CN102831358A - Method and device for preventing homepage tamper - Google Patents
Method and device for preventing homepage tamper Download PDFInfo
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- CN102831358A CN102831358A CN2012103570046A CN201210357004A CN102831358A CN 102831358 A CN102831358 A CN 102831358A CN 2012103570046 A CN2012103570046 A CN 2012103570046A CN 201210357004 A CN201210357004 A CN 201210357004A CN 102831358 A CN102831358 A CN 102831358A
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method and a device for preventing a homepage tamper and relates to the technical field of computers, and the method and the device are used for solving the problem in the prior art that the method for locking the home page of a browser is low in security, unreliable and easy to tamper. The method comprises the following steps: sending the process call of the browser by a preset sensing module, wherein the process call comprises a calling system function for inquiring the information of the home page of the browser by the browser; when the process call is sensed, intercepting the process call, and feeding back the address of the home page of the browser preset and stored in the sensing module to the process call of the browser through the system function for connecting and/or displaying the preset home page.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to field of computer technology, relate in particular to a kind of method and device that prevents webpage tamper.
Background technology
Along with the development of internet, applications, the homepage of web browser has become the hotly contested spot of Malware, virus and each macroreticular fail-safe software manufacturer.Malware, virus are through distorting the browser homepage, and the Webpage that can after browser starts or detects the operation that returns to the homepage, browser be browsed navigates to the page viral or that the Malware deviser embeds, has a strong impact on user's use.And each macroreticular fail-safe software manufacturer is experienced for better safety is provided to the user; Protection user's browser homepage is not maliciously tampered; Competitively released the function of locking browser homepage, made the user can set the homepage of browser, the network security software provides a kind of method that locks the user browser homepage; Be used to lock the homepage of the homepage of browser, to improve user experience for user's setting.Yet the method for existing locking browser homepage is closed Malware by virus easily and is cracked, and security is not high enough, and preventing virus and Malware are distorted the browser homepage fully, and be unreliable.Therefore, provide the higher method that prevents webpage tamper of a kind of security to become a problem that presses for solution.
Summary of the invention
Fundamental purpose of the present invention is to provide a kind of method and device that prevents webpage tamper; Preventing virus fully and Malware so that the solution prior art exists are distorted the browser homepage; Security is low; Insecure problem, wherein: the method that prevents webpage tamper of the embodiment of the invention comprises:
The process transfer of preset detecting module detecting browser, said process transfer comprises: browser calls the system function of Query Browser home address;
When detecting said process transfer, tackle this process transfer, and the browser home address that will be provided with and be stored in detecting module in advance feeds back to the process transfer of said browser through said system function, be used to connect and/or show preset homepage.
The device that prevents webpage tamper of the embodiment of the invention comprises:
Detecting module is used to detect the process transfer of browser, and said process transfer comprises: browser calls the system function of Query Browser home address;
Locking module; Be used for when detecting said process transfer; Tackle this process transfer, and the browser home address that will be provided with and be stored in detecting module in advance feeds back to the process of said browser through said system function, be used to connect and/or show preset homepage.
Wherein, said preset detecting module is provided with the process transfer of at least one intercept point interception browser in advance.According to technical scheme of the present invention; Through being set in advance, at least one intercept point tackles the system function of the process transfer Query Browser home address of browser; And the browser home address that will be provided with and be stored in detecting module in advance feeds back to the browser process of calling this system function,, be used to connect and/or show preset homepage; Can safe and reliablely prevent that virus or Malware to the distorting of browser homepage, having improved user experience effectively.
Description of drawings
In order to be illustrated more clearly in the technical scheme of the embodiment of the invention; The accompanying drawing of required use is done to introduce simply in will describing embodiment below; Obviously, the accompanying drawing in describing below only is some embodiments of the present invention, for those of ordinary skills; Under the prerequisite of not paying creative work, can also obtain other accompanying drawing according to these accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 is for prevent the schematic flow sheet of the method for webpage tamper according to an embodiment of the invention;
Fig. 2 is for prevent the structural representation of the device of webpage tamper according to an embodiment of the invention.
Embodiment
To combine the accompanying drawing in the embodiment of the invention below, the technical scheme in the embodiment of the invention is carried out clear, intactly description, obviously, described embodiment only is the present invention's part embodiment, rather than whole embodiment.Based on the embodiment among the present invention, those of ordinary skills are not making the every other embodiment that is obtained under the creative work prerequisite, all belong to the scope of the present invention's protection.
In order to be that method of the present invention is more convenient for understanding, the process that the application at first distorts the browser homepage to virus and Malware is done and is briefly introduced.Browser among the present invention comprises: the IE of windows (Internet Explorer) browser, 360 safe browsers, red fox browser etc.The application is that example is introduced with IE (Internet Explorer) browser of windows.
