CN103618729A - Multi-mechanism hierarchical attribute-based encryption method applied to cloud storage - Google Patents

Multi-mechanism hierarchical attribute-based encryption method applied to cloud storage Download PDF

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CN103618729A
CN103618729A CN201310647676.5A CN201310647676A CN103618729A CN 103618729 A CN103618729 A CN 103618729A CN 201310647676 A CN201310647676 A CN 201310647676A CN 103618729 A CN103618729 A CN 103618729A
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user
file
authorization center
access
attribute
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陈丹伟
樊晓唯
任勋益
何利文
王志伟
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Nanjing Post and Telecommunication University
Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications
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Nanjing Post and Telecommunication University
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Abstract

The invention discloses a multi-mechanism hierarchical attribute-based encryption method applied to cloud storage. The method comprises the steps that authorization centers determine recursion depths, select bilinear mappings and bilinear groups, generate a system MK and a PK, reserve the MK, and disclose the PK; the authorization centers allocate a master key authorized at the next stage (the step is executed when a subcenter exists); the central authorization center receives a user identity file and generates an attribute set A for the user identity file; the authorization centers generate a secret key SK for a user and distribute the SK to the user; a data owner DO generates an access strategy tree, the file is encrypted through an Encrypt method, and a ciphertext CT is uploaded to the cloud end; the user sends a request to the cloud end to have access to the file, the CT of the file is sent back through the cloud end, the user decrypts the file by means of the SK, and only when the attribute in the user SK meets an access control strategy of the file, complete decryption can be achieved; if decryption succeeds, a plaintext M is obtained by the user; if decryption does not succeed, it is shown that the user has no right to have access to the file.

Description

A kind of multimachine structure stratification attribute base encryption method that is applied to cloud storage
Technical field
The present invention relates to computer security technique field, particularly a kind of multimachine structure stratification attribute base encryption method that is applied to cloud storage.
Background technology
Cloud storage is to extend from the development of cloud computing basis, beyond the clouds for data user provides data outsourcing stores service.This new memory module has caused the extensive concern of academia and industrial circle.Yet, when cloud storage is applied to real life, still face following three challenges: the first, the confidentiality of protected data.When user's sensitive data is stored on cloud server, there is certain risk in the fail safe of data.On the one hand, server may check user data or illegally spy upon privacy of user; On the other hand, undelegated user may illegal wiretapping private data.The second, protection subscriber identity information is not revealed.Privacy of identities protection has in recent years become one of focus of everybody concern, and user does not wish that any server or storage medium obtain user's personal information.The 3rd, the fault-tolerance of cloud storage system.When system encounters attack, should be able to continue to keep its robustness and fail safe.
Access control is one of important means addressing the above problem, and the access control method of supporting fine granularity access is the important method that solves data confidentiality and privacy of user protection in cloud storage.Shamir has proposed first identity base and has encrypted (IBE) mechanism, Sahai and Waters have proposed attribute base and have encrypted (ABE) mechanism on the basis of IBE encryption method, realized the encryption and decryption based on attribute, in ABE scheme, user identity represents with the set of attribute, ABE has realized the access strategy of supporting flexibly thresholding, only needs recipient's community set to cover access strategy and gets final product declassified document.ABE mechanism comprises that key strategy-attribute base is encrypted (KP-ABE) and ciphertext strategy-attribute base is encrypted (CP-ABE) two classes at present.In KP-ABE scheme, ciphertext is relevant to a community set, and in CP-ABE, ciphertext is associated with access structure tree.
Yet above-mentioned two schemes all exists certain deficiency.First, adopt single authorization center mechanism, the system load ability of frequently not only giving alternately of user and authorization center is brought bottleneck, has increased potential potential safety hazard simultaneously.A kind of property set encryption method of many authorization center (Multi-authority ABE) is suggested thereupon; user property set is split; by different authorized organizations, manage and issue private key assembly; by this mechanism; each authorization center only obtains certain customers' attribute, has protected user's identity information.But this mechanism is only supported basic ABE method, lacks the flexibility of access.
