CN103781069B - Bidirectional-authentication method, device and system - Google Patents
Bidirectional-authentication method, device and system Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN103781069B CN103781069B CN201210400768.9A CN201210400768A CN103781069B CN 103781069 B CN103781069 B CN 103781069B CN 201210400768 A CN201210400768 A CN 201210400768A CN 103781069 B CN103781069 B CN 103781069B
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- value
- access point
- key
- current
- target
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Active
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
Abstract
The invention discloses a bidirectional-authentication method, device and system, wherein the method includes: a current access point type is obtained; if the obtained current access point type is a node which supports an LTE (Long Term Evolution) technology and is compatible with a 2G or 3G core network, UE (User Equipment) neglects a comparison result after authenticating a separation bit of an AMF (Authentication Management Field) in an authentication code AUTN, or does not authenticate the separation bit of the AMF; and the UE uses a ciphering key CK and an integrity protection key IK as an access-layer key after obtaining the ciphering key CK and the integrity protection key IK through evolution. The technical scheme provided by the invention is capable of ensuring that the UE performs corresponding authentication processes reasonably when the UE accesses a network in a node which supports the LTE technology and is compatible with the 2G or 3G core network so that legal UE is capable of accessing the network successfully under a condition that air-interface security is ensured.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to communication technical field, it is related to a kind of method of two-way authentication, equipment and system.
Background technology
With the development of mobile communication technology, 3G（3rd-generation, G mobile communication）Network big
Scaledeployment, the business just band of the big bandwidth of two-forty gives people colourful application experience.Especially recent smart mobile phone
Extensive growth, while being filled with new vitality to communication, also brings more challenges to operation.According to statistics, following 5
Year mobile data services traffic demand will increase nearly 40 times.But, Cellular Networks flow is in a long-term mistake with the growth of business revenue
The state of weighing apparatus, the sharp increase of mobile data services flow does not make the health service revenue linear increase therewith of operator.Operation
Network is maintained at higher load condition for a long time, and the business that the capacity of expansion can be increased quickly again is taken, so being badly in need of low cost
Jumbo solution is becoming increasingly acute solving the problems, such as this.
LTE Hi（Support LTE technology and the node of 2G or 3G core net can be fitted to）Be newly introduced a set of relies on
Existing mobile network, towards the communication technology of fixation, low speed mobile context.The protocol stack of LTE Hi access point and LTE（Long
Term Evolution, Long Term Evolution）Access point is identical, is and eats dishes without rice or wine using LTE technology, but LTE Hi node may compare LTE
Network is arranged earlier, so can only be accessed by existing 3G network.Under this scene, in LTE Hi access node, need
One logical block having 2G/3G adaptation ability, being adapted to, from safety angle between responsible LTE Hi node and 2G/3G core net
Degree is seen, UE（User Equipment, user equipment）Access logic as shown in Figure 1.LTE HiUE is the same with LTE UE, during access
Can triggering authentication process.Core net SGSN for LTE UE and 3G（ServingGPRS Support Node, GPRS service
Serve as a diplomatic envoy a little）With certificate server HLR（Home Location Register, attaching position register）For, this be one general
Logical 3G certification.And for LTE Hi UE, it considers that this is an EPS（Evolved Packet System evolution
Grouping system）AKA（Authentication and KeyAgreement, certification and key agreement）, by according to EPS AKA's
Process logic each parameter is verified, the AMF in authentication vector can be detected（Authentication Management
Field, authentication management domain）Separation bit whether be 1, lead to verify unsuccessfully so that UE cannot normal access network.And
And, after verification, SGSN can be according to the process logic of traditional 3G, directly by CK（Ciphering Key, encryption key）Send with IK
To LTE Hi node；In UE side, USIM（Universal Subscriber Identity Module, Universal Subscriber Identity mould
Block）Calculating CK, after IK, ME can sent it to（Mobile Equipment, mobile device）, ME is according to the place of LTE
Reason logic, converts thereof into KASME, so, the key leading to network side and UE side cannot be synchronous, thus cannot be carried out normal
Safeguard protection.
Content of the invention
The embodiment provides a kind of method of two-way authentication, equipment and system, for accessing WAP
UE provides two-way authentication, and then provides reliable safety assurance for eating dishes without rice or wine.
A kind of method of two-way authentication, including：
Acquisition is currently accessed vertex type；
If the vertex type that is currently accessed obtaining is to support Long Term Evolution LTE technology and can be fitted to 2G or 3G core net
Node, then user equipment (UE) ignore comparative result after the separation bit of the authentication management domain AMF in authentication verification code AUTN,
Or, the separation bit of AMF is not verified；And UE is after deducing acquisition encryption key CK and tegrity protection key IK
Directly as access layer secret key.
A kind of user equipment, including：
Access point type acquisition module, is currently accessed vertex type for obtaining；
Identification processing module, the vertex type that is currently accessed for obtaining in described access point type acquisition module is to support length
Phase evolution LTE technology and can be fitted to 2G or 3G core net node when, the authentication management domain in authentication verification code AUTN
Comparative result is ignored after the separation bit of AMF, or, the separation bit of AMF is not verified；And add deducing to obtain
Directly as access layer secret key after ciphering key K and tegrity protection key IK.
