CN103618995B - Position privacy protection method based on dynamic pseudonyms - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses a position privacy protection method based on dynamic pseudonyms. The position privacy protection method mainly overcomes the defect that the position privacy protection degree in an existing position pseudonym method based on position services is too low. The position privacy protection method comprises the steps that a communication system composed of users, a credible mechanism and a service provider is built; the system is initialized through the credible mechanism; the users sign in the credible mechanism on line to obtain public and private keys; the credible mechanism updates the pseudonyms and pseudonym certificates of the users regularly; the users use the dynamic pseudonyms to request position services from the service provider; the service provider provides service data for legal users and requests the credible mechanism to revoke malicious users; the legal users obtain the position service data. According to the position privacy protection method, identity anonymity is achieved by using the dynamic pseudonyms, the relation between identity information and spatiotemporal information is cut off, and therefore it is difficult for the service provider to speculate position information of the specific users by means of side information, position privacy of the users is protected effectively, and the position privacy protection method can be used for position privacy protection based on the position services in social networking services.
Description
The technical field is as follows:
the invention belongs to the technical field of wireless networks, relates to the protection of position privacy, and can be applied to the fields of peripheral inquiry, navigation service and the like.
Background art:
the social network is a form which naturally develops along with the application of Internet such as Email, BBS, blog, microblog and the like and reflects social communication groups, and is an online platform for sharing information such as interests, hobbies, states, activities and the like among the groups. With the popularization of various mobile devices such as smart phones and vehicle-mounted mobile terminals and the application of sensor network technology, the use of mobile terminal devices to access social networks is becoming more popular, and mobile social networks are becoming mainstream gradually. According to the latest report display published by nielsen in 2013, 2 months, more than half of social network users worldwide access the social network through mobile devices such as mobile phones at present. Among all applications of mobile social networks, applications based on location services are very popular. Whether traditional weather forecast prompts, GPS navigation information, or Twitter, Facebook, Foursquare, WeChat, etc., applications have received widespread attention and development. By utilizing the mobile social network based on the location service, the user can more accurately and efficiently establish a social network circle with surrounding people or objects, so that the user can be better integrated into the surrounding environment.
However, when a user enjoys mobile social network convenience, their privacy may also have been exposed to untrusted third parties. For example, a user sends a request to a service operator through a mobile phone in an office to inquire a hospital closest to the current location of the user, and in such a scenario, the user may simultaneously reveal the current location information of the user, i.e., the location privacy, and other related information derived from the location, including health status, social status, and the like; if the user uses the GPS navigation software, the user can continuously send the position information of the user to the service operator, so that the information such as the moving track, the schedule and the like of the user in a certain period of time can be leaked besides the privacy. Thus, the user needs to face a choice: on the one hand, a user needs to provide a more accurate location to a service operator to obtain a high-quality location-based service; on the other hand, accurate location information can again reveal the privacy of the user. It is because of these concerns that many potential users are prohibitive to mobile social networks using location-based services.
This problem is of great concern to governments, industries and academia. For example, the european commission has passed the "privacy and electronic communications act" to set clear legal requirements for privacy protection when dealing with personal data in electronic communications; in the aspect of operators, one of the largest global mobile communication operators vodafeng also makes a set of privacy management business rules; this problem has also been extensively studied in academia.
