CN103235882A - Method for judging monitoring behavior reliability of digital master control room operator in nuclear power plant - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention discloses a method for judging monitoring behavior reliability of a digital master control room operator in a nuclear power plant. The method includes the steps: dividing each monitoring information source into a plurality of monitoring nodes according to the monitoring process of a digital master control room by the operator in a monitoring task; respectively determining time windows for monitoring behaviors of the monitoring nodes; determining the sequence of transferring the monitoring behaviors of the monitoring nodes by the operator according to the time windows for the monitoring behaviors; calculating the monitoring success probability of the monitoring nodes; and judging whether monitoring behaviors of the digital master control room operator in the nuclear power plant are reliable or not according to the monitoring success probability. By dividing each monitoring information source in the monitoring task, a mathematical model for the monitoring behaviors and monitoring transfer is built, the monitoring success probability of the monitoring nodes can be quantitatively calculated, and the monitoring behavior reliability of the digital master control room operator in the nuclear power plant can be finally judged.

Description

Nuclear power plant's digitizing master-control room operator monitor behavior method of reliability decision

Technical field

The present invention relates to the Digital Control field of power plant, especially, relate to a kind of nuclear power plant digitizing master-control room operator monitor behavior method of reliability decision.

Background technology

NUREG/RC (Regulatory guides, the technological document of United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission)) series report is from early 1980s during at research operator cognitive behavior, just the operator is obtained information behavior and carry out serial experiment observation and research, and the operator's of nuclear power plant monitoring activity defined, namely refer to from nuclear power plant's master-control room environment, obtain the cognitive behavior of power plant's information.It is the operator observes to determine power plant to power plant's state running status, comprise check system whether just true(-)running and to some changing condition identify and confirm, as observe between power plant's state parameter, operators such as system operational parameters that display device shows, chart and alarm and exchange, obtain oral report from other operators in other zones of power plant, and to other regional dispatch personnel of power plant with verification equipment etc.In digitizing nuclear power plant, monitor the cognitive behavior that from the DCS environment, obtains power plant's relevant information (as nuclear power plant's state parameter, equipment state, system state, operation trend etc.) for the operator, nuclear power plant's master-control room mainly (VDU) shows the target information of required supervision by graphoscope (screen), the operator gets off to drive and the monitoring activity that guides the operator with SOP (situation operationprocedure, working specification state) (abnormality) at power plant's state model (normal condition).

And the research of nuclear power plant's manipulation monitoring activity is originated from the seventies in 20th century, and the research that is based on the operator monitor behavior of traditional core power plant begins, and progressively developing into double digitizing (is traditional core power plant instrument control I﹠amp; The digital improvement of C system) system monitoring behavioral study is generally paid close attention to the operator monitor object, is monitored failure mode, influence factor, and the contrast of monitoring activity (simulation and half digitizing) etc.

Domestic research to visual behaviour mainly concentrates on fields such as reading, information processing mechanism and the artificial intelligence of computing machine, nuclear power plant's operator monitor behavioral study is mainly concentrated on the operator to the summary of experience of the effective means of power plant's state information acquisition, do not form mature theory and technology.

External research about master-control room operator monitor behavior, mainly concentrate on and the fundamemtal phenomena that mainly concentrates at present surveillance operation (distribute with influence factor as monitoring range, monitored object, monitor task etc.) is analyzed in operator monitor behavior (being mainly traditional core power plant and half digitizing nuclear power plant) observed with the research and experiment of feature, have only the minority document to relate to cognitive pattern and the monitoring policy of operator monitor.And domestic research to monitoring activity mainly concentrates on Vision information processing pattern this part of reading, artificial intelligence field at present, and all research also all is qualitative description and the summary that rests on monitoring activity feature and rule.And, at present about the research neither one of master-control room operator monitor behavior be the digitizing nuclear power plant that runs be research object, do not possess digitizing this essential background and feature.

This shows, supervision research both domestic and external is not all furtherd investigate monitoring activity and is formed mechanism and kinetic mechanism, a kind of monitoring activity reliability quantitative model is not proposed, still blank to nuclear power plant's digitizing master-control room operator monitor behavioral study, the principle of operator's monitoring activity under the digitizing background, process kinetics mechanism is not set up, monitor the fail-safe analysis program, mathematical model and analysis software, and corresponding supporting database system is not all set up, to such an extent as to it is impossible that present people to nuclear power plant under the digitizing background uses because of the engineering of fail-safe analysis, has a strong impact on the security risk assessment of nuclear power plant under the digitizing technique background.

And, all be to be research object with traditional analog nuclear power plant or half digitizing nuclear power to monitoring activity research at present both at home and abroad, there is not effectively research object of digitizing master-control room conduct completely, correlative study means, technology and conclusion have significant limitation, and correlative study conclusion and model lack specific aim.Simultaneously, existing monitoring activity research mainly concentrates on describes and sums up the experiment of traditional core power plant master-control room operator monitor behavioural characteristic, influence factor, process and rule etc., do not relate to essential laws researchs such as operator monitor behavior dynamics mechanism and principle, be difficult to portray deeply and objectively and describe monitoring activity, be difficult to find the essential characteristics of motion of monitoring activity more, can not carry out engineering popularization widely and use; In addition, existing monitoring activity is mainly qualitative description, does not set up corresponding supervision fail-safe analysis program and mathematical model, does not possess the basis that engineering is used.And, the supervision reliability calculation method is not set up in existing monitoring activity research, make the monitoring activity reliability engineering quantitative analysis of dynamic, complicated and many processes lack means, and do not set up the basic reliability data system of supervision, make quantitative analysis lack basic people's mistake data.