A kind of system realizing two-way authentication, including above-mentioned user equipment (UE), and SGSN and access point apparatus, described connects
Entering point device is the node device supported LTE technology and can be fitted to 2G or 3G core net, and described UE passes through described access point
Equipment access network is simultaneously communicated with described SGSN.
Technical scheme be can be seen that by the technical scheme that embodiments of the invention described above provide so that UE
By support LTE technology and can be fitted to 2G or 3G core net node access networks network when, ensure that UE reasonably enters
The corresponding authentication processing process of row is so that legal UE can ensure to eat dishes without rice or wine to successfully access in the case of safety, to overcome
The problem that prior art exists.
Brief description
In order to be illustrated more clearly that the technical scheme of the embodiment of the present invention, below will be to required use in embodiment description
Accompanying drawing be briefly described it should be apparent that, drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, for this
For the those of ordinary skill of field, without having to pay creative labor, other can also be obtained according to these accompanying drawings
Accompanying drawing.
Fig. 1 is the schematic diagram of UE access network in the background technology of the present invention；
A kind of flow chart of the method for two-way authentication that Fig. 2 provides for embodiments of the invention one；
The flow chart of the method for another two-way authentication that Fig. 3 provides for embodiments of the invention two；
A kind of schematic diagram of user equipment that Fig. 4 provides for embodiments of the invention three；
A kind of schematic diagram of system realizing two-way authentication that Fig. 5 provides for embodiments of the invention four.
Specific embodiment
Below in conjunction with the accompanying drawing in the embodiment of the present invention, the technical scheme in the embodiment of the present invention is carried out clear, complete
Site preparation description is it is clear that described embodiment is only a part of embodiment of the present invention, rather than whole embodiments.It is based on
Embodiment in the present invention, it is every other that those of ordinary skill in the art are obtained under the premise of not making creative work
Embodiment, broadly falls into the scope of protection of the invention.
For ease of understanding, below in conjunction with concrete application example and corresponding accompanying drawing, the embodiment of the present invention is illustrated.
Embodiment one
Embodiments of the invention one provide a kind of method of two-way authentication, as shown in Fig. 2 comprising the following steps：
Step 201, obtains and is currently accessed vertex type, in order to judge whether current access point is to support LTE technology and energy
Enough it is fitted to the node of 2G or 3G core net；
In this step, user equipment obtain be currently accessed vertex type implementation can but not following any in including
A kind of implementation：
Mode one：Obtain the type of current access point, such as MME attachment received message, tracking according to the message that MME sends
Area update（TAU）Received message or Non-Access Stratum safe mode complete（NAS SMP）Message etc., has in corresponding message
Access node type indication information element, just can know access point type according to this cell；
Mode two：Determine the type of current access point according to the carrier frequency of current access point；
Mode three：The type of current access point is obtained from the cell broadcast messages of current access point；
Mode four：Determine the type of current access point according to the mode of operation of UE, you can with by UE id（UE identifies）With UE
Mode of operation is bound, and for example, the LTEUE for supporting LTE technology and can be fitted under the node of 2G or 3G core net reserves specially
The IMSI of door（International mobile subscriber identity）Region, being capable of currently connecing according to region decision UE at IMSI place in order to UE
The type of access point；
Mode five：Determine the type of current access point according to the ability that present mode is supported, for example, if the mode of operation of UE
Support 256QAM, then show that current access point is the node supported LTE technology and can be fitted to 2G or 3G core net, other moulds
The UE of formula does not have this ability
Step 202, if the vertex type that is currently accessed obtaining is to support LTE technology and can be fitted to 2G or 3G core net
Node, then user equipment (UE) ignore comparative result after the separation bit of the authentication management domain AMF in authentication verification code AUTN,
Or, the separation bit of AMF is not verified；And UE is directly close as Access Layer after deducing acquisition CK and IK
Key.
By embodiments of the invention described above as can be seen that by the identification of the access point type to UE so that UE can
When its access point is the node supported LTE technology and can be fitted to 2G or 3G core net, provided using above-mentioned steps 202
Processing mode, so that UE reasonably can carry out corresponding authentication processing it is ensured that legal UE can be in the safe feelings that ensure to eat dishes without rice or wine
Normal access network under condition.
Embodiment two
For ease of understanding, below in conjunction with accompanying drawing 3, the specific implementation of the embodiment of the present invention is further described.
Embodiments of the invention two provide a kind of method of two-way authentication, as shown in figure 3, comprising the following steps：
Step 301, the type of acquisition current access point；
If the access point of current UE is the common node only supporting LTE technology, when network side triggering authentication process,
It is authenticated according to traditional EPS AKA, do not execute subsequent step 304；If it is determined that current access point is to support LTE technology and energy
Enough it is fitted to the node of 2G or 3G core net, then execution step 304, LTE technology will be supported and 2G or 3G can be fitted to below
The node of core net is referred to as LTE Hi node.
When UE is attached to network, network side without UE safe context, then can trigger EPAAKA in attaching process
Process；Or, it is switched in LTE system for from other system, when Non-Access Stratum count value overturns NASCOUNT wrap
During round, network side also can trigger EPS AKA process, in order to complete corresponding mutual authentication process, now, just can hold
Row step 301；
The mode that UE acquisition is currently accessed vertex type has been described above in embodiment one, will not be described in detail herein.