Secondly, take CP-ABE in basic model in a large number, the community set in access structure only has one, only can meet access strategy by the various combinations of attribute, greatly reduces the flexibility of access control.Current urgent need is wanted a kind of attribute layering, by user property multi-zone supervision, realizes flexibly, when fine-grained access control the safety of protection user data and user property.And the present invention can solve problem above well.
Summary of the invention
The object of the invention is to provide a kind of multimachine structure stratification attribute base that is applied to cloud storage to encrypt (HM-ABE) method, the method has realized the common leading subscriber of many authorization center and user property classifying system, solved fail safe and the privacy problem of data file and user profile in cloud storage, realized efficiently, flexibly, fine-grained access control; The method makes the authorization center of different rights administer different attributes and distributes private key assembly, greatly reduce the workload of single trust authority, support the dynamic increase of authorization center, support access control flexibly, design the hierarchical mode of user property simultaneously, supported to compose a plurality of values for single attribute, and supported the inquiry across attribute set, increase the flexibility of community set in CP-ABE mechanism, adapted to more complicated fine granularity access control.
The present invention solves the technical scheme that its technical problem takes: the present invention proposes a kind of multimachine structure stratification attribute base encryption method that is applied to cloud storage, it comprises the steps:
Step 1: authorization center is determined depth of recursion, selects bilinear map and Bilinear Groups, and generation system master key MK and PKI PK retain MK, open PK;
Step 2: authorization center is distributed the master key (carrying out this step when having subcenter) of next stage mandate;
Step 3: user identity file is accepted at central authorization center, for it generates community set A;
Step 4: each authorization center generates key SK for user, and is distributed to user;
Step 5: data owner DO formulates access strategy tree Tree, and by Encrypt method, file File is encrypted, and ciphertext CT is uploaded to high in the clouds;
Step 6: user User is to high in the clouds request access file File, the ciphertext CT of high in the clouds backspace file, User utilizes private key SK declassified document, and in and if only if user SK, attribute can meet the access control policy of File, could decipher completely;
Step 7: if successful decryption, user obtains plaintext M; If decipher unsuccessfully, illustrate that user haves no right to access this document.
The present invention has set up the many authorization center mechanism of the gradational stratification of tool, makes the authorization center of different rights administer different attributes and distribute private key assembly; The present invention has set up the hierarchical mode of user property, and user property is effectively divided according to safe class.
The mathematical knowledge the present invention relates to is provided to definition below:
Definition 1 (bilinear map): establish crowd G 1and G 2be to take the multiplication loop group that prime number p is rank, establish G 1a generator be g, exist bilinearity to mapping meet following character:
(1) bilinearity: suppose to all g h ∈ G 1, a, b ∈ Z p, have e (g a, h b)=e (g, h) ab.
(2) non-degeneracy: have g, h ∈ G 1, make e (g, h) ≠ 1.
(3) computability: any g, h ∈ G 1, exist algorithm in a polynomial time to calculate e (g, h) result.
One, system architecture
As shown in Figure 1, the present invention provides the architectural framework of HM-ABE system, and this system is comprised of following five parts: cloud server (CSP), credible central authorization center (TA), subordinate's authorization center (AA), data owner (DO) and user (User).CSP provides high in the clouds data storage service; TA is believable central authorization center, is responsible for system parameters and generates and distribute, and be in charge of first order AA; The AA of subordinate is in charge of User Part attribute, and by upper level, AA authorizes; Data owner uploads encrypt file to high in the clouds after local cipher data; User is according to demand from high in the clouds download file and utilize user key deciphering.Entire system framework is illustrated in fig. 1 shown below.
CSP of the present invention is honest and curious (Honest but Curious), and CSP can be according to the method in scheme and protocol processes high in the clouds data, but can the user of spying upon as much as possible be stored in the data in high in the clouds.TA is that the complete believable ,Er AA of subordinate is half believable.User property is managed jointly by all AA on its place authorization center chain, establishes user property set A u=(A 1, A 2..., A n, according to hierarchical structure automatically by A ube divided into the mutually disjoint subset of K part and be in charge of by the AA of the K on AA chain, and meet
Figure BDA0000430114330000031
HM-ABE scheme of the present invention is comprised of following four part operations: system initialization, key generation, encryption method, decryption method.
