CN103338110A - Dynamic ID based RFID safety authentication method with search secret key - Google Patents
Dynamic ID based RFID safety authentication method with search secret key Download PDFInfo
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- CN103338110A CN103338110A CN2013102436082A CN201310243608A CN103338110A CN 103338110 A CN103338110 A CN 103338110A CN 2013102436082 A CN2013102436082 A CN 2013102436082A CN 201310243608 A CN201310243608 A CN 201310243608A CN 103338110 A CN103338110 A CN 103338110A
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Abstract
The invention discloses a dynamic ID based RFID (radio frequency identification) safety authentication method with a search secret key. The method comprises the following steps: generating a random number and sending authentication request to a label by a reader; calculating to obtain a first check code by the label, and transmitting the search secret key and the first check code to the reader; updating the search secret key; transmitting the random number, as well as the search secret key and the first check code both received from the label, to a data processing terminal by the reader; performing label authentication by the data processing terminal; if the authentication succeeds, calculating to obtain a second check code and transmitting the second check code to the reader, otherwise ending the procedure; retransmitting the received second check code to the label by the reader; performing authentication for the reader by the label. The method increases authentication efficiency, has a strong anti-attack property, and guarantees the safety during the authentication process; as an excellent dynamic ID based RFID safety authentication method with the search secret key, the invention can be widely applied to the field of authentication.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the safety certification field, particularly relate to a kind of RFID safety certifying method based on dynamic I D band search key.
Background technology
Along with the RFID(radio-frequency (RF) identification) broad development of technology, the safety problem of RFID system particularly safety and the privacy concern of air interface highlights day by day, is subjected to extensive concern in the industry, becomes one of key factor of restriction RFID technology application development.Because the opening of communication link and do not have linearly, air interface exists great potential safety hazard and safe tender spots, is faced with various security risks and threat, for example palms off, resets, attacks such as tracking, flow analysis and denial of service.The safety certification of present RFID, mainly be to adopt mutual authentication method, in order to reach certain fail safe, this method generally needs integrated pseudorandom number generator, has improved cost and the complexity of label, and because information is encrypted transmission, generally need carry out a large amount of hash computings in the time of the database-located label, greatly reduce authentication efficient, and certification mode be single, there is potential attack tender spots, bigger potential safety hazard is arranged.
Summary of the invention
In order to solve above-mentioned technical problem, the purpose of this invention is to provide a kind of safe and RFID safety certifying method based on dynamic I D band search key that authentication efficient is high.
The technical solution adopted for the present invention to solve the technical problems is:
RFID safety certifying method based on dynamic I D band search key comprises:
S1, reader generate a random number r and send it to label, send authentication request to label simultaneously;
After S2, label receive authentication request, according to the identification code ID of the random number r that receives and the current storage of label and search key SK carry out the one-way Hash function computing obtain H ((ID ⊕ SK) || r), and then obtain the first check code M1=H
L((ID ⊕ SK) || r), and will search for key SK and the first check code M1 sends to reader, and simultaneously the search key SK be upgraded, the search key SK after order is upgraded '=H
R((ID ⊕ SK) || r);
S3, reader send to data processing terminal with random number r, the search key SK and the first check code M1 that receive from label;
S4, data processing terminal carry out matching treatment in conjunction with database and the random number r that receives, search key SK and the first check code M1, thereby carry out smart-tag authentication, if authentication success then calculates the acquisition second check code M2 and sends it to reader, and continues execution in step S5; Otherwise finish;
The second check code M2 that S5, reader will receive is transmitted to label;
S6, label carry out the one-way Hash function computing and obtain H (ID|| SK '), and then judge H
L(ID||SK ') whether equate with the second check code M2 that if equate, then label passes through the authentication to reader, and the identification code ID of label is upgraded, the identification code ID after order is upgraded '=H
R(ID|| SK '); Otherwise finish.
Further, database described in the described step S4 store all labels information and and the data structure of all label correspondences be { sk
i, IDnew, a plurality of examples of IDold}, wherein sk
iSubscript i be natural number, sk
iBe the search key of the label of i example correspondence, IDnew is sk
iThe up-to-date identification code of corresponding label, IDold is sk
iIdentification code when corresponding label the last time is passed through authentication.
