CN103618995B - Position privacy protection method based on dynamic pseudonyms - Google Patents
Position privacy protection method based on dynamic pseudonyms Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a position privacy protection method based on dynamic pseudonyms. The position privacy protection method mainly overcomes the defect that the position privacy protection degree in an existing position pseudonym method based on position services is too low. The position privacy protection method comprises the steps that a communication system composed of users, a credible mechanism and a service provider is built; the system is initialized through the credible mechanism; the users sign in the credible mechanism on line to obtain public and private keys; the credible mechanism updates the pseudonyms and pseudonym certificates of the users regularly; the users use the dynamic pseudonyms to request position services from the service provider; the service provider provides service data for legal users and requests the credible mechanism to revoke malicious users; the legal users obtain the position service data. According to the position privacy protection method, identity anonymity is achieved by using the dynamic pseudonyms, the relation between identity information and spatiotemporal information is cut off, and therefore it is difficult for the service provider to speculate position information of the specific users by means of side information, position privacy of the users is protected effectively, and the position privacy protection method can be used for position privacy protection based on the position services in social networking services.
Description
Technical field:
The invention belongs to radio network technique field, it is related to the protection of location privacy, can be applicable to perimeter query, navigation clothes
The fields such as business.
Background technology:
Social networks, is as the application of the internet such as email, bbs, blog, microblogging and that organic growth is got up is anti-
Reflect a kind of form of social interaction colony, be provide one share in crowd the information such as interest, hobby, state and activity
Line platform.With the popularization of multiple mobile device such as smart mobile phone, vehicle mobile terminals, and the application of sensing network technology, make
Access social networks with mobile terminal device to become more and more popular, mobile social networking is increasingly becoming main flow.Existed according to Nelson
2013 2 months issue up-to-date report show, at present the whole world exceed half social network user by the mobile devices such as mobile phone Lai
Access social networks.In all applications of mobile social networking, the application based on location-based service is very popular.Either tradition
Weather forecast prompting, gps navigation information, or twitter, facebook, foursquare, wechat etc. application be obtained for
Widely pay close attention to and develop.Using the mobile social networking based on location-based service, user can more accurately and efficiently same surrounding
People or thing set up the social networks circle of oneself, thus better blending into surrounding environment.
However, user enjoy mobile social networking convenient when, its privacy is likely to be exposed to incredible the
Tripartite.For example, user passes through mobile phone to one request of service provider transmission in office, to inquire about from oneself current location
Near hospital, in such a scenario, user may reveal oneself current positional information, i.e. location privacy, Yi Jiyou simultaneously
Other relevant informations that position is released, including health status, social status etc.；And if user uses gps navigation software, then can
Continuously the positional information of oneself is sent to service provider, so, in addition to leaking above-mentioned privacy, also can let out
Leakage user is in the motion track of certain time, the information such as schedule.Therefore, user needs to face a selection: on the one hand, uses
Family need to service provider provide more accurate position could obtain high-quality based on location-based service；On the other hand, essence
True positional information can leak the privacy of user again.Exactly because these misgivings are so that a lot of potential user is to using based on position
The mobile social networking putting service is hung back.
Either government, industrial quarters or academia, has all given very big concern to this problem.Such as European commission
Pass through " privacy and electronic communication method ", the Privacy Protection that electronic communication is processed during personal data gives clear and definite method
Rule regulation；Operator's aspect, Waduven of one of maximum mobile communication carrier in the whole world has also worked out a set of privacy management business
Regulations；And in academia, this problem has also obtained extensive research.
Some common at present location privacy protection schemes mainly have the method anonymous based on position and based on the side obscuring
Method.In the method anonymous based on position, the actual position of user cannot be distinguished due to being hidden in several positions.