Step 302, user equipment (UE) pass through LTE Hi node and send certification request to core net；
Specifically, UE sends certification request by LTE Hi access point to SGSN, and SGSN is forwarded to after receiving this request
HLR, HLR send response message to described SGSN, contain UMTS in described response message（Universal
MobileTelecommunications System, mobile communication system）Authentication vector, this authentication vector includes：RAND（With
Machine value）、AUTN（Authentication code）, CK, IK and RES（Expected Response value）.
Step 303, after receiving described response message, SGSN sends request certification message to UE, in this request certification message
Middle will carry RAND and AUTN in the response message receiving.
It should be noted that the execution sequence of above-mentioned steps 301 and step 302 and 303 does not have the restriction of sequential relationship, that is,
As long as above-mentioned steps 301 executed before step 304, do not limit one and be scheduled on execution before step 302 or step 303.
Step 304, UE is authenticated to it after receiving described request certification message, and to network side after certification is passed through
SGSN initiates certification, and verification process includes：UE ignores after the separation bit of the AMF in authentication verification code AUTN and compares knot
Really, or, the separation bit of AMF is not verified；And UE deduce obtain CK and IK after directly as access
Layer key；
Specifically, this verification process can include：First, the medium access being recovered by the USIM of UE in described AUTN controls
MAC and serial number SQN；Afterwards, the medium access relatively in described AUTN controls MAC the and SQN and local SQN preserving and local
Whether the MAC calculating is identical, if identical, USIM calculates CK, IK and RES according to the RAND in described request certification message,
And send to the ME of UE, described CK and IK is directly preserved as access layer secret key by ME, and by the described RES calculating send to
The SGSN of network side proceeds the certification of network side, if described SGSN is proved to be successful, proceeds to step 305；In addition, UE also tests
Whether the separation bit of the AMF in card AUTN is 1, and ignore comparative result；Or, bit is not separated to AMF and carries out school
Test, to avoid the result being directed to the separation bit of AMF accordingly to lead to verification process failure.
Step 305, network side carries out algorithm configuration, and the algorithm having configured is sent to described UE.
Specifically, this algorithm configuration process can include：The described RES receiving is preserved by the SGSN of network side with local
The RES receiving from HLR compare, if both are identical, described CK and IK are sent to the current access point of UE（LTEHi accesses
Point）Preserved；SGSN also sends security mode messages to described LTE Hi access point, comprises in described security mode messages
The algorithm of SGSN selection and UE security capabilities etc.；After described LTE Hi access point receives this message, ignore the algorithm in message,
And according to UE security capabilities and local algorithm priority, select Access Layer algorithm；Then send to UE and carried out using IK
The Access Layer safe mode command AS SMC message of whole property protection, carries algorithm and the UE security capabilities of selection in message；
Described UE receives LTE Hi access point and sends described AS SMC message, starts the protection of AS Encryption and integrity, by described CK and IK
Respectively as encryption key and tegrity protection key.
Preferably, for ensuring communication safety property in the embodiment of the present invention, AS ciphering key K and IK can not indefinitely use,
Corresponding ciphering key K and IK can be regularly updated.Therefore, the embodiment of the present invention also introduces key aliveness control parameter
START, in order to control the effectiveness time limit of CK and IK；As new CK, when IK produces, START sets to 0, afterwards, this START value
Renewal process specifically can include：
UE determines that the updated value of key aliveness parameter START can be：
START’=MSB20(MAX { PDCP COUNT } | use CK, all carryings (inclusion signaling) of IK protection })+2, wherein,
PDCP COUNT is PDCP PDCP count value, and START is used for building initial p DCP when UE sets up and connects
COUNT value, and PDCP layer may have multiple carryings, each carrying has the PDCP count value of oneself, therefore, has multiple PDCP
Count value.That is, the value of START ' is the high 20+2 of maximum PDCP count value in this formula, when UE release connects
START value can be obtained using this formula, and save, use when for connection establishment next time.
According to the result of calculation of START ', if the value of current START is less than START ', by current START's
Value is updated to START ', and otherwise the value of current START is constant.
Further, can be included according to the process that this START puts more new key：When the value of described START reaches threshold value
When, by KSI（Key set identifier）It is set to invalid value, and by the CK in described USIM, IK deletes；So, when the business sending please
Ask, in attach request and tracking area update TAU request message in carry KSI and send to described SGSN, if SGSN judges
When corresponding KSI is invalid value, just new CK and IK can be generated, when access point enables newly with triggering authentication and key agreement AKA
CK, during IK, by START value and PDCP COUNT clear 0, thus the renewal realizing corresponding CK and IK is processed.
In the embodiment of the present invention, when release connects, the value of current START variable can be stored in ME；Work as shutdown
When, the value of described START variable of storage can be stored in USIM for ME, upper once start shooting when, ME is from described USIM
Read the value of corresponding START variable；And when setting up radio resource control RRC connection, the START in described ME is become
The value of amount is sent to the current access point of UE, now, also needs to the PDCP value new by the value construction of START variable in UE side,
In order to avoid after newly-established connection employs old key, also carrying out safeguard protection using used PDCPCOUNT, therefore,
By START（20bit）The value of variable is as PDCP algorithm PDCP COUNT（32bit）High 20 bit, institute
State 0 filling of the remaining bit of PDCP COUNT.
