CN103702406A - Cooperative user power and rate control method based on game theory in heterogeneous network - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention relates to a cooperative user power and rate control method based on a game theory in a heterogeneous network. By using the game theory for mathematical modeling and adding interference coexistence analysis related knowledge, a power and rate control game algorithm suitable for a heterogeneous network environment is provided. The method considers justice among users; since the algorithm introduces a cost function mechanism in a revenue function, not only can the problem of interference among different users and different systems be reflected, but also the problem of transmission rate and transmitted power justice among the users is considered. The cooperative user power and rate control method based on the game theory in the heterogeneous network has the advantages that the transmitted power is higher and the transmission rate justice is greatly improved under the situation of a small loss of revenues.

Description

In heterogeneous network based on game theoretic federated user rate and power control method

Technical field

The present invention relates to radio resource management techniques, particularly relate in heterogeneous network based on game theoretic federated user rate and power control method.

Background technology

In the communication system that multisystem coexists now, different service types requires data transmission rate different, needs effective power to control to reduce transmitting power, extending battery life.Due to the existence of disturbing, frequency spectrum share has realistic meaning for all participants' actual benefit maximizing behavior and the analysis of the mutual decision-making relation between user again.At present under the prerequisite of the mutual interference co-existence of heterogeneous network, how to utilize game theory to carry out rational power control and rate-allocation to user, thereby the research that effectively improves the availability of frequency spectrum mainly comprises non-cooperative power and controls game (Non-cooperative Power control Game, NPG) algorithm, but this algorithm is only simple power to be controlled, the transmission rate that it has been generally acknowledged that user is fixed value, in community, each user is " selfishness " in this case, be that they only can the continuous transmitting power that improves oneself maximize the revenue function of oneself.NPG model does not fully take into account the fairness between user, does not embody the interference that other users produce for targeted customer in revenue function yet.

Summary of the invention

The present invention proposes a kind of non-cooperation joint Power and speed of introducing cost function mechanism in revenue function and control game playing algorithm, proposed a kind of new cost function, introduce the cost function mechanism of speed aspect, also considered the situation of inter-system interference simultaneously.Improved algorithm by strict mathematical proof, has been discussed existence and the uniqueness of this betting model Nash Equilibrium, has provided the detailed realization flow of algorithm simultaneously, and by simulating, verifying the validity of algorithm.

Object of the present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions:

In heterogeneous network, based on game theoretic federated user rate and power control method, comprise the steps:

1) cognitive user access network;

2) survey and whether have idle frequency range; If exist, whether monitor channel there is the access of authorized user, does not exist and returns to step 1:

3), if there is not authorized user access network, again monitor;

4) transmitting power, transmission rate, cost function and revenue function are carried out to initialization, make k=0;

5) utilize initialization transmitting power, transmission rate and cost function, calculate Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio SINR and user's revenue function;

6) drawn revenue function and previous step profit function are contrasted, if current revenue function value is larger, finish; If current revenue function value is less, continue;

7) upgrade Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio and cost function;

8) make k=k+1;

9) enter step 5.

10) cognitive user exits network

The invention has the advantages that: the present invention has introduced cost function mechanism in revenue function, has not only solved the interference problem between different user, different system, also taken into account the fairness problem of transmission rate and transmitting power between user.Transmitting power of the present invention aspect is higher, makes transmission rate fairness aspect obtain very large improvement in the situation that of a small amount of income of loss simultaneously.

The object of the invention is to control game technical scheme in order to propose a kind of power and speed being suitable under heterogeneous network environment.This technical scheme has not only been considered the fairness between user, scheme has been introduced cost function mechanism in revenue function, not only embody the interference problem between different user, different system, also considered the fairness problem of transmission rate and transmitting power between user.

Accompanying drawing explanation

Fig. 1: control method flow chart of the present invention;

Fig. 2: along with the comparison of the distance users signal interference ratio of change of distance;

Fig. 3: the comparison of the present invention and document algorithm transmitting power;

Fig. 4: the comparison of the present invention and document algorithm transmission rate;

Fig. 5: the comparison of the present invention and document algorithm revenue function;

Fig. 6: system capacity loss result figure in interference co-existence situation.