Selection rank are prime number p, the Bilinear Groups G that generator is g 0, G 0on mapping e:G 0* G 0=G 1.Definition hash function H:{0,1} *→ G 0convert the character string of random length to G 0on random number, utilize this function user property can be changed to G in groups 0on element.
Two, method flow
1. initiation parameter
Central authorization center TA is that all users and AA respectively distribute a unique overall GID and AID in order to the unique identification as User Identity and AA.During initialization, the depth of recursion of TA regulation user key structure is depth, because AA and user property subset exist corresponding relation, so depth has also stipulated the maximum level of many authorization center.
Random the α, { β of selecting 1, β 2..., β depth∈ Z p.Here take depth=2 as example, system PKI is PK 0 = { G 0 , g , h 1 = g β 1 , f 1 = g 1 β 1 , h 2 = g β 2 , f 2 = g 1 β 2 , e ( g , g ) α } , Master key is MK 0={ β 1, β 2, g α.
One-level AA authorizes: the corresponding overall identification AID of each AA, and the community set Λ={ A of AA management 0, A 1..., A n, A here 0represent ground floor attribute, A trepresent second layer attribute, A i={ A i, 1, A i, 2..., A i, m, 1≤i≤n.When TA carries out initialization mandate to AA, TA selects r ∈ Z at random prepresent Λ, select r simultaneously i∈ Z prepresent A i∈ Λ, r i, j∈ Z prepresent a i, j∈ A i, 0≤i≤n, 1≤j≤m.The master key of first order AA is:
MK = { Λ , D = g α + r β 1 , D i , j = g r i · H ( a i , j ) r i , j ,
D i , j ′ = g r i , j ( 0 ≤ i ≤ n , 1 ≤ j ≤ m ) , E i = g r + r i β 2 ( 1 ≤ i ≤ n , ) }
In above-mentioned key, E ifor switching node deciphering, can carry out across sets match attribute.During conversion can be from r ' igo to r i.
The AA of subordinate authorizes: when establishing certain AA and need to enter system, first need higher level AA to authorize it.If the higher level AA community set WeiΛ, AA of subordinate community set
Figure BDA0000430114330000044
and
Figure BDA0000430114330000045
aA k+1master key by AA kfor it generates, AA krandom selection
Figure BDA0000430114330000046
representative
Figure BDA0000430114330000047
Figure BDA0000430114330000048
representative
Figure BDA0000430114330000049
Figure BDA00004301143300000410
representative
Figure BDA00004301143300000411
0≤i≤n, 1≤j≤m.Generate AA k+1master key be:
Figure BDA00004301143300000412
Figure BDA00004301143300000413
Wherein D, D i, j, E irespectively AA kin respective items.
2. user key generates
User's all properties A uby authorizing K authorization center on chain, jointly manage.If user is at the k≤K AA kon community set be
Figure BDA00004301143300000414
aA kfirst utilize pseudo-random function PSK according to user GID and AID kfor user is created on the private key parts α u on this AA (k)=P sk(u).AA kfor user selects ru at random (k)∈ Z prepresent Au (k), ru i ( k ) ∈ Z p Representative Au i ( k ) ∈ Au ( k ) , ru i , j ( k ) ∈ Z p Representative au i , j ( k ) ∈ Au i ( k ) , Finally generate user at AA kon key be:
SK u ( k ) = { VS ( k ) = g index ( AA k ) , Au ( k ) , Du ( k ) = g α u ( k ) + ru ( k ) β k , 1 , Du i , j ( k ) = g ru i ( k ) · H ( a u i , j ( k ) ) ru i , j ( k ) ,
Du i , j ′ ( k ) = g ru i , j ( k ) ( 0 ≤ i ≤ n , 1 ≤ j ≤ m ) , E i ( k ) = g ru ( k ) + ru i ( k ) β k , 2 ( 1 ≤ i ≤ n , ) }
Wherein
Figure BDA00004301143300000421
respectively AA kon two local master keys.