In the embodiment of the present invention, safety between Network Access Point for the UE can also be realized after completing above-mentioned certification
Switching.In order to make it easy to understand, below another Hi-AP is switched to from current Hi-AP with UE（I.e. target Hi-AP）, and UE exists
Carry out the explanation of corresponding handoff procedure, wherein, corresponding Hi-AP is LTE as a example switching between Hi-AP and the MME of LTE system
Hi access point.
（One）UE switches to the handoff procedure of another Hi-AP from current Hi-AP
This handoff procedure belongs to the handoff procedure of core net participation, and the handover request between source/target access network node needs
To forward through source/target core network and to get to opposite end.The process of core net SGSN can not be changed in the embodiment of the present invention
Mode, that is, from SGSN, this switching is exactly the handoff procedure of a SGSN-spanning.
Issue in target Hi-AP handover request message in source Hi-AP, carry the value of CK, IK, UE security capabilities and START,
Or only carry the value of START；
CK, IK of receiving be directly used as AS encryption key and tegrity protection key by target Hi-AP, and according to receiving
UE security capabilities and local algorithm priority are UE Choice encryption algorithm and protection algorithm integrallty, by the algorithm selecting with
And START value is transmitted to UE by switching command message.At this time, it may be necessary to by the new PDCP value of the value construction of START, Yi Mianxin
After the connection set up employs old key, also carry out safeguard protection using used PDCP COUNT.Therefore, Hi accesses
Point and UE construct PDCP algorithm PDCP COUNT according to the value of START, by the value of START（20bit）As
PDCP COUNT（32bit）High 20, low 12 bits of PDCP COUNT are with 0 filling.
When only carrying the value of START in this handover request message, when the value of START reaches threshold value, trigger new recognizing
Card and key agreement AKA, generate new key and activate safeguard protection.
（Two）The processing procedure that UE switches between Hi-AP and MME
In this handoff process, when UE switches to target LTE system from source Hi-AP, source Hi-AP will carry CK,
The handover request of the value of IK, UE security capabilities and START variable is sent to the target as target access in LTE system
MME；Described MME generates random value NONCEMME, and according to CK, IK receiving and described NONCEMMEDeduce KASME, accordingly
Deducing formula can be KASME=KDF（CK | | IK, NONCEMME）, wherein, KDF is secret key deduction function；Afterwards, further according to deduction
The K obtainingASMEAnd up Access Layer algorithm NAS COUNT（=0）Deduce KeNB, and according to UE security capabilities and local
Algorithm priority selects Access Layer NAS algorithm, and described deduction KeNB formula is：KeNB=KDF（KASME, UL NAS COUNT）, its
In, described KeNB is the key for access point.
When UE is switched to target Hi-AP from source LTE system, then the MME of source LTE system is according to local KASMEAnd it is descending
NAS COUNT deduces CK and IK, and is sent to SGSN by described target Hi-AP；Wherein, the formula of deduction CK and IK is：
KASME=KDF（CK | | IK, DL NAS COUNT）.
By embodiments of the invention described above as can be seen that UE can by being analyzed to being currently accessed vertex type, with
Realize, in the case that current access point is for Hi access point, two-way authentication provided in an embodiment of the present invention being enabled, thus protecting
Card UE reliably access network.And, AS key can also be regularly updated in the embodiment of the present invention, further ensure
The safety of key application.Furthermore, when UE switches to another access point from current access point, the embodiment of the present invention also provides
Corresponding hand-off process scheme, thus having safely provided guarantee when switching for access point, improves communications security, for sky
Mouth provides enough safety assurances.
Obviously, technical scheme provided in an embodiment of the present invention be not limited to access point type is carried out for LTE Hi two-way
Certification, as long as UE is networked using LTE mode, core net is that the other system of 2G/3G node all can be double by the present embodiment realization
To certification.
Embodiment three
The embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of user equipment, as shown in figure 4, this equipment specifically can include：
Access point type acquisition module 41, is currently accessed vertex type for obtaining；
Identification processing module 42, the vertex type that is currently accessed for obtaining in described access point type acquisition module 401 is
When supporting Long Term Evolution LTE technology and the node of 2G or 3G core net can be fitted to, the certification in authentication verification code AUTN
Comparative result is ignored after the separation bit of management domain AMF, or, the separation bit of AMF is not verified；And deducing
Directly as access layer secret key after acquisition encryption key CK and tegrity protection key IK.
Alternatively, above-mentioned access point type acquisition module 41 specifically can be, but not limited to including any one module following,
The type of the current access point of UE can be obtained by any one module following：
（1）Message analysis submodule 411, the message for being sent according to MME obtains the type of current access point, example
As received message, TAU received message or NAS SMP message adhered to according to the MME that MME issues and obtain current access point
Type；
（2）Carrier frequency analysis module 412, for determining the class of current access point according to the carrier frequency of current access point
Type；
（3）Broadcast analysis module 413, for obtaining current access point from the cell broadcast messages of current access point
Type；
（4）Working pattern analysis module 414, for determining the type of current access point according to the mode of operation of itself；
（5）Capability analysis module 415, for determining the class of current access point according to the ability that itself present mode is supported
Type.
