CN103532721A - Digital signature method, signature verification method, and method of distinguishing transaction signature and common signature - Google Patents
Digital signature method, signature verification method, and method of distinguishing transaction signature and common signature Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention provides a digital signature method, a signature verification method, and a method of distinguishing transaction signature and common signature. The digital signature method comprises the steps that SM3 calculation is performed by utilizing a transaction identity and a common identity; a first transaction hash value Z1 and a first common hash value Z2 are obtained; the first transaction hash value Z1 and the first common hash value Z2 are connected with a signature message M; the SM3 calculation is performed; a second transaction hash value e1 and a second common hash value e2 are obtained; the second transaction hash value e1 and the second common hash value e2 are subjected to signature operation by using a user private key d; and a transaction signature value (r, s) and a common signature value (r, s) are generated. Hashing and signature verification are performed by using a corresponding user identity (ID), and SM2 transaction signature and the common signature can be distinguished, so that a signature deception attack of other people is avoided.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to information security field.
Background technology
In recent years, the fast development of ecommerce need to fundamentally solve the problems such as true identity identification and network data transmission fail safe, with the UsbKey of LCDs, assents and gives birth to.Key with LCDs has increased man-machine interactive operation, has increased display screen and button, is convenient to user and inputs password, examines the Transaction Information of demonstration etc.
UsbKey with liquid crystal display in use can carry out dissimilar signature, simply can be divided into trading signature and common signature.Wherein trading signature need to be shown to Transaction Information (as proceeding to account, the amount of money etc. of transferring accounts) on the liquid crystal display screen of UsbKey, and waits for the process that just completes a trading signature after user has checked information and carried out definite operation.Common signature does not need liquid crystal display screen to show and user confirms.And attack UsbKey usual way with liquid crystal display, be exactly that the data of the Transaction Information common signed data that disguises oneself as is issued to the demonstration that UsbKey signs to walk around liquid crystal display screen, thereby complete, once deceive label.So, for how correctly distinguishing trading signature the UsbKey with liquid crystal display and common signature just seems particularly important.
The identification authentication mode of traditional RSA signature will progressively be replaced by SM2 signature algorithm under the requirement of national Password Management office.SM2 compares RSA Algorithm following advantage: safe, memory space is little, and signature speed is fast, the features such as domestic algorithm.
When using RSA signature algorithm will and hash algorithm (MD5, Sha1, SHAMD5, Sha256 etc.) be used in conjunction with just and can complete once signed.Because can have with the hash algorithm of RSA pairing multiple, so trading signature and common signature during RSA signature can be distinguished according to hash algorithm.But be different from, RSA signature algorithm can by distinguishing, several supporting hash algorithms be distinguished trading signature and nontransaction signature prevents from deceiving label attack.
SM2 signature algorithm can only support the use with SM3 hash algorithm, and SM2 signature can not be distinguished trading signature and nontransaction signature by hash algorithm.So need a kind of new mode distinguish trading signature and common signature, thereby preventing that other people deceiving from signing attacks.
Summary of the invention
In order to distinguish trading signature and common signature, the invention provides a kind of method of digital signature, sign test method and differentiation trading signature and common signature.
For solving the problems of the technologies described above, the invention provides following technical scheme:
A method for digital signature, comprising:
Utilize User Identity ID to carry out SM3 calculating, obtain the first Hash Value Z;
After described the first Hash Value Z is connected with signature information M, carry out SM3 calculating, obtain the second Hash Value e;
User's private key d, to described the second Hash Value e computing of signing, generates signature value (r, s).
Further, described User Identity ID is transaction ID or common sign, and described transaction ID is the User Identity ID of use while carrying out trading signature, the described common User Identity ID using while carrying out common signature that is designated.
Further, the described User Identity ID that utilizes carries out SM3 calculating, and the step that obtains the first Hash Value Z comprises:
Utilize User Identity ID, part elliptic curve system parameters and client public key P to carry out SM3 calculating, obtain the first Hash Value Z.
Further, described User Identity ID, part elliptic curve system parameters and the client public key P of utilizing carries out SM3 calculating, and the step that obtains the first Hash Value Z comprises:
Z=SM3(ENTL||ID||a||b||x
G||y
G||x
a||y
a)
Wherein:
The bit length of the User Identity ID that ENTL represents;
ID is User Identity;
A, b is curve system parameters;
X
g, y
gcoordinate for the basic point G of elliptic curve;
X
a, Y
acoordinate for client public key P;
|| represent numerical value to connect.
Further, user's private key d is to described the second Hash Value e computing of signing, and the step that generates signature value (r, s) comprises:
A1. by the data type conversion of e, be integer;
A2. produce random number k ∈ [1, n-1]; Described n is prime number;
A3. calculating elliptic curve point (x1, y1)=[k] G, is integer by the data type conversion of x1; Wherein, [k] G represents the k times of point of the basic point G of elliptic curve;
A4. calculate r=(e+x1) mod n, if r=0 or r+k=n return to A2;
A5. calculate s=((1+d)
-1* (k-r*d)) mod n, if s=0 returns to A2; Wherein, d is private key for user;
A6. by r, the data type conversion of s is byte serial, obtains the signature value (r, s) of message M.
A method for sign test, comprising:
User's PKI P separates signature computing to signature value (r, s), generates decrypted value;
Judge whether described decrypted value equates with the second Hash Value e, if equate, sign test success, if unequal, sign test failure.
Further, user's PKI P separates signature computing to signature value (r, s), and the step that generates decrypted value comprises:
B1. check r ∈ [1, n-1] whether to set up, if the checking of being false can't pass; Described n is prime number;
B2. check s ∈ [1, n-1] whether to set up, if the checking of being false can't pass;
B3. make M '=Z||M;
B4. calculating e '=SM3 (M '), is integer by the data type conversion of e ';
B5. by r, the data type conversion of s is integer, calculates t=(r+s) mod n, if t=0, checking can't pass;
B6. calculate elliptic curve point (x1 ', y1 ')=[s] G+[t] P; Wherein, [s] G represents the s times of point of the basic point G of elliptic curve, and [t] P represents the t times of point of client public key P;
B7. by the data type conversion of x1 ', be integer, and calculating R=(e '+x1 ') mod n, whether checking R=r sets up, and be verified, otherwise checking is not passed through if set up.
A method of distinguishing trading signature and common signature, comprising:
Utilize transaction ID and common sign to carry out respectively SM3 calculating, obtain the first transaction Hash Value Z1 and the first common Hash Value Z2;
After described the first transaction Hash Value Z1 is connected with signature information M respectively with the first common Hash Value Z2, carry out SM3 calculating, obtain the second transaction Hash Value e1 and the second common Hash Value e2;
User's private key d, to described the second transaction Hash Value e1 and the second common Hash Value e2 computing of signing respectively, generates respectively trading signature value (r, s) and common signature value (r, s).
Method provided by the invention is in completing the signature process of a SM2 algorithm, need first according to User Identity ID, to draw Z value, and Z value and signed data are done to the computing of SM3 hash, and again hash result is carried out afterwards to the computing of SM2, just calculated a signature process.
Because utilize first user identify label ID(transaction ID) and the common sign of the second User Identity ID() computing of signing respectively, so can distinguish trading signature and common signature by User Identity ID, when server end sign test, with corresponding User Identity ID, carry out hash sign test, can distinguish SM2 trading signature and common signature, thereby prevent that other people deceiving from sign attacking.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is the processing figure that the embodiment of the present invention is distinguished trading signature and common signature;
Fig. 2 is the flow chart of method of the digital signature of the embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 3 is the flow chart of the embodiment of the present invention sign test method corresponding with endorsement method;
Fig. 4 is the flow chart that the embodiment of the present invention is distinguished the method for trading signature and common signature.
Embodiment
For making the object, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention clearer, the present invention is described in further detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and the specific embodiments.It should be noted that, in the situation that not conflicting, the embodiment in the application and the feature in embodiment be combination in any mutually.
As shown in Figure 2, the method for a kind of digital signature of the embodiment of the present invention, comprising:
S01, utilize User Identity ID to carry out SM3 calculating, obtain the first Hash Value Z;
S02, described the first Hash Value Z is connected with signature information M after, carry out SM3 calculating, obtain the second Hash Value e;
S03, user's private key d, to described the second Hash Value K computing of signing, generate signature value (r, s);
S04, output signature value (r, s).
Wherein, described User Identity ID comprises transaction ID and common sign, and described transaction ID is the User Identity ID of use while carrying out trading signature, the described common User Identity ID using while carrying out common signature that is designated.
The process of common signature is the same with the process of trading signature, and difference is that the User Identity ID using is different.
User Identity ID, refers to user's the sign distinguished, is a string Ascii character, for example: zhangsan@163.COM, aaabbb etc.
Step S01 utilizes User Identity ID, part elliptic curve system parameters and client public key P to carry out SM3 calculating, obtains the first Hash Value Z.
Be specially:
Z=SM3(ENTL||ID||a||b||x
G||y
G||x
a||y
a)
Wherein:
ENTL is the bit length by the User Identity ID of 2 byte representations;
ID is User Identity;
A, b is system parameter of curve;
X
g, y
gcoordinate for the basic point G of elliptic curve;
X
a, Y
acoordinate for client public key P;
|| represent numerical value to connect.
Step S03 comprises:
A1. the method providing by GM/T0003.1-20124.2.4 and 4.2.3 is integer by the data type conversion of e;
A2. produce random number k ∈ [1, n-1]; Described n is prime number;
A3. calculate elliptic curve point (x1, y1)=[k] G, the method providing by the 4.2.8 of GM/T0003.1-2012 is integer by the data type conversion of x1; Wherein, [k] G represents the k times of point of the basic point G of elliptic curve;
A4. calculate r=(e+x1) mod n, if r=0 or r+k=n return to A2;
A5. calculate s=((1+d)
-1* (k-r*d)) mod n, if s=0 returns to A2; Wherein, d is private key for user;
A6. the method providing by GM/T0003.1-20124.2.2 is by r, and the data type conversion of s is byte serial, obtains the signature value (r, s) of message M.
The close n=FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 3333DF6B21C6052B 53BBF409 39D54123 that gets of state.
As shown in Figure 3, the method for a kind of sign test of the embodiment of the present invention, corresponding with the method for above-mentioned digital signature, comprising:
S05, user's PKI P separate signature computing to signature value (r, s), generate decrypted value;
S06, judge whether described decrypted value equates with the second Hash Value e, if equate, sign test success, if unequal, sign test failure.
Step S05 comprises:
B1. check r ∈ [1, n-1] whether to set up, if the checking of being false can't pass; Described n is prime number;
B2. check s ∈ [1, n-1] whether to set up, if the checking of being false can't pass;
B3. make M '=Z||M;
B4. calculate e '=SM3 (M '), the method providing by GM/T0003.1-2012 4.2.4 and 4.2.3 is integer by the data type conversion of e ';
B5. the method providing by GM/T0003.1-2012 4.2.3 is by r, and the data type conversion of s is integer, calculates t=(r+s) mod n, if t=0, checking can't pass;
B6. calculate elliptic curve point (x1 ', y1 ')=[s] G+[t] P; Wherein, [s] G represents the s times of point of the basic point G of elliptic curve, and [t] P represents the t times of point of client public key P;
B7. the method providing by GM/T0003.1-2012 4.2.8 is integer by the data type conversion of x1 ', and calculating R=(e '+x1 ') mod n, whether checking R=r sets up, and be verified, otherwise checking is not passed through if set up.
The close n=FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 3333DF6B21C6052B 53BBF409 39D54123 that gets of state.
As shown in Figure 4, a kind of method of distinguishing trading signature and common signature of the embodiment of the present invention, comprising:
Utilize transaction ID and common sign to carry out respectively SM3 calculating, obtain the first transaction Hash Value Z1 and the first common Hash Value Z2;
After described the first transaction Hash Value Z1 is connected with signature information M respectively with the first common Hash Value Z2, carry out SM3 calculating, obtain the second transaction Hash Value e1 and the second common Hash Value e2;
User's private key d, to described the second transaction Hash Value e1 and the second common Hash Value e2 computing of signing respectively, generates respectively trading signature value (r, s) and common signature value (r, s).
Wherein, the confirmation that Transaction Information need to obtain client could continue, and as shown in Figure 1, process is:
A, utilize User Identity ID to carry out SM3 calculating, obtain the first Hash Value Z;
Whether the User Identity ID that B, judgement participate in digital signature computing is transaction ID; If it is perform step C, if not, perform step D;
C, export Transaction Information and wait for that user confirms; Client confirms that transaction performs step D, client Cancels Transaction and exits signature process;
D, described the first Hash Value Z is connected with signature information after, carry out SM3 calculating, obtain the second Hash Value e;
E, user's private key d, to described the second Hash Value e computing of signing, generate signature value;
F, output signature value.
By distinguishing the mode of SM2 trading signature and common signature, when trading signature, can after treating that user checks Transaction Information confirmation, just complete this trading signature process at Usbkey screen display Transaction Information, prevent that other people label of deceiving from attacking.
Embodiment:
As shown in Figure 1, in trading signature and common signature process, user uses different User Identity ID, i.e. transaction ID and common sign, and two kinds of signature sign test processes are the same, distinguish and are that User Identity ID is different:
Utilize transaction ID and common sign to carry out respectively SM3 calculating, obtain the first transaction Hash Value Z1 and the first common Hash Value Z2;
After described the first transaction Hash Value Z1 is connected with signature information M respectively with the first common Hash Value Z2, carry out SM3 calculating, obtain the second transaction Hash Value e1 and the second common Hash Value e2;
User's private key d, to described the second transaction Hash Value e1 and the second common Hash Value e2 computing of signing respectively, generates respectively trading signature value (r, s) and common signature value (r, s).
The ID using during trading signature in the present embodiment is fixed as AAAA, and the ID of common signature use is fixed as BBBB, so in signature, if judgement user ID is AAAA, think trading signature, in the time of sign test, if the sign test of trading signature, user ID is AAAA, otherwise is BBBB.By appointing in advance the value of User Identity ID, distinguish trading signature and common signature.
The above; be only the specific embodiment of the present invention, but protection scope of the present invention is not limited to this, is anyly familiar with those skilled in the art in the technical scope that the present invention discloses; can expect easily changing or replacing, within all should being encompassed in protection scope of the present invention.Therefore, protection scope of the present invention should be as the criterion with the protection range described in claim.
Claims (8)
1. a method for digital signature, is characterized in that, comprising:
Utilize User Identity ID to carry out SM3 calculating, obtain the first Hash Value Z;
After described the first Hash Value Z is connected with signature information M, carry out SM3 calculating, obtain the second Hash Value e;
User's private key d, to described the second Hash Value e computing of signing, generates signature value (r, s).
2. method according to claim 1, it is characterized in that, described User Identity ID is transaction ID or common sign, and described transaction ID is the User Identity ID of use while carrying out trading signature, the described common User Identity ID using while carrying out common signature that is designated.
3. method according to claim 1, is characterized in that, the described User Identity ID that utilizes carries out SM3 calculating, and the step that obtains the first Hash Value Z comprises:
Utilize User Identity ID, part elliptic curve system parameters and client public key P to carry out SM3 calculating, obtain the first Hash Value Z.
4. method according to claim 3, is characterized in that, described User Identity ID, part elliptic curve system parameters and the client public key P of utilizing carries out SM3 calculating, and the step that obtains the first Hash Value Z comprises:
Z=SM3(ENTL||ID||a||b||x
G||y
G||x
a||y
a)
Wherein:
The bit length of the User Identity ID that ENTL represents;
ID is User Identity;
A, b is curve system parameters;
X
g, y
gcoordinate for the basic point G of elliptic curve;
X
a, Y
acoordinate for client public key P;
|| represent numerical value to connect.
5. method according to claim 1, is characterized in that, user's private key d is to described the second Hash Value e computing of signing, and the step that generates signature value (r, s) comprises:
A1. by the data type conversion of e, be integer;
A2. produce random number k ∈ [1, n-1]; Described n is prime number;
A3. calculating elliptic curve point (x1, y1)=[k] G, is integer by the data type conversion of x1; Wherein, [k] G represents the k times of point of the basic point G of elliptic curve;
A4. calculate r=(e+x1) mod n, if r=0 or r+k=n return to A2;
A5. calculate s=((1+d)
-1* (k-r*d)) mod n, if s=0 returns to A2; Wherein, d is private key for user;
A6. by r, the data type conversion of s is byte serial, obtains the signature value (r, s) of message M.
6. a method for sign test, is characterized in that: comprising:
User's PKI P separates signature computing to signature value (r, s), generates decrypted value;
Judge whether described decrypted value equates with the second Hash Value e, if equate, sign test success, if unequal, sign test failure.
7. method according to claim 6, is characterized in that,
User's PKI P separates signature computing to signature value (r, s), and the step that generates decrypted value comprises:
B1. check r ∈ [1, n-1] whether to set up, if the checking of being false can't pass; Described n is prime number;
B2. check s ∈ [1, n-1] whether to set up, if the checking of being false can't pass;
B3. make M '=Z||M;
B4. calculating e '=SM3 (M '), is integer by the data type conversion of e ';
B5. by r, the data type conversion of s is integer, calculates t=(r+s) mod n, if t=0, checking can't pass;
B6. calculate elliptic curve point (x1 ', y1 ')=[s] G+[t] P; Wherein, [s] G represents the s times of point of the basic point G of elliptic curve, and [t] P represents the t times of point of client public key P;
B7. by the data type conversion of x1 ', be integer, and calculating R=(e '+x1 ') mod n, whether checking R=r sets up, and be verified, otherwise checking is not passed through if set up.
8. a method of distinguishing trading signature and common signature, is characterized in that: comprising:
Utilize transaction ID and common sign to carry out respectively SM3 calculating, obtain the first transaction Hash Value Z1 and the first common Hash Value Z2;
After described the first transaction Hash Value Z1 is connected with signature information M respectively with the first common Hash Value Z2, carry out SM3 calculating, obtain the second transaction Hash Value e1 and the second common Hash Value e2;
User's private key d, to described the second transaction Hash Value e1 and the second common Hash Value e2 computing of signing respectively, generates respectively trading signature value (r, s) and common signature value (r, s).
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Application publication date: 20140122 |