Embodiment

Be illustrated in figure 1 in heterogeneous network based on game theoretic federated user rate and power control method flow diagram.This control method comprises the steps:

1) cognitive user access network;

2) survey and whether have idle frequency range; If exist, whether monitor channel there is the access of authorized user, does not exist and returns to step 1:

3) enter next step, if there is not authorized user access network, again monitor;

4) initialization: k=0, before starting algorithm, carries out initialization to transmitting power, transmission rate, cost function and revenue function;

5) calculate revenue function: utilize initialization transmitting power, transmission rate and cost function, calculate Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio SINR and user's revenue function;

6) relatively: drawn revenue function and previous step profit function are contrasted, if current revenue function value is larger, finish; If current revenue function value is less, continue;

7) upgrade: upgrade Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio and cost function;

8)k=k+1；

9) enter step 5.

10) cognitive user exits network.

Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing, technical solution of the present invention is described in detail.The model of studying is herein a wireless communication system being coexisted by FDD and TDD, total K community in disturbed system FDD system, N user, total K in EVAC (Evacuation Network Computer Model) TDD system ^tindividual community, N ^tindividual user.In j community, i user's signal interference ratio expression formula is:

${\mathrm{SIR}}_{\mathrm{ij}}={\mathrm{\γ}}_{\mathrm{ij}}=\frac{W}{r_{\mathrm{ij}}}\·\frac{h_{\mathrm{ij}}{p}_{\mathrm{ij}}}{\underset{\underset{k\≠i}{k=1}}{\overset{N\left(j\right)}{\mathrm{\Σ}}}{h}_{\mathrm{kj}}{p}_{\mathrm{kj}}+\mathrm{\μ}\underset{\underset{s\≠j}{s=1}}{\overset{K}{\mathrm{\Σ}}}\underset{k=1}{\overset{N\left(s\right)}{\mathrm{\Σ}}}{h}_{\mathrm{ks}}{p}_{\mathrm{ks}}+\underset{s=1}{\overset{K^T}{\mathrm{\Σ}}}\underset{k=1}{\overset{N^T\left(s\right)}{\mathrm{\Σ}}}{h}_{\mathrm{ks}}{p}_{\mathrm{ks}}/\mathrm{ACIR}+{\mathrm{\σ}}^2},\∀i\∈N,j\∈K---\left(1\right)$

Wherein, W is system bandwidth; User i, (i ∈ N) apart from base station j, the distance d of (j ∈ K) _ijrepresent; r _ijand p _ijthe message transmission rate and the transmitting power that represent respectively i user in j community; If channel matrix is expressed as H _ij={ h _ij, h wherein _ijrepresent in j community that i user is to the channel gain of this cell base station, its expression formula is

μ is inter-cell interference factor, and general value is μ ∈ [0,1]; ACIR is adjacent-channel interference ratio; σ ²for user's receiving terminal additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) power.

In fact between all users, all have interference factor μ ', its scope should be μ ' ∈ [0,1].In document (Efficient power control via pricing in wireless data networks), interference factor is made as to μ=μ '=1.But because this cell base station of user distance of peripheral cell is far away, signal is except normal loss, the signal that also can exist other factors such as shadow fading to cause weakens, the user of Er Zhe community is due to nearer apart from base station, only consider loss herein, the interference factor of Jiang Zhe community is made as 1, and the interference factor of outer community is less than 1.

Because user is desirably under can the method for salary distribution, optimize oneself through-put power and data rate, make maximum revenue.Therefore this revenue function not only will depend on SIR and power, also should depend on speed:

1) fixed transmission power, revenue function should increase with the increase of SIR;

2) fixing SIR, revenue function should reduce with the increase of transmitting power;

3) constant transmissions speed, revenue function should increase with the increase of SIR;

4) fixing SIR, revenue function should increase with the increase of transmission rate.