In this kind of method, k- anonymity is a kind of widely used degree of privacy criterion.When the position of user is hidden in k
In position and each position be considered as actual position probability equal when, just reached k- anonymous.Traditional centralized position
Putting anonymous methods needs to rely on after the position that k neighbouring user provides in service request is mixed by trusted third party again
Send request to service provider anonymous to reach k-.However, because trusted third party grasps the positional information of whole users,
Once by assault, in system, the privacy of whole users will be compromised.In order to eliminate the dependence to trusted third party, kido etc.
People proposes distributed position anonymous methods first, produces fictitious users by user oneself and reaches k- anonymity, to eliminate
Dependence to trusted third party.Yet with service provider grasp a large amount of sides information, the information of user is then limited, this letter
The imbalance of breath leads to user to be difficult to oneself produce the fictitious users information to service provider with enough hidings.Therefore use
Family oneself selects the method for fictitious users to be difficult to veritably reach the anonymous secret protection degree of k-.Based on the method obscured it is
Location fuzzy is carried out by technology such as position skew, Location quantizations, thus being consulted and request to Service Operation with inaccurate position
Ask service.But the reduction that inaccurately can lead to service quality of positional information, must adapt to the degree of the Fuzzy Processing of position
The requirement of service quality, when quality of service requirement is higher, the fog-level of position is restricted, and just obtaining positional information can not be subject to
To enough protections.In sum, position leakage to a certain extent is still resulted in using above two method.
In above-mentioned two class methods, the assumed name that usual user is remained unchanged for a long period of time using pet name etc. in request replaces oneself true
Real identity, to prevent true identity and positional information from being connected by attacker.However, user meet in public, talk,
The activity such as bankcard consumption may result in the leakage in particular moment true identity and position for the user, if attacker is by these sides
Information and the information obtaining from user's request combine and are analyzed, and the long-term assumed name of user and the relation of true identity can
Can reveal, so long-term assumed name performs practically no function.So, observed by long-term, the position that user reveals can be recorded by attacker
Corresponded to its true identity, thus analyzing other privacy informations of user.
Content of the invention
Present invention aims to the deficiency of above-mentioned prior art is it is proposed that a kind of position based on dynamic assumed name is hidden
Private guard method, constantly changes assumed name and assumed name certificate by using family when to service provider request location-based service, realizes
Effectively identity anonymous, the cut-out positional information of user and the contact of identity information, improve the degree of privacy of user.
For achieving the above object, the present invention comprises the steps:
(1) set up a communication system framework being made up of user, trust authority ta, service provider, wherein:
User, is communicated with trust authority ta and service provider by 3g or 4g Cellular Networks or wifi；
Trust authority ta is it is assumed that being believable and only needing timing to be responsible for registration and the use of user and service provider online
The granting of family assumed name certificate；
Service provider, the request of receive user simultaneously provides related location-based service for it；
(2) for above-mentioned communication system, initialized respectively,
(2a) trust authority ta generates the rsa public-key cryptosystem public and private key pair that key length is 1024, wherein, public
Key is pkta, private key is skta, select sha-256 as one-way Hash function h ()；
(2b) trust authority ta is selected and is issued assumed name certificate cycle t, and the request frequency according to user and privacy requirements choosing
Fix time well width δ t, makes the term of validity of all assumed name certificates be equal to δ t, then trust authority ta is issuing assumed name certificate cycle t
The number issuing assumed name certificate to each user is inside needed to be n=t/ δ t；
(2c) trust authority ta announces described pk to communication systemta, h (), t, δ t and n；
(3) user uiRegister personal information to trust authority ta, obtain rsa system public and private key pairWith
(4) trust authority ta is to user uiGranting assumed name message:
(4a) for user ui, when needing to trust authority ta request certificate, user uiSend one and use trust authority ta
Public key pktaCarry out the request message of rsa encryptionWherein,It is user uiIdentity mark
Know,It is that user uses oneself private keyTo identityThe rsa signature carrying out, r ' is 128 pseudorandoms
Number, t is current timestamp, | | represent Connection operator symbol；
(4b) trust authority ta receives user uiRequest message and user uiPublic key verifications its signature after, carry out as
Lower operation:
(4b1) it is user uiSelect two Hash seedsWithBy itself and user uiIdentityGenerate
User recordAnd preserve；
(4b2) it is user uiGenerate the assumed name of j-th time slotWherein, j=1,
2 ..., n, n represent the assumed name number that trust authority ta is provided every time to user,It is according to user uiKazakhstan
Uncommon seedCarry out the hash chain of j Hash operation nesting generation,It is according to user uiKazakhstan
Uncommon seedCarry out the hash chain of n+1-j Hash operation nesting generation；
(4b3) to each assumed nameWith its corresponding effective deadline etjCarry out rsa signature and obtain assumed name
Corresponding assumed name certificate:Wherein, etj=et0+ j δ t, et0It is one and issue assumed name
The initial time of certificate cycle t, δ t represents the term of validity of each assumed name certificate；
(4b4) to initial time et0, n assumed nameAnd its correspond to assumed name certificateWith 128 pseudo random numbers
R ', as key, is encrypted using Advanced Encryption Standard aes and generates assumed name messageAnd be sent to
User ui；
(5) user uiAfter receiving assumed name message, obtain all of assumed name with 128 pseudo random number r ' decipheringAssumed name
CertificateWith initial time et0, according to initial time et0, user is by etj=et0+ j δ t calculates j-th assumed name certificateEffective deadline etj, and preserve all of assumed nameAssumed name certificateWith effective deadline etj；
(6) user uiUsing assumed nameAssumed name certificateWith generation service requests such as current location information loc
Message, and it is sent to service provider；
(7) service provider receives user uiService request information after, check assumed nameLegitimacy, if assumed nameLegal, then execution step (8), if assumed nameIllegal, then stop to user uiService request information rung
Should；
(8) service provider inspection user uiWith the presence or absence of the malicious act of Denial of Service attack, if user is uiThere is not evil
Meaning behavior, service provider finds out required service data data for user, and with 128 pseudo random numbers rjTo service data
Data, current timestamp t1, and service provider is to t1SignatureCarry out aes encryption, obtain service reply and disappear
BreathReturn to user ui, execution step (9), if user is uiThere is malicious act, service provider
Request trust authority ta revocation user ui；
(9) user uiAfter the service of receiving replies message, with the public key pk of service providerspVerify its signature, if checking
Correctly, then user uses service data data, and otherwise, user re-executes step (6).
The present invention has the advantage that
1) present invention, due to making user constantly convert identity using dynamic assumed name, realizes more effective identity anonymous, cut-out
The contact of identity information and space time information, solves the privacy of user leakage problem due to causing using long-term assumed name, improves
The degree of privacy of user；
2) present invention to strengthen the workability of assumed name so that service provider is able to verify that hides due to pseudonymity certificate
The legitimacy of name user, thus cancel the assumed name of malicious user；
3) present invention due to make user at one's leisure between update and prestore assumed name, so that user is not needed in each request position
Assumed name is generated in real time, it is to avoid extra latency, thus ensure that user asks the efficient of location-based service to service provider during service
Property.
Brief description
Fig. 1 is the flowchart of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is the communication system framework being built with the present invention；
Fig. 3 is under service provider is carried out to privacy of user using varying number side information area speculating and attacks, with this
Invention emulates schematic diagram to the degree of protection of privacy of user.
Specific embodiments
The core concept of the present invention is to make user constantly convert identity by dynamic assumed name, realizes more effective identity and hides
Name, makes the space time information of user and identity information can not contact easily, improves privacy of user degree；Add assumed name certificate for assumed name
To strengthen the workability of assumed name, to make service provider be able to verify that the legitimacy of anonymous, and cancel malicious user.
With reference to Fig. 1, the location privacy protection method based on dynamic assumed name for the present invention, implementation step is as follows:
Step 1, sets up communication system framework.
With reference to Fig. 2, the communication system that this step is set up includes: user, trust authority ta, service provider.Wherein credible
Mechanism ta and service provider carry out two-way wired connection, and user and trust authority ta and service provider are all by 3g or 4g honeybee
Nest net or wifi are wirelessly connected.
Described user, comprises gps module, application module and three functional modules of certificate module；This gps module is used for obtaining
And the geographical location information of user is provided to application module, this application module is used for as user's request and receiving position service, should
Certificate module is used for applying for, store and manage assumed name and the assumed name certificate of user；
Described trust authority ta, comprises Registering modules, certificate module and revocation three functional modules of module；This Registering modules
It is responsible for registration and the key providing of user and service provider, this certificate module is responsible for user's assumed name and the life of assumed name certificate
Become and provide, this revocation module is responsible for the revocation of malicious user；Trust authority ta does not need to be maintained at line, simply exists, and registers mould
Block timing is online to process user's registration request, and certificate module timing carries out assumed name certificate issued online, and revocation module is according to system
Privacy and demand for security, may remain in line or timing be online.Trust authority ta is complete to user and service provider
Believable；
Described service provider, comprises database, application module and three functional modules of security module；This database is used for
Storage service data, this application module receive user location service request and be user's home position service data, this safe mould
Block is in order to monitor the malicious attack behavior of user, and jointly cancels malicious user with trust authority ta.Due to the service provider palm
Hold position, the service requirement information that user provides in service request information, and for commercial object, privacy of user may be believed
Breath betray to advertising company or may by assault, thus lead to privacy of user reveal, therefore service provider cannot not be complete
Entirely believable.
Step 2, trust authority ta initialization system, public address system parameter.
(2a) trust authority ta specify rsa public-key cryptosystem that above-mentioned communication system is 1024 using key length and
Key length is the aes DSE arithmetic of 128, generates the public and private key pair of rsa public-key cryptosystem for oneself, wherein,
Public key is pkta, private key is skta, select SHA sha-256 as one-way Hash function h () being used；
(2b) trust authority ta is selected and is issued assumed name certificate cycle t, and the request frequency according to user and privacy requirements choosing
Fix time well width δ t, makes the term of validity of all assumed name certificates be equal to δ t, then trust authority ta is issuing assumed name certificate cycle t
The number issuing assumed name certificate to each user is inside needed to be n=t/ δ t；
(2c) trust authority ta announces said system parameter pk to communication systemta, h (), t, δ t and n.
Step 3, user registers to trust authority ta, obtains public and private key.
(3a) user uiPublic key pk with trust authority tataBy its identity128 pseudorandoms producing with oneself
Number r carries out rsa encryption, obtains login request messageAnd send it to trust authority ta；
(3b), after trust authority ta receives login request message, it is user uiGenerate the public and private key pair of rsa system, wherein
Public key isPrivate key isThen using 128 pseudo random numbers r by the identity of userPublic keyAnd private keyCarry out aes encryption, replied messageAnd it is sent to user ui；
(3c) user uiWith 128 pseudo random numbers r to replying messageIt is decrypted, obtain it public
Private key pairWith
Step 4, trust authority ta provides assumed name and assumed name certificate to user.
(4a) for user ui, when needing to trust authority ta request certificate, user uiSend one and use trust authority ta
Public key pktaCarry out the request message of rsa encryptionWherein,It is user uiIdentity
Mark,It is that user uses oneself private keyTo identityThe rsa signature carrying out, r ' is that user oneself produces
128 pseudo random numbers, t is current timestamp, | | represent Connection operator symbol；
(4b) trust authority ta decrypted user uiRequest messageAnd user ui
Public keyVerify its signatureIf be proved to be successful, execution step (4c), otherwise, stop asking of response user
Seek message；
(4c) trust authority ta is user uiProvide assumed name and assumed name certificate, proceed as follows:
(4c1) it is user uiSelect two Hash seedsWithBy itself and user uiIdentityGenerate
User recordAnd preserve；
(4c2) it is user uiGenerate the assumed name of j-th time slotWherein, j=1,
2 ..., n, n represent the assumed name number that trust authority ta is provided every time to user,It is according to user uiKazakhstan
Uncommon seedCarry out the hash chain of j Hash operation nesting generation,It is according to user uiKazakhstan
Uncommon seedCarry out the hash chain of n+1-j Hash operation nesting generation；
(4c3) to each assumed nameWith its corresponding effective deadline etjPrivate key sk with oneselftaCarry out rsa label
Name obtains assumed nameCorresponding assumed name certificate:Wherein, etj=et0+ j δ t,
et0It is an initial time issuing assumed name certificate cycle t, δ t represents the term of validity of each assumed name certificate；
(4c4) to initial time et0, n assumed nameAnd its correspond to assumed name certificateWith 128 pseudo random numbers
R ', as key, generates assumed name message using after the encryption of Advanced Encryption Standard aesAnd send
To user ui.
Step 5, user's storage assumed name and assumed name certificate.
User uiDecipher assumed name message with 128 pseudo random number r ', obtain all of assumed nameAssumed name certificateWith initial time et0, according to initial time et0, user is by etj=et0+ j δ t calculates j-th assumed name certificateEffective deadline etj, and preserve all of assumed nameAssumed name certificateWith effective deadline etj.
Step 6, user utilizes assumed name to ask location-based service.
(6a) user uiWhen in j-th time slot, generate 128 pseudo random numbers rjAs temporary key, and generate
Query messagesWherein, loc represent user by gps module obtain current
Positional information, poi represents the demand for services type of user；
(6b) user uiBy query messages qjPublic key pk with service providerspCarry out rsa encryption, obtain service request and disappear
BreathAnd it is sent to service provider.
Step 7, service provider checks user's assumed name legitimacy.
Service provider decrypted user uiService request informationAfterwards, check assumed nameLegitimacy, that is,
Inspection user's assumed nameWhether provided and assumed name by trust authority taWhether it is added into blacklist, if assumed nameTo be provided and be not added into by trust authority ta blacklist, then assumed nameLegal, execution step 8, otherwise, assumed nameIllegal, stop to user uiService request information responded.
Step 8, service provider inspection user whether there is malicious act.
Service provider checks user uiWith the presence or absence of the malicious act of Denial of Service attack, if user is uiAt short notice
High frequency ground sends a large amount of service request information to service provider repeatedly, so that service provider is constantly responded thereto, and consumes
The system resource of service provider and the network bandwidth, cause service provider cannot normal work, then for malicious act, execute step
Rapid 10；If user is uiThere is not malicious act, execution step 9.
Step 9, service provider provides a user with service data.
Service provider finds out required service data data for user, with the private key sk of oneselfspTo current timestamp t1
Carry out rsa signature to obtainAnd with 128 pseudo random numbers rjTo service data data, current timestamp t1, and
To t1SignatureCarry out aes encryption, obtain service and reply messageReturn to user
ui, execution step 11.
Step 10, service provider request trust authority ta revocation user.
(10a) service provider is by user uiAssumed nameAssumed name certificateAnd effectively deadline etjSend
To trust authority ta；
(10b) trust authority ta calculates all users j-th time by the Hash seed in all user records
The assumed name of groove Wherein upIt is any user, It is according to user upHash
SeedCarry out the hash chain of j Hash operation nesting generation,It is according to user upHash
SeedCarry out the hash chain of n+1-j Hash operation nesting generation；
(10c) trust authority ta finds in all assumed names of above-mentioned generation and is reported assumed nameIdentical assumed name,
And then find for generating assumed nameThe user record belonging to Hash seedAgain by user ui's
IdentityAdd blacklist, no longer to uiCertificate；
(10d) trust authority ta is according to user uiTwo Hash seedsWithCalculate two hash chainsAnd by this two hash chain s1,jAnd s2,1It is sent to service provider；
(10e) service provider is according to hash chain s1,jHash chain s is obtained by k-j Hash operation nesting1,k=hk-j
(s1,j), according to hash chain s2,1Hash chain s is obtained by n-k Hash operation nesting2,n+1-k=hn-k(s2,1), thus being used
Family uiAll assumed names after j-th time slotWherein k=j+1, j+2 ..., n, and will
The assumed name obtaining adds blacklist.
Step 11, user's checking service replies message.
User uiThe service of receiving replies messageAfterwards, with 128 pseudo random numbers rjSolved
Close, and by the public key pk of service providerspVerify its signatureTo check the service receiving replies message whether to come
From service provider, if checking is correct, user uses service data data, otherwise, return to step 6.
Advantages of the present invention can be further illustrated by following emulation experiment:
1. experiment condition setting
1000 users are emulated on the area of a 10km × 10km by condition 1 using levy mobility model.If
Put the side information as attacker for the monitor area of varying number, the size of each monitor area is 500m × 500m, service fortune
Battalion business carries out to privacy of user speculating attack with reference to the service request information of side information and user.Random 20 users per minute to
Service provider asks service data, two hours of system operation.
Condition 2, in 1.228ghz omap4430 processor, the motorola of 1gb ram, android v4.0.4 system
Run time to the cryptographic algorithm used in the test present invention on xt885 smart mobile phone.
2. experiment content and result
Experiment 1, user when service of simulation operator carries out to user speculating attack using varying number side information area
Average privacy leakage probability, simulation result such as Fig. 3.From figure 3, it can be seen that service provider is randomly provided monitored space in map
During the quantity of domain, it is less than using the average privacy leakage probability of user during the present invention and realizes the anonymous fictitious users method of k-, therefore
The present invention fictitious users method more anonymous than realizing k- provides higher secret protection level.
Experiment 2, the efficiency executing the present invention to user is estimated.Because the mobile device computing capability of user is limited,
And consumption is compared in the operation of pseudo random number generation according to the present invention, aes encryption and decryption, rsa encryption and decryption, rsa signature and signature verification
When it is therefore desirable to measurement user executes the time-consuming of each step of the present invention.Above-mentioned time-consuming for obtaining, to the present invention on cell phone platform
The run time needed for each operation being related to is tested, result such as table 1, the class of operation performed by user in each step to the present invention
Type and number of times are counted, result such as table 2.
The test result of run time needed for table 1 each operation according to the present invention
The statistics of the type of the performed operation of user and number of times in each step of table 2 present invention
Can be drawn by Tables 1 and 2, user executes online registration, updates assumed name certificate and ask the time-consuming of location-based service
It is respectively 1.0469 milliseconds, 26.9223 milliseconds and 1.9069 milliseconds, above-mentioned taking can be accepted by cellphone subscriber.And,
User only need to carry out an online registration in new addition system, and updating assumed name certificate can also be carried out at one's leisure, will not give
User's increase additionally takes, and therefore the present invention has high efficiency.
Claims (3)
1. a kind of location privacy protection method based on dynamic assumed name, comprises the steps:
(1) set up a communication system framework being made up of user, trust authority ta, service provider, wherein:
User, is communicated with trust authority ta and service provider by 3g or 4g Cellular Networks or wifi；
Trust authority ta is believable and only needs the timing registration of responsible user and service provider and user's assumed name card online
The granting of book；
Service provider, the request of receive user simultaneously provides related location-based service for it；
(2) for above-mentioned communication system, initialized respectively,
(2a) trust authority ta specifies rsa public-key cryptosystem and the key that above-mentioned communication system is 1024 using key length
Length is the aes DSE arithmetic of 128, generates the public and private key pair of rsa public-key cryptosystem, wherein, public key for oneself
For pkta, private key is skta, select sha-256 as one-way Hash function h ()；
(2b) trust authority ta is selected and is issued assumed name certificate cycle t, and when the request frequency according to user and privacy requirements are selected
Between well width δ t, make all assumed name certificates the term of validity be equal to δ t, then trust authority ta issuing assumed name certificate cycle t domestic demand
Number from assumed name certificate to each user that to issue is n=t/ δ t；
(2c) trust authority ta announces described pk to communication systemta, h (), t, δ t and n；
(3) user uiRegister personal information to trust authority ta, obtain rsa system public and private key pairWith
(3a) user uiPublic key pk with trust authority tataBy its identity128 pseudo random numbers r producing with oneself
Carry out rsa encryption, obtain login request messageAnd send it to trust authority ta；
(3b), after trust authority ta receives login request message, it is user uiGenerate the rsa system that key length is 1024 public and private
Key pair, wherein public key arePrivate key isThen using 128 pseudo random numbers r by the identity of userPublic
KeyAnd private keyCarry out aes encryption, replied messageAnd it is sent to user ui；
(3c) user uiWith 128 pseudo random numbers r to replying message deciphering, obtain its public and private key pairWith
(4) trust authority ta is to user uiGranting assumed name message:
(4a) for user ui, when needing to trust authority ta request certificate, user uiSend one with trust authority ta public key
pktaCarry out the request message of rsa encryptionWherein,It is user uiIdentity mark
Know,It is that user uses oneself private keyTo identityThe rsa signature carrying out, r ' is one 128
Pseudo random number, t is current timestamp, | | represent Connection operator symbol；
(4b) trust authority ta receives user uiRequest message and user uiPublic key verifications its signature after, grasped as follows
Make:
(4b1) it is user uiSelect two Hash seedsWithBy itself and user uiIdentityGenerate
User recordAnd preserve；
(4b2) it is user uiGenerate the assumed name of j-th time slotWherein, j=1,2 ...,
N, n represent the assumed name number that trust authority ta is provided every time to user,It is according to user uiHash kind
SonCarry out the hash chain of j Hash operation nesting generation,It is according to user uiHash
SeedCarry out the hash chain of n+1-j Hash operation nesting generation；
(4b3) to each assumed nameWith its corresponding effective deadline etjCarry out rsa signature and obtain assumed nameCorresponding
Assumed name certificate:Wherein, etj=et0+ j δ t, et0It is one and issue assumed name card
The initial time of book cycle t, δ t represents the term of validity of each assumed name certificate；
(4b4) to initial time et0, n assumed nameAnd its correspond to assumed name certificateWith 128 pseudo random number r '
As key, encrypted using Advanced Encryption Standard aes and generate assumed name messageAnd be sent to
User ui；
(5) user uiAfter receiving assumed name message, obtain all of assumed name with 128 pseudo random number r ' decipheringAssumed name certificateWith initial time et0, according to initial time et0, user is by etj=et0+ j δ t calculates j-th assumed name certificateEffective deadline etj, and preserve all of assumed nameAssumed name certificateWith effective deadline
etj；
(6) user uiUsing assumed nameAssumed name certificateDisappear with generation service requests such as current location information loc
Breath, and it is sent to service provider；
(7) service provider receives user uiService request information after, check assumed nameLegitimacy, if assumed nameLegal, then execution step (8), if assumed nameIllegal, then stop to user uiService request information rung
Should；
(8) service provider inspection user uiWith the presence or absence of the malicious act of Denial of Service attack, if user is uiThere is not malice row
For, service provider finds out required service data data for user, and with 128 pseudo random numbers rjTo service data data, when
Front timestamp t1, and service provider is to t1SignatureCarry out aes encryption, obtain service and reply messageReturn to user ui, execution step (9), if user is uiThere is malicious act, i.e. user ui?