Specifically, in order to ensure the safety of key in addition it is also necessary to periodically be updated to key, for this this user equipment also
Can include：
Key aliveness control parameter determining module 43, for determining the updated value of key aliveness control parameter START
For：Multiple carry the maximum PDCP count value in corresponding multiple PDCP PDCP count values high 20 add again
Upper 2；And if the value of current START is less than described updated value, the value of current START is updated to described updated value, otherwise
The value of current START is constant, and the initial value of START is 0；
Key updating module 44, when the value of the START of described key aliveness control parameter determining module 43 determination reaches
During threshold value, key set identifier KSI is set to invalid value, and CK and IK in USIM is deleted.
Manage corresponding key aliveness control parameter for convenience, then this user equipment can also include key aliveness control
Parameter management module 45 processed, and/or, data transmission blocks 46 and PDCP COUNT constructing module 47, wherein：
Key aliveness control parameter management module 45, for when release connects, storing the value of current START；Or,
Simultaneously stored in shutdown, receiving the value of described START that described ME sends, upper once start shooting when, will be described
The value of START sends to described ME；
Data transmission blocks 46, for when setting up radio resource control RRC connection, by the START in described ME
Value be sent to the current access point of described UE；And PDCP COUNT constructing module 47, for setting up wireless heterogeneous networks
Agreement RRC is high 20 as PDCP COUNT using the value of START when connecting, and the remaining bit of described PDCP COUNT uses 0
Filling.
By embodiments of the invention described above as can be seen that UE passes through to be analyzed to being currently accessed vertex type, if currently
Access point be LTE Hi access point when, then enable the identification processing module 42 comprising in above-mentioned user equipment execute two-way accordingly
Authentication processing in verification process, with ensure legal UE can reliably access network it is possible to carry out to AS key periodically more
Newly, enough safety assurances are provided for eating dishes without rice or wine.
It should be noted that the specific implementation of function that each processing module comprising in the said equipment is realized exists
Have a detailed description in each embodiment above, therefore repeated no more here.
Those skilled in the art can be understood that, for convenience and simplicity of description, only with above-mentioned each function
The division of module is illustrated, and in practical application, can distribute above-mentioned functions by different function moulds as desired
Block completes, and the internal structure of equipment will be divided into different functional modules, to complete all or part of work(described above
Energy.The equipment of foregoing description and the specific work process of module, may be referred to the corresponding process in preceding method embodiment, here
Repeat no more.
Example IV
The embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of system realizing two-way authentication, as shown in figure 5, this system includes：Embodiment three
Described user equipment (UE) 51, and SGSN52 and access point apparatus 53, wherein, corresponding access point apparatus are to support LTE skill
Art and can be fitted to the node device of 2G or 3G core net, corresponding UE can by described access point equipment access network simultaneously
Communicate with described SGSN.
Further, following processing procedure can also be included within the system：
The random value RAND that the USIM of UE passes through to receive calculates CK, IK and Expected Response value RES, and sends to ME；ME
Described CK and IK is preserved the access layer secret key as UE, and the described RES receiving is sent to described SGSN；SGSN
Receive described RES, and this RES is compared with the local RES receiving from HLR preserving, if identical, described HLR is sent
CK and IK send to the current access point of UE（I.e. described access point equipment）Preserve, using the Access Layer as this current access point
Key.
Alternatively, can also include within the system：The MME of source Hi-AP, target Hi-AP and LTE system, wherein, Hi-
AP is the node held LTE technology and can be fitted to 2G or 3G core net（I.e. access point apparatus）, and：
Described source Hi-AP, for when UE is switched to target Hi-AP from current Hi-AP, the value of CK, IK and START being sent out
Give target Hi-AP, or, only START is sent to target Hi-AP；
Described target Hi-AP, for when UE switches over, receiving the value of CK, IK and START of source Hi-AP transmission
When directly enable described CK and IK, or, when only receive source Hi-AP send START when, when START reaches threshold value trigger
Regenerate the operation of CK and IK；
Described MME, for when UE switches to target Hi-AP from current MME, according to KASMEObtain CK and IK, and pass through
Described target Hi-AP is sent to described SGSN；When UE is switched to current MME from described source Hi-AP, according to the random value generating
NONCEMME, and CK and IK receiving, obtain KASME.
PDCP COUNT can also be included and set up module 51 in corresponding target Hi-AP, for connecing from source as described UE
When access point switches to current Hi-AP, the value according to described START constructs PDCP COUNT, wherein, the value conduct of described START
Described PDCP COUNT's is high 20, and low 12 use 0 of described PDCP COUNT are filled.
Further, this system can also include：HLR（Attaching position register）, for receiving described SGSN transmission
Certification request after respond described certification request, comprise UMTS authentication vector in described response message, specifically include：RAND、
AUTN, CK, IK and RES；Described SGSN sends request certification to UE after receiving the response message that described HLR sends and disappears
The authentication information carrying in breath, and described request certification message includes：RAND and AUTN.
The user equipment that a kind of system realizing two-way authentication that the present embodiment provides is comprised is in above-described embodiment three
Have been described in detail, therefore do not repeated.