By the known revenue function of above-mentioned requirements be one with transmission rate and SIR are directly proportional, transmitting power is inversely proportional to function, owing to considering that nonlinear function can make research too complicated, therefore herein by the linear function of nonlinear function optimization, so revenue function can be write as following form:

$u_{\mathrm{ij}}=\frac{r_{\mathrm{ij}}=\ln \left(K{\mathrm{\γ}}_{\mathrm{ij}}\right)}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}}---\left(2\right)$

Wherein K is the parameter relevant with qos requirement, can be by regulating parameter K to reach the required QoS object of user, and its expression formula is:

$K=\frac{e^{f\left({\mathrm{\γ}}_{\mathrm{ij}}\right)}}{{\mathrm{\γ}}_{\mathrm{ij}}}$

From formula 3, also can find out, adjust parameter K and also can reach adjustment bit error rate p _eobject.The physical significance of whole revenue function be user under high as far as possible SIR condition, constantly adjust own transmitting power and transmission rate so that the interests maximization of oneself.

Based on above deficiency, NPRGP model proposes cost function c _ij:

c _ij=αβ _ijh _ijp _ij （4）

β wherein _ijfor the fairness factor of rate-allocation between user in this paper, the expression formula of this factor is:

${\mathrm{\β}}_{\mathrm{ij}}=\frac{|r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T-r_{\mathrm{ij}}|}{r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T}---\left(5\right)$

In formula,

represent the Theoretical Rate value that this user should distribute according to actual conditions; r _ijthe transmission rate value that represents this user's reality.Fairness factor β _ijas a parameter, be incorporated in cost function, object is that to allow the large user of fairness punish more, and the user that fairness is little punishes few.So just can embody the fair principle of variety classes user aspect rate-allocation.Wherein α is adjustable constant, can control cost function by adjusting the size of α, obtains the revenue function in ideal simultaneously, need meet the following conditions:

$\mathrm{\α}\·\max \left[\frac{|r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T-r_{\mathrm{ij}}|}{r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T}\right]\≤1---\left(6\right)$

Therefore revenue function becomes:

$u_{\mathrm{ij}}^c=u_{\mathrm{ij}}-c_{\mathrm{ij}}=\frac{r_{\mathrm{ij}}\ln \left(K{\mathrm{\γ}}_{\mathrm{ij}}\right)}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}}-\mathrm{\α}{\mathrm{\β}}_{\mathrm{ij}}{h}_{\mathrm{ij}}{p}_{\mathrm{ij}}---\left(7\right)$

Under 3 interference co-existence conditions based on game theoretic federated user rate and power control

In order to prove that algorithm of the present invention is that the non-cooperation joint Power of feasible standard is controlled and the game playing algorithm of rate-allocation, needs to prove that this algorithm meet following theorem.Proof procedure is as follows:

Theorem 1(is about the Nash Equilibrium existence theorem of transmission rate) in NPRGP game

in, for transmission rate, there is Nash Equilibrium $r^{*}=({\mathrm{<figure-callout\; id="11"\; label="r"\; filenames="HDA0000449968700000031.png"\; state="\{\{state\}\}">r</figure-callout>}}_{11}^{*},{\mathrm{<figure-callout\; id="21"\; label="r"\; filenames="HDA0000449968700000022.png"\; state="\{\{state\}\}">r</figure-callout>}}_{21}^{*},\&CenterDot;\&CenterDot;\&CenterDot;,{\mathrm{<figure-callout\; id="1"\; label="r\; N"\; filenames="HDA0000449968700000011.png,HDA0000449968700000012.png"\; state="\{\{state\}\}">r</figure-callout>}}_N^1,\&CenterDot;\&CenterDot;\&CenterDot;r_{\mathrm{NK}}^{*}).$

Proof: the existence condition of Nash Equilibrium is:

(1) R _ijit is the subset in the protruding Euclidean space Ω of tight non-NULL;

(2)

at R _ijcontinuously upper, and for r _ijthat secondary is recessed.

Policy space about speed is tight convex set, so meet first condition, existing only need proves that revenue function is the concave function about speed, and provable revenue function exists Nash Equilibrium about speed.First calculate

c is about r _ijsingle order partial derivative:

