CN103560998A - Method and system for wireless sensor network to resist DoS attacks - Google Patents
Method and system for wireless sensor network to resist DoS attacks Download PDFInfo
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- CN103560998A CN103560998A CN201310468289.5A CN201310468289A CN103560998A CN 103560998 A CN103560998 A CN 103560998A CN 201310468289 A CN201310468289 A CN 201310468289A CN 103560998 A CN103560998 A CN 103560998A
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
- Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
- Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks
Abstract
The invention relates to a method and system for a wireless sensor network to resist DoS attacks and belongs to the technical field of wireless sensor networks. The method for the wireless sensor network to resist DoS attacks relates to a wireless sensor module, a second-level security guard mechanism and a low power consumption method for resisting DoS attacks. Through a security rousing mechanism and an encryption authentication algorithm, a sensor node is authenticated or encrypted and decrypted in a non-sleep state, and thus the DoS attacks can be resisted effectively under low power consumption conditions, and energy consumption of the remaining part of the wireless sensor network is prevented from being affected. Therefore, except for the energy consumption necessary to receive and transmit data information, the energy consumption can be reduced to the maximum while the DoS attacks can be resisted.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to wireless sensor network technology field, especially relate to the wireless sensor network opposing DoS(Denial of Service that a kind of low-power consumption is calculated, denial of service) method and the system of attacking.
Background technology
Wireless sensor network (Wireless Sensor Networks WSNs) is comprised of sensor node intensive, low-cost, random distribution.The multinomial technology such as transducer, radio communication, embedded calculating, MEMS (micro electro mechanical system) and microelectronics that it is integrated.It is the information of the various environment of Real-Time Monitoring, perception and collection or object synergistically, and it is processed, and by specific network technology, sends the information of needs to user.Its huge applications prospect has caused military affairs, industry, business and the expert's of academia extensive concern.In military field, by wireless sensor network, the transducer distributing afield snugly can be sent back to headquarter by the information of obtaining.At civil area, wireless sensor network can be used widely at aspects such as furniture intellectuality, environmental monitoring, health care, hazard predictions.In industry and commerce field, wireless sensor network is used widely in industrial automation, space exploration and other commercial uses.
Wireless sensor node is the elementary cell of network, and the stable operation of node is the assurance of whole network reliability.Wireless sensor node is a miniature embedded system normally, and volume is little, has radio communication, sensing and data processing function, but disposal ability, storage capacity and communication capacity relatively a little less than.Wireless sensor node adopts compact power (battery) power supply, and the life-span of power supply has determined the life-span of wireless sensor node.Wireless sensor network node is mainly responsible for the acquisition and processing to peripheral information, and the data that send own collection to adjacent node or data retransmission that adjacent node is sended over the node to base station or more close base station.
As seen from Figure 1, wireless sensor node is generally by sensor assembly (transducer, A/D converter), processor module (microprocessor, memory), and wireless communication module (wireless transceiver) and energy supply module (battery) form.Wireless sensor node is in wake-up states (operating state), and energy consumption is many, particularly transceiving data bag.
Opposing DoS attack is a difficult thing, particularly for the situation of wireless sensor node resource-constrained in wireless sensor network, it is the normal operation that the energy that exhausts wireless sensor node attempts to affect whole network that assailant starts the object of DoS attack.DoS attack can occur in physical layer.For example, by radio interference, can also transmit to disturb wireless sensor network protocols or physical damage central site network node by malice.Assailant, by continuing to send a series of useless packets in wireless sensor network, can exhaust the battery of wireless sensor node.Because wireless sensor node can carry out handle packet by consumed energy, or reception and forwarding data bag, make wireless sensor node all the time in wake-up states, consume the energy resource of wireless sensor node, make node lose serviceability.Endangering larger attack is to occur in internal sensor network, if assailant can break through the wireless sensor node in network, can create route loop so, finally exhausts the energy of all nodes.The Dos existing for authentication protocol attacks problem, existing opposing DoS attack method, mainly comprise that stateless connection mechanism (specifically can be referring to P.Karn, W.Simpson.Photuris:Session-Key Management Protocol.RFC2522, IETF Network Working Group, March, 1999, Cookie mechanism (specifically can be referring to P.Karn, W.Simpson.Photuris:Session-Key Management Protocol.RFC2522, IETF Network Working Group, March, 1999) and proof of work (uelsand J.Brainard.Client Puzzles:A Cryptographic Counter measure against Connection Depletion Attacks.In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed Security Systems (NDSS ' 99), pages51 – 165.IEEE Computer).
