret protection.
The content of the invention
For the defect existing for existing cloud data storage public's audit program, the technical problem to be solved is
A kind of cloud data-privacy protection public's auditing method based on symmetric key is provided, to improve the efficiency of public's audit program, and
The safety of symmetric key offer is provided.
In order to solve above-mentioned technical problem, the present invention is adopted the following technical scheme that:
Cloud data-privacy protection public's auditing method based on symmetric key, the method comprising the steps of:
(1)Generate the key stage:By data owner(DO)Four private keys are generated at random, two pairs of private keys pair are formed, by counting
According to owner(DO)And Cloud Server(CS)Shared one pair of which private key pair, data owner(DO)And auditing by third party(TPA)
It is shared another to private key pair;
(2)Calculate the signature stage:Data owner(DO)Using private key and data block as input, be each data block and its
Index calculates signature, and signature is sent to Cloud Server(CS);
(3)The proof stage:Cloud Server(CS)From auditing by third party(TPA)The index and third party for receiving data block is examined
Meter(TPA)After the random challenge for generating, being calculated data integrity proves, data integrity being proved, being sent to third party examines
Meter(TPA), by auditing by third party(TPA)Verified.
In a preferred approach, the step(3)Middle Cloud Server(CS)When data integrity proof is calculated, first at random
An element in elliptic curve group is generated, is proven further according to shared cipher key calculation.
The method provided by the present invention can both save computing and storage overhead, support secret protection and public's audit again, its
The security performance of the scheme offer based on public key can be provided simultaneously relative to prior art and be carried based on the scheme of symmetric key
For efficiency.
This method is to improving the public audit technology of cloud data, and then promotes Chinese cloud data service development and flourishing interconnection
Net economic implications are great.
Description of the drawings
The present invention is further illustrated below in conjunction with the drawings and specific embodiments.
Fig. 1 is the shared schematic diagram of key in the method provided by the present invention;
Fig. 2 is the interactive schematic diagram of Qualify Phase DO, CS, TPA in the method provided by the present invention.
Specific embodiment
In order that technological means, creation characteristic, reached purpose and effect that the present invention is realized are easy to understand, tie below
Conjunction is specifically illustrating, and the present invention is expanded on further.
Cheng Qian was implemented in the scheme of being given and first explained four definition:
(1)Four entities in scheme:Data owner DO, Cloud Server CS, auditing by third party TPA and user.DO is gathered around
There is one group of data block M, be each data block mi∈ M generate signature sigmai, one group of signature sigmaiRepresented by Φ;The major function of CS is negative
Duty Content Management, data storage block M and signature Φ, all data messages related to service content are stored on CS, and are permitted
Perhaps client is downloaded or content information is updated;When user data audit request is received, TPA is then to cloud service provider
Submit request, and the related data information of cloud service provider return of auditing, most rear line returned data integrity auditing result to;With
Family simply using the Audit Report from TPA, is will not be referred in scheme.
(2)The definition of data block:Assume that the file of DO is divided into many block Zp(ZpRepresent the set of integers comprising p element
Close, p is a Big prime);
(3)The definition of data block index:To each data block mi∈ M, the present invention define respective meta-data, i.e. data block
Index metai=(name | i), the information of name unique definition files;
(4)Definition in elliptic curve:Qualify Phase employs elliptic curve cryptography, and p represents finite field
Size, G represent the defined elliptic curve on finite field.
When the present invention carries out the audit of the public with secret protection based on symmetric key to cloud data, mainly include three ranks
Section:(1)Generate the key stage;(2)Calculate the signature stage;(3) Qualify Phase.
The key stage is being generated, DO generates four private key ccs at random1,α2,β1,β2∈ integer sets Zp, it is divided into two pairs of private keys pair
(α1,β1) and (α2,β2), by the shared α of DO and CS1,α2,β1,β2∈, DO and TPA share (α2,β2)(As shown in Figure 1).
The signature stage is being calculated, to each data block(mi∈M)DO is private key to (α1,β1), (α2,β2) and data block it is corresponding
Index metaiAs input, signature sigma is calculated by HASH functionsi, and signature is issued into CS.
In Qualify Phase, (Φ is by a series of signature sigmas for the signature Φ that CS reception DO sendiComposition) and TPA send data Q
(Q includes the index meta of data blockiThe challenge c for being generated with TPA at randomi∈Zp), CS generates u ∈ G at random, and by u, enjoys
Private key (α1,β1), data signature σiAnd the data Q calculating data integrity that TPA sends proves { μ, σ };TPA receives CS and sends
Integrity certification { μ, σ, u } after verified, checking σ with by μ, u, the private key (α that TPA is enjoyed2,β2), challenge ci, data block
Index metaiResult is calculated whether equal, when equal, then the integrity certification of CS is correct, otherwise mistake.
The public's audit program being consequently formed operationally, is proved when CS provides correct data integrity, algorithm of auditing
Correct TRUE will necessarily be returned;When CS loses or altered data block, there is provided during the integrity certification of mistake, audit algorithm is returned
FALSE, returns the probability very little of TRUE, that is, realizes public's audit aim.
Meanwhile, data block m of DOiTPA will not be leaked to, that is, realizes privacy protection goal.
Furthermore, by running this scheme in OPENSTACK platforms, may certify that when operating on mass data block, this
Computing cost, communication overhead and the storage overhead for inventing the scheme for providing is smaller than other schemes.
For ease of the understanding to the present invention program, the solution of the present invention will be specifically described by an example below.
The present embodiment equally includes generating the key stage, generates signature stage and Qualify Phase three phases.