$\frac{{\&PartialD;u}_{\mathrm{ij}}^c}{{\&PartialD;r}_{\mathrm{ij}}}=\frac{\&PartialD;(\frac{r_{\mathrm{ij}}\ln \left({\mathrm{K\&gamma;}}_{\mathrm{ij}}\right)}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}}-\mathrm{\&alpha;}\frac{|r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T-r_{\mathrm{ij}}|}{r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T}{h}_{\mathrm{ij}}{p}_{\mathrm{ij}})}{{\&PartialD;r}_{\mathrm{ij}}}=\frac{(\ln \left({\mathrm{K\&gamma;}}_{\mathrm{ij}}\right)-1)}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}}\&PlusMinus;\frac{{\mathrm{\&alpha;h}}_{\mathrm{ij}}{p}_{\mathrm{ij}}}{r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T}---\left(8\right)$

Note: when

$\frac{\&PartialD;u_{\mathrm{ij}}^c}{\&PartialD;r_{\mathrm{ij}}}=\frac{(\ln \left(K{\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{\mathrm{ij}}\right)-1)}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}}+\frac{\mathrm{\&alpha;}{h}_{\mathrm{ij}}{p}_{\mathrm{ij}}}{r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T};$

If

$\frac{\&PartialD;u_{\mathrm{ij}}^c}{\&PartialD;r_{\mathrm{ij}}}=\frac{(\ln \left(K{\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{\mathrm{ij}}\right)-1)}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}}-\frac{\mathrm{\&alpha;}{h}_{\mathrm{ij}}{p}_{\mathrm{ij}}}{r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T}.$

If revenue function is about r _ijbe concave function, can find iptimum speed value

$r_{\mathrm{ij}}^{*}=\frac{\&PartialD;u_{\mathrm{ij}}^c}{\&PartialD;r_{\mathrm{ij}}}=\frac{(\ln \left(K{\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{\mathrm{ij}}\right)-1)}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}}\&PlusMinus;\frac{\mathrm{\&alpha;}{h}_{\mathrm{ij}}{p}_{\mathrm{ij}}}{r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T}=0---\left(9\right)$

about r _ijsecond-order partial differential coefficient be calculated as follows:

$\frac{{\&PartialD;}^2{u}_{\mathrm{ij}}^c}{\&PartialD;r_{\mathrm{ij}}^2}=\frac{(\ln \left(K{\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{\mathrm{ij}}\right)-1)}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}}=-\frac{1}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}{r}_{\mathrm{ij}}^T}<0---\left(10\right)$

Obviously, revenue function about r _ijbe secondary concave function, therefore proved Nash Equilibrium

existence.

Theorem 2(is about the Nash Equilibrium uniqueness theorem of transmission rate) ^[7]if a certain revenue function

for concave function, if it exists Nash Equilibrium, and its policy space is tight non-NULL convex set, if there is a nonnegative constant x _i, make it strictly recessed for diagonal angle, this Nash Equilibrium has uniqueness so.

Proof: according to game theory, the weight of definition user revenue function and:

$\mathrm{\&sigma;}(\stackrel{\&RightArrow;}{R},\stackrel{\&RightArrow;}{X})=\underset{i=1}{\overset{N}{\mathrm{\&Sigma;}}}{x}_i{u}_{\mathrm{ij}}^c(r_{\mathrm{ij}},r_{-\mathrm{ij}})---\left(11\right)$

About this weight and pseudo-gradient can be expressed as:

$f_j(\stackrel{\&RightArrow;}{R},\stackrel{\&RightArrow;}{X})={[x_1\&dtri;u_{1j}(r_{1j},r_{-1j}),\&CenterDot;\&CenterDot;\&CenterDot;,x_N\&dtri;u_{\mathrm{Nj}}(r_{\mathrm{Nj}},r_{-\mathrm{Nj}})]}^T---\left(12\right)$

Can be in the hope of the pseudo-gradient about transmission rate

1≤i wherein, k≤N:

$B_{\mathrm{ik}}=\left\{\begin{array}{cc}{x}_i\frac{{\&PartialD;}^2{u}_{\mathrm{ij}}^c}{\&PartialD;r_{\mathrm{ij}}\&PartialD;r_{\mathrm{kj}}}=-\frac{x_i}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}{r}_{\mathrm{ij}}}<0& i=k\\ x_i\frac{{\&PartialD;}^2{u}_{\mathrm{ij}}^c}{\&PartialD;r_{\mathrm{ij}}\&PartialD;r_{\mathrm{kj}}}=0& i\&NotEqual;k\end{array}\right.---\left(\text{13}\right)$

Therefore

for pair of horns battle array, wherein diagonal element is negative.Simultaneously

also be diagonal matrix, therefore according to document Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games,

strictly recessed for diagonal angle, therefore proved the uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium transmission rate.