So total key of user is: SK u = { { SK u ( k ) } k = 1 K , D user = g ( α + Σ w = 1 W αu ( w ) / Σ w = 1 W β w , 1 } , D wherein userbe total decruption key of user, for decrypt ciphertext, by TA, issued.
3. encryption method
Data owner before clear data M is uploaded to CSP needs it to encrypt, and the community set according to the access rule of setting and the management of each authorization center, is split as W substrategy by access strategy, respectively a corresponding W authorization center.
If it is the set of access strategy tree.First data owner selects a random number θ ∈ Z p, the ciphertext of clear data M is C ~ = M · e ( g , g ) αθ
Use Г (w)represent AA (w)on access strategy tree, Г (w)in from downward each the node x of root node R (w)corresponding multinomial q all x.For non-leaf node, q xrank (use d xrepresent) for the threshold value of node x subtracts 1, i.e. d x=k x-1.If x (w)for leaf node, q xrank be 0, i.e. d x=0.To the arbitrary node x except root node (w), q x(0)=q parent (x)(index (x)), the random selection of polynomial other values; For root node q r(0)=θ, θ ∈ Z p, other random selections, determine q with lagrange polynomial xthresholding multinomial.Use Y (w)represent all leaf node y (w)set, X (w)represent all nonleaf node x (w)set, generate AA (w)on ciphertext be:
CT ( w ) = { V C ( w ) = g iBndex ( A A w ) , Γ ( w ) , C ( w ) = h w , 1 θ , C ‾ ( w ) = h w , 2 θ ∀ y ( w ) ∈ Y ( w ) : C y ( w ) = g q y ( 0 ) , C y ′ ( w ) = H ( attr ( y ( w ) ) ) q y ( 0 ) ∀ x ( w ) ∈ X ( w ) : C ^ x ( w ) = h w , 2 q x ( 0 ) } ,
Similarly, in other W-1 authorization center, carry out similar ciphering process, the ciphertext and the access strategy thereof that finally obtain clear data M are: C = { { Γ ( w ) } w = 1 W , C ~ = M · e ( g , g ) αθ , { CT ( w ) } w = 1 W }
4. decryption method
When user accesses the file on CSP, CSP sends to encrypt file after user, and user needs user's key to decipher it, when and if only if user's community set meets the access strategy on each AA, could correctly decipher.If it is upper that access strategy is distributed in W AA, user has K private key parts, and and if only if could decipher when a K >=W and W access strategy all meets.
Whether decryption method first match user private key parts is consistent with the authorization center AID in ciphertext, version match success when VS=VK.If the ciphertext of w authorization center is CT (w), private key for user parts are
Figure BDA0000430114330000055
decryption method is called Tree (Au) and is verified private key parts
Figure BDA0000430114330000056
in Au (w)whether meet ciphertext CT (w)in Γ (w).Tree (Au) adopts recursive fashion to realize, for the arbitrary node x in access strategy tree, Tree x(Au) return to a S set that comprises label xif, Au (w)do not meet Г (w)tree (Au) returns to null value; Otherwise decryption method is selected i ∈ S and starts recurrence from root node to carry out function at random
Figure BDA0000430114330000061
be defined as follows:
1) if x is leaf node
A) when attr ( x ) ∉ Au i ( w ) , Au i ( w ) ∈ Au ( w ) Time,
Figure BDA0000430114330000063
return to null;
B) when attr ( x ) ∈ Au i ( w ) , Au i ( w ) ∈ Au ( w ) Time, because
Figure BDA0000430114330000065
g oon element, might as well suppose
Figure BDA0000430114330000066
Figure BDA0000430114330000067
2) if x is non-leaf node,
Figure BDA0000430114330000068
be defined as follows:
If B xany k xthe set that the child node of individual node x forms, establishes wherein arbitrary child node z ∈ B x, during satisfied following two conditions that and if only if: the nonempty set that 1. DecryptNode returns is S z, i ∈ S zor 2. there is i ' ≠ i, i ' ∈ S z, and node z is decrypted node z while being a switching node, otherwise function returns to null.For z ∈ B x:
If 1. i ∈ S z, call function
Figure BDA0000430114330000069
function result is kept at F zin.