Carry out first generating the key stage, the purpose in this stage is:Generate data owner DO, Cloud Server CS and the 3rd
The respective keys of auditing party TPA, are that following calculating is prepared, comprise the following steps:
Step 100, DO generate four private keys.Using security parameter as input in the step, DO generates four private keys at random
α1,α2,β1,β2∈Zp。
Step 101, distributes corresponding shared key.Distribute private key in the step, by the shared a pair of secret keys (α of DO and CS1,
β1), DO and TPA shares another a pair of secret keys (α2,β2)。
Then carry out generating the signature stage, this stage purpose is:It is that each data block and its index generate signature, and issues
CS.Comprise the following steps:
Step 102, DO are that each data block and its index calculate signature sigmai.In the step, DO is with specific reference to shared key
α1,α2,β1,β2∈Zp, each data block mi∈ M and its index metai, calculated with HASH functions and signed, each data block mi∈M
Signature sigmaiComposition Φ.
Calculated signature Φ is sent to CS by step 103, DO.
Qualify Phase is defined finally, this stage purpose is:CS is calculated after data integrity is proved and is sent to TPA, by
Proving whether for TPA checking CS is correct.Comprise the following steps(As shown in Figure 2):
Step 104, the challenge that CS is generated at random from the index and TPA that TPA receives data block.Specifically, CS in the step
Q={ (meta are received from TPAi,ci)}(metaiIt is miIndex, ci∈ZpIt is the random challenges for generating of TPA).
Step 105, CS calculate data integrity and prove and be sent to TPA.Specifically, CS is generated in elliptic curve group at random
An element u ∈ G, according to shared key (α1,β1), calculating proves P={ μ, σ }.P includes two parts μ and σ, μ ∈ G by u,
ci, miAnd finite field size, i.e. mould p is calculated with power, and σ ∈ G are by u, ci, mi, metai, σi, (α1,β1) and p calculated with power
Arrive, wherein data signature σi∈ Φ are obtained from DO, { (metai,ci)=Q obtained from TPA, (α1,β1) it is private key that CS is enjoyed.Meter
After the completion of calculation, { u, μ, σ } is sent to TPA by CS.
Step 106, after TPA receives integrity certification { μ, σ, u }, verifies σ and by μ, u, (α2,β2), ci, metai, p meters
Whether calculation obtains result equal, wherein (α2,β2) it is private key that TPA is enjoyed, it is equal, TRUE is returned, FALSE is otherwise returned.
During the realization of this example, it is assumed that attack the TPA that can disguise oneself as, it is therefore an objective to obtain DO by integrity certification P
Data block, there is effective oracle model can be with attack algorithm, then may certify that out that this is not by emulator output procedure
Feasible, therefore secret protection can be carried out.
There is attack and can disguise oneself as CS in hypothesis, target is the former data block of modification and generates new proof P'(P' ≠ P) make
By algorithm, may certify that corresponding signature is also just different, and attacker's puppet is produced when the data block of attacker is different with former data block
Meet algorithm signature sigma ' probability very little, therefore can realize the public audit performance.
Ultimate principle, principal character and the advantages of the present invention of the present invention has been shown and described above.The technology of the industry
Personnel it should be appreciated that the present invention is not restricted to the described embodiments, the simply explanation described in above-described embodiment and description this
The principle of invention, without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, the present invention also has various changes and modifications, these changes
Change and improvement is both fallen within scope of the claimed invention.The claimed scope of the invention by appending claims and its
Equivalent thereof.
Claims (2)
1. the cloud data-privacy based on symmetric key protects public's auditing method, it is characterised in that methods described includes following step
Suddenly:
(1) generate the key stage:Four private keys are generated at random by data owner, two pairs of private keys pair is formed, by data owner
One pair of which private key pair is shared with Cloud Server, data owner and auditing by third party share another to private key pair;
(2) calculate the signature stage:Private key and data block as input, are that each data block and its index are calculated by data owner
Signature is sent to Cloud Server by signature, wherein data owner for each data block private key to and the corresponding rope of data block
Draw as input, calculated with HASH functions and signed, and calculated signature is sent to into Cloud Server;
(3) prove the stage:Cloud Server is generated at random from the index and auditing by third party that auditing by third party receives data block
After challenge, being calculated data integrity proves, data integrity is proved to be sent to auditing by third party, is entered by auditing by third party
Row checking.
2. the cloud data-privacy based on symmetric key according to claim 1 protects public's auditing method, it is characterised in that
In the step (3) Cloud Server calculate data integrity prove when, a unit being first randomly generated in elliptic curve group
Element, is proven further according to shared cipher key calculation.
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CN104601586B (en) * | 2015-01-29 | 2017-12-19 | 西安电子科技大学 | The outsourcing statistical method that a kind of disclosure can verify that |
CN104993937B (en) * | 2015-07-07 | 2018-12-11 | 电子科技大学 | A kind of method of inspection for cloud storage data integrity |
CN105491006B (en) * | 2015-11-13 | 2018-11-13 | 河南师范大学 | Cloud outsourcing key sharing means and method |
CN105515778B (en) * | 2015-12-25 | 2018-10-16 | 河南城建学院 | Cloud storage data integrity services signatures method |
CN106790303B (en) * | 2017-03-23 | 2019-07-23 | 西安电子科技大学 | The data integrity verification method completed in cloud storage by third party |
CN113190875B (en) * | 2020-11-12 | 2022-06-24 | 国网江苏省电力有限公司苏州供电分公司 | Public auditing method capable of sharing private data in energy Internet environment |
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