For opposing DoS attack, the wireless sensor node in wireless sensor network, after receiving packet, has two kinds of processing modes: authentication and forwarding; Two kinds of processing modes all require wireless sensor node under wake-up states, if authentication success, forwarding data bag; Authentification failure packet discard.If assailant continues to send a series of packet spoof, after wireless sensor node receives, need authentication or forward, all will make wireless sensor node continue in wake-up states, exhaust energy resource, lose serviceability, thereby affect whole network.Therefore in opposing DoS attack, manage to reduce the power consumption of wireless sensor node, the prolongation transducer reliably working time becomes one of problem that in Networked Sensors design, emphasis is considered.
And the method that the wireless sensor network of prior art opposing Dos attacks exists defect in this respect, need to improve.
Summary of the invention
The object of the present invention is to provide a kind of method of wireless sensor network opposing DoS attack, its wireless sensor node is received after data, waking authentication phase node up without in wake-up states, thereby when can realize opposing DoS attack, reduce the power consumption of wireless sensor node, extend the life-span of wireless sensor node.
Another object of the present invention is to provide a kind of wireless sensor network system that can resist the reduction wireless sensor node power consumption of DoS attack.
The method of wireless sensor network opposing DoS attack of the present invention, described wireless sensor network comprises some wireless sensor nodes that ， appointed area, at least one base station is disposed, its step comprises:
1, described base station is adjacent node, each node and is adjacent and between node, carries out key agreement, determine and store shared Anti-DoS attack key and packet authenticate key, complete the establishment of self-organizing radio sensor network, all nodes are in sleep state simultaneously;
2, before described base station or each node send packet, first send wireless awakening signal and the MAC value that generated by Anti-DoS attack key by it to next adjacent node of Route Selection;
3, described adjacent node receives wireless awakening signal and MAC(Message Authentication Code by its wireless awakening device, message authentication code) value, after the success of wireless awakening device checking wireless awakening signal, MAC value is sent to the processing module of this node, the Anti-DoS attack key by it according to storage carries out the checking of MAC value;
4, MAC value is waken present node up after being verified, and receives the packet of a upper node transmission and carries out packet authentication according to packet authenticate key, and present node only forwards by the packet after authentication;
5, destination node is carried out packet authentication according to packet authenticate key after receiving the packet that on it, adjacent node sends, and processes by the packet of authentication, or abandons not by the packet of authentication.
Described in each, node still enters sleep state after executing corresponding operating.
The Anti-DoS attack key of described base station and each node can be that preset the whole network is unified key; Also can be not identical key.
The packet authenticate key of described base station and each node can be that preset the whole network is unified key; Also can be not identical key.
Described Anti-DoS attack key storage is in the main control chip of each node processing module; Described packet authenticate key is stored in the safety chip of each node processing module.
Described MAC value checking and/or packet authentication adopt SHA.
In described packet, embed timestamp information or counter information, as the parameter of MAC value and/or packet identifying algorithm.
Resist a wireless sensor network for DoS attack, comprise at least one base station and several wireless sensor nodes of arranging in appointed area, described wireless sensor node comprises sensor assembly, processor module, wireless communication module and energy supply module; Described wireless communication module comprises wireless transceiver and wireless awakening device, and wherein said wireless awakening device is for receiving and verify wireless awakening signal; Described base station is adjacent node, each node and is adjacent and between node, stores shared Anti-DoS attack key and packet authenticate key, and generates MAC value by its Anti-DoS attack key.
Described processor module comprises main control chip and safety chip, stores respectively Anti-DoS attack key and packet authenticate key.
The inventive method is roughly divided into following several part:
A1, in appointed area, dispose wireless sensor node, enter initial phase;
A2, all wireless sensor nodes are in sleep state;
First A3, base station or sensing node send wake-up signal and MAC value to neighbor node before sending packet;
A4, neighbor node verification wake-up signal and MAC value, if verification failure, sensor node, still in sleep state, does not receive or forwarding data bag; If verification succeeds, wakes up and receive, process or forwarding data bag.
The present invention has adopted the two-stage safety protecting mechanism of main control chip and safety chip, specifically comprises following content,
In B1, sensor assembly, transducer is used for gathering corresponding measured value;
In B2, processor module, main control chip belongs to low-power chip, has simple disposal ability, and the key storage of Anti-DoS attack is in main control chip;
In B3, processor module, safety chip can be intelligent card chip, and disposal ability is strong, can carry out data encryption, integrality, and instruction is controlled, the operations such as authentication, cryptographic algorithm, the keys such as authentication are all stored in safety chip, and level of security is higher;
In B4, wireless communication module, wireless awakening device is used for receiving wake-up signal verification; Wireless transceiver is for receiving and send packet.
In described method, wherein, steps A 1 specifically comprises that wireless sensor node is randomly dispersed in appointed area, then enters initial phase, mainly carries out key agreement, Route Selection etc.; The authenticate key of Anti-DoS attack can be the same key that whole network is unified, can be preset; Also can be different keys, by key agreement, determine.
In described method, wherein, steps A 3 specifically comprises that the key by Anti-DoS attack generates MAC value.
In described method, wherein, steps A 4 specifically comprises that wireless awakening device in neighbor node receives after wake-up signal, checking wake-up signal, if verification failure, node maintains sleep state, does not wake up, if verification succeeds sends to MAC value the main control chip of low-power consumption; The opposing Dos of main control chip utilization storage attacks key verification MAC, if success wakes sensor node up, receives packet, and forwards or process; Otherwise do not wake up.
Compared with prior art, the present invention adopts the methods such as the two-stage safety protecting mechanism of main control chip and safety chip, safe arouse machine processed, authentication mechanism, beneficial effect is that wireless sensor node can carry out authentication check under the state not waking up, only under verification succeeds condition, just wake sensor node up, verification failure does not wake up; When resisting DoS attack, low-energy-consumption falls substantially, extend the service time of sensing node.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is existing sensor node structured flowchart;
Fig. 2 is the radio sensing network deployment diagram of the inventive method;
Fig. 3 is the sensor node structured flowchart of the inventive method;
Fig. 4 is the Anti-DoS attack sensor node inter-process flow chart of the inventive method.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing, the present invention is described in detail.
What the present invention solved is the low-power consumption processing problem of opposing DoS attack, utilize the special module of sensing node to form, safe arouse machine processed and authentication mechanism are resisted DoS attack, make sensing node under non-wake-up states, can authenticate the MAC value of Anti-DoS attack, thereby effectively reduce the energy consumption of sensing node.
As shown in Figure 2, the invention provides a kind of system of Internet of Things sensing node opposing DoS attack, it comprises base station, wireless sensing node.First by described wireless sensing node random placement in targeted environment, before disposing, do not know the position of sensor node; Then described system enters initial phase, comprises Route Selection, key agreement etc.
Described sensing node can be used as routing node, is used for forwarding data bag to neighbor node, also can be used as measured node, is used for gathering the data in surrounding environment; Simultaneously can lowest power consumption ground opposing DoS attack.Therefore the module of described sensor node forms specifically as shown in Figure 3, comprises sensor assembly, processor module, wireless communication module and energy supply module; Wherein, described sensor assembly is used for gathering ambient data; Described processor module has two-stage safety protecting mechanism, by main control chip, and safety chip, memory forms; Wireless awakening device in described wireless communication module is used for receiving wireless awakening signal, and verification correctness, and wireless transceiver is for receiving and send packet after described sensing node wakes up; Described energy supply module provides described sensor node work required energy resource.Form and compare with existing sensor node module, described sensor node has increased the two-stage safety protecting mechanism of main control chip and safety chip newly, and wherein main control chip can be worked under the environment of low-power consumption, thereby can complete, carries out authentication calculations under non-wake-up states; The level of security of safety chip is higher, and for storing important key, disposal ability is strong, can guarantee the privacy of data, integrality, and authentication etc.
In concrete enforcement, described base station disposal ability is strong and energy is sufficient, all the sensors node described after initial phase finishes enters sleep state, under sleep state, only have described wireless awakening device and main control chip in sleeping state (low power consumpting state), described in other, module is all in sleep state, saves energy.
As shown in Figure 4, key step of the present invention comprises:
A1, random being deployed in targeted environment of wireless sensor node; The present invention does not specifically limit deployment way and the topological structure of wireless sensor node, and system enters initial phase, and wireless sensor network is set up in self-organizing.