Theorem 3(is about the Nash Equilibrium existence theorem of transmitting power) in NPRGP game

in, for transmitting power, there is Nash Equilibrium $p^{*}=({\mathrm{<figure-callout\; id="11"\; label="p"\; filenames="HDA0000449968700000031.png"\; state="\{\{state\}\}">p</figure-callout>}}_{11}^{*},{\mathrm{<figure-callout\; id="21"\; label="p"\; filenames="HDA0000449968700000022.png"\; state="\{\{state\}\}">p</figure-callout>}}_{21}^{*},\&CenterDot;\&CenterDot;\&CenterDot;,{\mathrm{<figure-callout\; id="1"\; label="p\; N"\; filenames="HDA0000449968700000011.png,HDA0000449968700000012.png"\; state="\{\{state\}\}">p</figure-callout>}}_N^1,\&CenterDot;\&CenterDot;\&CenterDot;,p_{\mathrm{NK}}^{*})$

Proof: the proof with the Nash Equilibrium existence about transmission rate is identical, also must meet two conditions that document Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games proposes.Due between the policy space value of each user's transmitting power is, therefore can know that the policy space about transmitting power is tight convex set, so meet first condition, now only needing proof revenue function is the concave function about transmitting power, and provable revenue function exists Nash Equilibrium about transmitting power.First calculate

c is about p _ijsingle order partial derivative:

$\frac{\&PartialD;u_{\mathrm{ij}}^c}{\&PartialD;p_{\mathrm{ij}}}=\frac{\&PartialD;(\frac{r_{\mathrm{ij}}\ln \left(K{\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{\mathrm{ij}}\right)}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}}-\mathrm{\&alpha;}\frac{|r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T-r_{\mathrm{ij}}|}{r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T}{h}_{\mathrm{ij}}{p}_{\mathrm{ij}})}{\&PartialD;r_{\mathrm{ij}}}=\frac{r_{\mathrm{ij}}(1-\ln \left(K{\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{\mathrm{ij}}\right))}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}^2}-\mathrm{\&alpha;}\frac{|r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T-r_{\mathrm{ij}}|}{r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T}{h}_{\mathrm{ij}}---\left(14\right)$

If revenue function is about p _ijbe concave function, can find iptimum speed value

$p_{\mathrm{ij}}^{*}=\frac{\&PartialD;u_{\mathrm{ij}}^c}{\&PartialD;p_{\mathrm{ij}}}=\frac{r_{\mathrm{ij}}(1-\ln \left(K{\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{\mathrm{ij}}\right))}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}^2}-\mathrm{\&alpha;}\frac{|r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T-r_{\mathrm{ij}}|}{r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T}{h}_{\mathrm{ij}}=0---\left(15\right)$

Calculate below

about p _ijsecond-order partial differential coefficient:

$\frac{{\&PartialD;}^2{u}_{\mathrm{ij}}^c}{\&PartialD;p_{\mathrm{ij}}^2}=\frac{\&PartialD;(\frac{r_{\mathrm{ij}}(1-\ln \left(K{\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{\mathrm{ij}}\right))}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}^2}-\mathrm{\&alpha;}\frac{|r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T-r_{\mathrm{ij}}|}{r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T}{h}_{\mathrm{ij}})}{\&PartialD;p_{\mathrm{ij}}}=\frac{r_{\mathrm{ij}}[2\ln \left(K{\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{\mathrm{ij}}\right)-3]}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}^3}<0---\left(\text{16}\right)$

Obviously, revenue function

about p _ijbe secondary concave function, therefore proved Nash Equilibrium

existence.

Theorem 4(is about the Nash Equilibrium uniqueness theorem of transmitting power) if each about p _ijstrictly concave function, each at p _-ijin be convex function and work as

about p _ijconcave function, so

negative definite, wherein

be

jacobi function.