The configuration of IE (as: IE home address, level of security, cache file are deposited path etc.) is to be stored in the registration table of Windows.In program development process, virus, Malware, also have the network security software to realize revising the homepage of IE easily through the registration table of revising Windows.Usually the registration table application program interface function of using Windows (for example: RegSetValue) specify the information such as item and value of the major key of registration table, sub-key, modification.When detecting client terminal start-up IE or clicking " homepage " button of IE toolbar; The API of the process of browser (like iexplore.exe) meeting calling system removes the corresponding key assignments of browser homepage in the inquiry and registration table; Connect the Website page that the key-value pair obtain is answered then, and show this page.The Website page that jump to this moment possibly be the page after virus or Malware are distorted.
In order to reach the purpose of locking IE homepage; Stop virus or Malware distorting to the IE homepage; Make IE when starting " homepage " button of perhaps corresponding click IE toolbar, can connect and show the Website page that is provided with in advance, the application's method adopts flow process as shown in Figure 1 to realize preventing to distort webpage.
Preset detecting module comprises the data file that function library and this module operation back are set up in the present embodiment.Comprise the program code that prevents webpage tamper in the said function library, be stored in after the browser home address that is provided with is in advance encrypted in the data file of this module foundation.When browser starts, at first start detecting module.
After preset detecting module starts, the process transfer of detecting real-time browser.
Said preset detecting module is realized the interception to the process transfer query function of browser through with the position of the function that obtains browser homepage key assignments Hook Function being set at the process transfer inquiry and registration table of browser.When the process transfer system function of browser, if detect the Hook Function of this function, then at first call Hook Function, Hook Function is further calling system function again.Hook Function inside has increased the interception code, can the browser home address that system function returns be revised as the browser home address that is stored in detecting module that is provided with in advance.Detecting module can be provided with Hook Function in the position of a plurality of system functions of process transfer of browser, to reach safer, stable interception result.
The concrete technical scheme of method of a kind of IE of locking homepage of the application is described with a concrete embodiment of IE below.
When IE starts, at first want the initialization com object, play up the interface.Concrete function call process such as following Example:
Call the main window message processing function of IE;
IEWinMain;
Window main thread message processing function when calling the IE startup;
BrowserThreadProc;
Call IE and play up interface main thread message processing function,
IEFrameWndProc;
The CShellBrowser2::OnCreate function is created and is played up the interface.
Then, IE inquiry and registration table obtains the station address of IE homepage, is used to be connected to this website, and shows the corresponding website page.It is following specifically to call example:
CShellBrowser2::ReplaceCmdLine, the related command line parameter when obtaining the IE startup;
GetStdLocation further obtains start-up parameter;
URLSubRegQueryW is used to inquire about the relevant key assignments of registration table homepage that IE starts;
SHRegGetUSValueW is used to inquire about the relevant key assignments of registration table homepage that IE starts;
RegQueryValueExA is used to inquire about the relevant key assignments of registration table homepage that IE starts;
RegQueryValueExW is used to inquire about the relevant key assignments of registration table homepage that IE starts;
After executing aforesaid operations, obtain the key assignments of the homepage of IE in the HIVE structure of the process of the inquiry and registration table of IE internal memory from registration table, promptly home address is used for the home address that obtains to connect here, and shows corresponding Website page.
But; Because virus or Malware possibly revised the homepage key assignments in the HIVE structure, therefore, acquisition possibly be the home address of having been distorted; If the home address that will obtain is used for connecting here; And show that corresponding Website page, the homepage of browser display will be the Website pages that virus or Malware are provided with, and have a strong impact on user's use experience.
The position of functions such as CShellBrowser2::ReplaceCmdLine is provided with intercept point; Tackle this and call, and the IE home address that sets in advance is fed back to the process of calling this system function, as Query Result; Supply browser to be connected to the corresponding website of this home address; And show this Website page, prevent that Malware from distorting webpage thereby reach, the purpose of locking IE homepage. The position of RegQueryValueExW function is provided with IAT Hook (latent hook), realizes the interception function call, and preset IE homepage information is returned to the process of the browser that calls this system function. RegQueryValueExW function place is provided with IAT Hook, than other function calls bottom more, is difficult for being discovered by malice virus or other softwares, and stability and reliability are higher.The detecting module here is Safemon.dll.The browser home address that sets in advance is stored in the detecting module through after the encryption, can effectively prevent cracking and distorting of malice virus or software, and reliability is higher. The Hook Function of RegQueryValueExW.
But under the management of other network security softwares or management software, then other network security softwares or management software possibly revised the IE homepage that detecting module returns when calling the upper system function as if IE.Distort webpage in order to prevent Malware; Effectively lock the IE homepage; Detecting module is further tackled the system function calling process of iexplore.exe; The position of function call is provided with intercept point on the upper strata, and as in the position of calling the URLSubRegQueryW function intercept point being set, interception iexplore.exe calls the URLSubRegQueryW function. URLSubRegQueryW function setup Inline Hook (inline hook), when the URLSubRegQueryW function was called, detecting module returned to the process of calling this system function with preset IE home address, as Query Result.
All pass through the URLSubRegQueryW function call with the relevant all operations of homepage IE, and this calls than other network management softwares and more approach the upper strata, therefore can obtain good interception result. The Hook Function of URLSubRegQueryW function.
Equally, after IE started, when receiving the instruction of click " homepage " button, the process of IE (like iexplore.exe) also wanted the inquiry and registration table to obtain the IE home address.Concrete querying flow is:
IEWinMain;
The InternalCallWinProc function is created IE inner window calling routine;
The CInternetToolbar::SizableWndProc function, initialization IE toolbar related linear program;
The CIEFrameAuto::GoHome function, the instruction of " homepage " button is clicked in response;
Then, the calling system function, the inquiry and registration table obtains the station address of IE homepage, is used to be connected to this website, and shows the corresponding website page, and concrete invoked procedure is:
SDHGetPageLocation, the relevant key assignments of the registration table homepage when being used for clicking " homepage " button;
URLSubRegQueryW, the relevant key assignments of registration table homepage when being used for inquiry click " homepage " button;
The SHRegGetUSValueW function, the relevant key assignments of registration table homepage when being used for inquiry click " homepage " button;
RegQueryValueExA, the relevant key assignments of registration table homepage when being used for inquiry click " homepage " button;
The RegQueryValueExW function, the relevant key assignments of registration table homepage when being used for inquiry click " homepage " button.
RegQueryValueExW function setup IAT Hook (latent hook) realizes the interception function call, and preset IE homepage is returned to this system function calls.But under the management of other network security softwares or management software, then other network security softwares or management software possibly revised the IE homepage that detecting module returns when calling the upper system function as if IE.In order effectively to lock the IE homepage; Detecting module is further tackled the system function invoked procedure of iexplore.exe; On the upper strata intercept point is set,, tackles iexplore.exe and call the URLSubRegQueryW function as at URLSubRegQueryW function setup intercept point. URLSubRegQueryW function setup Inline Hook (inline hook), when the URLSubRegQueryW function was called, detecting module returned to this system function with preset IE homepage information and calls.
Be the implementation process that example has been explained the method for locking IE homepage just above, based on same principle, to the IE software setting intercept point of different editions with the software version of IE. RegQueryValueExW is provided with IAT Hook (latent hook), realizes the interception function call; RegQueryValueExW is provided with IAT Hook (latent hook), realizes the interception function call.When browser started, detecting module at first read the version information of IE, according to different browser versions, in the position of corresponding process transfer system function intercept point was set.
The position of CShellBrowser2::ReplaceCmdLine function is provided with intercept point; The process inquiry IE homepage of deeper interception inquiry IE homepage; Be used for when IE starts locking IE homepage, can avoid virus and Malware effectively, improved user experience the distorting of IE homepage.
Detecting module is provided with a plurality of intercept points, browser process is called the operation of the system function of inquiry IE homepage information and is tackled, and can effectively lock the homepage of IE, and security is higher.
Corresponding, the application also provides a kind of device that prevents webpage tamper, and is as shown in Figure 2, comprising: detecting module 201 and locking module 202, wherein:
Detecting module 201 is used to detect the process transfer of browser, and said process transfer comprises: browser calls the system function of Query Browser home address;
Locking module 202; Be used for when detecting said process transfer; Tackle this process transfer, and the browser home address that will be provided with and be stored in detecting module in advance feeds back to the process of said browser through said system function, be used to connect and/or show preset homepage.The process transfer of browser can be connected to the corresponding website of this home address, and show this Website page, thereby reach the browser homepage of display setting behind the Query Result that has obtained home address, prevents that malicious code from distorting the purpose of web page address.
Wherein, said detecting module is provided with at least one intercept point in advance, is used to tackle the process transfer that browser calls the inquiry home address.The present invention is provided with intercept point at the process transfer inquiry and registration table of browser with the position of the function that obtains browser homepage key assignments in advance; Tackle this process transfer, and feed back to the process transfer that calls this system function to the browser home address that is provided with in advance, as Query Result; Be used to supply browser to be connected to the corresponding website of this home address; And show this Website page, thus reach the browser homepage of display setting, prevent that malicious code from distorting the purpose of web page address.
One or more among the CShellBrowser2::ReplaceCmdLine.
The set-up mode of said at least one intercept point is a Hook Function.When the process transfer of browser was provided with the system function of hook, Hook Function moved, and just can the browser home address that be provided with in advance be turned back to the process transfer of said browser, was used for showing or connecting, thereby realized the locking main browser page.