Sensor node in A2, radio sensing network enters sleep state; Wireless awakening device in sleeping state is used for receiving wireless awakening signal, stores the key of Anti-DoS attack in main control chip, is used for low-power consumption to process MAC verification.
First A3, base station or sensor node send wireless awakening signal and MAC value to neighbor node before sending packet; Wherein MAC value is to use the key of Anti-DoS attack and the shared Information generation of adjacent node, and the present invention does not limit the specific algorithm that generates MAC value, can be hash algorithm, Hmac algorithm etc.
A4, the wireless awakening device in dormant neighbor node receive wireless awakening signal and MAC value; Wireless awakening device carries out the verification of wireless awakening signal, if verification failure does not wake node up, turns back to steps A 2; If success, sends to main control chip by MAC value.Wherein the present invention does not limit generation and the checking algorithm of wireless awakening signal.
A5, the main control chip in sleeping state receive MAC value and carry out verification; The key of the Anti-DoS attack of main control chip utilization storage enters new MAC verification, if verification failure does not wake node up, turns back to steps A 2; If success, sends order and start wake up procedure, wake node up.
The sensor node of A6, wake-up states is used wireless transceiver to receive packet, the correctness of the corresponding secret key verification msg bag of safety chip utilization storage; If this sensor node is routing node, be proved to be successful forwarding data bag, otherwise packet discard, if this sensor node is destination node, is proved to be successful and carries out corresponding operating, otherwise inoperation packet discard.When this sensor node processes completes, enter the sleep state shown in steps A 2.
In concrete enforcement, the key storage of the Anti-DoS attack that steps A 5 is used, in main control chip, can be that preset the whole network is unified key; Also can be not identical key, in described system initialisation phase or stage of communication, adjacent described sensor node carries out key agreement, determines shared Anti-DoS attack key; In steps A 6 for the key storage of verification msg bag correctness at safety chip, this key can be that preset the whole network is unified key; Also can be not identical key, in described system initialisation phase or stage of communication, adjacent described sensor node carries out key agreement, determines shared key, thereby completes the establishment of Self-organizing Sensor Networks.
Figure 4 shows that the sensing node inter-process details flow chart of the inventive method.Take SHA (Gallagher P.Secure Hash Standard (SHS) [J] .2008) SHA-1(Gallagher P.Secure Hash Standard (SHS) [J] .2008.) be example (being designated as function f), an embodiment who the invention provides a kind of wireless sensor node opposing DoS attack of Internet of Things, can comprise the steps successively.
(1) random placement sensor node in targeted environment, can, by aircraft random placement sensor node in target area, also can implement artificial random placement.
(2) all the sensors node enters initial phase, comprises key agreement, Route Selection etc.; Key (the K of the Anti-DoS attack using in described embodiment
1) and the key (K of verification msg bag correctness
2) for the whole network, unify key, be stored in respectively in the main control chip and safety chip of sensor node; Wireless sensor network is set up in self-organizing.
(3) all the sensors node in sensor network enters sleep state
(4) MAC=f (c, K are calculated in base station
1), MAC and wireless awakening signal are sent to neighbor node; Wherein c is the shared information that adjacent two sensor nodes are consulted, and k, for opposing Replay Attack (Replay Attacks), can stab information or counter information the joining day, as MAC=f (c, b, K in hashing algorithm
1), wherein b is timestamp or counter information.
(5) neighbor node, first in the correctness of wireless awakening device checking wireless awakening signal, sends to main control chip by MAC after being proved to be successful, the K of main control chip utilization storage
1, calculate MAC
0=f (c, K
1), compare MAC
0whether equate with MAC; If unequal, do not wake up, if equate, wake up, to base station, send request data command.
(6) base station receives after the request msg order of neighbor node, calculates h=f (m, K
2), and m+h is sent to neighbor node; Wherein m is packet.For preventing Replay Attack, in hashing algorithm, can stab information or counter information the joining day.
(7) neighbor node in wake-up states utilizes wireless transceiver to receive m+h, the K of safety chip utilization storage
2, calculate h
0=f (m, K
2), compare h
0whether equate with h, if do not wait packet discard, if equate, forwarding data bag is to other neighbor nodes, wait this node processing to complete the laggard sleep state that enters.
(8) adjacent two neighbor node repeating steps (4)～(7), until correct packet arrives destination node, otherwise wrong packet is dropped, and in sensor network, do not transmit, and saves the energy consumption of sensor node.
(9) when destination node execution step (7), if compare h
0equate with h, according to packet, process, no longer forward; If do not wait packet discard, do not carry out other operations.
From above embodiment,
Situation one: even if assailant can catch wireless awakening signal and reset, but do not know key K
1, thereby cannot forge correct MAC, the main control chip checking MAC failure of routing node, thereby can not wake up, effectively save energy.
Situation two: in described embodiment, after step (5) node is waken up, assailant cannot know key K
2, thereby cannot forge the correct m+h in step (6), the safety chip checking data bag failure of the routing node having waken up, packet discard.Abandon timely misdata bag and can avoid other nodes of network because receiving, process, forward this packet and off-energy, thereby greatly reduce the impact of network power consumption.
Therefore, compared with prior art, the method for the invention can effectively be resisted DoS attack, avoids the energy consumption of sensor node; And the modular structure of sensor node provides the two-stage safety protecting mechanism of main control chip and safety chip, when can utilize energy resource, improve the fail safe of higher level effective and reasonablely.
Claims (10)
1. a method for wireless sensor network opposing DoS attack, described wireless sensor network comprises that ， appointed area, at least one base station disposes some wireless sensor nodes, its step comprises:
1) described base station is adjacent node, each node and is adjacent and between node, carries out key agreement, determine and store shared Anti-DoS attack key and packet authenticate key, complete the establishment of self-organizing radio sensor network, all nodes are in sleep state simultaneously;
2) before described base station or each node send packet, first send wireless awakening signal and the MAC value that generated by Anti-DoS attack key by it to next adjacent node of Route Selection;
3) described adjacent node receives wireless awakening signal and MAC value by its wireless awakening device, after the success of wireless awakening device checking wireless awakening signal, MAC value is sent to the processing module of this node, and the Anti-DoS attack key by it according to storage carries out the checking of MAC value;
4) MAC value is waken present node up after being verified, and receives the packet of a upper node transmission and carries out packet authentication according to packet authenticate key, and present node only forwards by the packet after authentication;
5) destination node is carried out packet authentication according to packet authenticate key after receiving the packet that on it, adjacent node sends, and processes by the packet of authentication, or abandons not by the packet of authentication.
2. the method that wireless sensor network opposing Dos according to claim 1 attacks, is characterized in that, described in each, node still enters sleep state after executing corresponding operating.
3. the method that wireless sensor network opposing Dos according to claim 1 attacks, is characterized in that, the Anti-DoS attack key of described base station and each node can be that preset the whole network is unified key; Also can be not identical key.
4. the method that wireless sensor network opposing Dos according to claim 1 attacks, is characterized in that, the packet authenticate key of described base station and each node can be that preset the whole network is unified key; Also can be not identical key.
5. the method that wireless sensor network opposing Dos according to claim 1 attacks, is characterized in that, described Anti-DoS attack key storage is in the main control chip of each node processing module; Described packet authenticate key is stored in the safety chip of each node processing module.
6. the method that wireless sensor network opposing Dos according to claim 1 attacks, is characterized in that, described MAC value checking and/or packet authentication adopt SHA.
7. the method that wireless sensor network opposing Dos according to claim 1 attacks, is characterized in that, embeds timestamp information or counter information, as the parameter of MAC value and/or packet identifying algorithm in described packet.
8. the system of wireless sensor network opposing DoS attack, comprise at least one base station and several wireless sensor nodes of arranging in appointed area, described wireless sensor node comprises sensor assembly, processor module, wireless communication module and energy supply module; Described wireless communication module comprises wireless transceiver and wireless awakening device, and wherein said wireless awakening device is for receiving and verify wireless awakening signal; Described base station is adjacent node, each node and is adjacent and between node, stores shared Anti-DoS attack key and packet authenticate key, and generates MAC value by its Anti-DoS attack key.
9. the system of wireless sensor network opposing DoS attack according to claim 8, is characterized in that, described processor module comprises main control chip and safety chip, stores respectively Anti-DoS attack key and packet authenticate key.
10. the system of wireless sensor network opposing DoS attack according to claim 8, is characterized in that, packet authenticate key and/or the Anti-DoS attack key of described base station and each node can be that preset the whole network is unified key; Also can be not identical key.
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