Some of the current common location privacy protection schemes are mainly location anonymity-based methods and confusion-based methods. In location anonymity based approaches, the user's true location cannot be distinguished as being hidden in several locations. In this type of approach, k-anonymity is a widely adopted measure of privacy. K-anonymity is achieved when the user's location is hidden in k locations and the probability of each location being considered a true location is equal. The traditional centralized location anonymization method needs to rely on a trusted third party to mix the locations provided by k adjacent users in a service request and then send the request to a service provider to achieve k-anonymity. However, since the trusted third party grasps the location information of all users, the privacy of all users in the system is revealed once hacked. In order to eliminate the dependence on the trusted third party, Kido et al first proposed a distributed location anonymization method, which achieves k-anonymity by the users themselves generating false users to eliminate the dependence on the trusted third party. However, since the service operator has a lot of side information and the information of the user is limited, the imbalance of the information causes that the user can hardly generate false user information which is hidden enough for the service operator. Therefore, the method that the user selects the false user by himself is difficult to really achieve the privacy protection degree of k-anonymity. The confusion-based approach is to perform location obfuscation through techniques such as location offset, location quantization, etc., to request services from service operators with inaccurate locations. However, the inaccuracy of the location information may cause the quality of service to be degraded, the degree of the blurring processing of the location must be adapted to the quality of service requirement, and when the quality of service requirement is high, the degree of the blurring of the location is limited, so that the location information cannot be sufficiently protected. In summary, the two methods still result in some leakage of the location.
In the above two methods, users usually use long-term unchangeable pseudonyms such as nicknames to replace their real identities when requesting, so as to prevent the real identities and location information from being linked by attackers. However, the activities of the user meeting, talking, swiping card consumption, etc. in public places may cause the leakage of the real identity and location of the user at a particular moment, and if an attacker analyzes these side information in combination with the information obtained from the user request, the relationship between the user's long-term pseudonym and the real identity may be leaked, so that the long-term pseudonym is similar to a dummy. Thus, through long-term observation, an attacker can correspond the location records revealed by the user with the real identity of the attacker, and further analyze other private information of the user.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a location privacy protection method based on dynamic pseudonyms aiming at the defects of the prior art, which realizes effective identity anonymity by continuously replacing pseudonyms and pseudonym certificates when a user requests location service from a service operator, cuts off the relation between location information and identity information of the user and improves the privacy degree of the user.
In order to achieve the above object, the present invention comprises the steps of:
(1) establishing a communication system framework consisting of a user, a Trusted Authority (TA) and a service operator, wherein:
the user communicates with the trusted authority TA and the service operator through a 3G or 4G cellular network or WiFi;
a trusted authority TA, which is assumed to be trusted and is only in charge of registering users and service operators and issuing user pseudonym certificates regularly and online;
the service operator receives the request of the user and provides the relevant position service for the user;
(2) for the above-mentioned communication system, the initialization is performed separately,
(2a) the trusted authority TA generates a public and private key pair of an RSA public key cryptosystem with a key length of 1024 bits, wherein the public key is pkTAThe private key is skTASelecting SHA-256 as a one-way hash function h (·);
(2b) the method comprises the steps that a trusted authority TA selects a pseudonym certificate issuing period T, a time slot width delta T is selected according to request frequency and privacy requirements of users, the valid periods of all pseudonym certificates are equal to delta T, and the number of pseudonym certificates which need to be issued to each user in the pseudonym certificate issuing period T by the trusted authority TA is N = T/delta T;
(2c) trusted authority TA publishes the pk to a communication systemTAH (-), T, Δ T and N;
(3) user uiRegistering personal information with trusted authority TA to obtain RSA system public and private key pairAnd
(4) trusted authority TA towards user uiAnd (3) issuing a pseudonym message:
(4a) for user uiWhen a certificate is requested from a trusted authority TA, user uiSending a trusted authority TA public key pkTARequest message for RSA encryptionWherein,is user uiThe identity of (2) is identified,is that the user uses his own private keyFor identity identificationPerforming RSA signature, r' is a 128-bit pseudo-random number, t is the current timestamp, | | represents a character connector;