Further, described step S4 comprises:
S41, data processing terminal are at first searched the example in the database, judge whether to exist certain instances conform condition sk
i=SK if exist, then obtains the value { sk of this example
i, IDnew, execution in step S44 behind the IDold}; Otherwise execution in step S42;
S42, data processing terminal to all examples carry out the one-way Hash function computing obtain H ((IDnew ⊕ SK) || r), and judge whether to exist the H of certain example correspondence
L((IDnew ⊕ SK) || r) equate with M1, if exist, authentication success then, and then obtain the value { sk of this example
i, IDnew, execution in step S45 behind the IDold}; Otherwise execution in step S43;
S43, data processing terminal carry out the one-way Hash function computing to all examples and obtain H ((IDold) ⊕ SK) || r), and judge whether to exist the H of certain example correspondence
L((IDold ⊕ SK) || equate with M1 that r) if exist, authentication success then obtains the value { sk of this example
i, IDnew, IDold}, and then calculate the acquisition second check code M2=H
L(IDold || sk
i), and the second check code M2 sent to reader, simultaneously this example is upgraded, and continue execution in step S5; Otherwise finish;
S44, calculating are also judged H
L((IDnew ⊕ SK) || whether equate with M1 that r) if equate, then authentication success continues execution in step S45; Otherwise finish;
S45, carry out the one-way Hash function computing and obtain H (IDnew||sk
i), and then obtain the second check code M2=H
L(IDnew||sk
i), and the second check code M2 sent to reader, simultaneously this example is upgraded, and continue execution in step S5.
Further, described in the described step S43 this example is upgraded, it is specially:
Value { sk to this example
i, IDnew, IDold} upgrades, the sk after order is upgraded
iFor: sk
i'=H
R((IDold ⊕ SK) || r), the IDnew after order is upgraded is IDnew '=H
R(IDold||ski).
Further, described in the described step S45 this example is upgraded, it is specially:
Value { sk to this example
i, IDnew, IDold} upgrades, the sk after order is upgraded
iFor: sk
i'=H
R((IDnew ⊕ SK) || r), the IDold after order is upgraded is IDold '=IDnew, and the IDnew after order is upgraded is IDnew '=H
R(IDnew||ski).
Further, described identification code ID, search key SK and random number r have identical figure place, and the output figure place of one-way hash function computing is the twice of the figure place of identification code ID.
The invention has the beneficial effects as follows: the RFID safety certifying method based on dynamic I D band search key of the present invention, the search key SK of combination tag authenticates in verification process, simultaneously behind each authentication operation all to tag ID code ID, the a plurality of entities corresponding with label of search key SK and database storage upgrade, and the two-way authentication mode of the authentication of employing reader and smart-tag authentication, can mate rapidly and authenticate, reduce the operand of verification process, improved authentication efficient, and can resist location tracking, common RFID such as impersonation attack and replay attack desynchronization attacks, anti-aggressiveness is strong, thereby has guaranteed the fail safe of verification process.
Embodiment
At first, variable, definition and the oeprator that occurs among the present invention described:
R: the random number that reader generates;
ID: the identification code of label;
SK: the search key of label;
H (): one-way Hash function computing;
H
LThe left-half of (): H () operation result;
H
RThe right half part of (): H () operation result;
||: the cascade computing;
⊕: XOR;
M1: first check code, the intermediate variable of verification process;
M2: second check code, the intermediate variable of verification process;
Sk
i: the search key of the label of i example correspondence in the database;
IDnew:sk
iThe up-to-date identification code of corresponding label;
IDold:sk
iIdentification code when corresponding label the last time is passed through authentication;
Value after X ': X upgrades, X can be ID, SK, sk here
i, IDnew and IDold.