If 2. i ' ∈ S z, i ' ≠ i, call function
Figure BDA00004301143300000610
and result is kept to F z' in.
If node conversion is carried out in a) i ≠ 0:
B) if i=0,
Figure BDA00004301143300000612
To each z ∈ B xchild node calculate F zafter, utilize Lagrange's interpolation can obtain the F of node x x,
Figure BDA00004301143300000613
iz=index (z) wherein, S ' z={ index (z): z ∈ B x, Lagrangian coefficient is Δiz , S z ′ ( 0 ) = Π jz ∈ S Z ′ , jz ≠ iz 0 - jz iz - jz , Finally solve the function at node x place value is:
Figure BDA0000430114330000071
Recurrence upwards, can obtain root node R place
Figure BDA0000430114330000072
functional value is:
Figure BDA0000430114330000073
when i ≠ 0, we are right
Figure BDA0000430114330000074
change:
Figure BDA0000430114330000075
If user meets the access strategy of all W authorization center,
Figure BDA0000430114330000076
without null value, calculate as follows:
Figure BDA0000430114330000077
Can obtain thus:
Figure BDA0000430114330000078
Expressly
Figure BDA0000430114330000079
successful decryption.
Beneficial effect:
1, the present invention supports the gradational multiple authorized organization of tool, simultaneously by user property classification, supports more flexibly, fine-grained access control policy
2, the present invention greatly reduces the workload of single trust authority.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is system architecture diagram of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is flow chart of the present invention.
Embodiment
Below by conjunction with Figure of description, further illustrate technical scheme of the present invention.
Embodiment 1
The mathematical knowledge the present invention relates to is provided to definition below:
Definition 1 (bilinear map): establish crowd G 1and G 2be to take the multiplication loop group that prime number p is rank, establish G 1a generator be g, exist bilinearity to mapping
Figure BDA0000430114330000081
meet following character:
Bilinearity: suppose to all g h ∈ G 1, a, b ∈ Z p, have e (g a, h b)=e (g, h) ab.
Non-degeneracy: have g, h ∈ G 1, make e (g, h) ≠ 1.
Computability: any g, h ∈ G 1, exist algorithm in a polynomial time to calculate e (g, h) result.
As shown in Figure 1, the present invention provides the architectural framework of HM-ABE system, and system is comprised of following five parts: cloud server (CSP), credible central authorization center (TA), subordinate's authorization center (AA), data owner (DO) and user (User).CSP provides high in the clouds data storage service; TA is believable central authorization center, is responsible for system parameters and generates and distribute, and be in charge of first order AA; The AA of subordinate is in charge of User Part attribute, and by upper level, AA authorizes; Data owner uploads encrypt file to high in the clouds after local cipher data; User is according to demand from high in the clouds download file and utilize user key deciphering.Entire system framework is illustrated in fig. 1 shown below.
CSP of the present invention is honest and curious (Honest but Curious), and CSP can be according to the method in scheme and protocol processes high in the clouds data, but can the user of spying upon as much as possible be stored in the data in high in the clouds.TA is that the complete believable ,Er AA of subordinate is half believable.User property is managed jointly by all AA on its place authorization center chain, establishes user property set A u={ A 1, A 2..., A n, according to hierarchical structure automatically by A ube divided into the mutually disjoint subset of K part and be in charge of by the AA of the K on AA chain, and meet
Figure BDA0000430114330000082
HM-ABE scheme of the present invention is comprised of following four part operations: system initialization, key generation, encryption method, decryption method.
Selection rank are prime number p, the Bilinear Groups G that generator is g 0, G 0on mapping e:G 0* G 0=G 1.Definition hash function H:{0,1} *→ G 0convert the character string of random length to G 0on random number, utilize this function user property can be changed to G in groups 0on element.
Method flow
Initiation parameter
Central authorization center TA is that all users and AA respectively distribute a unique overall GID and AID in order to the unique identification as User Identity and AA.During initialization, the depth of recursion of TA regulation user key structure is depth, because AA and user property subset exist corresponding relation, so depth has also stipulated the maximum level of many authorization center.