(4b) trusted authority TA receives user uiUsing the request message of user uiAfter the signature of the public key is verified, the following operations are carried out:
(4b1) for user uiSelecting two hash seedsAndit is compared with user uiIdentification ofGenerating user recordsAnd storing;
(4b2) for user uiGenerating pseudonyms for the jth time slotWhere j =1,2, …, N represents the number of pseudonyms issued by trusted authority TA to the user at a time,is according to user uiHash seed ofNesting the generated hash chain by j times of hash operation,is according to user uiHash seed ofPerforming hash operation for N +1-j times to nest to generate a hash chain;
(4b3) for each pseudonymAnd its corresponding effective off-time ETjPerforming RSA signature to obtain pseudonymThe corresponding pseudonymous certificate:wherein, ETj=ET0+j·ΔT，ET0Is a starting time of a pseudonymous certificate issuing cycle T, Δ T representing the validity period of each pseudonymous certificate;
(4b4) for the starting time ET0N pseudonymsAnd its corresponding pseudonymous certificateGeneration of pseudonym messages using AES encryption with 128-bit pseudo-random number r' as keyAnd sends it to user ui；
(5) User uiAfter receiving the pseudonym message, decrypting by using 128-bit pseudo-random number r' to obtain all pseudonymsPseudonymous certificateAnd a starting time ET0According to the starting time ET0User through ETj=ET0+ j.DELTA.T to calculate the jthPseudonymous certificateEffective off-time ET ofjAnd save all the pseudonymsPseudonymous certificateAnd effective off-time ETj；
(6) User uiUsing pseudonymsPseudonymous certificateAnd current location information loc, etc. to generate a service request message and send it to a service operator;
(7) service operator receives user uiAfter the service request message, the pseudonym is checkedValidity of if pseudonymIf it is legal, go to step (8), if the pseudonym is trueIf it is illegal, stopping the user uiResponds to the service request message;
(8) service operator checking user uiWhether a malicious behavior of denial of service attack exists or not, if the user u exists, the user u performs malicious behavioriIn the absence of malicious activity, the service operator finds the DATA of the service required for the user and uses the 128-bit pseudo-random number rjFor service DATA DATA, current time stamp t1And service operator pair t1Is signedAES encryption is carried out to obtain service reply messageReturned to user uiStep (9) is executed, if the user uiIn the presence of malicious activity, the service operator requests the trusted authority TA to revoke the user ui；
(9) User uiAfter receiving the service reply message, using the public key pk of the service operatorSPThe signature thereof is verified, and if the verification is correct, the user uses the service DATA, otherwise, the user re-executes step (6).
The invention has the following advantages:
1) according to the invention, the dynamic pseudonym is used to enable the user to continuously change the identity, so that more effective identity anonymity is realized, the relation between identity information and time-space information is cut off, the problem of user privacy leakage caused by long-term pseudonym use is solved, and the privacy degree of the user is improved;
2) the invention enhances the usability of the pseudonym by using the pseudonym certificate, so that a service operator can verify the validity of the anonymous user, thereby revoking the pseudonym of the malicious user;
3) the invention ensures that the user updates and prestores the pseudonym in idle time, so that the user does not need to generate the pseudonym in real time when requesting the position service every time, and additional time delay is avoided, thereby ensuring the high efficiency of requesting the position service from a service operator by the user.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of an implementation of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a communication system framework constructed with the present invention;
fig. 3 is a schematic diagram illustrating the degree of protection of the user privacy by the present invention when a service provider speculatively attacks the user privacy by using different number of side information areas.
Detailed description of the preferred embodiments
The core idea of the invention is that the user continuously changes identity through dynamic pseudonyms, so that more effective identity anonymity is realized, the spatio-temporal information and the identity information of the user cannot be easily linked, and the privacy degree of the user is improved; pseudonym certificates are added to pseudonyms to enhance the usability of pseudonyms, so that service operators can verify the validity of anonymous users and revoke malicious users.
Referring to fig. 1, the location privacy protection method based on dynamic pseudonym of the present invention includes the following steps:
step 1, establishing a communication system framework.
Referring to fig. 2, the communication system established in this step includes: user, trusted authority TA, service operator. The trusted authority TA is in bidirectional wired connection with the service operator, and the user is in wireless connection with the trusted authority TA and the service operator through a 3G or 4G cellular network or WiFi.