The invention provides a kind of RFID safety certifying method based on dynamic I D band search key, comprising:
S1, reader generate a random number r and send it to label, send authentication request to label simultaneously;
After S2, label receive authentication request, according to the identification code ID of the random number r that receives and the current storage of label and search key SK carry out the one-way Hash function computing obtain H ((ID ⊕ SK) || r), and then obtain the first check code M1=H
L((ID ⊕ SK) || r), and will search for key SK and the first check code M1 sends to reader, and simultaneously the search key SK be upgraded, the search key SK after order is upgraded '=H
R((ID ⊕ SK) || r);
S3, reader send to data processing terminal with random number r, the search key SK and the first check code M1 that receive from label;
S4, data processing terminal carry out matching treatment in conjunction with database and the random number r that receives, search key SK and the first check code M1, thereby carry out smart-tag authentication, if authentication success then calculates the acquisition second check code M2 and sends it to reader, and continues execution in step S5; Otherwise finish;
The second check code M2 that S5, reader will receive is transmitted to label;
S6, label carry out the one-way Hash function computing and obtain H (ID|| SK '), and then judge H
L(ID||SK ') whether equate with the second check code M2 that if equate, then label passes through the authentication to reader, and the identification code ID of label is upgraded, the identification code ID after order is upgraded '=H
R(ID|| SK '); Otherwise finish.
Be further used as preferred embodiment, database described in the described step S4 store all labels information and and the data structure of all label correspondences be { sk
i, IDnew, a plurality of examples of IDold}, wherein sk
iSubscript i be natural number, sk
iBe the search key of the label of i example correspondence, IDnew is sk
iThe up-to-date identification code of corresponding label, IDold is sk
iIdentification code when corresponding label the last time is passed through authentication.
Be further used as preferred embodiment, described step S4 comprises:
S41, data processing terminal are at first searched the example in the database, judge whether to exist certain instances conform condition sk
i=SK if exist, then obtains the value { sk of this example
i, IDnew, execution in step S44 behind the IDold}; Otherwise execution in step S42;
S42, data processing terminal to all examples carry out the one-way Hash function computing obtain H ((IDnew ⊕ SK) || r), and judge whether to exist the H of certain example correspondence
L((IDnew ⊕ SK) || r) equate with M1, if exist, authentication success then, and then obtain the value { sk of this example
i, IDnew, execution in step S45 behind the IDold}; Otherwise execution in step S43;
S43, data processing terminal carry out the one-way Hash function computing to all examples and obtain H ((IDold) ⊕ SK) || r), and judge whether to exist the H of certain example correspondence
L((IDold ⊕ SK) || equate with M1 that r) if exist, authentication success then obtains the value { sk of this example
i, IDnew, IDold}, and then calculate the acquisition second check code M2=H
L(IDold || sk
i), and the second check code M2 sent to reader, simultaneously this example is upgraded, and continue execution in step S5; Otherwise finish;
S44, calculating are also judged H
L((IDnew ⊕ SK) || whether equate with M1 that r) if equate, then authentication success continues execution in step S45; Otherwise finish;
S45, carry out the one-way Hash function computing and obtain H (IDnew||sk
i), and then obtain the second check code M2=H
L(IDnew||sk
i), and the second check code M2 sent to reader, simultaneously this example is upgraded, and continue execution in step S5.
Be further used as preferred embodiment, described in the described step S43 this example upgraded, it is specially:
Value { sk to this example
i, IDnew, IDold} upgrades, the sk after order is upgraded
iFor: sk
i'=H
R((IDold ⊕ SK) || r), the IDnew after order is upgraded is IDnew '=H
R(IDold||ski).
Be further used as preferred embodiment, described in the described step S45 this example upgraded, it is specially:
Value { sk to this example
i, IDnew, IDold} upgrades, the sk after order is upgraded
iFor: sk
i'=H
R((IDnew ⊕ SK) || r), the IDold after order is upgraded is IDold '=IDnew, and the IDnew after order is upgraded is IDnew '=H
R(IDnew||ski).
Be further used as preferred embodiment, described identification code ID, search key SK and random number r have identical figure place, and the output figure place of one-way hash function computing is the twice of the figure place of identification code ID.
Label described in the present invention refers to the RFID label, and reader refers to the RFID reader, and the present invention supposes that the transfer of data between reader and the data processing terminal is safe, and emphasis of the present invention is to improve at the authentication between RFID label and the RFID reader.
A specific embodiment of the present invention is as follows:
A kind of RFID safety certifying method based on dynamic I D band search key comprises:
A1, reader generate a random number r and send it to label, send authentication request to label simultaneously;
After A2, label receive authentication request, according to the identification code ID of the random number r that receives and the current storage of label and search key SK carry out the one-way Hash function computing obtain H ((ID ⊕ SK) || r), and then obtain the first check code M1=H
L((ID ⊕ SK) || r), and will search for key SK and the first check code M1 sends to reader, and simultaneously the search key SK be upgraded, the search key SK after order is upgraded '=H
R((ID ⊕ SK) || r);
A3, reader send to data processing terminal with random number r, the search key SK and the first check code M1 that receive from label;
A4, data processing terminal carry out matching treatment in conjunction with database and the random number r that receives, search key SK and the first check code M1, thereby carry out smart-tag authentication, if authentication success then calculates the acquisition second check code M2 and sends it to reader, and continues execution in step S5; Otherwise finish, comprise following substep:
A41, data processing terminal are at first searched the example in the database, judge whether to exist certain instances conform condition sk
i=SK if exist, then obtains the value { sk of this example
i, IDnew, execution in step A44 behind the IDold}; Otherwise execution in step A42;
A42, data processing terminal to all examples carry out the one-way Hash function computing obtain H ((IDnew ⊕ SK) || r), and judge whether to exist the H of certain example correspondence
L((IDnew ⊕ SK) || r) equate with M1, if exist, authentication success then, and then obtain the value { sk of this example
i, IDnew, execution in step A45 behind the IDold}; Otherwise execution in step A43; Here, there is not certain instances conform condition sk in the database
i=SK shows that then stationary problem appears in search key SK and the database of label, therefore carries out the desynchronization authentication processing process of this step;
A43, data processing terminal carry out the one-way Hash function computing to all examples and obtain H ((IDold) ⊕ SK) || r), and judge whether to exist the H of certain example correspondence
L((IDold ⊕ SK) || equate with M1 that r) if exist, authentication success then obtains the value { sk of this example
i, IDnew, IDold}, and then calculate the acquisition second check code M2=H
L(IDold || sk
i), and the second check code M2 sent to reader, simultaneously to the value { sk of this example
i, IDnew, IDold} upgrades, the sk after order is upgraded
iFor: sk
i'=H
R((IDold ⊕ SK) || r), the IDnew after order is upgraded is IDnew '=H
RAnd continue execution in step A5 (IDold||ski); Otherwise finish;
A44, calculating are also judged H
L((IDnew ⊕ SK) || whether equate with M1 that r) if equate, then authentication success continues execution in step A45; Otherwise finish;
A45, carry out the one-way Hash function computing and obtain H (IDnew||sk
i), and then obtain the second check code M2=H
L(IDnew||sk
i), and the second check code M2 sent to reader, simultaneously to the value { sk of this example
i, IDnew, IDold} upgrades, the sk after order is upgraded
iFor: sk
i'=H
R((IDnew ⊕ SK) || r), the IDold after order is upgraded is IDold '=IDnew, and the IDnew after order is upgraded is IDnew '=H
RAnd continue execution in step A5 (IDnew||ski).
The second check code M2 that A5, reader will receive is transmitted to label;
A6, label carry out the one-way Hash function computing and obtain H (ID|| SK '), and then judge H
L(ID||SK ') whether equate with the second check code M2 that if equate, then label passes through the authentication to reader, and the identification code ID of label is upgraded, the identification code ID after order is upgraded '=H
R(ID|| SK '); Otherwise finish.
Use this method to carry out the authentication of RFID label, need be on label an integrated chip with operation processing function.The search key SK is upgraded by the one-way Hash function of label utilization safety in this method, can also serve as label in the pseudo random number of verification process, guarantee the freshness of information in the verification process, need be on label integrated pseudorandom number generator, reduced the label cost.This method all dynamically updates relevant identification code or search key behind each authentication operation, and the mode of employing reader and label two-way authentication, can resist and comprise that forward secrecy attack, back are to multiple attacks such as security attack and position attacks, and taken into account balance between hardware cost, efficient and the authentication security well, can reduce cost the practicality height.
Identification code ID, search key SK and random number r have identical figure place, the output figure place of one-way hash function computing is the twice of the figure place of identification code ID, therefore, the one-way hash function operation result being got the figure place that left-half or right half part obtain equates with the figure place of identification code ID.
Database store all labels information and and the data structure of all label correspondences be { sk
i, IDnew, a plurality of examples of IDold}, wherein sk
iSubscript i be natural number, sk
iBe the search key of the label of i example correspondence, IDnew is sk
iThe up-to-date identification code of corresponding label, IDold is sk
iIdentification code when corresponding label the last time is passed through authentication.Under the circumstance of initialization, the sk of i example
iBe the search key SK of the label of this example correspondence, IDnew and IDold are the identification code ID of the label of this example correspondence, according to the handling process of front as can be known, in this case, first after the authentication, sk
iBe updated to: sk
i'=H
R((IDnew ⊕ SK) || r), IDold is updated to IDold '=IDnew, and IDnew is updated to IDnew '=H
RAnd the search key SK of label is updated to SK '=H (IDnew||ski),
R((ID ⊕ SK) || r), the ID of label is updated to ID '=H
R(ID|| SK ').In conjunction with sk
i=SK and IDnew=ID, after upgrading as can be known, sk
i'=SK ', IDnew '=ID ', IDold '=ID, it is also similar to upgrade situation later on each time, and namely IDnew is sk
iThe up-to-date identification code of corresponding label, IDold is sk
iIdentification code when corresponding label the last time is passed through authentication.Other situation of this method is also similar, differs one here for example.
More than be that preferable enforcement of the present invention is specified, but the invention is not limited to described embodiment, those of ordinary skill in the art also can make all equivalent variations or replacement under the prerequisite of spirit of the present invention, the modification that these are equal to or replacement all are included in the application's claim institute restricted portion.
Claims (6)
1. based on the RFID safety certifying method of dynamic I D band search key, it is characterized in that, comprising:
S1, reader generate a random number r and send it to label, send authentication request to label simultaneously;
After S2, label receive authentication request, according to the identification code ID of the random number r that receives and the current storage of label and search key SK carry out the one-way Hash function computing obtain H ((ID ⊕ SK) || r), and then obtain the first check code M1=H
L((ID ⊕ SK) || r), and will search for key SK and the first check code M1 sends to reader, and simultaneously the search key SK be upgraded, the search key SK after order is upgraded '=H
R((ID ⊕ SK) || r);
S3, reader send to data processing terminal with random number r, the search key SK and the first check code M1 that receive from label;
S4, data processing terminal carry out matching treatment in conjunction with database and the random number r that receives, search key SK and the first check code M1, thereby carry out smart-tag authentication, if authentication success then calculates the acquisition second check code M2 and sends it to reader, and continues execution in step S5; Otherwise finish;
The second check code M2 that S5, reader will receive is transmitted to label;
S6, label carry out the one-way Hash function computing and obtain H (ID|| SK '), and then judge H
L(ID||SK ') whether equate with the second check code M2 that if equate, then label passes through the authentication to reader, and the identification code ID of label is upgraded, the identification code ID after order is upgraded '=H
R(ID|| SK '); Otherwise finish.
2. the RFID safety certifying method based on dynamic I D band search key according to claim 1 is characterized in that: database described in the described step S4 store all labels information and and the data structure of all label correspondences be { sk
i, IDnew, a plurality of examples of IDold}, wherein sk
iSubscript i be natural number, sk
iBe the search key of the label of i example correspondence, IDnew is sk
iThe up-to-date identification code of corresponding label, IDold is sk
iIdentification code when corresponding label the last time is passed through authentication.