According to theorem 3, define herein user's revenue function weight and:

$\mathrm{\&sigma;}(\stackrel{\&RightArrow;}{P},\stackrel{\&RightArrow;}{X})=\underset{i=1}{\overset{N}{\mathrm{\&Sigma;}}}{x}_i{u}_{\mathrm{ij}}^c(p_{\mathrm{ij}},p_{-\mathrm{ij}})---\left(17\right)$

About this weight and pseudo-gradient can be expressed as:

$f_j(\stackrel{\&RightArrow;}{P},\stackrel{\&RightArrow;}{X})={[x_1\&dtri;u_{1j}(p_{1j},p_{-1j}),\&CenterDot;\&CenterDot;\&CenterDot;{,x}_N\&dtri;u_{\mathrm{Nj}}(p_{\mathrm{Nj}},p_{-\mathrm{Nj}})]}^T---\left(18\right)$

Know from the above

at p _ijin be strict recessed, in addition:

$\frac{\&PartialD;u_{\mathrm{ij}}^c}{\&PartialD;p_{\mathrm{sj}}}{|}_{s\&NotEqual;i}=-\frac{r_{\mathrm{ij}}}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}}\frac{h_{\mathrm{sj}}}{\underset{\underset{\underset{k\&NotEqual;i}{k\&NotEqual;s}}{k=1}}{\overset{N}{\mathrm{\&Sigma;}}}{h}_{\mathrm{kj}}{p}_{\mathrm{kj}}+h_{\mathrm{sj}}{p}_{\mathrm{sj}}+{\mathrm{\&sigma;}}^2}---\left(19\right)$

$\frac{{\&PartialD;}^2{u}_{\mathrm{ij}}^c}{\&PartialD;p_{\mathrm{sj}}^2}{|}_{s\&NotEqual;i}=\frac{r_{\mathrm{ij}}}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}}\frac{h_{\mathrm{sj}}^2}{{(\underset{\underset{k\&NotEqual;i}{\underset{k\&NotEqual;s}{k=1}}}{\overset{N}{\mathrm{\&Sigma;}}}{h}_{\mathrm{kj}}{p}_{\mathrm{kj}}+h_{\mathrm{sj}}{p}_{\mathrm{sj}}+{\mathrm{\&sigma;}}^2)}^2}---\left(20\right)$

More than proved at p _-ijin be convex function.Below right

ask p _ijsecond dervative:

$\frac{{\mathrm{\&sigma;}}^2(\stackrel{\&RightArrow;}{P},\stackrel{\&RightArrow;}{X})}{\&PartialD;p_{\mathrm{ij}}^2}=\underset{i=1}{\overset{N}{\mathrm{\&Sigma;}}}{x}_i{r}_{\mathrm{ij}}\left[\frac{2\ln \left(K{\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{\mathrm{ij}}\right)-3}{p_{\mathrm{ij}}^3}\right]<0---\left(21\right)$

Above formula can be found out about p _ijconcave function, therefore provable

it is negative definite.So the weight of revenue function and

be that diagonal angle is strictly recessed, therefore the Nash Equilibrium about transmitting power is exactly unique.

Control method of the present invention is carried out to simulation analysis, in simulation analysis, set TDD and FDD for being total to replace mode, distance between two base stations is 100m, disturbed system is FDD system, EVAC (Evacuation Network Computer Model) is TDD system, has 10 users and is randomly dispersed in community, and base station is positioned at the central authorities of each community, radius of society is 500m, has descendingly set the Theoretical Rate value r that each user should distribute according to actual conditions _ij=[95kbps, 88kbps, 80kbps, 73kbps, 65kbps, 58kbps, 52kbps, 45kbps, 38kbps, 30kbps], make the user of near distance obtain higher transmission rate, the user of distance obtains lower transmission rate, thereby more effectively utilizes Internet resources.Each user's peak transfer rate

minimum transmission rate is

maximum transmission power is

minimum emissive power is transmission bandwidth is W=10 ⁶hz, additive white Gaussian noise power (AWGN) is σ ²=5 * 10 ^-15watts/Hz, interference factor

c=0.097, g _ijthe gain of the interfering link producing to base station for this user, therefore adopt and h _ijthe same model.

