CN102869010A - Method and system for single sign-on - Google Patents

Method and system for single sign-on Download PDF

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Publication number
CN102869010A
CN102869010A CN2011101857121A CN201110185712A CN102869010A CN 102869010 A CN102869010 A CN 102869010A CN 2011101857121 A CN2011101857121 A CN 2011101857121A CN 201110185712 A CN201110185712 A CN 201110185712A CN 102869010 A CN102869010 A CN 102869010A
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China
Prior art keywords
authentication
terminal
authentication center
described terminal
nonce1
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CN2011101857121A
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Chinese (zh)
Inventor
张孟旺
田甜
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ZTE Corp
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ZTE Corp
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Priority to CN2011101857121A priority Critical patent/CN102869010A/en
Priority to PCT/CN2012/074932 priority patent/WO2013004104A1/en
Publication of CN102869010A publication Critical patent/CN102869010A/en
Pending legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/068—Authentication using credential vaults, e.g. password manager applications or one time password [OTP] applications
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless

Abstract

The invention provides a method and a system for single sign-on. The method comprises the following steps that a terminal sends a service request to an RP; the RP redirects the authentication request to an authentication center; the authentication center authenticates the terminal in an SIP Digest manner and redirects an authentication result to the RP by the terminal; and the RP supplies service to the terminal according to the authentication result. According to the invention, resources needed by GBA deployment of service providers are reduced and a requirement that a non-UICC terminal accesses into an IMS network can be met simultaneously; and furthermore, the application services relevant to the IMS network can be accessed in an SSO manner.

Description

Single-point logging method and system
Technical field
The present invention relates to the communications field, in particular to a kind of single-point logging method and system.
Background technology
At unified IP Multimedia System (IP multimedia subsystem, referred to as IMS) terminal (User Equipment, referred to as UE) verification process and realizing in the process of single-sign-on (Single Sign-On is referred to as SSO), existing have 3 kinds of scenes:
1, has Universal Integrated Circuit Card (Universal Integrated Circuit Card in the IMS UE, referred to as UICC), and Virtual network operator has been disposed the situation of common authentication mechanism (General Bootstrapping Architecture is referred to as GBA): can utilize this moment the same Liberty Alliance of GBA authentication mechanism (Liberty Alliance)/open identification (OpenID) in conjunction with realizing single-sign-on and realizing intercommunication with existing other SSO mechanism.Under this scene, in order to realize SSO, operator can dispose a large amount of GBA, is embedded in the UICC card for each IMS UE simultaneously, utilizes GBA and UICC card internal information to finish SSO function to IMS terminal access application server.
2, has the UICC card in the IMS UE, but operator can not dispose the situation of GBA: need in this case the UE terminal use is authenticated, when realizing this IMS terminal to the SSO function of AS application server, the Authentication and Key Agreement schemes that (Authentication and Key Agreement is referred to as AKA)/OpenID combines that adopt more.Specific as follows:
IMS UE sends an authentication request to application server (Application Server referred to as AS, also claims RP), comprises the OpenID identifier in this request; RP utilizes this OpenID identifier to find OpenID identity supplier (OpenID Provider, referred to as OP) final URL(uniform resource locator) (Uniform/Universal Resource Locater, referred to as URL), the directional user's authentication request of laying equal stress on arrives this URL; OP is from home subscriber register (Home Subscriber Server, referred to as HSS) obtain the AKA Ciphering Key and based on the user terminal information content of IP multimedia private user identity (IP Multimedia Private Identity is referred to as IMPI); OP uses the AKA authentication method to send an authentication challenge to UE, so that UE authenticates this network; UE sends a response to challenge to OP, finishes the authentication to UE in OP; OP sends a label information of declaring that the OpenID identifier belongs to this terminal to UE and asserts, this asserts shared key (key may be the shared key of OP and RP, also may be the key of the OP self) mark that is used OP and RP by OP; Redirected this asserted and arrived RP; If what utilize is OP and RP shared key, the then direct certifying signature information of RP, and notice UE the result.If what use is OP self secret key encryption, then RP is sent to OP to this duplicate of asserting and verifies, after the OP checking the result is notified to RP, last RP notifies the result to UE again.
This framework can be so that Virtual network operator be accessed the service function that the WEB server provides authentication as OpenID provider for the user.To preserving the application program of ISIM (identification among the IMS), the user can provide the SSO function to it such as the realization of striding IMS and web server.Allow the user at their common identity identifier of WEB control.The WEB application program that the user controls by the Virtual network operator that access is trusted, the fail safe that can improve user's self information.
3, IMS UE does not have the UICC card, and operator does not dispose the situation of GBA yet: along with increasing of non-UICC card terminal access to IMS network, the probability that this situation occurs is increasing, and do not disposing under GBA and the non-UICC card situation, the user also usually needs to access the application service relevant with IMS with use of IMS network, and in this case, authentication becomes and is necessary very much based on the IMS-SSO of non-UICC.But, not yet propose under this scene, how to carry out the SSO function in the correlation technique.
In sum, in the correlation technique, the terminal that only has the UICC card could realize the SSO function, and then the various application services in the access IMS network, and most applications needs Virtual network operator to dispose in a large number GBA, will increase like this input cost of operator; And the terminal that does not have the UICC card can not utilize existing architectural schemes to realize the SSO function that related application in the IMS network is served.
Summary of the invention
Main purpose of the present invention is to provide a kind of single-point logging method and system, to address the above problem at least.
The invention provides a kind of single-point logging method, comprise: terminal sends service request to application server RP: described RP obtains the authentication center address, the authentication request of self is redirected to described authentication center by described terminal, perhaps, described RP returns to described terminal and is used to indicate the response that described terminal authenticates to described authentication center;
Described terminal sends authentication request to described authentication center;
Described authentication center uses session initiation protocol digest authentication SIP Digest mode that described terminal is authenticated, and authentication result is redirected to described RP by described terminal;
In using described SIP Digest mode verification process, described authentication center utilizes identical cryptographic Hash and random number to produce shared key with described terminal;
Described RP provides service according to described authentication result for described terminal.
The present invention also provides a kind of single-node login system, comprising:
Terminal is used for sending service request to application server RP, sends authentication request to described authentication center, utilizes identical cryptographic Hash and random number to produce shared key with described authentication center;
Described RP is used for obtaining described authentication center address, and described authentication request is redirected to authentication center, and is used for providing service according to the authentication result of described authentication center for described terminal;
Described authentication center is used for using session initiation protocol digest authentication SIP Digest mode that described terminal is authenticated, and authentication result is redirected to described RP by described terminal, utilizes identical cryptographic Hash and random number to produce shared key with described terminal.
By the present invention, RP is redirected to authentication center with the request of UE or sends to UE and is used to indicate it and need to arrives the information that authentication center authenticates, authentication center obtains adopting SIP Digest mode to come this UE is authenticated according to the User Identity of receiving after the authentication request, and authentication result is redirected to RP, solved the problem that the certificate scheme in the correlation technique only is only applicable to have the terminal of UICC card, the method can be supported the authentication to the terminal single-sign-on RP that does not have UICC, because the method does not need to dispose a large amount of GBA, therefore reduce operator and disposed the needed resource of GBA, simultaneously can satisfy non-UICC terminal access to IMS network, and can access the relevant application service of IMS network by the mode of SSO.
Description of drawings
Accompanying drawing described herein is used to provide a further understanding of the present invention, consists of the application's a part, and illustrative examples of the present invention and explanation thereof are used for explaining the present invention, do not consist of improper restriction of the present invention.In the accompanying drawings:
Fig. 1 is the flow chart according to the single-point logging method of the embodiment of the invention;
Fig. 2 is the structured flowchart according to the single-node login system of the embodiment of the invention;
Fig. 3 utilizes SIP Digest authentication mechanism to realize the flow chart of the single-sign-on identifying procedure of application server according to the IMS terminal of the non-UICC card of embodiment 1;
Fig. 4 is that the IdP that the operator according to the embodiment of the invention provides utilizes SIP Digest authentication mechanism to realize the single-sign-on authentication integrated stand composition of the IMS terminal application server of non-UICC card;
Fig. 5 is the flow chart according to another single-point logging method of the embodiment of the invention;
Fig. 6 is that the operator according to embodiment 2 utilizes SIP Digest authentication mechanism to realize the single-sign-on identifying procedure figure of the IMS terminal application server of non-UICC card as OpenID Provider;
Fig. 7 utilizes SIP Digest authentication mechanism to realize the single-sign-on authentication integrated stand composition of the IMS terminal application server of non-UICC card according to the operator of the embodiment of the invention as OpenID Provider;
Embodiment
Hereinafter also describe in conjunction with the embodiments the present invention in detail with reference to accompanying drawing.Need to prove, in the situation that do not conflict, embodiment and the feature among the embodiment among the application can make up mutually.
Fig. 1 is that the method comprises according to the flow chart of the single-point logging method of the embodiment of the invention:
Step S102, terminal sends service request to RP;
Step S104, IdP address, RP access authentication center, and self authentication request is redirected to authentication center by terminal, perhaps, RP returns to terminal and is used to indicate the response that terminal authenticates to authentication center;
Step S106, terminal is to the authentication request of authentication center's transmitting terminal;
Step S108, authentication center use session initiation protocol digest authentication SIP Digest mode that terminal is authenticated, and authentication result is redirected to RP by terminal;
Step S110, RP provides service according to authentication result for terminal.
In the method, terminal does not send the identification information of self to RP, and RP can not obtain the identification information of UE, also can not authenticate terminal, but adopt certain mechanism to make terminal to the authentication request of authentication center's initiation to terminal.Wherein, can realize by two kinds of mechanism, the one, RP returns and is used to indicate the response that terminal authenticates to signatory authentication center; Another follows redirected RP authentication message that RP is redirected to signatory authentication center closely by terminal self authentication request message is sent to this re-orientation processes mechanism of signatory authentication center, that is to say, RP is redirected to authentication center with the authentication request of self by terminal, like this, extended meeting sends to authentication center by being redirected the authentication request of flow process with self after the terminal.This mode is so that RP can't obtain the identification information of terminal, and terminal directly authenticates to authentication center trusty, prevents from subscriber identity information is revealed to RP, thereby has improved fail safe
In the correlation technique, the SSO function of the UE terminal application server generally mode that combines of mode or the AKA/OpenID by Liberty Alliance/OpenID combination realizes, this dual mode is only supported the authentication of UICC identification information, therefore being only applicable to the UE terminal has UICC card situation in advance, and in the real world applications, the UE that does not have the UICC card constantly increases, therefore, need new mechanism to support the UE terminal of non-UICC card to realize the SSO function, the method of the present embodiment, adopt SIP Digest mode to authenticate, the kind of the User Identity of supporting is not limited to the UICC identification information, therefore, can support not have the authentication of the terminal of UICC.
By above method, Virtual network operator can be finished the unified certification of the UE terminal being used AS as the supplier of user authentication center, and convenient various application servers access terminal.Virtual network operator can provide a large number of users group for the application service provider, operator can be by cooperating to better meet customer group to the demand of various application services with AS provider, the user accesses associated application servers by the Virtual network operator of trusting simultaneously, and not only providing users with the convenient has also increased the profit mode that the fail safe of user profile has also enlarged operator simultaneously.
Preferably, use before SIP Digest mode authenticates UE in authentication center, authentication center can judge whether to exist and UE between the first shared key K 0If, do not exist, then continue subsequent treatment, if exist, then the skip authentication center uses SIP Digest mode to the step that UE authenticates, and directly authentication result is redirected to RP.By above determining step, the speed of processing can to the direct return authentication result of the UE that had authenticated to RP, improve in authentication center.
In the correlation technique, because OP authentication center only carries out unilateral authentication to the UE terminal, and may there be unverified attack condition in server, therefore, may exist because server illegally causes the relatively poor problem of fail safe.Therefore, in the present embodiment, RP can also be redirected to authentication center with the RP authentication request, and wherein, the RP authentication request is carried RP identify label RP_credential authentication center and RP authenticated and preserves authentication result according to the RP identify label.By above method, the UE of non-UICC card can realize the SSO function to valid application server in the IMS network, can better guarantee the fail safe of IMS terminal identity information by the employing two-way authentication, and can correctly identify illegal application server, improve the fail safe of service.
Preferably, above User Identity can be open identify label (OpenID), and authentication center can be OP; Perhaps, User Identity can distribute the identify label that obtains for identify label or the UE that is input to UE in internet protocol multimedia subsystem (IMS) system, and authentication center can be single-sign-on authentication center (IdP).
In implementation, authentication center uses SIP Digest mode can adopt following processing mode to the process that UE authenticates: authentication center authenticates terminal according to the SIP Digest Ciphering Key (SD-AV) corresponding to this terminal.Should (SD-AV) can obtain and store from HSS according to User Identity by authentication center, wherein, SD-AV comprises following content at least: User Identity, identifying algorithm (algorithm), quality assurance, action scope (realm) and a cryptographic Hash H (A1), wherein, H (A1) is comprised of User Identity, realm and password (password).
Preferably, based on above parameter, authentication center uses SIP Digest mode can comprise the process that terminal authenticates: authentication center produces random number nonce, and the message of carrying algorithm, nonce and realm etc. is sent to UE; UE produces random number cnonce, the H (A1) that produces according to nonce, cnonce with by realm, User Identity and the password that stores in advance etc. utilizes algorithm to generate response response, return response message to authentication center, wherein, response message carries cnonce, nonce, realm, response and algorithm; Authentication center adopts algorithm according to the H (A1) of storage, nonce, the cnonce calculation check response Xresponse that receives of storage, the response and the Xresponse that receive are compared, if identical then authentication success, otherwise authentification failure; The rspauth value under the SIP Digest authentication mechanism is calculated by authentication center.Utilize SIP Digest authentication mechanism, operator is by providing IdP unified certification center that the application server of user and access is carried out unified two-way authentication, can be good at realizing the SSO function in the scene 3.
Preferably, the basis of response can also comprise: UE uses the access times of same nonce when calculating response.Utilize nonce-count also to participate in response and calculate, can reduce the possibility of Replay Attack
By above process, produce random number nonce in authentication center, the message of carrying algorithm, nonce and realm is sent to after the terminal, UE just can utilize the identifying algorithm calculating K according to H (A1) and cnonce 0After authentication center's use SIP Digest mode authenticated UE, authentication center can be according to the identifying algorithm calculating K 0And storage.By above method, authentication center and UE can be according to the mutual parameter generation shared key K between the two of verification process 0, authentication center can judge whether this UE to be carried out authentication according to whether storing this shared key.
After authentication center is to the UE authentication success, in order to guarantee the communication security between UE and the RP, can adopt following processing mode:
(1) be that identify label or the UE that is input to UE distributes the identify label that obtains in the IMS system at User Identity, authentication center is IdP, and in the situation of authentication center's authentication success, authentication center generates random number nonce1, according to nonce1 and K 0Generate the second key K 1Authentication center adopts K 0Encrypt nonce1 and the authentication result RP_Auth of RP is obtained K 0(nonce1, RP_Auth), the shared key Kr between employing and the RP, i encrypts K 1Obtain Kr with the authentication result UE_Auth to UE, i (K1, UE_Auth); Authentication center sends to terminal and carries K 0The 200OK information of (nonce1, RP_Auth) and rspauth parameter value and with Kr, i (K 1, UE_Auth) be redirected to RP, perhaps, terminal obtains K in terminal is redirected to the redirect message of RP in authentication center 0(nonce1, RP_Auth), rspauth parameter value and Kr, i (K 1, UE_Auth) afterwards with Kr, i (K 1, UE_Auth) be redirected to RP; UE deciphers K 0(nonce1, RP_Auth) obtains the authentication result to RP, utilizes the method the same with authentication center to produce the rspauth parameter value, and with the information that receives in the rspauth contrast, finish terminal to the verification process of network; Generate the second key K after the network authentication success 1And RP deciphers Kr, i (K 1, UE_Auth), adopt K 1The cryptographic services content is sent to UE; UE adopts K 1Be decrypted the acquisition service content.
(2) be OpenID at User Identity, authentication center is OP, and in the situation of authentication center's authentication success:
A kind of processing mode is that authentication center generates random number nonce1, according to nonce1 and K 0Generate the second key K 1Authentication center adopts K 0Encrypt nonce1 and the authentication assertion RP_Assert of RP is obtained K 0(nonce1, RP_Assert), the shared key Kr between employing and the RP, i encrypts K 1Obtain Kr, o (K with the authentication assertion UE_Assert to UE 1, UE_Assert); Authentication center sends to terminal and carries K 0The 200OK information of (nonce1, RP_Auth) and rspauth parameter value and with Kr, o (K 1, UE_Auth) be redirected to RP, perhaps, terminal obtains K in terminal is redirected to the redirect message of RP in authentication center 0(nonce1, RP_Assert), rspauth parameter value and Kr, o (K 1, UE_Assert) afterwards with Kr, i (K 1, UE_Assert) be redirected to RP; UE deciphers K 0(nonce1, RP_Assert) obtains the authentication assertion to RP, utilizes the method the same with authentication center to produce the rspauth parameter value, and with the information that receives in the rspauth contrast, finish terminal to the verification process of network; Generate the second key K after the network authentication success 1And RP deciphers Kr, o (K 1, UE_Assert), adopt K 1The cryptographic services content is sent to UE; UE adopts K 1Be decrypted the acquisition service content.
Another kind of processing mode is that authentication center generates random number nonce1, according to nonce1 and K 0Generate the second key K 1Authentication center adopts K 0Encrypt nonce1 and obtain K 0(nonce1), the shared key Kr between employing and the RP, i encrypts K 1Obtain Kr, o (K with the authentication assertion UE_Assert to UE 1, UE_Assert); Authentication center sends to terminal and carries K 0(nonce1) and the 200OK information of rspauth parameter value and with Kr, o (K 1, UE_Auth) be redirected to RP, perhaps, terminal obtains K in terminal is redirected to the redirect message of RP in authentication center 0(nonce1), rspauth parameter value and Kr, o (K 1, UE_Assert) afterwards with Kr, i (K 1, UE_Assert) be redirected to RP; UE deciphers K 0(nonce1), utilize the method the same with authentication center to produce the rspauth parameter value, and with the information that receives in the rspauth contrast, finish terminal to the verification process of network; Generate the second key K after the network authentication success 1And RP deciphers Kr, o (K 1, UE_Assert), adopt K 1The cryptographic services content is sent to UE; UE adopts K 1Be decrypted the acquisition service content.In this case, do not need to be with the RP authentication result to terminal UE, terminal trust identification center, authentication center authenticates RP by just sending to UE information, if terminal UE can be received K from authentication center 0(nonce1), just represented that RP authentication passed through, need to clearly not remove notification terminal UE.
In the above method, the interactive information between authentication center and the UE, between authentication center and the RP all adopts each self-corresponding shared key to be encrypted, and has guaranteed the information interaction security between authentication center and UE and authentication center and the RP; In addition, for the authentication request of UE, produce a K 1, in order to utilize K between UE and the RP 1Mutual service content is encrypted, prevents from illegally intercepting and capturing user data, improved further fail safe.
Need to prove, above method adopts SIP Digest mechanism, is not only applicable to the authentication of the terminal of non-UICC, also go for the authentication of UICC terminal, and, need not to configure a large amount of GBA, reduce Virtual network operator and disposed GBA and the cost that embeds the UICC card.
The present embodiment also provides a kind of single-node login system, and Fig. 2 is the structured flowchart according to the single-node login system of the embodiment of the invention, and this system comprises: UE22 is used for sending a request message to RP 24; RP 24, are used for authentication request is redirected to authentication center 26, and are used for providing service according to the authentication result of authentication center 26 for UE 22; Authentication center 26 is used for using SIP Digest mode that UE 22 is authenticated, and authentication result is redirected to RP 24 by UE 22.
Authentication center 26 also is used for according to the RP identify label RP 24 being authenticated and preserve authentication result.
Preferably, in the situation that User Identity is OpenID, authentication center 26 is OP; Be to be input to the identify label of UE or UE distributes in the IMS system in the situation of the identify label that obtains at User Identity, authentication center 26 is IdP.
Preferably, authentication center 26 is also for generation of the secure communication key, and this secure communication key is redirected to RP 24 by UE 22; RP 24 also is used for adopting this secure communication secret key encryption service content and being sent to UE 22; UE 22 adopts this secure communication key to be decrypted the acquisition service content also for generation of this secure communication key.
Processing for the single-sign-on of IMS terminal in not disposing the network architecture of GBA of non-UICC card, below will be described in detail in conjunction with Fig. 3 and 6 in an embodiment, need to prove, be integrated stand composition and flow chart in the accompanying drawing, UE is the non-UICC card of IMS terminal, the application server that RP will access corresponding to the IMS terminal, the SSO subsystem that IdP/OP map network operator provides.In order to make flow process more short and sweet, the agreement that does not have the concrete network element interface of some networks of impact not draw and support on flow process does not have explanation, the function that possesses of UE and RP interface for example, the function that UE and IdP interface possess, the function that HSS and IdP interface possess, and the relevant agreement of supporting etc. is all not shown; Interface reference point can realize Diameter between HSS and the IdP, can reuse the Cx interface in the IMS core net, and UE and IdP all will support the condition such as SIP Digest authentication mechanism also not indicate in the drawings; For for purpose of brevity, do not draw in the drawings these physical interface reference points.The negotiation mechanism of RP and IdP realization shared key utilizes current mechanism to realize smoothly, and IdP is to the authentication of RP, and also existing ripe mechanism successfully realizes now, is not repeated here.
The embodiment 1 and 2 that the following describes combines the technical scheme of above-mentioned a plurality of preferred embodiments.
Embodiment 1
The present embodiment provides a kind of method that realizes the SSO function of application server based on SIP Digest authentication mechanism in the common IMS network.The mechanism of in the method, UE terminal and AS server having been carried out two-way authentication; Can satisfy the UE terminal of non-UICC card in the IMS network to its application server realizing SSO function; Compare with OpenID/AKA, have better versatility and fail safe, guaranteed the safety of UE user terminal and AS server.
Fig. 4 is that the IdP that the operator according to the embodiment of the invention provides utilizes SIP Digest authentication mechanism to realize the single-sign-on authentication integrated stand composition of the IMS terminal application server of non-UICC card, Fig. 3 utilizes SIP Digest authentication mechanism to realize the flow chart of the single-sign-on identifying procedure of application server according to the IMS terminal of the non-UICC card of embodiment 1, this embodiment is take framework shown in Figure 4 as the basis, described the flow process of single-point logging method in conjunction with Fig. 3, details are as follows:
Step 1:UE terminal sends a HTTP service request to application server RP.
Step 2: the address of the signatory IdP of authentication center is known and located to application server RP according to the signatory and support relation between prior and the operator; Then application server RP and signatory authentication center utilize prior art to carry out setting up shared key Kr, i alternately.
Step 3: application server RP responds 401 undelegated HTTPS responses to the UE terminal, requires the UE terminal to go to authentication center to carry out authentication; In this response, comprise simultaneously authentication center IdP address and RP identity information; Perhaps application server RP is redirected RP self authentication request to the signatory IdP of authentication center, carries the RP identity information in this message.Do not comprise the relevant authentication information of any UE terminal in application server RP, RP does not authenticate UE.
Step 4:UE terminal sends the HTTP authentication request message according to the IdP address to the IdP of authentication center, the UE terminal is carried out authentication to request IdP or the UE terminal follows redirect message closely to the IdP of authentication center transmission authentication request message, the identification information of carried terminal UE in the message.
Step 5:IdP authenticates RP according to RP identification information (RP_credential), preserves the authentication result RP_Auth to RP; Judge whether have the UE corresponding with it and IdP shared key K among the IdP according to transmitting the User Identity (U_credential) that comes simultaneously 0Carry out if exist this shared key then directly to jump to step 12, otherwise continue to carry out lower step by step rapid.
Corresponding SIPDigest Authentication Vector (SD-AV) and user configuration information content are searched and downloaded to the User Identity that step is received on the step 6:IdP foundation (U_credential) in HSS.Comprising U_credential, realm, qop, algorithm and H (A1), wherein H (A1) is by U_credential, the hash function value that realm and password form.Under many HSS environment, IdP can obtain by inquiry SLF the HSS address of corresponding stored user information, finds this corresponding HSS.
Step 7:IdP produces a random number nonce, and the H (A1) that downloads from HSS is stored with this nonce.
Step 8:IdP sends 401 unverified challenge message to UE, comprises U_credential, realm, qop, algorithm and nonce in this information.
Step 9: terminal UE produces random number cnonce.Utilize U_credential, realm and password produce H (A1); Recycling H (A1), cnonce etc. produce UE and IdP shared key K 0Calculate the response value by an one-way Hash function F.response＝F(H(A)，cnonce，nonce，qop，nonce-count)。Terminal is carried out network authentication with cnonce and is avoided " chosen plaintext " attack.Nonce-count is counter, and the same nonce of the every use of user calculates a response, and nonce-count will increase, and utilizes nonce-count also to participate in response and calculates, and reduces the possibility of Replay Attack.
Step 10:UE sends a response response to the challenge information in the step 8 to IdP, comprises cnonce, nonce, response, realm, U_credential, qop, algorithm, Digest-url and nonce-count in this response message.
Step 11: utilize the nonce value that stores that the nonce value in the response message is tested, if check is correct, then IdP utilizes nonce and the H (A1) of relevant parameters cnonce, the nonce-count receive, qop etc. and former storage to calculate Xresponse, the Xresponse that calculates and the response value of receiving are compared, if the identical then authenticated user of both comparative results is passed through, otherwise the failure of UE user end certification; If the terminal authentication success, then IdP generates parameters rs pauth value according to SIP Digest authentication mechanism method; Produce UE and IdP shared key K with H (A1), cnonce etc. 0
Step 12:IdP produces the authentication result information UE_Auth that obtains UE; IdP produces a random number nonce1 again; Then utilize K 0, nonce1 etc. produces key K 1Shared key K 0Nonce1 and RP_Auth are encrypted operation generation K 0(nonce1, RP_Auth); With RP and IdP shared key Kr, i encrypts K 1Produce Kr, i (K with UE_Auth 1, UE_Auth).
Step 13:IdP sends 200OK information to the UE terminal, comprise the information such as authentication result information UE_Auth, key life cycle and rspauth parameter value that IdP produces UE, show authentication success to the UE terminal, IdP is redirected the UE terminal to RP simultaneously, this message is carried Kr, i (K 1, UE_Auth); Perhaps IdP sends redirect message, is redirected UE to RP, carries authentication result information UE_Auth, key life cycle, rspauth parameter value and Kr that IdP produces UE in the message, i (K 1, the message such as UE_Auth).
Step 14:UE terminal deciphering K 0(nonce1, RP_Auth) obtains nonce1 value and RP authentication result, obtains the legitimacy of RP application server.If valid application server then order is carried out the lower step, otherwise returns an announcement information that server is illegal directly for the UE terminal; Terminal UE is utilized the mechanism identical with IdP to calculate and is produced the rspauth parameter value, and compares with the rspauth parameter value of receiving, both identical terminals of then finishing are to the success identity process of network; Recycling K after the network authentication success 0, nonce1 etc. produces key K 1
The redirect message that step 15:IdP sends is redirected to RP, carries Kr in this message, i (K 1, UE_Auth).
After step 16:RP receives this message, utilize shared key deciphering Kr, i (K 1, UE_Auth), RP obtains IdP to authentication result information and the key K of UE terminal 1
Step 17:RP determines whether that according to UE_Auth this UE provides authorization service content UE_Author; And use key K 1This authorization message is encrypted generation K 1(UE_Author).
Step 18:RP is to the UE notified on authorization information content.
Step 19:UE utilizes key K 1Whether can decipher K 1(UE_Author) satisfy it and whether can obtain request service.
Wherein step 17,18 and 19 is concrete application layer step, is optional step
Arbitrary step failure among the above-mentioned steps 1-19, then whole verification process stops to continue.
After if this IMS terminal UE acquires request service, when asking again other application server, when carrying User Identity (U_credential) information in this IMS terminal use UE authentication request, IdP is by searching K corresponding to this User Identity (U_credential) information 0Whether key knows this user authenticated passing through, if there is this K 0Key then user need to carrying out SIP Digest authentication, only need to not begin to process from step 12; Otherwise need to carry out whole verification process.Work as K 0The key life cycle expires, its auto-destruct then, and authenticated user need to again be carried out SIP Digest authentication and be produced UE and IdP shared key.
Fig. 5 is the flow chart according to another single-point logging method of the embodiment of the invention, and as shown in Figure 5, the method comprises:
Step S502, UE send the authentication request that carries User Identity to RP, RP obtains the address of the corresponding IdP of authentication center that contracts, and authentication request is redirected to authentication center;
Step S504, authentication center use session initiation protocol digest authentication (Session Initiation Protocol Digest is referred to as SIP Digest) mode that UE is authenticated, and authentication result is redirected to RP by UE;
Step S506, RP provides service according to authentication result for UE.
In the method, the unified certification center O P of operator (SSO) possesses simultaneously OpenID Provider and satisfies SIP Digest authentication mechanism ability; Terminal UE sends the OpenID authentication request message of carrying the OpenID identifier to RP; RP finishes standardization and location OP end address process according to the OpenID2.0 agreement, and carries out follow-up association process, produces the shared key between RP and the OP; RP is redirected to authentication center with the authentication request of self by terminal simultaneously, and like this, terminal self authentication request also is redirected to authentication center simultaneously.
In the correlation technique, because authentication center only carries out unilateral authentication to the UE terminal, and may there be unverified attack condition in server, therefore, may exist because server illegally causes the relatively poor problem of fail safe.Therefore, can adopt following processing mode:
In the redirect message that RP sends to the signatory IdP of authentication center, carry terminal identity sign and RP identify label under the OpenID mechanism;
So that authentication center has obtained after the RP identify label, authentication center just can authenticate and preserve authentication result according to the RP identify label to RP by above mode.
Preferably, use before SIP Digest mode authenticates UE in authentication center, authentication center can judge whether to exist and UE between the first shared key K 0If, do not exist, then continue subsequent treatment, if exist, then the skip authentication center uses SIP Digest mode to the step that UE authenticates, and directly authentication result is redirected to RP.By above determining step, the speed of processing can to the direct return authentication result of the UE that had authenticated to RP, improve in authentication center.
In implementation, authentication center uses SIP Digest mode can adopt following processing mode to the process that UE authenticates: authentication center authenticates terminal according to the SIP Digest Ciphering Key (SD-AV) corresponding to this terminal.Should (SD-AV) can obtain and store from HSS according to User Identity by authentication center, wherein, SD-AV comprises following content at least: User Identity, identifying algorithm (algorithm), quality assurance, action scope (realm) and a cryptographic Hash H (A1), wherein, H (A1) is comprised of User Identity, realm and password (password).
Preferably, based on above parameter, authentication center uses SIP Digest mode can comprise the process that terminal authenticates: authentication center produces random number nonce, and the message of carrying algorithm, nonce and realm etc. is sent to UE; UE produces random number cnonce, the H (A1) that produces according to nonce, cnonce with by realm, User Identity and the password that stores in advance etc. utilizes algorithm to generate response response, return response message to authentication center, wherein, response message carries cnonce, nonce, realm, response and algorithm; Authentication center adopts algorithm according to the H (A1) of storage, nonce, the cnonce calculation check response Xresponse that receives of storage, the response and the Xresponse that receive are compared, if identical then authentication success, otherwise authentification failure.After the terminal authentication success, authentication center utilizes SIP Digest mechanism to calculate the rspauth parameter value; Utilize SIP Digest authentication mechanism, operator is by providing IdP unified certification center that the application server of user and access is carried out unified two-way authentication, can be good at realizing the SSO function in the scene 3.
Preferably, the basis of response can also comprise: UE uses the access times of same nonce when calculating response.Utilize nonce-count also to participate in response and calculate, can reduce the possibility of Replay Attack
By above process, produce random number nonce in authentication center, the message of carrying algorithm, nonce and realm is sent to after the terminal, UE just can utilize the identifying algorithm calculating K according to H (A1) and cnonce 0After authentication center's use SIP Digest mode authenticated UE, authentication center can be according to the identifying algorithm calculating K 0And storage.By above method, authentication center and UE can be according to the mutual parameter generation shared key K between the two of verification process 0, authentication center can judge whether this UE to be carried out authentication according to whether storing this shared key.
After authentication center is to the UE authentication success, in order to guarantee the communication security between UE and the RP, can adopt following processing mode: be OP in authentication center, and in the situation of authentication center's authentication success, authentication center generates random number nonce1, according to the first shared key K between nonce1 and authentication center and the terminal 0Generate the second key K 1Authentication center adopts K 0Encrypt nonce1 and to the authentication result RP_Auth of RP, obtain K 0(nonce1, RP_Auth), the shared key Kr between employing and the RP, i encrypts K 1Authentication result UE_Auth with to terminal obtains Kr, i (K 1, UE_Auth); Authentication center sends to terminal and carries K 0The 200OK information of (nonce1, RP_Auth) and rspauth parameter value and with Kr, i (K 1, UE_Auth) be redirected to RP, perhaps, terminal obtains K in terminal is redirected to the redirect message of RP in authentication center 0(nonce1, RP_Auth), rspauth parameter value and Kr, i (K 1, UE_Auth) afterwards with Kr, i (K 1, UE_Auth) be redirected to RP; Terminal deciphering K 0(nonce1, RP_Auth) obtains the authentication result to RP, utilizes the method the same with authentication center to produce the rspauth parameter value, and with the information that receives in the rspauth contrast, finish terminal to the verification process of network; Generate the second key K after the network authentication success 1And RP deciphers Kr, i (K 1, UE_Auth), adopt K 1The cryptographic services content is sent to terminal; Terminal adopts K 1Be decrypted the acquisition service content.
In the above method, the interactive information between authentication center and the UE, between authentication center and the RP all adopts each self-corresponding shared key to be encrypted, and has guaranteed the information interaction security between authentication center and UE and authentication center and the RP; In addition, for the authentication request of UE, produce a K 1, in order to utilize K between UE and the RP 1Mutual service content is encrypted, prevents from illegally intercepting and capturing user data, improved further fail safe.
Need to prove, above method adopts SIP Digest mechanism, is not only applicable to the authentication of the terminal of non-UICC, also go for the authentication of UICC terminal, and, need not to configure a large amount of GBA, reduce Virtual network operator and disposed GBA and the cost that embeds the UICC card.
The present embodiment also provides a kind of single-node login system, and Fig. 2 is the structured flowchart according to the single-node login system of the embodiment of the invention, and this system comprises: UE 22, is used for sending the OpenID authentication request to RP 24; RP 24, are used for finishing the machine-processed authentication request of also passing through UE 22 redirected RP and UE 22 of OpenID to authentication center 26, and are used for providing service according to the authentication result of authentication center 26 for UE 22; Authentication center 26 is used for using SIP Digest mode that UE 22 is authenticated, and authentication result is redirected to RP 24 by terminal.
Preferably, authentication center 26 also is used for according to the RP identify label RP 24 being authenticated and preserve authentication result.
Preferably, authentication center 26 can also be for generation of the secure communication key, and the secure communication key is redirected to RP 24 by UE 22; RP 24 also is used for adopting secure communication secret key encryption service content and being sent to UE 22; UE 22 adopts the secure communication key to be decrypted the acquisition service content also for generation of the secure communication key
Embodiment 2
Fig. 7 utilizes SIP Digest authentication mechanism to realize the single-sign-on authentication integrated stand composition of the IMS terminal application server of non-UICC card according to the operator of the embodiment of the invention as OpenID Provider, Fig. 6 is that the operator according to embodiment 2 utilizes SIP Digest authentication mechanism to realize the single-sign-on identifying procedure figure of the IMS terminal application server of non-UICC card as OpenID Provider, this embodiment is take framework shown in Figure 7 as the basis, described the flow process of single-point logging method in conjunction with Fig. 6, details are as follows:
Step 1:UE terminal is sent an OpenID authentication request to RP, carries user's OpenID identifier information in this request.
Step 2:RP carries out standardization to the OpenID identifier, obtain OpenID Provider address and find OP terminal point URL according to this identifier RP simultaneously, the expectation of UE terminal uses this URL to finish authentication, pass through association process between RP and the OP, utilize current mechanism such as Diffie-Hellman IKE etc. to set up a shared key Kr, o; RP is redirected this user OpenID authentication request and sends the RP authentication request to the OP address.In this message, comprise simultaneously RP identity information and OpenID2.0 Plays parameter information content.
Step 3:RP is redirected this user OpenID authentication request and sends the RP authentication request to the OP address.In this message, comprise simultaneously RP identity information and OpenID2.0 Plays parameter information content.
Step 4:OpenID authentication request is redirected to the address of OpenID identity supplier OP.After this step, OP sets up related between User Identity and the OpenID identifier information.
Step 5:OP authenticates RP according to RP identification information (RP_credential); Simultaneously according to judging whether have the UE corresponding with it and OP shared key K among the OP with the mapping associated terminal identification information U_credential that transmits the user OpenID identifier information OpenID identifier that comes 0Carry out if exist this shared key then directly to jump to step 12, otherwise continue to carry out lower step by step rapid.OP has set up the interrelated mapping between OpenID identifier and the terminal user ID identifier in this step.
Corresponding SIP Digest Authentication Vector (SD-AV) and user configuration information content are searched and downloaded to step with the User Identity symbol (U_credential) that OpenID identifier is associated on the step 6:OP foundation in HSS.Comprising U_credential, realm, qop, algorithm and H (A1), wherein H (A1) is by U_credential, the hash function value that realm and password form.Under many HSS environment, OP can obtain by inquiry SLF the HSS address of corresponding stored user information, finds this corresponding HSS.
Step 7:OP produces a random number nonce, and the H (A1) that downloads from HSS is stored with this nonce.
Step 8:OP sends 401 unverified challenge message to UE, comprises U_credential, realm, qop, algorithm and nonce in this information.
Step 9: produce a random number cnonce.Utilize U_credential, realm and password produce H (A1); Recycling H (A1), cnonce etc. produce UE and OP shared key K 0Calculate the response value by an one-way Hash function F.response＝F(H(A1)，cnonce，nonce，qop，nonce-count)。Terminal is carried out network authentication with cnonce and is avoided " chosenplaintext " attack.Nonce-count is counter, and the same nonce of the every use of user calculates a response, and nonce-count will increase, and utilizes nonce-count also to participate in response and calculates, and reduces the possibility of Replay Attack.
Step 10:UE sends a response response to the challenge information in the step 8 to OP, comprises cnonce, nonce, response, realm, U_credential, qop, algorithm, Digest-url and nonce-count in this response message.
Step 11: utilize the nonce value that stores that the nonce value in the response message is tested, if check is correct, then OP utilizes nonce and the H (A1) of relevant parameters cnonce, the nonce-count receive, qop etc. and former storage to calculate Xresponse, the Xresponse that calculates and the response value of receiving are compared, if the identical then authenticated user of both comparative results is passed through, otherwise the failure of UE user end certification; After the success of authentication terminal, the OP of authentication center utilizes method calculating rspauth parameter value in the SIP Digest mechanism; Produce UE and OP shared key K with H (A1), cnonce etc. 0
Step 12:OP is according to the authentication assertion information UE_Assert that the authentication result of terminal is produced to UE; OP produces a random number nonce1 again; Then utilize K 0, nonce1 etc. produces key K 1Shared key K 0Nonce1 is encrypted operation produces K 0(nonce1); Encrypt K with RP and OP shared key 1Produce Kr, o (K with UE_Assert 1, UE_Assert).
Step 13:OP sends 200OK information to the UE terminal, comprises K 0(nonce1), the information such as rspauth parameter value and key life cycle; OP is redirected the UE terminal to RP simultaneously, and this message is carried Kr, o (K 1, UE_Assert).Perhaps OP sends and is redirected UE to RP message, carries K in this message 0(nonce1), Kr, o (K 1, UE_Assert), the information such as rspauth parameter value and key life cycle.
Step 14:UE terminal deciphering K 0(nonce1), obtain the nonce1 value; The simultaneously terminal UE utilization mechanism identical with IdP is calculated and is produced the rspauth parameter value, and compares with the rspauth parameter value of receiving, both identical terminals of then finishing are to the success identity process of network; Recycling K after the network authentication success 0, nonce1 etc. produces key K 1
The redirect message that step 15:OP sends is redirected to RP, carries Kr in this message, o (K 1, UE_Assert).
After step 16:RP receives this message, utilize shared key deciphering Kr, o (K 1, UE_Assert), RP obtains OP to as a result UE_Assert and the key K asserted of UE terminal 1
Step 17:RP examines after UE_Assert asserts, RP produces the authorization message UE_Author of UE; And use key K 1This authorization message is encrypted generation K 1(UE_Author).
Step 18:RP is to the UE notified on authorization information content, carry information K 1(UE_Author).
Step 19:UE utilizes key K 1Whether can decipher K 1(UE_Author) satisfy it and whether can obtain request service.
Wherein step 17,18 and 19 is concrete application layer step, is optional step.
Arbitrary step failure among the 1-19 in the above-mentioned steps, then whole verification process stops to continue.
After if this IMS terminal UE acquires request service, when asking again other application server, when carrying user OpenID identifier information OpenID identifier in this IMS terminal use UE authentication request, OP searches corresponding K by the related terminal identification information of this user OpenID identifier information OpenID identifier mapping 0Whether key knows this user authenticated passing through, if there is this K 0Key then user need to carrying out SIP Digest authentication, only need to not carry out operating after 11 steps; Otherwise need to carry out whole verification process; Work as K 0The key life cycle expires, its auto-destruct then, and authenticated user need to again be carried out SIP Digest authentication and be produced UE and OP shared key.
Access in the RP application server UE user, if meet with in the unexpected suspension situation, when UE does not also finish the UE verification process, if then behind the network recovery UE want access application server then to need to restart verification process; When UE has finished verification process, do not arrive K if recover the network time spent 0Life cycle, then UE can continue to use this K behind the network recovery 0Carry out subsequent operation, otherwise need again authentication.After UE user accesses the RP application server, initiatively close special circumstances such as nullifying UE or outage if meet with the user, then the user need to finish the whole execution flow processs such as registration in IMS again.
In sum, the scheme that the embodiment of the invention provides can be supported the authentication to the terminal single-sign-on RP that does not have UICC, because the method does not need to dispose a large amount of GBA, and can satisfy non-UICC terminal access to IMS network, therefore reduce Virtual network operator and disposed GBA and the cost that embeds the UICC card, reduce the consumption of safeguarding various device, and can access the relevant application service of IMS network by the mode of SSO.
Obviously, those skilled in the art should be understood that, above-mentioned each module of the present invention or each step can realize with general calculation element, they can concentrate on the single calculation element, perhaps be distributed on the network that a plurality of calculation elements form, alternatively, they can be realized with the executable program code of calculation element, carried out by calculation element thereby they can be stored in the storage device, perhaps they are made into respectively each integrated circuit modules, perhaps a plurality of modules in them or step are made into the single integrated circuit module and realize.Like this, the present invention is not restricted to any specific hardware and software combination.
The above is the preferred embodiments of the present invention only, is not limited to the present invention, and for a person skilled in the art, the present invention can have various modifications and variations.Within the spirit and principles in the present invention all, any modification of doing, be equal to replacement, improvement etc., all should be included within protection scope of the present invention.

Claims (15)

1. a single-point logging method is characterized in that, comprising:
Terminal sends service request to application server RP;
Described RP obtains the authentication center address;
Described RP is redirected to described authentication center with the authentication request of self by described terminal, and perhaps, described RP returns to described terminal and is used to indicate the response that described terminal authenticates to described authentication center;
Described terminal sends authentication request to described authentication center;
Described authentication center uses session initiation protocol digest authentication SIP Digest mode that described terminal is authenticated, and authentication result is redirected to described RP by described terminal;
In using described SIP Digest mode verification process, described authentication center utilizes identical cryptographic Hash and random number to produce shared key with described terminal;
Described RP provides service according to described authentication result for described terminal.
2. method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, before the described use SIP Digest of authentication center mode authenticates described terminal, also comprises:
Described authentication center judge whether to exist and described terminal between the first shared key K 0If, do not exist, then continue subsequent treatment, if exist, then skip the step that described authentication center uses SIP Digest mode that described terminal is authenticated, directly authentication result is redirected to described RP.
3. method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, also comprises:
Described RP obtains the address of described authentication center, self authentication request is redirected to described authentication center or described RP to be returned to described terminal and is used to indicate the response that described terminal authenticates to described authentication center, wherein, described RP authentication request is carried RP identify label RP_credential; Described terminal is followed redirect message or is sent authentication message to described authentication center;
Described authentication center authenticates and preserves authentication result according to described RP identify label to described RP.
4. method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, the described use SIP Digest of authentication center mode authenticates described terminal and comprises:
Described authentication center authenticates described terminal according to the SIP Digest Ciphering Key corresponding to described terminal.
5. method according to claim 4 is characterized in that, described authentication center obtains corresponding to the described SIP Digest Ciphering Key of described terminal from home subscriber register HSS according to described User Identity and also stores.
6. method according to claim 4, it is characterized in that, described SIP Digest Ciphering Key comprises following content at least: User Identity, identifying algorithm algorithm, quality assurance, action scope realm, a cryptographic Hash H (A1), wherein, H (A1) is comprised of described User Identity, described realm and password password.
7. method according to claim 6 is characterized in that, the described use SIP Digest of authentication center mode authenticates described terminal and comprises:
Described authentication center produces random number nonce, and the message of carrying described algorithm, described nonce and described realm is sent to described terminal;
Described terminal produces random number cnonce, according to described nonce, described cnonce and the cryptographic Hash H (A1) that produced by the password of described realm, described User Identity and input, generate response response by described algorithm, return response message to described authentication center, wherein, described response message carries described cnonce, described nonce, described realm, described response and described algorithm;
Described authentication center adopts described algorithm according to nonce and the described cnonce calculation check response Xresponse that receives of the H (A1) of described storage, described storage, the described response and the described Xresponse that receive are compared, if identical then authentication success, otherwise authentification failure; Calculate the rspauth parameter value of SIP Digest authentication mechanism.
8. method according to claim 7 is characterized in that,
Produce random number nonce in described authentication center, the message of carrying described algorithm, described nonce and described realm is sent to after the described terminal, also comprises: described terminal is calculated the first shared key K between described authentication center and the described terminal according to the H (A1) of described generation and described cnonce 0
After the described use SIP Digest of authentication center mode authenticated described terminal, also comprise: described K calculated according to H (A1) and the described cnonce of described storage in described authentication center 0And storage, the rspauth parameter value of calculating SIP Digest authentication mechanism.
9. each described method is characterized in that according to claim 1-8, and described User Identity is open identify label OpenID, and described authentication center is OpenID supplier OP; Perhaps, described User Identity is that the identify label or the described terminal that are input to described terminal are distributed the identify label that obtains in internet protocol multimedia subsystem IMS system, and described authentication center is the IdP of single-sign-on authentication center.
10. method according to claim 9, it is characterized in that, be to be input to the identify label of described terminal or described terminal is distributed the identify label that obtains in the IMS system at described User Identity, described authentication center is described IdP, and in the situation of described authentication center authentication success, also comprise:
Described authentication center generates random number nonce1, according to the first shared key K between described nonce1 and described authentication center and the described terminal 0Generate the second key K 1
Described authentication center adopts described K 0Encrypt described nonce1 and to the information contents such as authentication result RP_Auth of described RP, obtain K 0(nonce1, RP_Auth), the shared key Kr between employing and the described RP, i encrypts described K 1Authentication result UE_Auth with to described terminal obtains Kr, i (K 1, UE_Auth);
Described terminal is redirected to described terminal in described authentication center and obtains described K in the redirect message of described RP 0(nonce1, RP_Auth), rspauth parameter value and Kr, i (K 1, UE_Auth) afterwards with Kr, i (K 1, UE_Auth) be redirected to described RP;
The described K of described terminal deciphering 0(nonce1, RP_Auth), obtain the authentication result to described RP, described terminal utilizes the identical mode of described authentication center to produce the rspauth parameter value, the rspauth that contrast produces and deciphering obtain the rspauth value, described terminal is finished the authentication of network, and described terminal generates the second key K after the network authentication success 1And described RP deciphers described Kr, i (K 1, UE_Auth), adopt described K 1The cryptographic services content is sent to described terminal;
Described terminal adopts K 1Be decrypted and obtain described service content.
11. method according to claim 9 is characterized in that, is OpenID at described User Identity, described authentication center is OP, and in the situation of described authentication center authentication success, also comprises:
Described authentication center generates random number nonce1, according to the first shared key K between described nonce1 and described authentication center and the described terminal 0Generate the second key K 1
Described authentication center adopts described K 0Encrypt described nonce1 and to the information contents such as authentication assertion RP_Assert of described RP, obtain K 0(nonce1, RP_Assert), the shared key Kr between employing and the described RP, o encrypts described K 1Authentication assertion UE_Assert with to described terminal obtains Kr, o (K 1, UE_Assert);
Described authentication center sends to described terminal and carries K 0The 200OK information of (nonce1, RP_Auth) and rspauth parameter value and with Kr, o (K 1, UE_Auth) be redirected to described RP, perhaps, described terminal is redirected to described terminal in described authentication center and obtains described K in the redirect message of described RP 0(nonce1, RP_Assert), rspauth parameter value and Kr, o (K 1, UE_Assert) afterwards with Kr, o (K 1, UE_Assert) be redirected to described RP;
The described K of described terminal deciphering 0(nonce1, RP_Assert), obtain the authentication assertion to described RP, and from message, obtain the rspauth parameter value, described terminal utilizes the identical mode of described authentication center to produce the rspauth parameter value, the rspauth that contrast produces and deciphering obtain the rspauth value, and described terminal is finished the authentication of network, and described terminal generates the second key K after the network authentication success 1And described RP deciphers described Kr, o (K 1, UE_Assert), adopt described K 1The cryptographic services content is sent to described terminal;
Described terminal adopts K 1Be decrypted and obtain described service content.
12. method according to claim 9 is characterized in that, is OpenID at described User Identity, described authentication center is OP, and in the situation of described authentication center authentication success, also comprises:
Described authentication center generates random number nonce1, according to the first shared key K between described nonce1 and described authentication center and the described terminal 0Generate the second key K 1
Described authentication center adopts described K 0Encrypt the information contents such as described nonce1, obtain K 0(nonce1), the shared key Kr between employing and the described RP, o encrypts described K 1Authentication assertion UE_Assert with to described terminal obtains Kr, o (K 1, UE_Assert);
Described authentication center sends to described terminal and carries K 0(nonce1) and the 200OK information of rspauth parameter value and with Kr, o (K 1, UE_Auth) be redirected to described RP, perhaps, described terminal is redirected to described terminal in described authentication center and obtains described K in the redirect message of described RP 0(nonce1), rspauth parameter value and Kr, o (K 1, UE_Assert) afterwards with Kr, o (K 1, UE_Assert) be redirected to described RP;
The described K of described terminal deciphering 0(nonce1), obtain nonce1, and from message, obtain the rspauth parameter value, described terminal utilizes the identical mode of described authentication center to produce the rspauth parameter value, the rspauth that contrast produces and deciphering obtain the rspauth value, described terminal is finished the authentication of network, and described terminal generates the second key K after the network authentication success 1And described RP deciphers described Kr, o (K 1, UE_Assert), adopt described K 1The cryptographic services content is sent to described terminal;
Described terminal adopts K 1Be decrypted and obtain described service content.
13. a single-node login system is characterized in that, comprising:
Terminal is used for sending service request to application server RP, sends authentication request to described authentication center, utilizes identical cryptographic Hash and random number to produce shared key with described authentication center;
Described RP is redirected to described authentication center for obtaining the authentication request of described authentication center address with self by described terminal, perhaps, described RP is used for obtaining described authentication center address and returns to described terminal and be used to indicate the response that described terminal authenticates to described authentication center;
And be used for providing service according to the authentication result of described authentication center for described terminal;
Described authentication center is used for using session initiation protocol digest authentication SIP Digest mode that described terminal is authenticated, and authentication result is redirected to described RP by described terminal, utilizes identical cryptographic Hash and random number to produce shared key with described terminal.
14. system according to claim 13 is characterized in that, described authentication center also is used for according to the RP identify label described RP being authenticated and preserve authentication result.
15. system according to claim 13 is characterized in that, described authentication center is also for generation of the secure communication key, and described secure communication key is redirected to described RP by described terminal; Described RP also is used for adopting described secure communication secret key encryption service content and being sent to described terminal; Described terminal adopts described secure communication key to be decrypted and obtains described service content also for generation of described secure communication key.
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