Random the α, { β of selecting 1, β 2..., β depth∈ Z p.Here take depth=2 as example, system PKI is PK 0 = { G 0 , g , h 1 = g β 1 , f 1 = g 1 β 1 , h 2 = g β 2 , f 2 = g 1 β 2 , e ( g , g ) α } , Master key is MK 0={ β 1, β 2, g α.
One-level AA authorizes: the corresponding overall identification AID of each AA, and the community set Λ={ A of AA management 0, A 1..., A n, A here 0represent ground floor attribute, A irepresent second layer attribute, A i={ A i, 1, A i, 2..., A i, m, 1≤i≤n.When TA carries out initialization mandate to AA, TA selects r ∈ Z at random prepresent Λ, select r simultaneously i∈ Z prepresent A i∈ Λ, r i,j∈ Z prepresent a i,j∈ A i, 0≤i≤n, 1≤j≤m.The master key of first order AA is:
MK = { Λ , D = g α + r β 1 , D i , j = g r i · H ( a i , j ) r i , j ,
D i , j ′ = g r i , j ( 0 ≤ i ≤ n , 1 ≤ j ≤ m ) , E i = g r + r i β 2 ( 1 ≤ i ≤ n , ) }
In above-mentioned key, E ifor switching node deciphering, can carry out across sets match attribute.During conversion
Figure BDA0000430114330000094
can be from r ' igo to r i.
The AA of subordinate authorizes: when establishing certain AA and need to enter system, first need higher level AA to authorize it.If the higher level AA community set WeiΛ, AA of subordinate community set and
Figure BDA0000430114330000096
aA k+1master key by AA kfor it generates, AA krandom selection
Figure BDA0000430114330000097
representative
Figure BDA0000430114330000098
Figure BDA0000430114330000099
representative
Figure BDA00004301143300000910
representative
Figure BDA00004301143300000912
0≤i≤n, 1≤j≤m.Generate AA k+1master key be:
Figure BDA00004301143300000913
Figure BDA00004301143300000914
Wherein D, D i, j, E irespectively AA kin respective items.
User key generates
User's all properties A uby authorizing K authorization center on chain, jointly manage.If user is at the k≤K AA kon community set be
Figure BDA00004301143300000915
aA kfirst utilize pseudo-random function PSK according to user GID and AID kfor user is created on the private key parts α u on this AA (k)=P sk(u).AA kfor user selects ru at random (k)∈ Z prepresent Au (k), ru i ( k ) ∈ Z p Representative Au i ( k ) ∈ Au ( k ) , ru i , j ( k ) ∈ Z p Representative au i , j ( k ) ∈ Au i ( k ) , Finally generate user at AA kon key be:
SK u ( k ) = { VS ( k ) = g index ( AA k ) , Au ( k ) , Du ( k ) = g α u ( k ) + ru ( k ) β k , 1 , Du i , j ( k ) = g ru i ( k ) · H ( a u i , j ( k ) ) ru i , j ( k ) ,
Du i , j ′ ( k ) = g ru i , j ( k ) ( 0 ≤ i ≤ n , 1 ≤ j ≤ m ) , E i ( k ) = g ru ( k ) + ru i ( k ) β k , 2 ( 1 ≤ i ≤ n , ) }
Wherein
Figure BDA0000430114330000103
respectively AA kon two local master keys.
So total key of user is: SK u = { { SK u ( k ) } k = 1 K , D user = g ( α + Σ w = 1 W α u ( w ) / Σ w = 1 W β w , 1 } , D wherein userbe total decruption key of user, for decrypt ciphertext, by TA, issued.
Encryption method
Data owner before clear data M is uploaded to CSP needs it to encrypt, and the community set according to the access rule of setting and the management of each authorization center, is split as W substrategy by access strategy, respectively a corresponding W authorization center.
If
Figure BDA0000430114330000105
it is the set of access strategy tree.First data owner selects a random number θ ∈ Z p, the ciphertext of clear data M is C ~ = M · e ( g , g ) αθ
Use Г (w)represent AA (w)on access strategy tree, Г (w)in from downward each the node x of root node R (w)corresponding multinomial q all x.For non-leaf node, q xrank (use d xrepresent) for the threshold value of node x subtracts 1, i.e. d x=k x-1.If x (w)for leaf node, q xrank be 0, i.e. d x=0.To the arbitrary node x except root node (w), q x(0)=q parent (x)(index (x)), the random selection of polynomial other values; For root node q r(0)=θ, θ ∈ Z p, other random selections, determine q with lagrange polynomial xthresholding multinomial.Use Y (w)represent all leaf node y (w)set, X (w)represent all nonleaf node x (w)set, generate AA (w)on ciphertext be:
CT ( w ) = { V C ( w ) = g iBndex ( A A w ) , Γ ( w ) , C ( w ) = h w , 1 θ , C ‾ ( w ) = h w , 2 θ ∀ y ( w ) ∈ Y ( w ) : C y ( w ) = g q y ( 0 ) , C y ′ ( w ) = H ( attr ( y ( w ) ) ) q y ( 0 ) ∀ x ( w ) ∈ X ( w ) : C ^ x ( w ) = h w , 2 q x ( 0 ) } ,
Similarly, in other W-1 authorization center, carry out similar ciphering process, the ciphertext and the access strategy thereof that finally obtain clear data M are: C = { { Γ ( w ) } w = 1 W , C ~ = M · e ( g , g ) αθ , { CT ( w ) } w = 1 W }
Decryption method
When user accesses the file on CSP, CSP sends to encrypt file after user, and user needs user's key to decipher it, when and if only if user's community set meets the access strategy on each AA, could correctly decipher.If it is upper that access strategy is distributed in W AA, user has K private key parts, and and if only if could decipher when a K >=W and W access strategy all meets.
Whether decryption method first match user private key parts is consistent with the authorization center AID in ciphertext, version match success when VS=VK.If the ciphertext of w authorization center is CT (w), private key for user parts are
Figure BDA0000430114330000111
decryption method is called Tree (Au) and is verified private key parts
Figure BDA0000430114330000112
in Au (w)whether meet ciphertext CT (w)in Γ (w).Tree (Au) adopts recursive fashion to realize, for the arbitrary node x in access strategy tree, Tree x(Au) return to a S set that comprises label xif, Au (w)do not meet Г (w)tree (Au) returns to null value; Otherwise decryption method is selected i ∈ S and starts recurrence from root node to carry out function at random
Figure BDA0000430114330000113
be defined as follows:
1) if x is leaf node
A) when attr ( x ) ∉ Au i ( w ) , Au i ( w ) ∈ Au ( w ) Time,
Figure BDA0000430114330000115
return to null;
B) when attr ( x ) ∈ Au i ( w ) , Au i ( w ) ∈ Au ( w ) Time, because
Figure BDA0000430114330000117
g oon element, might as well suppose
Figure BDA0000430114330000118
Figure BDA0000430114330000119
2) if x is non-leaf node,
Figure BDA00004301143300001110
be defined as follows:
If B xany k xthe set that the child node of individual node x forms, establishes wherein arbitrary child node z ∈ B x, during satisfied following two conditions that and if only if: the nonempty set that 1. DecryptNode returns is S z, i ∈ S zor 2. there is i ' ≠ i, i ' ∈ S z, and node z is decrypted node z while being a switching node, otherwise function returns to null.For z ∈ B x:
If 1. i ∈ S z, call function
Figure BDA00004301143300001111
function result is kept at F zin.
If 2. i ' ∈ S z, i ' ≠ i, call function
Figure BDA00004301143300001112
and result is kept to F z' in.
If node conversion is carried out in a) i ≠ 0:
Figure BDA00004301143300001113
B) if i=0,
Figure BDA0000430114330000121
To each z ∈ B xchild node calculate F zafter, utilize Lagrange's interpolation can obtain the F of node x x,
Figure BDA0000430114330000122
iz=index (z) wherein, S ' z={ index (z): z ∈ B x, Lagrangian coefficient is Δiz , S z ′ ( 0 ) = Π jz ∈ S Z ′ , jz ≠ iz 0 - jz iz - jz , Finally solve the function at node x place
Figure BDA0000430114330000124
be directly:
Figure BDA0000430114330000125
Recurrence upwards, can obtain root node R place
Figure BDA0000430114330000126
functional value is:
Figure BDA0000430114330000127
when i ≠ 0, we are right
Figure BDA0000430114330000128
change:
Figure BDA0000430114330000129
If user meets the access strategy of all W authorization center,
Figure BDA00004301143300001210
without null value, calculate as follows:
Figure BDA00004301143300001211
Can obtain thus:
Figure BDA00004301143300001212
Expressly
Figure BDA00004301143300001213
successful decryption.