By embodiments of the invention described above as can be seen that UE passes through to be analyzed to being currently accessed vertex type, if currently
When access point is LTE Hi access point, then enable in the identification processing module 42 execution mutual authentication process of embodiment three description
Authentication processing, with ensure legal UE can reliably access network, and AS key is regularly updated, when UE is from currently connecing
When access point switches to another access point, target access is encrypted the selection of algorithm for UE, is peace during access point switching
Entirely provide guarantee and improve communications security, provide enough safety assurances for eating dishes without rice or wine.
It should be noted that the implementing of the function realized of each processing module comprising in said system or entity
Mode has had a detailed description in each embodiment above, therefore repeats no more here.
Those skilled in the art can be understood that, for convenience and simplicity of description, only with above-mentioned each function
The division of module is illustrated, and in practical application, can distribute above-mentioned functions by different function moulds as desired
Block completes, and the internal structure of equipment will be divided into different functional modules, to complete all or part of work(described above
Energy.The specific work process of the system of foregoing description, equipment and module, may be referred to corresponding in preceding method embodiment
Journey, will not be described here.
It should be understood that disclosed system, apparatus and method in several embodiments provided herein, permissible
Realize by another way.For example, apparatus embodiments described above are only schematically, for example, described module
Divide, only a kind of division of logic function, actual can have other dividing mode when realizing, and for example multiple modules can be tied
Close or be desirably integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored, or do not execute.Another, shown or discussed
Coupling each other or direct-coupling or communication connection can be by some interfaces, the INDIRECT COUPLING of device or module or logical
Letter connects, and can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.
The above, the only present invention preferably specific embodiment, but protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto,
Any those familiar with the art the invention discloses technical scope in, the change or replacement that can readily occur in,
All should be included within the scope of the present invention.Therefore, protection scope of the present invention should be with scope of the claims
It is defined.
Claims (13)
1. a kind of method of two-way authentication is it is characterised in that include：
Acquisition is currently accessed vertex type；
If the vertex type that is currently accessed obtaining is the section supported Long Term Evolution LTE technology and can be fitted to 2G or 3G core net
Point, then user equipment (UE) ignore comparative result after the separation bit of the authentication management domain AMF in authentication verification code AUTN, or
Person, does not verify to the separation bit of AMF；And UE is straight after deducing acquisition encryption key CK and tegrity protection key IK
Connect as access layer secret key；
Wherein, the method also includes：
UE calculating determines that the updated value of key aliveness control parameter START is：Multiple carry corresponding multiple grouped datas and converge
High 20 of maximum PDCP count value in poly- agreement PDCP count value add 2；
If the value of current START is less than described updated value, the value of current START is updated to described updated value, otherwise when
The value of front START is constant, and the initial value of START is 0；
When the value of described START reaches threshold value, key set identifier KSI is set to invalid value, and CK and IK in USIM is deleted
Remove.
2. method according to claim 1 is it is characterised in that the step that described acquisition is currently accessed vertex type includes：
Obtain the type of current access point according to the message that Mobility Management Entity MME sends；
Or, determine the type of current access point according to the carrier frequency of current access point；
Or, obtaining the type of current access point from the cell broadcast messages of current access point；
Or, determine the type of current access point according to the mode of operation of UE；
Or, determine the type of current access point according to the ability that UE present mode is supported.
3. method according to claim 1 it is characterised in that described UE deduce obtain CK and IK after directly as
The process of access layer secret key specifically includes：
The random value RAND that universal subscriber identity module USIM of UE is passed through to receive calculates CK, IK and Expected Response value RES, and
Send to mobile device ME；
Described CK and IK is preserved the access layer secret key as UE by described ME, and the described RES receiving is sent to logical
Use packet wireless service support node SGSN；
SGSN receives described RES, and this RES is compared with the local RES receiving from attaching position register HLR preserving, if
Identical, then the CK and IK that described HLR sends is sent and preserve to the current access point of described UE, using being currently accessed as UE
The access layer secret key of point.
4. method according to claim 1 is it is characterised in that the method also includes：
When release connects, the value of current START is stored in ME；Or, shutdown when, described ME will store described in
The value of START is stored in described USIM, and upper once start shooting when, described ME reads described START's from described USIM
Value；
And/or,
When setting up radio resource control RRC connection, the value of the START in described ME is sent to the access point of UE, and
The value of START is high 20 as PDCP COUNT, and the remaining bit of described PDCP COUNT is with 0 filling.
5. method according to claim 1 is it is characterised in that the method also includes the processing procedure that UE switches, and
This process includes：
UE is switched to target Hi-AP as target access from the source Hi-AP as source access point, then：Source Hi-AP by CK,
The value of IK and START is sent to target Hi-AP, and target Hi-AP is using CK and IK receiving；Or, source Hi-AP is only by START
Value be sent to target Hi-AP, the triggering when START reaches threshold value regenerates the operation of CK and IK, and wherein, Hi-AP is institute
State the node held LTE technology and 2G or 3G core net can be fitted to；
Or,
UE is switched to target Hi-AP from source LTE system, then the MME of source LTE system is according to KASMEObtain CK and IK, and by Ck and IK
It is sent to target Hi-AP corresponding core net node SGSN；
Or,
UE is switched to target LTE system from source Hi-AP, then target LTE system MME is according to the random value NONCE generatingMME, and
CK and IK receiving, obtains KASME.