Summary of the invention

The object of the invention is to provide a kind of nuclear power plant's digitizing master-control room operator monitor behavior method of reliability decision that can carry out quantitative analysis and judgement to nuclear power plant's digitizing master-control room operator monitor behavior reliability, do not set up with the principle, the process kinetics mechanism that solve operator's monitoring activity under the digitizing background, monitor fail-safe analysis program, mathematical model, and corresponding supporting database system all sets up, therefore the technical matters that can't analyze because of reliability the people of nuclear power plant under the digitizing background.

For achieving the above object, the invention provides a kind of nuclear power plant digitizing master-control room operator monitor behavior method of reliability decision, may further comprise the steps:

Step S1: according to the monitoring process of operator in the monitor task to the digitizing master-control room, each monitor message source is divided into a plurality of monitor nodes;

Step S2: determine the time window to the monitoring activity of described a plurality of monitor nodes respectively;

Step S3: according to the time window of described monitoring activity, the operator determines that described operator is to the transfer sequence of the monitoring activity of described a plurality of monitor nodes;

Step S4: the supervision probability of success of calculating described a plurality of monitor nodes;

Step S5: according to the described supervision probability of success,, judge whether the described digitizing master-control room operator's of nuclear power plant monitoring activity is reliable.

As a further improvement on the present invention:

Described step S4 may further comprise the steps:

Step S401: calculating operation person's node i discover the probability of success

Step S402: when calculating operation person transferred to the monitoring activity of node i from the monitoring activity of node i-1, the probability of success was shifted in operator monitor

Step S403: the supervision probability of success of computing node i

Computing formula is

Step S404: when calculating monitor node number is n, the supervision probability of success of described a plurality of monitor nodes

Computing formula is $P_M^S=\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\mathrm{\Π}}}{P}_{\mathrm{Mi}}^S=P_{M1}^S\×P_{M2}^S\×\·\·\·\×P_{\mathrm{Mi}}^S\×\·\·\·\×P_{\mathrm{Mn}}^S,$ Wherein, n=1,2 ..., n.

Described step S402 may further comprise the steps:

Transferring to node i when described operator's monitoring activity from node i-1 is isomorphism when shifting, and carries out step S4021 and step S4022; Transferring to node i when described operator's monitoring activity from node i-1 is isomery when shifting, and carries out step S4023 and step S4024;

Step S4021: adopt following formula calculating operation person monitoring activity isomorphism to shift failed probability:

$p\{{\mathrm{TR}}_{\mathrm{ij}}^k,H_i,S_j,A_k,R_p,M_q\}=p(T_j^k,H_i,S_j,A_k,R_p,M_q|{T_i}^k\}$

$=p\left\{T_j^k\right|H_i,S_j,A_k,R_p,M_q\}\left(p\right\{H_i\left(t\right)\left|H_i(t-1)\right\}+p\{S_j\left(t\right)\left|S_j(t-1)\right\}+p\left\{A_k\left(t\right)\right|A_k(t-1)\}+$

$p\left\{R_p\left(t\right)\right|R_p(t-1)\}+p\{M_q\left(t\right)\left|M_q(t-1)\right\})$

Wherein, S _jBe system state, H _iBehaviour is because of state, A _kBe alarm condition, R _pBe working specification state and M _qIt is the second class management role state;

S _j(t) be j system state, and when moment t, j=(0,1);

H _i(t) be i the residing state of people, and when moment t, i=(0,1);

A _k(t) be k state of reporting to the police, and when moment t, k=(0,1);

R _P(t) be the state of p state of operation rules, and when moment t, i=(0,1);

Mq (t) is q two class shape management roles, and when moment t, k=(0,1);

T ^K _jRepresent j part in k the functional block;

T ^K _iRepresent i part in k the functional block;

For the people because of state i, system state j, alarm condition k, working specification state p, two class management role state q, in K object element, the operator monitor activity is transferred to area information j from area information i;

For the operator at H _i, S _j, A _k, R _P, M _qUnder the state, monitor that the fault rate to j information takes place from i information transfer the K module;

For at H _i, S _j, A _k, R _P, M _qUnder the state, monitor that j information transfer fault rate takes place the K module;

P{H _i(t) | H _i(t-1) be that the people is because of the system state fault rate;

P{S _j(t) | S _j(t-1) } be power plant system state fault rate;

P{A _k(t) | A _k(t-1) } be the alarm condition fault rate;

P{R _P(t) | R _P(t-1) } be working specification state fault rate;

P{M _q(t) | M _q(t-1) } be two class management role state fault rates;

Step S4022: calculating operation person's monitoring activity isomorphism shifts probability of successful, and computing formula is $P_{\mathrm{Ti}}^S=1-$ $p\{{\mathrm{TR}}_{\mathrm{ij}}^k,H_i,S_j,A_k,R_p,M_q\};$