3. the RFID safety certifying method based on dynamic I D band search key according to claim 2 is characterized in that described step S4 comprises:
S41, data processing terminal are at first searched the example in the database, judge whether to exist certain instances conform condition sk
i=SK if exist, then obtains the value { sk of this example
i, IDnew, execution in step S44 behind the IDold}; Otherwise execution in step S42;
S42, data processing terminal to all examples carry out the one-way Hash function computing obtain H ((IDnew ⊕ SK) || r), and judge whether to exist the H of certain example correspondence
L((IDnew ⊕ SK) || r) equate with M1, if exist, authentication success then, and then obtain the value { sk of this example
i, IDnew, execution in step S45 behind the IDold}; Otherwise execution in step S43;
S43, data processing terminal carry out the one-way Hash function computing to all examples and obtain H ((IDold) ⊕ SK) || r), and judge whether to exist the H of certain example correspondence
L((IDold ⊕ SK) || equate with M1 that r) if exist, authentication success then obtains the value { sk of this example
i, IDnew, IDold}, and then calculate the acquisition second check code M2=H
L(IDold || sk
i), and the second check code M2 sent to reader, simultaneously this example is upgraded, and continue execution in step S5; Otherwise finish;
S44, calculating are also judged H
L((IDnew ⊕ SK) || whether equate with M1 that r) if equate, then authentication success continues execution in step S45; Otherwise finish;
S45, carry out the one-way Hash function computing and obtain H (IDnew||sk
i), and then obtain the second check code M2=H
L(IDnew||sk
i), and the second check code M2 sent to reader, simultaneously this example is upgraded, and continue execution in step S5.
4. the RFID safety certifying method based on dynamic I D band search key according to claim 3 is characterized in that described in the described step S43 this example is upgraded, it is specially:
Value { sk to this example
i, IDnew, IDold} upgrades, the sk after order is upgraded
iFor: sk
i'=H
R((IDold ⊕ SK) || r), the IDnew after order is upgraded is IDnew '=H
R(IDold||ski).
5. the RFID safety certifying method based on dynamic I D band search key according to claim 3 is characterized in that described in the described step S45 this example is upgraded, it is specially:
Value { sk to this example
i, IDnew, IDold} upgrades, the sk after order is upgraded
iFor: sk
i'=H
R((IDnew ⊕ SK) || r), the IDold after order is upgraded is IDold '=IDnew, and the IDnew after order is upgraded is IDnew '=H
R(IDnew||ski).
6. the RFID safety certifying method based on dynamic I D band search key according to claim 3, it is characterized in that, described identification code ID, search key SK and random number r have identical figure place, and the output figure place of one-way hash function computing is the twice of the figure place of identification code ID.
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| 李慧贤: "轻量级RFID双向认证协议设计与分析", 《西安电子科技大学学报》 * |
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| CN103905202A (en) * | 2014-03-28 | 2014-07-02 | 广东工业大学 | RFID lightweight class bidirectional authentication method based on PUF |
| CN103905202B (en) * | 2014-03-28 | 2017-07-11 | 广东工业大学 | A kind of RFID lightweight mutual authentication methods based on PUF |
| CN105138937A (en) * | 2015-09-24 | 2015-12-09 | 北京芯联创展电子技术有限公司 | Method and device of radio-frequency identification and security demonstration |
| CN106209768A (en) * | 2016-06-20 | 2016-12-07 | 广东工业大学 | A kind of extendible RFID mutual authentication method |
| CN106603228A (en) * | 2016-12-21 | 2017-04-26 | 广东工业大学 | RFID key wireless generation method based on Rabin encryption |
| CN110786033A (en) * | 2017-06-23 | 2020-02-11 | 3M创新有限公司 | Wireless authentication system |
| US11778465B2 (en) | 2017-06-23 | 2023-10-03 | 3M Innovative Properties Company | Wireless authentication systems |
| CN109711218A (en) * | 2018-12-26 | 2019-05-03 | 无锡泛太科技有限公司 | A kind of RFID rapid authentication method of lightweight |
| CN111610732A (en) * | 2020-04-28 | 2020-09-01 | 同方泰德国际科技(北京)有限公司 | Method, device and equipment for replacing configurable input/output module |
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