If 6. it is characterised in that target access is Hi-AP, the method also includes method according to claim 5：
Target access and described UE construct PDCP COUNT, wherein, the value conduct of described START according to the value of described START
Described PDCP COUNT's is high 20, and low 12 use 0 of described PDCP COUNT are filled.
7. a kind of user equipment is it is characterised in that include：
Access point type acquisition module, is currently accessed vertex type for obtaining；
Identification processing module, the vertex type that is currently accessed for obtaining in described access point type acquisition module is to support to drill for a long time
When entering LTE technology and the node of 2G or 3G core net can be fitted to, authentication management domain AMF's in authentication verification code AUTN
Comparative result is ignored after separating bit, or, the separation bit of AMF is not verified；And it is close deducing acquisition encryption
Directly as access layer secret key after key CK and tegrity protection key IK；
This equipment also includes：
Key aliveness control parameter determining module, the updated value for determining key aliveness control parameter START is：Multiple
Add 2 for high 20 that carry the maximum PDCP count value in corresponding multiple PDCP PDCP count value；And
If the value of current START is less than described updated value, the value of current START is updated to described updated value, otherwise currently
The value of START is constant, and the initial value of START is 0；
Key updating module, when the value of the START that described key aliveness control parameter determining module determines reaches threshold value, will
Key set identifier KSI is set to invalid value, and CK and IK in USIM is deleted.
8. equipment according to claim 7 it is characterised in that described access point type acquisition module include any one as follows
Individual module：
Message analysis submodule, the message for being sent according to MME obtains the type of current access point；
Carrier frequency analysis module, for determining the type of current access point according to the carrier frequency of current access point；
Broadcast analysis module, for obtaining the type of current access point from the cell broadcast messages of current access point；
Working pattern analysis module, for determining the type of current access point according to the mode of operation of itself；
Capability analysis module, for determining the type of current access point according to the ability that itself present mode is supported.
9. equipment according to claim 7 is it is characterised in that this equipment also includes：
Key aliveness control parameter management module, for when release connects, storing the value of current START；Or, for
During shutdown, receive the value of described START that described ME sends and simultaneously stored, upper once start shooting when, by the value of described START
Send to described ME；
And/or,
Data transmission blocks, for when setting up radio resource control RRC connection, the value of the START in described ME being sent out
Give the access point of described UE；PDCP COUNT constructing module, for inciting somebody to action when setting up radio resource control RRC connection
The value of START is high 20 as PDCP COUNT, and the remaining bit of described PDCP COUNT is with 0 filling.
10. a kind of system realizing two-way authentication is it is characterised in that include the user equipment described in any one of claim 7 to 9
UE, SGSN and access point apparatus, described access point equipment is the node supported LTE technology and can be fitted to 2G or 3G core net
Equipment, described UE is passed through described access point equipment access network and is communicated with described SGSN.
11. systems according to claim 10 are it is characterised in that this system also includes：
The random value RAND that universal subscriber identity module USIM of described UE is passed through to receive calculates CK, IK and Expected Response value
RES, and send to mobile device ME；
Described CK and IK is preserved the access layer secret key as UE by described ME, and the described RES receiving is sent to institute
State SGSN；
Described SGSN receives described RES, and this RES is compared with the local RES receiving from HLR preserving, if identical, by institute
State the CK that HLR sends and IK and send and preserve to the current access point of described UE, using the access layer secret key as current access point.
12. systems according to claim 10 or 11 are it is characterised in that this system also includes：Source Hi-AP, target Hi-AP
And the MME in LTE system, wherein, Hi-AP be described in hold LTE technology and the node of 2G or 3G core net can be fitted to, and：
Described source Hi-AP, for when UE is switched to target Hi-AP from current Hi-AP, the value of CK, IK and START being sent to
Target Hi-AP, or, only START is sent to target Hi-AP；
Described target Hi-AP, for when UE switches over, receive source Hi-AP transmission the value of CK, IK and START when straight
Connect and enable described CK and IK, or, when only receiving source Hi-AP transmission START, trigger again when START reaches threshold value
Generate the operation of CK and IK；
Described MME, for when UE switches to target Hi-AP from current MME, according to KASMEObtain CK and IK, and pass through described mesh
Mark Hi-AP is sent to described SGSN；When UE is switched to current MME from described source Hi-AP, according to the random value generating
NONCEMME, and CK and IK receiving, obtain KASME.
13. systems according to claim 10 are it is characterised in that described target Hi-AP also includes：
PDCP COUNT sets up module, for when described UE switches to current Hi-AP from source access point, according to described START
Value construction PDCP COUNT, wherein, the value of described START is high 20 as described PDCP COUNT, described PDCP
Low 12 use 0 of COUNT are filled.