The user comprises a GPS module, an application module and a certificate module; the GPS module is used for obtaining and providing the geographic position information of the user for an application module, the application module is used for requesting and receiving position service for the user, and the certificate module is used for applying, storing and managing a pseudonym and a pseudonym certificate of the user;
the trusted authority TA comprises a registration module, a certificate module and a revocation module; the registration module is responsible for managing registration and key issuing of users and service operators, the certificate module is responsible for generating and issuing pseudonyms and pseudonym certificates of the users, and the revocation module is responsible for revoking malicious users; the trusted authority TA does not need to be kept online, but only processes the user registration request regularly online, the certificate module regularly performs pseudonymous certificate issuing online, and the revocation module can be kept online or regularly online according to the privacy and security requirements of the system. The trusted authority TA is fully trusted to the user and the service operator;
the service operator comprises three functional modules, namely a database, an application module and a safety module; the database is used for storing service data, the application module receives a user position service request and returns position service data for a user, and the security module is used for monitoring malicious attack behaviors of the user and revoking the malicious user together with the trusted authority TA. The service operator is not fully trusted because the service operator grasps the location, service demand information, provided by the user in the service request message, and may sell user privacy information to an advertising company for business purposes or may be hacked, thereby causing the user privacy to be revealed.
And step 2, the trusted authority TA initializes the system and publishes system parameters.
(2a) The trusted authority TA stipulates that the communication system adopts an RSA public key cryptosystem with a key length of 1024 bits and an AES symmetric cryptosystem with a key length of 128 bits to generate a public-private key pair of the RSA public key cryptosystem for itself, wherein the public key is pkTAThe private key is skTASelecting a secure hash algorithm SHA-256 as the one-way hash function h (·);
(2b) the method comprises the steps that a trusted authority TA selects a pseudonym certificate issuing period T, a time slot width delta T is selected according to request frequency and privacy requirements of users, the valid periods of all pseudonym certificates are equal to delta T, and the number of pseudonym certificates which need to be issued to each user in the pseudonym certificate issuing period T by the trusted authority TA is N = T/delta T;
(2c) the trusted authority TA publishes the system parameter pk to the communication systemTAH (-), T, Δ T and N.
And 3, registering the user with the trusted authority TA to obtain the public and private keys.
(3a) User uiWith public key pk of trusted authority TATAIdentify itRSA encryption is carried out with the 128 bit pseudo random number r generated by the user to obtain a registration request messageAnd sends it to trusted authority TA;
(3b) after receiving the registration request message, the trusted authority TA gives the user uiGenerating a public-private key pair of RSA system, wherein the public key isThe private key isThe user's identity is then identified using a 128-bit pseudo-random number rPublic keyAnd a private keyAES encryption is carried out to obtain a reply messageAnd sends it to user ui；
(3c) User uiReplying to messages with 128-bit pseudorandom number r pairsDecrypting to obtain its public and private key pairAnd
and 4, the trusted authority TA issues the pseudonym and the pseudonym certificate to the user.
(4a) For user uiWhen a certificate is requested from a trusted authority TA, user uiSending a trusted authority TA public key pkTARequest message for RSA encryptionWherein,is user uiThe identity of (2) is identified,is that the user uses his own private keyFor identity identificationPerforming RSA signature, wherein r' is a 128-bit pseudo-random number generated by a user, t is a current time stamp, | | represents a character connector;
(4b) trusted authority TA decryption user uiRequest message ofAnd use user uiOf (2) a public keyVerify its signatureIf the verification is successful, executing the step (4 c), otherwise, stopping responding to the request message of the user;
(4c) trusted authority TA as user uiIssuing a pseudonym and a pseudonym certificate, and performing the following operations:
(4c1) for the useruiSelecting two hash seedsAndit is compared with user uiIdentification ofGenerating user recordsAnd storing;
(4c2) for user uiGenerating pseudonyms for the jth time slotWhere j =1,2, …, N represents the number of pseudonyms issued by trusted authority TA to the user at a time,is according to user uiHash seed ofNesting the generated hash chain by j times of hash operation,is according to user uiHash seed ofPerforming hash operation for N +1-j times to nest to generate a hash chain;
(4c3) for each pseudonymAnd its corresponding effective off-time ETjUsing its own private key skTAPerforming RSA signature to obtain pseudonymThe corresponding pseudonymous certificate:wherein, ETj=ET0+j·ΔT，ET0Is a starting time of a pseudonymous certificate issuing cycle T, Δ T representing the validity period of each pseudonymous certificate;
(4c4) for the starting time ET0N pseudonymsAnd its corresponding pseudonymous certificateGenerating a pseudonym message after encryption by using advanced encryption standard AES (advanced encryption Standard) by using 128-bit pseudo-random number r' as a keyAnd sends it to user ui。
And 5, storing the pseudonym and the pseudonym certificate by the user.