Step S4023: adopt following formula calculating operation person monitoring activity isomery to shift failed probability:

$p\left({\mathrm{\λ}}_{\mathrm{jn}}^{\mathrm{im}}\right)=q_j(t+\mathrm{\Δt})P\left(B_k^j\right|H_i,S_j,A_k,R_p,M_q)$

Wherein,

For at moment t, system state j, people be because of state i, alarm condition k, and working specification state p with two class management role state q, transfers to n member transfer process of j piece from m member of i piece;

For at system state j, the people is because of state i, alarm condition k, and working specification state p, two class management role state q monitor j member of i piece;

For at moment t, system state j, people be because of state i, alarm condition k, and working specification state p, two class management role state q, n member transferring to the j piece from m member of i piece shifts failed probability;

q _j(t+ Δ t) is at constantly (t+ Δ t), and system state j, people be because of state i, alarm condition k, and working specification state p, two class management role state q monitor the weight coefficient of i piece;

For at system state j, the people is because of state i, alarm condition k, and working specification state p, two class management role state q monitor j member probability of failure of i piece;

Step S4024: calculating operation person's monitoring activity isomorphism shifts probability of successful, and computing formula is

Before carrying out described step S1, described method is further comprising the steps of:

Step S0: judge that power plant's running status is normally or unusual.

When the judged result of described step S0 for just often, among the described step S1, describedly each monitor message source is divided into a plurality of monitor nodes is based on the experience of monitor task, dependent surveillance parameter, working specification and the aforesaid task of operator monitor and divides;

When the judged result of described step S0 when being unusual, among the described step S1, described each monitor message source is divided into a plurality of monitor nodes is to divide according to the state of operation rules of analysis event or accident.

The present invention has following beneficial effect:

Nuclear power plant of the present invention digitizing master-control room operator monitor behavior method of reliability decision, by the division to each monitor message source in the monitor task, thereby made up monitoring activity and monitored the mathematical model that shifts, and can quantize the supervision probability of success of monitor node to calculate, finally can judge the digitizing master-control room operator's of nuclear power plant monitoring activity reliability.The present invention also can promote the use of other the operator monitor activity of similar digitizing industrial system master-control room and behavior fail-safe analysis field, lays the foundation with control for digitizing industrial system operator monitor system monitors the prevention of losing efficacy.

Except purpose described above, feature and advantage, the present invention also has other purpose, feature and advantage.With reference to figure, the present invention is further detailed explanation below.

Description of drawings

The accompanying drawing that constitutes the application's a part is used to provide further understanding of the present invention, and illustrative examples of the present invention and explanation thereof are used for explaining the present invention, do not constitute improper restriction of the present invention.In the accompanying drawings:

Fig. 1 is nuclear power plant's digitizing master-control room operator monitor action process synoptic diagram of the preferred embodiment of the present invention;

Fig. 2 is the logical process synoptic diagram of the DCS master-control room operator monitor behavior quantitative test of the preferred embodiment of the present invention;

Fig. 3 is the transfer sequence synoptic diagram of monitor node of the monitoring process of the preferred embodiment of the present invention;

Fig. 4 is the hidden Markov model synoptic diagram of the tape spare of the preferred embodiment of the present invention; And

Fig. 5 is the schematic flow sheet of nuclear power plant's digitizing master-control room operator monitor behavior method of reliability decision of the preferred embodiment of the present invention;

Fig. 6 is the schematic flow sheet of nuclear power plant's digitizing master-control room operator monitor behavior method of reliability decision of the preferred embodiment of the present invention 1.

Embodiment

Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing embodiments of the invention are elaborated, but the multitude of different ways that the present invention can be defined by the claims and cover is implemented.

Monitoring activity is the operator's of power plant information source as the part of operator's cognitive activities.Feature and rule based on operator's monitoring activity under the DCS, surveillance operation is divided into two stages based on power plant's state with it from cognition, the one, to locking (the monitors identified object that current time is unique) monitored object (information source, i.e. DCS master-control room monitor unit or information area, object _i) monitoring activity (supervision is discovered), this process is typical static cognitive activities, comprise monitor task affirmation (origination event or initial active), obtain the monitor message (physical message of vision or the sense of hearing, as the power plant system state parameter, report to the police etc.), monitor message identification (comprises the monitor message selection, identification and assessment), select monitoring policy (to comprise formulation, select monitoring policy and monitored path) (comprise that information discovers with monitoring output, and output monitors cognitive result, and with the short-term memory form object information is passed to the cognitive link of state estimation, trigger action person's state estimation cognitive behavior); Subordinate phase is to monitor to shift, i.e. the supervision of operator between target (information source) shifted, to finish the dynamic process (referring to seeing Fig. 1, Fig. 2) to information search or monitored path transfer.Based on power plant's current state and requirement, operator's above two stage cognitive activities that circulate repeatedly in monitoring process monitor and control with dynamic power plant realizing, continuously for power plant's state estimation provides parameter and information.

As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the information source that shows on nuclear power plant's master-control room display device is designated as: Objecti (information source).The information source Object that the operator shows from nuclear power plant's master-control room display device (Object1, Object2...Objectn represent the 1st information source, the 2nd information source ... n information source) in the locking of i information Objecti (as second information source Object2) discover, be the operator to the cognitive process of obtaining of locking information, be designated as and monitor and to discover.The current information Object1 that the operator shows from nuclear power plant's master-control room display device transfers to the process of next source of target information Object2, i.e. operator monitor transfer process.The master-control room operator of nuclear power plant is exactly that the operator is repeating to monitor the process of discovering and monitoring transfer repeatedly between each monitor message object under the master-control room environment based on the monitoring process of task orientation power plant state information acquisition, finish up to monitor task, surveillance operation finishes.

Monitoring activity quantitative test principle:

The monitoring activity (comprise power plant normal operating condition with unusual) of operator under non-single (independence) task is for dynamic and continuous, to given monitor task (as certain power plant's event or accident are monitored, to supervision of a certain particular system of power plant etc.), based on accompanying drawing 2 can be with the operator monitor behavior according to the intrinsic priority logical order of surveillance operation (as the key message presentative time, structural order, the perhaps control node dot sequency of rules regulations etc.), continuous, dynamic monitoring process is according to the monitored object in the process (information specific source or target in the monitor task, instant (Ti constantly) as the operating a certain state of power plant/device temperature parameter monitors), it is divided into corresponding monitoring point (is referred to as monitor node or transfering node, be designated as (N, n=1,2, ..., N) (see accompanying drawing 3), and based on following hypothesis and logic rules:

(1) surveillance operation is carried out from left to right successively according to diagram monitor node logical relation, and the operator can not skip the front node automatically and enters next monitor node (namely not considering surveillance operation jump monitor node situation).

(2) monitoring process success or not, to the discovering of each monitor node among the figure, and to monitoring that between adjacent monitor node shifting success or not determines, namely any one node monitors that failure will cause the monitor task failure by the operator.

(3) do not consider to monitor the reparative factor of failure.

Operator's surveillance operation mainly is subjected to two class influence factor effects, and the one, the characteristic of environment and variation in DCS, refer to that mainly VDU goes up the indicating characteristic of information and the power plant system data/change in information (relevant with the man-machine interface of Digital Control chamber) of demonstration; The 2nd, operator's knowledge and expectation, and the operator is according to own understanding to nuclear power plant's running status and an inherent psychological power plant state model that forms.The monitoring activity that preceding a kind of influence factor causes is called the monitoring activity of data-driven, and the latter is called the monitoring activity of knowledge driving or model-driven.In the commercial Application, judge monitoring activity whether success then be that the correct operation behavior (operator's input information and digitizing man-machine interface are carried out alternately) that the data that whether provide according to this man-machine interface according to operating personnel or information have been made next step is judged, if the operation behavior of next step is correct, judge that then the monitoring step before this operation steps is successful.

After accident took place among the DCS, main cognitive activities occurred in the supervision stage in operator and the power plant's interface alternation process.Power plant presents power plant's information after the accident by DCS, and the operator drives sensory perceptual system perception power plant information by people's attention mechanism.Influence the main cognitive load of operator monitor behavior and derive from DCS information demonstration change perceived, the working memory load variations that VDU shows and the interface management task causes and the variation of attention mechanism.DCS master-control room operator monitor driving mechanism should be data-driven and model-driven coefficient " combination drive ", and model-driven is in leading position.Generally speaking, the operator is when the normal operation of power plant and transient state, and the operator monitor behavior drives with data-driven leading, and when being in event or accident running status in power plant, the operator monitor behavior is taken as the leading factor with model-driven under the guiding of state of operation rules.

Isomorphism shifts: the transfer between the man-machine interface of same screen, isomery transfer are the transfers between the different digital screen.

Referring to Fig. 5, nuclear power plant of the present invention digitizing master-control room operator monitor behavior method of reliability decision may further comprise the steps:

Step S1: according to the monitoring process of operator in the monitor task to the digitizing master-control room, each monitor message source is divided into N monitor node, as N ₁, N ₂... N _n(referring to Fig. 3).As can be seen from Figure 3, the operator is based on a certain manipulation task, the monitor node N1 that goes out from logical abstraction comes into effect and monitors and discover and monitor that transfers waits behavior, finishes whole watchdog logic nodes up to surveillance operation according to logical relation (rules guiding etc.), reaches the node N that monitors end _n

Step S2: determine respectively the time window of the monitoring activity of a plurality of monitor nodes, namely divide starting point T0 and the terminal point TE of surveillance operation, determine the time period (window) of surveillance operation.At PSA-HRA (PSA:probability safety analysis, probabilistic safety analysis; HRA:human reliability analysis, the people is because of fail-safe analysis) analyze, monitor starting point can be set to get the hang of working specification (note 0 is constantly) constantly; In analyzing, other to determine rationally to monitor that starting point constantly based on actual conditions.

Step S3: according to the time window of monitoring activity, the operator determines that the operator is to the transfer sequence (referring to Fig. 3) of the monitoring activity of described a plurality of monitor nodes.

Step S4: the supervision probability of success of calculating a plurality of monitor nodes.In the practical application, generally be by calculate respectively " operator's node i discover the probability of success

Transfer to the node i operator monitor with the operator from node i-1 and shift the probability of success

And get both probability products and obtain node (i) the operator monitor probability of success.

Step S5: according to the described supervision probability of success, judge whether the digitizing master-control room operator's of nuclear power plant monitoring activity is reliable.In the practical application, can be according to the supervision probability of success value that obtains, inquire about various international and domestic industry standards (according to the type difference of application scenario and the man-machine interface that relates to, the standard of judging is also different, the standard of judging is determined according to practical situations, also can be that power plant is from the standard of establishing), can know to monitor probability of success value whether in allowed limits (whether operator's the supervision probability of success reliably decides according to standard listed project and criterion thereof), thereby judge whether reliable.

Above-mentioned steps, by the division to each monitor message source in the monitor task, thereby made up monitoring activity and monitored the mathematical model that shifts, and can quantize the supervision probability of success of monitor node to calculate, finally can judge the digitizing master-control room operator's of nuclear power plant monitoring activity reliability.The present invention also can promote the use of other the operator monitor activity of similar digitizing industrial system master-control room and behavior fail-safe analysis field, lays the foundation with control for digitizing industrial system operator monitor system monitors the prevention of losing efficacy.

Embodiment 1:

Referring to Fig. 6, method of reliability decision is shifted in the digitizing master-control room operator's of nuclear power plant of present embodiment supervision, may further comprise the steps:

Step S0: judge power plant's running status, namely beginning to determine monitor task, monitor the current running status that needs to determine power plant before the analysis, only get " normally " and " unusually " two kinds.

Step S1: according to the monitoring process of operator in the monitor task to the digitizing master-control room, with each monitor message source according to certain rule be divided into N monitor node, as N ₁, N ₂... N _nIn the present embodiment, when the judged result of step S0 for just often, each monitor message source is divided into a plurality of monitor nodes is based on the experience of monitor task, dependent surveillance parameter, working specification and the aforesaid task of operator monitor and divides; When the judged result of step S0 when being unusual, for the HRA monitor task under the PSA framework, it is to divide according to the state of operation rules of analysis event or accident that each monitor message source is divided into a plurality of monitor nodes.In addition, also can be based on the knowledge characterizing method of operating process and event handling rules is realized for node division.

Step S2: determine respectively the time window of the monitoring activity of a plurality of monitor nodes, namely divide starting point T0 and the terminal point TE of surveillance operation, determine the time period (window) of surveillance operation.In PSA-HRA analyzes, monitor the starting point working specification (note 0 constantly) constantly that can be set to get the hang of; In analyzing, other to determine rationally to monitor that starting point constantly based on actual conditions.

Step S3: according to the time window of monitoring activity, the operator determines that the operator is to the transfer sequence of the monitoring activity of described a plurality of monitor nodes.

Step S4: the supervision probability of success of calculating a plurality of monitor nodes.In the practical application, generally be by calculate respectively " operator's node i discover the probability of success

Transfer to the node i operator monitor with the operator from node i-1 and shift the probability of success

And get both probability products and obtain node (i) the operator monitor probability of success.Based on Boolean algebra logical operation rule, whole monitoring process failed probability ( ) be each monitor node probability of failure sum; Each node failure probability, can by this node is monitored probability of success ( ) fetch logic mends to obtain, and the probability of success of each node is determined by the successful transition probability with the directly related two class monitoring activities of this node (be node discover cognitive behavior and the supervision displacement behavior that successfully was transferred to this node from last node), is designated as respectively

With

In the present embodiment, preferably adopt following steps performing step S4:

Step S401: calculating operation person's node i discover the probability of success

The operator can be considered as the operator to the supervision cognitive activities of fix information resource for the supervision cognitive activities of node i, and namely the operator is to the discovering of information, and its probability of failure has two kinds of methods to obtain:

(1) one is based on the traditional core power station monitors the classical probable value of error, in conjunction with the digital information indicating characteristic, takes Extrapolation method to obtain to monitor and discovers probability of failure value interval, gets then to mend to obtain discovering the probability of success

(2) two are based on SDT (SDT) theory, obtain DCS operator in conjunction with analog machine experiment statistics result information is discovered probability of failure average and scope, determine the probability of success of discovering of node i then according to corresponding nodal information feature and influence factor

Be in discrete state at signal and noise and under the situation that is not easy to differentiate, can use SDT.Signal must be detected by the operator, " having " (I have detected signal) and " not having " (I do not detect signal) two class reaction patterns can occur in the process that detects.As shown in table 1 the reaction of operator in experiment is divided into four kinds: hit, make a false report, fail to report and correct rejection.

Four kinds of reactions of observer in the experiment of table 1 SDT

In SDT, can represent the value of this four classes event with probable value.The value of all kinds of events equals the numerical value of this event generation divided by the sum of each row event generation among the figure.

P _(hit)+P _(miss)＝1

P _(fa)+P _(cr)＝1

Come the probability of success of discovering of calculating operation person's node i based on SDT (SDT, Signal detection theory)

The operator accurately obtains monitored object information from lot of background information (power plant's state parameter, figure, table etc.) in fact exactly at the information process of discovering that monitors, if this process is done following processing:

(1) supposes that the operator accurately obtains nodal information and is considered as discovering success, correctly do not acquire nodal information and just be considered as discovering failure.

(2) the residing background information of node is considered as noise among the SDT, then the information that needs the operator to discover in the monitoring process is exactly the stimulation that can be considered as the operator.

(3) respective operations person to discover the nodal information probability of failure be exactly the probability that the operator fails to report in the SDT model, the operator discovers the probability of success of discovering of node i

It is exactly the probability P that the operator hits in the SDT model _(hit)

And the probability P that the operator fails to report _(hit)Be based on the operator fails to report stimulation (monitor node information) reaction experiment in noise background statistical probability value (P _(miss)), then the operator discovers the probability of success of discovering of node i

$P_{\mathrm{Di}}^S=1-P_{\left(\mathrm{miss}\right)}$

Step S402: when calculating operation person transferred to the monitoring activity of node i from the monitoring activity of node i-1, the probability of success was shifted in operator monitor

In the present embodiment, step S402 may further comprise the steps:

By to influencing the influence factor of operator monitor behavior, as system state (S _i), the people is because of state (H _i), alarm condition (A _k), working specification state (R _p) and the second class management role (M _q) state etc., can make up the hidden Markov model of tape spare, see Fig. 4.Among Fig. 4, H _i(i=1,2 ..., n) represent the people because of state, S _j(j=1,2 ..., m) expression system state, A _k(k=1,2 ..., s) expression alarm state, R _P(P=1,2 ..., y) expression working specification state, M _q(q=1,2 ..., x) expression two class management role states.The state value of aforesaid five aspect influence factors, and basic fault rate, the weight of every kind of each main composition factor of influence factor can obtain by monitoring the eye movement experiment.

Transferring to node i when operator's monitoring activity from node i-1 is that isomorphism is when shifting, carry out step S4021 and step S4022, the isomorphism markov of setting up DCS nuclear power plant tape spare monitoring process shifts failure model (being that calculating operation person's monitoring activity isomorphism shifts failed probability).

Step S4021: adopt following formula calculating operation person monitoring activity isomorphism to shift failed probability:

$p\{{\mathrm{TR}}_{\mathrm{ij}}^k,H_i,S_j,A_k,R_p,M_q\}=p(T_j^k,H_i,S_j,A_k,R_p,M_q|{T_i}^k\}$

$=p\left\{T_j^k\right|H_i,S_j,A_k,R_p,M_q\}\left(p\right\{H_i\left(t\right)\left|H_i(t-1)\right\}+p\{S_j\left(t\right)\left|S_j(t-1)\right\}+p\left\{A_k\left(t\right)\right|A_k(t-1)\}+$

$p\left\{R_p\left(t\right)\right|R_p(t-1)\}+p\{M_q\left(t\right)\left|M_q(t-1)\right\})$

Wherein, S _jBe system state, H _iBehaviour is because of state (people's state may have several, and for example, easily state is general, tense situation, high-pressure state, i are represented wherein a kind of state that the people carves at a time), A _kBe alarm condition, R _pBe working specification state and M _qIt is the second class management role state;

S _j(t) be j system state, and when moment t, j=(0,1);

H _i(t) be i the residing state of people, and when moment t, i=(0,1);

A _k(t) be k state of reporting to the police, and when moment t, k=(0,1);

R _P(t) be the state of p state of operation rules, and when moment t, i=(0,1);

M _q(t) be q two class shape management roles, and when moment t, k=(0,1);

T ^K _jRepresent j part in k the functional block;

T ^K _iRepresent i part in k the functional block;

For the people because of state i, system state j, alarm condition k, working specification state p, two class management role state q, in K object element, the operator monitor activity is transferred to area information j from area information i;

For the operator at H _i, S _j, A _k, R _P, M _qUnder the state, monitor that the fault rate to j information takes place from i information transfer the K module;

For at H _i, S _j, A _k, R _P, M _qUnder the state, monitor that j information transfer fault rate takes place the K module;

P{H _i(t) | H _i(t-1) be that the people is because of the system state fault rate; People's state is divided into: very nervous, and anxiety, light three kinds of states; Use H respectively _i(t)=2, H _i(t)=1, H _i(t)=0 expression.

P{S _j(t) | S _j(t-1) } be power plant system state fault rate; The power plant system state generally comprises normal and abnormality, uses S respectively _i(t)=1, S _i(t)=0 expression.

P{A _k(t) | A _k(t-1) } be the alarm condition fault rate; If warning is normal, use A _k(t) if=0 the expression. warning itself is not in the triggering stage, but warning system has been sent warning, uses A so _k(t) if=1 the expression. warning system is in the false alarm signal and has sent warning, uses A so _k(t)=20 expression.

P{R _P(t) | R _P(t-1) } be working specification state fault rate; State is divided into normal and unusual, uses R respectively _i(t)=1, R _i(t)=0 expression.

P{M _q(t) | M _q(t-1) } be two class management role state fault rates.Two generic tasks refer to when finishing the work, and can not finish this task by the soft interface of correspondence, at this moment need to open a series of soft interfaces of other correspondence, and these a series of soft interfaces are with regard to two generic tasks; The two generic task states that call generally comprise normal and unusual, use M respectively _i(t)=1, M _i(t)=0 expression.

System state j, alarm condition k, working specification state p and the fault rate of two class management role state q under the state status of correspondence are inquired about from monitor the Transfer Fault basic database and are obtained.

Step S4022: calculating operation person's monitoring activity isomorphism shifts probability of successful, and computing formula is $P_{\mathrm{Ti}}^S=1-$ $p\{{\mathrm{TR}}_{\mathrm{ij}}^k,H_i,S_j,A_k,R_p,M_q\}.$

Transferring to node i when operator's monitoring activity from node i-1 is that isomery is when shifting, carry out step S4023 and step S4024, the isomery markov of setting up DCS nuclear power plant tape spare monitoring process shifts failure model (being that calculating operation person's monitoring activity isomery shifts failed probability).

Step S4023: adopt following formula calculating operation person monitoring activity isomery to shift failed probability:

$p\left({\mathrm{\λ}}_{\mathrm{jn}}^{\mathrm{im}}\right)=q_j(t+\mathrm{\Δt})P\left(B_k^j\right|H_i,S_j,A_k,R_p,M_q)$

Wherein,

For at moment t, system state j, people be because of state i, alarm condition k, and working specification state p with two class management role state q, transfers to n member transfer process of j piece from m member of i piece;

For at system state j, the people is because of state i, alarm condition k, and working specification state p with two class management role state q, monitors j member of i piece;

For at moment t, system state j, people be because of state i, alarm condition k, and working specification state p, with two class management role state q, n member transferring to the j piece from m member of i piece shifts failed probability;

q _j(t+ Δ t) is at constantly (t+ Δ t), and system state j, people be because of state i, alarm condition k, and working specification state p with two class management role state q, monitors the weight coefficient of i piece;

For at system state j, the people is because of state i, alarm condition k, and working specification state p with two class management role state q, monitors j member probability of failure of i piece;

Step S4024: calculating operation person's monitoring activity isomorphism shifts probability of successful, and computing formula is

The another kind of implementation of step S4:

When the monitor task of step S1 was single (independence) task, operator monitor failure quantitative test was as follows:

Operator's single task role refers to the operator and carries out relatively independent special manipulation task such as definite value, test or maintenance.Operator's monitoring activity is mainly finds (discovering) to the abnormal information in the manipulation task.If the abnormal information during supposition operator discovery task is handled just is considered as monitoring successfully that the information that do not note abnormalities just is considered as monitoring and fails, and so also can utilize signal check opinion (SDT) method, reference " operator's node i discover the probability of success

Calculating principle and method calculate single (independence) task operating person and monitor probability of failure

$P_M^F=P_{\left(\mathrm{miss}\right)}=1-P_{\left(\mathrm{hit}\right)}$

Step S403: the supervision probability of success of computing node i

Computing formula is

Step S404: when calculating monitor node number is n, the supervision probability of success of a plurality of monitor nodes Computing formula is $P_M^S=\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\mathrm{\Π}}}{P}_{\mathrm{Mi}}^S=P_{M1}^S\×P_{M2}^S\×\·\·\·\×P_{\mathrm{Mi}}^S\×\·\·\·\×P_{\mathrm{Mn}}^S,$ Wherein, n=1,2 ..., n.

Step S5: according to the described supervision probability of success, judge whether the digitizing master-control room operator's of nuclear power plant monitoring activity is reliable.

In summary, the present invention has the following advantages:

(1) the present invention has set up nuclear power plant's digitizing master-control room operator monitor action process and kinetic mechanism, for formulating the operator monitor behavioural norm, promote the supervision performance and preventing to monitor that error provides strategy and means.

(2) the present invention has set up manipulation monitoring activity quantitative test mathematical model, has provided the operator and has carried out the mathematical model that manipulation task monitors reliability quantitative analysis and judgement, for process monitoring reliability quantitative analysis through engineering approaches provides efficient algorithm and rule.

(3) the present invention is based on the mathematical model of above-mentioned supervision fail-safe analysis, can be and monitor that reliability engineering is used means are provided, for the digitizing master-control room operator people of nuclear power plant provides support because of fail-safe analysis.

(4) the present invention can promote the use of the operator monitor activity of similar digitizing industrial system master-control room and the behavior fail-safe analysis field of other field, lays the foundation with control for digitizing industrial system operator monitor system monitors the prevention of losing efficacy.

The above is the preferred embodiments of the present invention only, is not limited to the present invention, and for a person skilled in the art, the present invention can have various changes and variation.Within the spirit and principles in the present invention all, any modification of doing, be equal to replacement, improvement etc., all should be included within protection scope of the present invention.

Claims (4)

1. nuclear power plant's digitizing master-control room operator monitor behavior method of reliability decision is characterized in that, may further comprise the steps:

Step S1: according to the monitoring process of operator in the monitor task to the digitizing master-control room, each monitor message source is divided into a plurality of monitor nodes;

Step S2: determine the time window to the monitoring activity of described a plurality of monitor nodes respectively;

Step S3: according to the time window of described monitoring activity, determine that described operator is to the transfer sequence of the monitoring activity of described a plurality of monitor nodes;

Step S4: the supervision probability of success of calculating described a plurality of monitor nodes;

Step S5: according to the described supervision probability of success, judge whether the described digitizing master-control room operator's of nuclear power plant monitoring activity is reliable.

2. method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, described step S4 may further comprise the steps:

Step S401: calculating operation person's node i discover the probability of success

Step S402: when calculating operation person transferred to the monitoring activity of node i from the monitoring activity of node i-1, the probability of success was shifted in operator monitor

Step S403: the supervision probability of success of computing node i

Computing formula is

Step S404: when calculating monitor node number is n, the supervision probability of success of described a plurality of monitor nodes

Computing formula is $P_M^S=\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\mathrm{\Π}}}{P}_{\mathrm{Mi}}^S=P_{M1}^S\×P_{M2}^S\×\·\·\·\×P_{\mathrm{Mi}}^S\×\·\·\·\×P_{\mathrm{Mn}}^S,$ Wherein, n=1,2 ..., n.

3. method according to claim 2 is characterized in that, described step S402 may further comprise the steps:

Transferring to node i when described operator's monitoring activity from node i-1 is isomorphism when shifting, and carries out step S4021 and step S4022; Transferring to node i when described operator's monitoring activity from node i-1 is isomery when shifting, and carries out step S4023 and step S4024;

Step S4021: adopt following formula calculating operation person monitoring activity isomorphism to shift failed probability:

$p\{{\mathrm{TR}}_{\mathrm{ij}}^k,H_i,S_j,A_k,R_p,M_q\}=p(T_j^k,H_i,S_j,A_k,R_p,M_q|{T_i}^k\}$

$=p\left\{T_j^k\right|H_i,S_j,A_k,R_p,M_q\}\left(p\right\{H_i\left(t\right)\left|H_i(t-1)\right\}+p\{S_j\left(t\right)\left|S_j(t-1)\right\}+p\left\{A_k\left(t\right)\right|A_k(t-1)\}+$

$p\left\{R_p\left(t\right)\right|R_p(t-1)\}+p\{M_q\left(t\right)\left|M_q(t-1)\right\})$

Wherein, S _jBe system state, H _iBehaviour is because of state, A _kBe alarm condition, R _pBe working specification state and M _qIt is the second class management role state;

S _j(t) be j system state, and when moment t, j=(0,1);

H _i(t) be i the residing state of people, and when moment t, i=(0,1);

A _k(t) be k state of reporting to the police, and when moment t, k=(0,1);

R _P(t) be the state of p state of operation rules, and when moment t, i=(0,1);

Mq (t) is q two class shape management roles, and when moment t, k=(0,1);

For the people because of state i, system state j, alarm condition k, working specification state p, with two class management role state q, in K object element, the operator monitor activity is transferred to area information j from area information i;

T ^K _jRepresent j part in k the functional block;

T ^K _iRepresent i part in k the functional block;

For the operator at H _i, S _j, A _k, R _P, M _qUnder the state, monitor that the fault rate to j information takes place from i information transfer the K module;

For at H _i, S _j, A _k, R _P, M _qUnder the state, monitor that j information transfer fault rate takes place the K module;

P{H _i(t) | H _i(t-1) be that the people is because of the system state fault rate;

P{S _j(t) | S _j(t-1) } be power plant system state fault rate;

P{A _k(t) | A _k(t-1) } be the alarm condition fault rate;

P{R _P(t) | R _P(t-1) } be working specification state fault rate;

P{M _q(t) | M _q(t-1) } be two class management role state fault rates;

Step S4022: calculating operation person's monitoring activity isomorphism shifts probability of successful, and computing formula is $P_{\mathrm{Ti}}^S=1-$ $p\{{\mathrm{TR}}_{\mathrm{ij}}^k,H_i,S_j,A_k,R_p,M_q\};$

Step S4023: adopt following formula calculating operation person monitoring activity isomery to shift failed probability:

$p\left({\mathrm{\λ}}_{\mathrm{jn}}^{\mathrm{im}}\right)=q_j(t+\mathrm{\Δt})P\left(B_k^j\right|H_i,S_j,A_k,R_p,M_q)$

Wherein,

For at moment t, system state j, people be because of state i, alarm condition k, and working specification state p with two class management role state q, transfers to n member transfer process of j piece from m member of i piece;

For at system state j, the people is because of state i, alarm condition k, and working specification state p, two class management role state q monitor j member of i piece;

For at moment t, system state j, people be because of state i, under the alarm condition k, and working specification state p, with two class management role state q, n member transferring to the j piece from m member of i piece shifts failed probability;

q _j(t+ Δ t) is at constantly (t+ Δ t), and system state j, people be because of state i, alarm condition k, and working specification state p, two class management role state q monitor the weight coefficient of i piece;

For at system state j, the people is because of state i, and alarm condition k under the working specification state p, under two class management role state q, monitors j member probability of failure of i piece;

Step S4024: calculating operation person's monitoring activity isomorphism shifts probability of successful, and computing formula is

4. according to each described method in the claim 1 to 3, it is characterized in that before carrying out described step S1, described method is further comprising the steps of:

Step S0: judge that power plant's running status is normally or unusual;

When the judged result of described step S0 for just often, among the described step S1, describedly each monitor message source is divided into a plurality of monitor nodes is based on the experience of monitor task, dependent surveillance parameter, working specification and the aforesaid task of operator monitor and divides;

When the judged result of described step S0 when being unusual, among the described step S1, described each monitor message source is divided into a plurality of monitor nodes is to divide according to the state of operation rules of analysis event or accident.

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