In short time, high frequency ground sends a large amount of service request information to service provider repeatedly, so that service provider constantly it is rung
Should, consume the system resource of service provider and the network bandwidth, cause service provider cannot normal work, then execution step
(10)；
(9) user uiAfter the service of receiving replies message, with the public key pk of service providerspVerify its signature, if checking is correct,
Then user uses service data data, and otherwise, user re-executes step (6)；
(10) service provider request trust authority ta revocation user ui:
(10a) service provider is by user uiAssumed nameAssumed name certificateAnd effectively deadline etjIt is sent to
Trust authority ta；
(10b) trust authority ta calculates all users in j-th time slot by the Hash seed in all user records
Assumed nameWherein upIt is any user,It is according to user upHash
SeedCarry out the hash chain of j Hash operation nesting generation,It is according to user up's
Hash seedCarry out the hash chain of n+1-j Hash operation nesting generation；
(10c) trust authority ta finds in all assumed names of above-mentioned generation and is reported assumed nameIdentical assumed name, enters
And find for generating assumed nameThe user record belonging to Hash seedAgain by user ui's
IdentityAdd blacklist, no longer to uiCertificate；
(10d) trust authority ta is according to user uiTwo Hash seedsWithCalculate two hash chainsWithAnd by this two hash chain s1,jAnd s2,1It is sent to service provider；
(10e) service provider is according to two hash chain s1,jAnd s2,1, obtain user uiAll vacations after j-th time slot
NameWherein k=j+1, j+2 ..., n, s1,k=hk-j(s1,j), s2,n+1-k=hn-k(s2,1),
And the assumed name obtaining is added blacklist；
Described user, comprises gps module, application module and three functional modules of certificate module；This gps module be used for obtain and to
Application module provides the geographical location information of user, and this application module is used for as user's request and receiving position service, this certificate
Module is used for applying for, store and manage assumed name and the assumed name certificate of user；
Described trust authority ta, comprises Registering modules, certificate module and revocation three functional modules of module；This Registering modules is responsible for
Management user and the registration of service provider and key providing, this certificate module be responsible for user's assumed name and assumed name certificate generation and
Provide, this revocation module is responsible for the revocation of malicious user；Trust authority ta does not need to be maintained at line, simply in Registering modules timing
The online user's registration that processes is asked, and certificate module timing carries out assumed name certificate issued online, and revocation module is according to the privacy of system
And demand for security, may remain in line or timing is online, trust authority ta is completely believable to user and service provider；
Described service provider, comprises database, application module and three functional modules of security module；This database is used for storing
Service data, this application module receive user location service request and be user's home position service data, this security module use
To monitor the malicious attack behavior of user, and jointly cancel malicious user with trust authority ta, grasped due to service provider and use
Position that family provides in service request information, service requirement information, and for commercial object, user privacy information may be gone out
Be sold to advertising company or may by assault, thus lead to privacy of user reveal, therefore service provider is not exclusively may be used
Letter.
2. method according to claim 1, wherein the user u described in step (6)iUsing assumed nameAssumed name certificateWith effective deadline etjGenerate service request information, carry out as follows:
(6a) user uiWhen in j-th time slot, generate 128 pseudo random numbers rjAs temporary key, and generate inquiry
MessageWherein, loc represents user current location information, and poi represents user
Demand for services；
(6b) user uiBy query messages qjPublic key pk with service providerspCarry out rsa encryption, obtain service request information
3. method according to claim 1, the wherein service provider described in step (7) receive user uiService request
After message, check assumed nameLegitimacy, be inspection user's assumed nameWhether provided by trust authority ta, and examine
Test assumed nameWhether it is added into blacklist, if assumed nameIt is to be provided and be not added into by trust authority ta black name
Single, then assumed nameLegal, otherwise, assumed nameIllegal.
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