Embodiment 2
As shown in Figure 2, a data owner DO uploads a file File to high in the clouds, and user User obtains the ciphertext of File and utilizes its private key SK to be decrypted from high in the clouds.
Its embodiment is:
(1) authorization center is determined depth of recursion, selects bilinear map and Bilinear Groups, and generation system master key MK and PKI PK retain MK, open PK;
(2) authorization center is distributed the master key (carrying out this step when having subcenter) of next stage mandate;
(3) user identity file is accepted at central authorization center, for it generates community set A;
(4) each authorization center generates key SK for user, and is distributed to user;
Key structure: key structure of the present invention is layering, making the element in key can be both single user property, can be also the attribute set of a recurrence; When system initialization, the level degree of depth of definition key structure is depth, limits maximum recurrence number of times; Suppose depth=3, the element of ground floor and the second layer can be set, can be also single attribute; And the element of the 3rd layer can only, as single user property, be given an example: Name:Jack, ID:30202, Age:24, Sex:Male, and Location:USA, Job:Student}}} is in key structure, and each subset has unique identification; If ψ represents key, ψ irepresent i attribute set in key structure;
(5) data owner DO formulates access strategy tree Tree, and by Encrypt method, file File is encrypted, and ciphertext CT is uploaded to high in the clouds;
Access control tree: the access control policy in the present invention is tree structure, and leaf node represents a concrete attribute, and nonleaf node represents a threshold value; Definition noc xfor child's number of node x, k xfor the threshold value of node x, 0 < k x≤ noc x; Work as k xit within=1 o'clock, is " OR " operation; Work as k x=noc xtime be " AND " operation; The child nodes of each node is arrived to noc by 1 xsequence, the father node of parent (x) return node x, index (x) returns to the sequence number that child node x is corresponding, if leaf node, attr (x) returns to the property value of leaf node;
(6) user User is to high in the clouds request access file File, the ciphertext CT of high in the clouds backspace file, and User utilizes private key SK declassified document, and in and if only if user SK, attribute can meet the access control policy of File, could decipher completely;
(7) successful decryption, user obtains plaintext M; Decipher unsuccessfully, illustrate that user haves no right to access this document; Overall process finishes.

Claims (4)

1. a multimachine structure stratification attribute base encryption method that is applied to cloud storage, is characterized in that following steps that the method comprises:
Step 1: authorization center is determined depth of recursion, selects bilinear map and Bilinear Groups, and generation system master key MK and PKI PK retain MK, open PK;
Step 2: authorization center is distributed the master key (carrying out this step when having subcenter) of next stage mandate;
Step 3: user identity file is accepted at central authorization center, for it generates community set A;
Step 4: each authorization center generates key SK for user, and is distributed to user;
Step 5: data owner DO formulates access strategy tree Tree, and by Encrypt method, file File is encrypted, and ciphertext CT is uploaded to high in the clouds;
Step 6: user User is to high in the clouds request access file File, the ciphertext CT of high in the clouds backspace file, User utilizes private key SK declassified document, and in and if only if user SK, attribute can meet the access control policy of File, could decipher completely;
Step 7: if successful decryption, user obtains plaintext M; If decipher unsuccessfully, illustrate that user haves no right to access this document.
2. method according to claim 1, is characterized in that: described method has been set up the many authorization center mechanism of the gradational stratification of tool.
3. method according to claim 1, is characterized in that: described method has been set up the hierarchical mode of user property, and user property is effectively divided according to safe class.
4. method according to claim 1, is characterized in that: described method is applied to cloud storage.
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