K=0.21886。Simple in order to analyze, set constant λ=1.6 * 10 ¹⁰.Totally 5 of EVAC (Evacuation Network Computer Model) users, are randomly dispersed in community, have descendingly set the Theoretical Rate value that each user should distribute according to actual conditions $r_{\mathrm{ij}}^T=[72\mathrm{kbps},63\mathrm{kbps},54\mathrm{kbps},45\mathrm{kbps},36\mathrm{kbps}],$ All the other parameters are with identical above.

NPRGP and revenue function signal interference ratio that the present invention proposes are 12.42, and the setting of the two signal interference ratio is all can guarantee user's proper communication just, guarantees target SIR, as shown in Figure 2.

In document Energy-Efficient Joint Power and Rate Control via Pricing in Wireless Data Networks, used and identical herein utility function, different is the cost function of only having considered power aspect in the document, and does not introduce the cost function mechanism of speed aspect.Therefore below the algorithm in NPRGP in this paper and the document is analyzed.Fig. 3 is the comparison of the present invention and document (Energy-Efficient Joint Power and Rate Control via Pricing in Wireless Data Networks) algorithm transmitting power, Fig. 4 is the comparison of the present invention and document (Energy-Efficient Joint Power and Rate Control via Pricing in Wireless Data Networks) algorithm transmission rate, and Fig. 5 is the comparison of the present invention and document (Energy-Efficient Joint Power and Rate Control via Pricing in Wireless Data Networks) algorithm revenue function.From Fig. 3 to 5, can find out, NPRGP algorithm is herein slightly high aspect transmitting power, but makes transmission rate fairness aspect obtain very large improvement in the situation that of a small amount of income of loss, has reached the object of this algorithm.

Finally consider the NPRGP algorithm under isomery scene, owing to there is no at present that document matching an antithetical couplet closes that power is controlled and speed is controlled at and carries out correlative study under isomery scene, so do not provide the comparing result of this algorithm and other algorithms herein.So main to adding the capacity after system interference to assess herein, the way of mainly using for reference in 3GPP is studied.Coexisting in research of LTE, need the relation of analogue system relative capacity loss and ACIR.Wherein, the loss of the system average size of employing 5% is as the assessment level of the external system maximum interference that can bear.In emulation, need to calculate respectively system average size when having external system disturb and disturb without external system, by considering that above-mentioned volume change obtains relative capacity loss situation, formula is as follows:

$\mathrm{TP}\_\mathrm{loss}=1-\frac{{\mathrm{TP}}_{\mathrm{ave}-m}}{{\mathrm{TP}}_{\mathrm{ave}-s}}$

Wherein,

TP_loss represents to add external system to disturb the damaed cordition of power system capacity afterwards;

TP _ave-mwhile representing not have external system to disturb, system average size;

TP _ave-swhile representing to add external system to disturb, the average size of disturbed system.

Fig. 6 is the system capacity loss under interference co-existence condition.If the system capacity loss when not having external system to disturb is 0.As can be seen from the figure, when ACIR value hour, system capacity loss is greater than system average level; Along with the increase of ACIR, system capacity loss declines gradually and approaches system average level.For coexisting between assurance system, system capacity loss should be lower than 5%.

Should be appreciated that the above detailed description of technical scheme of the present invention being carried out by preferred embodiment is illustrative and not restrictive.Those of ordinary skill in the art modifies reading the technical scheme that can record each embodiment on the basis of specification of the present invention, or part technical characterictic is wherein equal to replacement; And these modifications or replacement do not make the essence of appropriate technical solution depart from the spirit and scope of various embodiments of the present invention technical scheme.

Claims (1)

1. In heterogeneous network based on game theoretic federated user rate and power control method, it is characterized in that, this control method comprises the steps:

   1) cognitive user access network;

   2) survey and whether have idle frequency range; If exist, whether monitor channel there is the access of authorized user, does not exist and returns to step 1:

   3), if there is not authorized user access network, again monitor;

   4) transmitting power, transmission rate, cost function and revenue function are carried out to initialization, make k=0;

   5) utilize initialization transmitting power, transmission rate and cost function, calculate Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio SINR and user's revenue function;

   6) drawn revenue function and previous step profit function are contrasted, if current revenue function value is larger, finish; If current revenue function value is less, continue;

   7) upgrade Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio and cost function;

   8) make k=k+1;

   9) enter step 5;

   10) cognitive user exits network.

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