User uiDecrypting the pseudonym message with 128-bit pseudo-random number r' to obtain all pseudonymsPseudonymous certificateAnd a starting time ET0According to the starting time ET0User through ETj=ET0+ j.DELTA.T calculation of the jth pseudonymous certificateEffective off-time ET ofjAnd save all the pseudonymsPseudonymous certificateAnd effective off-time ETj。
And 6, the user requests the location service by using the pseudonym.
(6a) User uiDuring the j time slot, a 128-bit pseudo random number r is generatedjAs a temporary key, and generating a query messageThe method comprises the following steps that loc represents current position information obtained by a user through a GPS module, and poi represents a service requirement type of the user;
(6b) user uiWill inquire about the message QjUsing the public key pk of the service operatorSPPerforming RSA encryption to obtain service request messageAnd sent to the service operator.
And 7, the service operator checks the validity of the pseudonym of the user.
Service operator decrypting user uiService request message ofAfter that, the pseudonym is checkedBy checking the validity of the user pseudonymWhether issued by trusted authority TA and pseudonymWhether it is blacklisted, if it is a pseudonymIf the name is issued by the trusted authority TA and is not added into the blacklist, the pseudonymLegal, go to step 8, otherwise, pseudonymIllegal, stop to user uiResponds to the service request message.
And 8, the service operator checks whether the user has malicious behaviors.
Service operator checking user uiWhether a malicious behavior of denial of service attack exists or not, if the user u exists, the user u performs malicious behavioriRepeatedly sending a large number of service request messages to a service operator at high frequency in a short time, enabling the service operator to continuously respond to the service request messages, consuming system resources and network bandwidth of the service operator, causing the service operator to be incapable of working normally, and executing a step 10 if the service operator is a malicious behavior; if user uiAnd if no malicious behavior exists, executing step 9.
Step 9, the service operator provides the service data to the user.
The service operator finds out the DATA of the required service for the user and uses its own private key skSPFor the current time stamp t1Performing RSA signature derivationUsing 128-bit pseudo random numbers r in combinationjFor service DATA DATA, current time stamp t1And to t1Is signedAES encryption is carried out to obtain service reply messageReturned to user uiStep 11 is performed.
Step 10, the service operator requests the trusted authority TA to revoke the user.
(10a) The service operator willUser uiIs a pseudonym ofPseudonymous certificateAnd effective off-time ETjSending the information to a trusted authority TA;
(10b) the trusted authority TA calculates the pseudonyms of all users in the jth time slot through the Hash seeds in all user records Wherein u ispIs a function of any user or users of the system, is according to user upHash seed ofPerforming hash operation nesting generation for j timesThe hash chain of (a) is set,is according to user upHash seed ofPerforming hash operation for N +1-j times to nest to generate a hash chain;
(10c) the trusted authority TA finds and reports the pseudonym among all the pseudonyms generated aboveThe same pseudonym, and then found for generating the pseudonymThe hash seed ofThen user u is sentiIdentification ofAdd to black list, no longer to uiIssuing a certificate;
(10d) trusted authority TA according to user uiTwo hash seeds ofAndcomputing two hash chainsAnd combines the two hash chains S1,jAnd S2,1Sending to a service operator;
(10e) service operator according to hash chain S1,jHash chain S is obtained through k-j times of Hash operation nesting1,k=hk-j(S1,j) According to a hash chain S2,1By N-k timesSimultaneous operation nesting to obtain hash chain S2,N+1-k=hN-k(S2,1) Thereby obtaining user uiAll pseudonyms after the jth time slotWhere k = j +1, j +2, …, N, and the resulting pseudonym is added to the blacklist.
Step 11, the user authenticates the service reply message.
User uiReceiving a service reply messageThen, using 128-bit pseudo random number rjDecrypted and passed the public key pk of the service operatorSPVerify its signatureTo check whether the received service reply message comes from the service operator and, if verified correctly, the user uses the service DATA, otherwise, to return to step 6.
The advantages of the present invention can be further illustrated by the following simulation experiments:
1. experimental conditions set
Condition 1, 1000 subscribers were simulated using the Levy mobile model over a 10km × 10km area. Setting different numbers of monitoring areas as side information of attackers, wherein the size of each monitoring area is 500m multiplied by 500m, and service operators carry out conjecture attack on the privacy of users by combining the side information and service request messages of the users. At random 20 users per minute request service data from the service operator and the system runs for two hours.
Condition 2, run time for testing the cryptographic algorithms used in the present invention on a motorola xt885 smartphone, 1.228GHz OMAP4430 processor, 1GB RAM, Android v4.0.4 system.
2. Contents and results of the experiments
Experiment 1, simulation service operators use different numbers of side information areas to carry out the average privacy disclosure probability of users when carrying out the speculative attack on the users, and the simulation result is as shown in fig. 3. As can be seen from fig. 3, when the service operator randomly sets the number of monitoring areas in the map, the average privacy disclosure probability of the user is lower than that of the k-anonymous false user method when the method is adopted, so that the method provides a higher privacy protection level than that of the k-anonymous false user method.
Experiment 2, the efficiency of the user in performing the invention was evaluated. Due to the limited computing power of the user's mobile device, the time consuming operations involved in the present invention of pseudo-random number generation, AES encryption/decryption, RSA signature, and signature verification are time consuming, and therefore require a measure of the time consumed by the user to perform the steps of the present invention. In order to obtain the above time consumption, the running time required by each operation related to the present invention is tested on the mobile phone platform, the result is shown in table 1, and the type and the number of times of the operation performed by the user in each step of the present invention are counted, and the result is shown in table 2.
TABLE 1 test results of run times required for various operations to which the present invention relates
TABLE 2 statistics of the types and times of user-performed operations in the various steps of the present invention
As can be seen from tables 1 and 2, the time taken for the user to perform online registration, update the pseudonymous certificate, and request the location service is 1.0469 ms, 26.9223 ms, and 1.9069 ms, respectively, which are acceptable to the cell phone user. Moreover, the user only needs to perform online registration once when newly joining the system, the pseudonymous certificate can be updated in an idle state, and extra time consumption is not increased for the user, so the method and the system have high efficiency.
Claims (3)
1. A location privacy protection method based on dynamic pseudonyms comprises the following steps:
(1) establishing a communication system framework consisting of a user, a Trusted Authority (TA) and a service operator, wherein:
the user communicates with the trusted authority TA and the service operator through a 3G or 4G cellular network or WiFi;
the trusted authority TA is trusted and is only in regular online charge of registration of users and service operators and issuance of user pseudonym certificates;
the service operator receives the request of the user and provides the relevant position service for the user;
(2) for the above-mentioned communication system, the initialization is performed separately,
(2a) the trusted authority TA stipulates that the communication system adopts an RSA public key cryptosystem with a key length of 1024 bits and an AES symmetric cryptosystem with a key length of 128 bits to generate a public-private key pair of the RSA public key cryptosystem for itself, wherein the public key is pkTAThe private key is skTASelecting SHA-256 as a one-way hash function h (·);
(2b) the method comprises the steps that a trusted authority TA selects a pseudonym certificate issuing period T, a time slot width delta T is selected according to request frequency and privacy requirements of users, the valid periods of all pseudonym certificates are enabled to be equal to delta T, and the number of pseudonym certificates to be issued to each user by the trusted authority TA in the pseudonym certificate issuing period T is N which is T/delta T;
(2c) trusted authority TA publishes the pk to a communication systemTAH (-), T, Δ T and N;
(3) user uiRegistering personal information with trusted authority TA to obtain RSA system public and private key pairAnd
(3a) user uiWith public key pk of trusted authority TATAIdentify itRSA encryption is carried out with the 128 bit pseudo random number r generated by the user to obtain a registration request messageAnd sends it to trusted authority TA;
(3b) after receiving the registration request message, the trusted authority TA gives the user uiGenerating a public and private key pair of RSA system with the key length of 1024 bits, wherein the public key isThe private key isThe user's identity is then identified using a 128-bit pseudo-random number rPublic keyAnd a private keyAES encryption is carried out to obtain a reply messageAnd sends it to user ui；
(3c) User uiDecrypting the reply message by using 128-bit pseudo random number r to obtain the public and private key pair thereofAnd
(4) trusted authority TA towards user uiAnd (3) issuing a pseudonym message:
(4a) for user uiWhen a certificate is requested from a trusted authority TA, user uiSending a trusted authority TA public key pkTARequest message for RSA encryptionWherein,is user uiThe identity of (2) is identified,is that the user uses his own private keyFor identity identificationPerforming RSA signature, r' is a 128-bit pseudo-random number, t is the current timestamp, | | represents a character connector;
(4b) trusted authority TA receives user uiUsing the request message of user uiAfter the signature of the public key is verified, the following operations are carried out:
(4b1) for user uiSelecting two hash seedsAndit is compared with user uiIdentification ofGenerating user recordsAnd storing;
(4b2) for user uiGenerating pseudonyms for the jth time slotWhere j is 1,2, …, N indicates the number of pseudonyms issued to the user by the trusted authority TA each time,is according to user uiHash seed ofNesting the generated hash chain by j times of hash operation,is according to user uiHash seed ofPerforming hash operation for N +1-j times to nest to generate a hash chain;
(4b3) for each pseudonymAnd its corresponding effective off-time ETjPerforming RSA signature to obtain pseudonymThe corresponding pseudonymous certificate:wherein, ETj＝ET0+j·ΔT，ET0Is a starting time of a pseudonymous certificate issuing cycle T, Δ T representing the validity period of each pseudonymous certificate;
(4b4) for the starting time ET0N pseudonymsAnd its corresponding pseudonymous certificateGeneration of pseudonym messages using AES encryption with 128-bit pseudo-random number r' as keyAnd sends it to user ui；
(5) User uiAfter receiving the pseudonym message, decrypting by using 128-bit pseudo-random number r' to obtain all pseudonymsPseudonymous certificateAnd a starting time ET0According to the starting time ET0User through ETj＝ET0+ j.DELTA.T calculation of the jth pseudonymous certificateEffective off-time ET ofjAnd save all the pseudonymsPseudonymous certificateAnd effective off-time ETj；
(6) User uiUsing pseudonymsPseudonymous certificateAnd current location information loc, etc. to generate a service request message and send it to a service operator;
(7) service operator receives user uiAfter the service request message, the pseudonym is checkedValidity of if pseudonymIf it is legal, go to step (8), if the pseudonym is trueIf it is illegal, stopping the user uiResponds to the service request message;
(8) service operator checking user uiWhether a malicious behavior of denial of service attack exists or not, if the user u exists, the user u performs malicious behavioriIn the absence of malicious activity, the service operator finds the DATA of the service required for the user and uses the 128-bit pseudo-random number rjFor service DATA DATA, current time stamp t1And service operator pair t1Is signedAES encryption is carried out to obtain service reply messageReturned to user uiStep (9) is executed, if the user uiPresence of malicious activity, i.e. user uiRepeatedly sending a large number of service request messages to a service operator at high frequency in a short time, so that the service operator continuously responds to the service request messages, system resources and network bandwidth of the service operator are consumed, and the service operator cannot work normally, and executing the step (10);
(9) user uiAfter receiving the service reply message, using the public key pk of the service operatorSPVerifying the signature, if the verification is correct, using the service DATA DATA by the user, otherwise, re-executing the step (6) by the user;
(10) service operator requesting trusted authority TA to revoke user ui：
(10a) Service operator connects user uiIs a pseudonym ofPseudonymous certificateAnd effective off-time ETjSending the information to a trusted authority TA;
(10b) the trusted authority TA calculates the time slot of j of all users through the Hash seeds in all user recordsKana (a kind of name)Wherein u ispIs a function of any user or users of the system,is according to user upHash seed ofNesting the generated hash chain by j times of hash operation,is according to user upHash seed ofPerforming hash operation for N +1-j times to nest to generate a hash chain;
(10c) the trusted authority TA finds and reports the pseudonym among all the pseudonyms generated aboveThe same pseudonym, and then found for generating the pseudonymThe hash seed ofThen user u is sentiIdentification ofAdd to black list, no longer to uiIssuing a certificate;
(10d) trusted authority TA according to user uiTwo hash seeds ofAndcomputing two hash chainsAndand combines the two hash chains S1,jAnd S2,1Sending to a service operator;
(10e) service operator according to two hash chains S1,jAnd S2,1Get user uiAll pseudonyms after the jth time slotWhere k is j +1, j +2, …, N, S1,k＝hk-j(S1,j)，S2,N+1-k＝hN-k(S2,1) Adding the obtained pseudonym into a blacklist;
the user comprises a GPS module, an application module and a certificate module; the GPS module is used for obtaining and providing the geographic position information of the user for an application module, the application module is used for requesting and receiving position service for the user, and the certificate module is used for applying, storing and managing a pseudonym and a pseudonym certificate of the user;
the trusted authority TA comprises a registration module, a certificate module and a revocation module; the registration module is responsible for managing registration and key issuing of users and service operators, the certificate module is responsible for generating and issuing pseudonyms and pseudonym certificates of the users, and the revocation module is responsible for revoking malicious users; the trusted authority TA does not need to be kept online, but only processes the user registration request regularly online in the registration module, the certificate module regularly performs pseudonymous certificate issuing online, the revocation module can keep online or regularly online according to the privacy and safety requirements of the system, and the trusted authority TA is completely trusted to the user and the service operator;
the service operator comprises three functional modules, namely a database, an application module and a safety module; the database is used for storing service data, the application module receives a user position service request and returns position service data for the user, the security module is used for monitoring malicious attack behaviors of the user and revoking the malicious user together with a trusted authority TA, and the service operator is not completely trusted because the service operator grasps the position and service requirement information provided by the user in the service request message and possibly sells user privacy information to an advertising company for business purposes or is possibly attacked by hackers, thereby causing the user privacy to be leaked.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the user u of step (6)iUsing pseudonymsPseudonymous certificateAnd effective off-time ETjGenerating a service request message, and performing the following steps:
(6a) user uiDuring the j time slot, a 128-bit pseudo random number r is generatedjAs a temporary key, and generating a query messageWherein loc represents the current position information of the user, and poi represents the service requirement of the user;
(6b) user uiWill inquire about the message QjUsing the public key pk of the service operatorSPPerforming RSA encryption to obtain service request message
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the service operator of step (7) receives the user uiAfter the service request message, the pseudonym is checkedIs to check the user pseudonymWhether issued by trusted authority TA and checking pseudonymsWhether it is blacklisted, if it is a pseudonymIf the name is issued by the trusted authority TA and is not added into the blacklist, the pseudonymLegal otherwise, pseudonymIs illegal.
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