Priority Applications (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201210400768.9A CN103781069B (en) | 2012-10-19 | 2012-10-19 | Bidirectional-authentication method, device and system |
| PCT/CN2013/085602 WO2014059947A1 (en) | 2012-10-19 | 2013-10-21 | Bidirectional authentication method, device and system |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201210400768.9A CN103781069B (en) | 2012-10-19 | 2012-10-19 | Bidirectional-authentication method, device and system |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN103781069A CN103781069A (en) | 2014-05-07 |
| CN103781069B true CN103781069B (en) | 2017-02-22 |
Family
ID=50487589
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201210400768.9A Active CN103781069B (en) | 2012-10-19 | 2012-10-19 | Bidirectional-authentication method, device and system |
Country Status (2)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN103781069B (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2014059947A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (11)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN106341816B (en) * | 2016-08-31 | 2019-09-24 | 上海寰创通信科技股份有限公司 | A kind of authenticated configuration method applied to business WIFI system |
| CN108810890B (en) | 2017-05-05 | 2019-06-11 | 华为技术有限公司 | Anchor key generation method, equipment and system |
| CN107426185A (en) * | 2017-06-22 | 2017-12-01 | 北京佰才邦技术有限公司 | A kind of communication means and system |
| US11071021B2 (en) * | 2017-07-28 | 2021-07-20 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Security key derivation for handover |
| CN109511113B (en) * | 2017-07-28 | 2020-04-14 | 华为技术有限公司 | Security implementation method, related device and system |
| CN112738804B (en) | 2017-11-17 | 2021-12-21 | 华为技术有限公司 | Safety protection method and device |
| CN109819439B (en) * | 2017-11-19 | 2020-11-17 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method for updating key and related entity |
| CN108064039B (en) * | 2018-02-11 | 2021-05-25 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Method, device and computer storage medium for acquiring IP address |
| CN110583001B (en) * | 2018-04-10 | 2022-05-17 | 联发科技（新加坡）私人有限公司 | Method, apparatus and computer readable storage medium for error KSI handling in mobile communications |
| CN110913393B (en) * | 2018-09-15 | 2021-09-07 | 华为技术有限公司 | Switching method and terminal equipment |
| CN110831000B (en) * | 2019-10-31 | 2023-04-07 | 迈普通信技术股份有限公司 | Secure access method, device and system |
Citations (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101203030A (en) * | 2006-12-13 | 2008-06-18 | 联想(北京)有限公司 | Apparatus and method for identifying authority by mobile terminal multi-mode protocol stack |
Family Cites Families (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101600205B (en) * | 2009-07-10 | 2011-05-04 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method and related device for accessing SIM card user equipment to evolution network |
| US8897751B2 (en) * | 2011-03-14 | 2014-11-25 | Alcatel Lucent | Prevention of eavesdropping type of attack in hybrid communication system |
-
2012
- 2012-10-19 CN CN201210400768.9A patent/CN103781069B/en active Active
-
2013
- 2013-10-21 WO PCT/CN2013/085602 patent/WO2014059947A1/en active Application Filing
Patent Citations (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101203030A (en) * | 2006-12-13 | 2008-06-18 | 联想(北京)有限公司 | Apparatus and method for identifying authority by mobile terminal multi-mode protocol stack |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
| Title |
|---|
| 3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE), Security architecture (Release 10);3GPP;《3GPP TSGSSA》;20120630;第6.1.1节，第6.1.2节 * |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN103781069A (en) | 2014-05-07 |
| WO2014059947A1 (en) | 2014-04-24 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN103781069B (en) | Bidirectional-authentication method, device and system | |
| CN104854892B (en) | Method and apparatus for deriving wlan security context from WWAN security context | |
| US11863982B2 (en) | Subscriber identity privacy protection against fake base stations | |
| CN108966220B (en) | A kind of method and the network equipment of secret key deduction | |
| US10637858B2 (en) | Key-derivation verification in telecommunications network | |
| CN101715188B (en) | A kind of update method of air interface key and system | |
| TWI332345B (en) | Security considerations for the lte of umts | |
| CN103945376B (en) | The wireless device and method that re-cipher key is carried out in the case where reducing packet loss conditions for high throughput wireless communication | |
| US11297492B2 (en) | Subscriber identity privacy protection and network key management | |
| CN109600804A (en) | A kind of methods, devices and systems of safeguard protection | |
| US8565433B2 (en) | Method and system for managing air interface key | |
| WO2019096075A1 (en) | Method and apparatus for message protection | |
| CN109691156B (en) | Base station, mobility management entity and operation method thereof | |
| WO2009152759A1 (en) | Method and device for preventing loss of network security synchronization | |
| EP2648437B1 (en) | Method, apparatus and system for key generation | |
| US20220279471A1 (en) | Wireless communication method for registration procedure | |
| WO2020056433A2 (en) | SECURE COMMUNICATION OF RADIO RESOURCE CONTROL (RRC) REQUEST OVER SIGNAL RADIO BEARER ZERO (SRBo) | |
| CN109819439B (en) | Method for updating key and related entity | |
| WO2013152740A1 (en) | Authentication method, device and system for user equipment | |
| BR112020000870A2 (en) | method of data transmission, device and system related to it | |
| CN101867931A (en) | Device and method for realizing non access stratum in wireless communication system | |
| CN101820622B (en) | The method and system of managing empty mapping keys in wireless communication system | |
| CN102378168B (en) | The method of multisystem core net notice key and multisystem network | |
| US20220417750A1 (en) | Wireless network switching method and device | |
| WO2012159356A1 (en) | Method, apparatus and system for simplifying wireless local area network authentication |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| C06 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| C10 | Entry into substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| C14 | Grant of patent or utility model | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant |