CN103368741B - The multi-receiver label decryption method of participant's identity anonymous - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses the multi-receiver label decryption method of a kind of participant's identity anonymous, for solving the technical problem of existing multi-receiver label decryption method poor stability.Technical scheme is, (1) sender signs close.Sender IDsChoose n authorized receiver ID1,ID2,...,IDn, set up authorized receiver identity information list L={ID1,ID2,...,IDn, sign ciphertext C=< Y, X, U, σ, W, T, J > by structure, and close for label ciphertext C is broadcasted, complete to sign close operation.(2) recipient's deciphering.Recipient IDiFirst h '=H is calculated according to the element signed in ciphertext C4(σ, X, U, T, J), then judges equation e (W, P)=e (X+h ' Y, Ppub) whether set up, utilize symmetrical decipherment algorithm Dk() message cipher text σ is decrypted and obtains clear-text message M=DK(σ), decrypting process is completed.Owing to sender realizes sender anonymity by the pseudo-PKI of structure, use lagrange-interpolation that the identity information of all authorized receivers merges the identity anonymous realizing authorized receiver to non authorized recipients simultaneously, improve the safety of multi-receiver label decryption method.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of multi-receiver label decryption method, particularly to the multi-receiver label of a kind of participant's identity anonymous
Decryption method.
Background technology
In distributed network application (such as Web conference, roundtable conference and pay TV), in order to protect communication system
In all participant's privacy of identities of conversating, and guarantee that session content only correctly can be deciphered with authorized user, rather than
Authorized user cannot correctly decipher, and needs secure broadcast technology as support.Secure broadcast is to realize a sender to multiple
Authorized receiver sends safely the technology of identical message, it is possible to realize the demand for security of above-mentioned network application.
Document " Anonymous ID Based Signcryption Scheme for Multiple Receivers,
Cryptology ePrint Archive.Report2009/345 " disclose the connecing of sender anonymity of a kind of identity-based more
Receipts person signs decryption method, having main steps that of the method: first, and user's (including sender and recipient) is with the identity information of self
Registering to trusted third party TTP (Trusted Third Party), TTP is that each registration user calculates PKI and private
Key, and the PKI of user is open, corresponding private key secret is distributed to each user;When signing close, sender randomly chooses
Some registered subscriber identity informations also constitute an identity of the sender information aggregate together with self-identity information, with oneself
Private key, the identity of the sender information aggregate of structure, the identity information of authorized receiver and message to be sent calculate
Thus obtain ciphertext, and ciphertext is broadcasted;During deciphering, recipient first checks the authorized receiver in ciphertext after receiving ciphertext
Identity information list, if oneself is not authorized receiver, is not decrypted;If oneself being authorized receiver, then with certainly
Oneself private key is verified the identity of sender and is decrypted.But there are some defects in the program: first, although sender passes through
Self-identity information is hidden in identity of the sender information aggregate and realizes the method that identity of the sender is anonymous, but such
Method can not stop assailant to use the identity of the sender information aggregate employing cross validation's attack in multiple ciphertexts and collusion
The method attacked reduces the conjecture scope to identity of the sender, even can directly obtain transmission when conjecture scope is sufficiently small
Person's identity;Secondly, in the scheme that the document proposes, comprise the identity information set of all authorized receivers in ciphertext, i.e. appoint
What receives the identity information that the recipient of this ciphertext can know the authorized receiver of this message, thus it cannot be guaranteed that connects
The identity anonymous of receipts person (includes that authorized receiver is to the body between identity anonymous and the authorized receiver of non authorized recipients
Part is anonymous).
Summary of the invention
In order to overcome the deficiency of existing multi-receiver label decryption method poor stability, the present invention provides a kind of participant's identity
Anonymous multi-receiver label decryption method.The sender of the method constructs one according to oneself PKI when each broadcast communication
Pseudo-PKI communicates, and can inquire the identity of the sender information of its correspondence owing to assailant passes through PKI, thus pseudo-public
The true identity of sender can be stashed by the use of key, such that it is able to realize sender anonymity;Sender is signing close disappearing
Lagrange's interpolation technology is used to be merged by the identity information of all authorized receivers as sign ciphertext one during breath
Part, thus in signing ciphertext, the most directly expose the identity information list of sender, and then authorized receiver couple can be realized
The identity anonymous of non authorized recipients;Meanwhile, can not be by signing the relation meter between ciphertext element between authorized receiver
Calculate the identity information of the other side, such that it is able to the identity anonymous realized between authorized receiver.When preventing broadcast communication potential
The identity information leakage problem of participant, protect the privacy of communication parties, improve the peace of multi-receiver label decryption method
Quan Xing.
The technical solution adopted for the present invention to solve the technical problems: the multi-receiver label of a kind of participant's identity anonymous are close
Method, is characterized in comprising the following steps:
(1) the close process of the label of sender;
Sender IDsTo the label of clear-text message M close time,
(1a) sender IDsChoose n authorized receiver ID1,ID2,...,IDn, set up authorized receiver's identity information row
Table L={ID1,ID2,...,IDn, wherein n is the integer more than zero;
(1b) sender IDsChoose random number r ∈ Zq *, calculate the pseudo-PKI Y=rQ of senders, wherein QsFor sender IDs
PKI, Zq *For non-zero multiplicative group based on prime number q;
(1c) for each authorized receiver IDi, wherein i=1,2 ..., n, sender IDsEvaluation xi=H2(IDi)
With numerical value yi=αi(Qi+P1), then, utilize lagrange-interpolation to construct polynomial function fiX () is as follows:
Wherein, x is polynomial function fiThe independent variable of (x);
Then, sender IDsIt is calculated as follows information:
Wherein, H2For password one-way Hash function, QiFor authorized receiver IDiPKI, P1For sender IDsFrom group G1In
The element arbitrarily chosen, ai,jIt is polynomial function fiThe coefficient of (x) and i ≠ j, i=1,2 ..., n, j=1,2 ..., n, Ji ′=α
αi -1Ppub, αiFor sender IDsThe positive integer randomly choosed,
(1d) construction set T={T1,T2,...,TnAnd set J={J1,J2,...,Jn};
(1e) sender IDsEvaluation U=α P, and utilize sender IDsPseudo-PKI Y evaluation X=α Y and key K
=H3(e(Ppub,P1)α), wherein, H3For password one-way Hash function, e is bilinear map, PpubFor system Your Majesty's key;
(1f) sender IDsUtilize symmetric encipherment algorithm EkClear-text message M is encrypted by (), obtains message ciphertext σ=EK
(M);
(1g) sender IDsCalculate h=H4(σ, X, U, T, J), then, calculates signing messages W=(α+h) rDs, wherein Ds
For sender IDsPrivate key, H4For password one-way Hash function.
(1h) sender IDsStructure signs ciphertext C=< Y, X, U, σ, W, T, J >, and close for label ciphertext C is broadcasted,
Complete to sign close operation;
(2) decrypting process of recipient;
Recipient IDi, wherein i=1,2 ..., n, to sign ciphertext C deciphering time,
(2a) recipient IDiFirst according to element σ, X, U, T, the J signed in ciphertext C, h '=H is calculated4(σ, X, U, T, J),
Then equation e (W, P)=e (X+h ' Y, P is judgedpub) whether set up, wherein, W, X, Y are to sign the element in ciphertext C, P and Ppub
For the open parameter of system, e is bilinear map;
If equation is false, then ciphertext C is signed in explanation is invalid or recipient IDiIt not authorized receiver, at this moment,
Recipient IDiExit decrypting process;If equation is set up, then signing ciphertext C is effective and recipient IDiIt is authorized receiver,
Then, recipient IDiContinue executing with procedure below;
(2b) recipient IDiEvaluation xi=H2(IDi), then utilize the element T signed in ciphertext C and J to calculate middle
Parameter With
(2c) recipient IDiUse the element U and intermediate parameters η signed in ciphertext CiAnd τiEvaluation ω=e (τi,
ηi)e(U,Di)-1, wherein DiFor recipient IDiPrivate key, then, computation key K=H3(ω);
(2d) recipient IDiUtilize symmetrical decipherment algorithm Dk() message cipher text σ is decrypted and obtains clear-text message M=DK
(σ), decrypting process is completed.
The invention has the beneficial effects as follows: due to the sender of the method when each broadcast communication all according to the PKI of oneself
Construct a pseudo-PKI to communicate, the identity of the sender information of its correspondence can be inquired owing to assailant passes through PKI,
So the true identity of sender can be stashed by the use of pseudo-PKI, it is achieved thereby that sender anonymity;Sender exists
Lagrange's interpolation technology is used to be merged by the identity information of all authorized receivers as signing when signing close message close
A part for literary composition, thus in signing ciphertext, the most directly expose the identity information list of sender, and then achieve mandate reception
Person's identity anonymous to non authorized recipients;Can not calculate by signing the relation between ciphertext element between authorized receiver
Go out the identity information of the other side, it is achieved thereby that the identity anonymous between authorized receiver.Ginseng potential when preventing broadcast communication
With the identity information leakage problem of person, protect the privacy of communication parties, improve the safety of multi-receiver label decryption method.
With embodiment, the present invention is elaborated below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is the flow chart of the multi-receiver label decryption method of participant's identity anonymous of the present invention.
Detailed description of the invention
The present invention is described in detail with reference to Fig. 1.
Explanation of nouns.
TTP: trusted third party, is often taken on by key generation centre, is responsible for producing the private key of sender and recipient;
Z: the security of system parameter that trusted third party TTP chooses;
Q: the Big prime that trusted third party TTP chooses, meets q > 2z;
G1: the q rank addition cyclic group that trusted third party TTP chooses;
G2: the q factorial method cyclic group that trusted third party TTP chooses;
E: the G that trusted third party TTP chooses1And G2On bilinear map, i.e. e:G1×G1→G2;
A → B: the mapping of definition territory A to codomain B;
P:G1On generation unit, trusted third party TTP randomly select;
S: system master key, is randomly selected by trusted third party TTP;
Zq *: non-zero multiplicative group based on prime number q;
Ppub: system Your Majesty's key, Ppub=sP;
Hi: password one-way Hash function, wherein i=1,2,3,4;
{0,1}*: the string that arbitrarily long " 0 " or " 1 " is constituted;
M: clear-text message;
The length of | M |: clear-text message M;
Ek(): symmetric encipherment algorithm, wherein k is key;
Ek(m): utilize symmetric encipherment algorithm EkMessage m is encrypted by ();
Dk(): symmetrical decipherment algorithm, with symmetric encipherment algorithm Ek() is corresponding, and wherein k is key;
Dk(c): utilize symmetrical decipherment algorithm DkCiphertext c is decrypted by ();
The open parameter of params: system;
ID: subscriber identity information, user includes sender and recipient;
IDs: the identity information of sender;
Qs: sender IDsPKI, Qs=H1(IDs);
Ds: sender IDsPrivate key, Ds=sQs;
Y: sender IDsPseudo-PKI;
The number of n: authorized receiver;
IDi: the identity information of authorized receiver i, wherein i=1,2 ..., n;
Qi: authorized receiver IDiPKI, Qi=H1(IDi), wherein i=1,2 ..., n;
Di: authorized receiver IDiPrivate key, Di=sQi, wherein i=1,2 ..., n;
L: authorized receiver's identity information list;
P1: the element arbitrarily chosen from group G1;
fi(x): utilizing the polynomial function that Lagrange's interpolation constructs, wherein x is independent variable, i=1,2 ..., n;
A mod q: represent that A is divided by the remainder after q;
σ: message ciphertext;
C: sign ciphertext;
<a, b ..., c>: by element a, b ..., the sequential element set that c is constituted;
Specific implementation method is as follows:
Step 1, system is set up.
Key generation centre chooses Big prime q, wherein a q according to security parameter z > 2z, the addition on one q rank of structure follows
Ring group G1With q factorial method cyclic group G2;Construct a bilinear map e:G1×G1→G2;From group G1On randomly select generation
Unit P, and randomly select system master key s ∈ Zq *, calculate corresponding system Your Majesty key Ppub=sP;Construct 4 password one-way hash functions
Function, is designated as: H1: { 0,1}*→G1;H2: { 0,1}*→Zq *;H3: G2→{0,1}|M|;H4: { 0,1}|M|×G1 n+3→Zq *;Choose
Symmetric encipherment algorithm Ek() and symmetrical decipherment algorithm Dk(), wherein k is key;
Key generation centre structure public address system parameter params, params building method is:
params=<G1,G2,q,e,P,Ppub,H1,H2,H3,H4,Ek(),Dk()>
Meanwhile, key generation centre safe storage system master key s.
Step 2, user registers.
User submits identity information ID ∈ { 0,1} to key generation centre*, key generation centre is according to systematic parameter
Params, system master key s and subscriber identity information ID ∈ { 0,1}*Calculate the PKI Q of userID=H1(ID), the private key of user
DID=sQID, externally announce the PKI of this user and the private key of user be sent to user safely.
Step 3, sender signs close.
Sender IDsChoose n authorized receiver ID1,ID2,...,IDn, wherein n be integer and n more than 0, structure authorizes
Recipient identity information list L={ID1,ID2,...,IDn};Sender IDsAs follows to the close process of label of clear-text message M:
Sender IDsChoose random number r ∈ Zq *, calculate the pseudo-PKI Y=rQ of senders, wherein QsFor sender IDsPublic affairs
Key;
Sender IDsFrom group G1In randomly select the element P of1, for each authorized receiver IDi, i=1,
2 ..., n, sender IDsChoose random number αi∈Zq *, evaluation xi=H2(IDi) and numerical value yi=αi(Qi+P1), utilize glug
Bright day interpolation method structure n-1 order polynomial function fi(x):
Wherein, x is polynomial function fiThe independent variable of (x);
Then, sender IDsIt is calculated as follows information:
Wherein, H2For password one-way Hash function, QiFor authorized receiver IDiPKI, ai,jIt is polynomial function fi(x)
Coefficient and i ≠ j, i=1,2 ..., n, j=1,2 ..., n, Ji ′=α αi -1Ppub,αiFor sender IDsRandomly choose
Positive integer;
Sender IDsEvaluation U=α P, and utilize sender IDsPseudo-PKI Y evaluation X=α Y, then, utilize double
Linearly to and password one-way Hash function H3Computation key K=H3(ω), wherein ω=e (Ppub,P1)α;Symmetric cryptography is utilized to calculate
Method EkClear-text message M is encrypted and obtains message ciphertext σ=E by ()K(M);
Sender IDsCalculate h=H4(σ, X, U, T, J), then, calculates signing messages W=(α+h) rDs, wherein DsFor sending out
The person of sending IDsPrivate key, H4For password one-way Hash function;
Sender IDsIt is C=< Y, X, U, σ, W, T, J > that structure signs ciphertext, and close for label ciphertext C is broadcasted.
Step 4, recipient deciphers.
Recipient IDi, wherein i=1,2 ..., n, as follows to the decrypting process signing ciphertext C:
First according to signing ciphertext C calculating h '=H4(σ, X, U, T, J), then according to element X, Y, the W signed in ciphertext C
Parameter P open with system and PpubJudge equation e (W, P)=e (X+h'Y, Ppub) whether set up;
If equation is false, then ciphertext C is signed in explanation is invalid or recipient IDiIt not authorized receiver, at this moment,
Recipient IDiExiting decrypting process, if setting up, then signing ciphertext C is effective and recipient IDiIt is authorized receiver, continues
Perform procedure below;
Recipient IDiUtilize password one-way Hash function H2Evaluation xi=H2(IDi), utilize numerical value xiWith label ciphertext C
In set T and J calculate intermediate parameters ηi=T1+xiT2+...+(xi n-1modq)TnAnd τi=J1+xiJ2+...+(xi n-1modq)
Jn;
Recipient IDiUse the element U and parameter η signed in ciphertext CiAnd τiEvaluation ω=e (τi,ηi)e(U,
Di -1) then computation key K=H3(ω);Finally utilize the decipherment algorithm D in systematic parameterk() message cipher text σ is decrypted
Obtain message plaintext M=DK(σ), decrypting process is completed.
Claims (1)
1. the multi-receiver label decryption method of participant's identity anonymous, it is characterised in that comprise the following steps:
Key generation centre chooses Big prime q, wherein a q according to security parameter z > 2z, the addition cyclic group on one q rank of structure
G1With q factorial method cyclic group G2;Construct a bilinear map e:G1×G1→G2;From group G1On randomly select generation unit P,
And randomly select system master key s ∈ Zq *, calculate corresponding system Your Majesty key Ppub=sP;Construct 4 password one-way hash function letters
Number, is designated as: H1: { 0,1}*→G1;H2: { 0,1}*→Zq *;H3: G2→{0,1}|M|;H4: { 0,1}|M|×G1 n+3→Zq *, wherein, | M
| it is the length of clear-text message M, { 0,1}*It is arbitrarily long 0 or 1 string constituted, { 0,1}|M|It it is the string of 0 or 1 long for | M | composition;
Choose symmetric encipherment algorithm Ek() and symmetrical decipherment algorithm Dk(), wherein k is key;
(1) the close process of the label of sender;
Sender IDsTo the label of clear-text message M close time,
(1a) sender IDsChoose n authorized receiver ID1,ID2,...,IDn, set up authorized receiver identity information list L=
{ID1,ID2,...,IDn, wherein n is the integer more than zero;
(1b) sender IDsChoose random number r ∈ Zq *, calculate the pseudo-PKI Y=rQ of senders, wherein QsFor sender IDs's
PKI, Zq *For non-zero multiplicative group based on prime number q;
(1c) for each authorized receiver IDi, wherein i=1,2 ..., n, sender IDsEvaluation xi=H2(IDi) and
Numerical value yi= i(Qi+P1), then, utilize lagrange-interpolation to construct polynomial function fiX () is as follows:
Wherein, x is polynomial function fiThe independent variable of (x);
Then, sender IDsIt is calculated as follows information:
Wherein, H2For password one-way Hash function, QiFor authorized receiver IDiPKI, P1For sender IDsFrom group G1In arbitrarily
The element chosen, ai,jIt is polynomial function fiThe coefficient of (x) and i ≠ j, i=1,2 ..., n, j=1,2 ..., n, iFor sender IDsThe positive integer randomly choosed,
(1d) construction set T={T1,T2,...,TnAnd set J={J1,J2,...,Jn};
(1e) sender IDsEvaluation U=P, and utilize sender IDsPseudo-PKI Y evaluation X=Y and key K=
H3(e(Ppub,P1)), wherein, H3For password one-way Hash function, e is bilinear map, PpubFor system Your Majesty's key;
(1f) sender IDsUtilize symmetric encipherment algorithm EkClear-text message M is encrypted by (), obtains message ciphertext σ=EK
(M);
(1g) sender IDsCalculate h=H4(σ, X, U, T, J), then, calculating signing messages W=(+h)rDs, wherein DsFor sending out
The person of sending IDsPrivate key, H4For password one-way Hash function;
(1h) sender IDsStructure signs ciphertext C=< Y, X, U, σ, W, T, J >, and close for label ciphertext C is broadcasted, and completes to sign
Close operation;
(2) decrypting process of recipient;
Recipient IDi, wherein i=1,2 ..., n, to sign ciphertext C deciphering time,
(2a) recipient IDiFirst according to element σ, X, U, T, the J signed in ciphertext C, h '=H is calculated4(σ, X, U, T, J), then
Judge equation e (W, P)=e (X+h ' Y, Ppub) whether set up, wherein, W, X, Y are to sign the element in ciphertext C, and e is bilinearity
Map;
If equation is false, then ciphertext C is signed in explanation is invalid or recipient IDiIt not authorized receiver, at this moment, receive
Person IDiExit decrypting process;If equation is set up, then signing ciphertext C is effective and recipient IDiIt is authorized receiver, connects
, recipient IDiContinue executing with procedure below;
(2b) recipient IDiEvaluation xi=H2(IDi), then utilize the element T signed in ciphertext C and J to calculate intermediate parameters
ηi=T1+xiT2+...+(xi n-1 mod q)TnAnd τi=J1+xiJ2+...+(xi n-1 mod q)Jn;
(2c) recipient IDiUse the element U and intermediate parameters η signed in ciphertext CiAnd τiEvaluation ω=e (τi,ηi)e
(U,Di)-1, wherein DiFor recipient IDiPrivate key, then, computation key K=H3(ω);
(2d) recipient IDiUtilize symmetrical decipherment algorithm Dk() message cipher text σ is decrypted and obtains clear-text message M=DK(σ),
Complete decrypting process.
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CN101977197A (en) * | 2010-10-29 | 2011-02-16 | 西安电子科技大学 | Multi-receiver encryption method based on biological characteristics |
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CN101119196A (en) * | 2006-08-03 | 2008-02-06 | 西安电子科技大学 | Bidirectional identification method and system |
CN101977197A (en) * | 2010-10-29 | 2011-02-16 | 西安电子科技大学 | Multi-receiver encryption method based on biological characteristics |
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