URLSubRegQueryW function setup Inline Hook.IAT Hook is set is difficult for being discovered by malice virus or other softwares, stability and reliability are higher; The function call place is provided with intercept point on the upper strata, can tackle virus and Malware distorting the IE homepage; At the upper system function and the first floor system function setup intercept point of inquiry IE homepage information, can tackle the operation of IE process inquiry IE home address simultaneously, the more safe and reliable Malware that prevents is distorted the homepage of browser comprehensively.Said detecting module can read the version information of browser, according to different browser versions, in the position of corresponding call function intercept point is set.
The Hook Function of RegQueryValueExW function. The Hook Function of URLSubRegQueryW function.
Each embodiment in this instructions is general, and the mode of going forward one by one that adopts is described, and what each embodiment stressed all is and the difference of other embodiment that identical similar part is mutually referring to getting final product between each embodiment.
The application can describe in the general context of the computer executable instructions of being carried out by computing machine, for example program module or unit.Usually, program module or unit can comprise the routine carrying out particular task or realize particular abstract, program, object, assembly, data structure or the like.In general, program module or unit can be realized by software, hardware or both combinations.Also can in DCE, put into practice the application, in these DCEs, by through communication network connected teleprocessing equipment execute the task.In DCE, program module or unit can be arranged in this locality and the remote computer storage medium that comprises memory device.
At last; Also need to prove; In this article; Relational terms such as first and second grades only is used for an entity or operation are made a distinction with another entity or operation, and not necessarily requires or hint relation or the order that has any this reality between these entities or the operation.And; Term " comprises ", " comprising " or its any other variant are intended to contain comprising of nonexcludability; Thereby make and comprise that process, method, commodity or the equipment of a series of key elements not only comprise those key elements; But also comprise other key elements of clearly not listing, or also be included as this process, method, commodity or equipment intrinsic key element.Under the situation that do not having much more more restrictions, the key element that limits by statement " comprising ... ", and be not precluded within process, method, commodity or the equipment that comprises said key element and also have other identical element.
Used specific case herein the application's principle and embodiment are set forth, the explanation of above embodiment just is used to help to understand the application's method and main thought thereof; Simultaneously, for one of ordinary skill in the art, according to the application's thought, the part that all can change in specific embodiments and applications, in sum, this description should not be construed as the restriction to the application.
Claims (10)
1. method that prevents webpage tamper comprises:
The process transfer of preset detecting module detecting browser, said process transfer comprises: browser calls the system function of Query Browser home address;
When detecting said process transfer, tackle this process transfer, and the browser home address that will be provided with and be stored in detecting module in advance feeds back to said process transfer through said system function, be used to connect and/or show preset homepage.
2. method according to claim 1, said preset detecting module is provided with at least one intercept point in advance, is used to tackle the process transfer of browser inquiry home address.
3. method according to claim 1 and 2 is provided with intercept point in advance calling the position of inquiry and registration table with the function that obtains browser homepage key assignments; The set-up mode of said intercept point is a Hook Function.
RegQueryValueExW,
SHDOCVW!URLSubRegQueryW、
One or more among the CShellBrowser2::ReplaceCmdLine, wherein,
URLSubRegQueryW is used for inquiry and registration heading page key value;
CShellBrowser2::ReplaceCmdLine is used to obtain the command line parameter that browser starts;
Said detecting module comprises the Hook Function of said inquiry and registration table with the function that obtains browser homepage key assignments at least.
5. according to each described method among the claim 1-4, said detecting module is provided with intercept point according to different browser versions in the position of corresponding call function.
6. device that prevents webpage tamper comprises:
Detecting module is used to detect the process transfer of browser, and said process transfer comprises: browser calls the system function of Query Browser home address;
Locking module; Be used for when detecting said process transfer; Tackle this process transfer, and the browser home address that will be provided with and be stored in detecting module in advance feeds back to the process transfer of said browser through said system function, be used to connect and/or show preset homepage.
7. device according to claim 6, said preset detecting module is provided with at least one intercept point in advance, is used to tackle the process transfer of browser inquiry home address.
8. according to claim 6 or 7 described devices, intercept point is set in advance calling the position of inquiry and registration table with the function that obtains browser homepage key assignments; The set-up mode of said intercept point is a Hook Function.
RegQueryValueExW,
SHDOCVW!URLSubRegQueryW、
One or more among the CShellBrowser2::ReplaceCmdLine, wherein,
URLSubRegQueryW is used for inquiry and registration heading page key value;
CShellBrowser2::ReplaceCmdLine is used to obtain the command line parameter that browser starts;
Said detecting module comprises the Hook Function of said inquiry and registration table with the function that obtains browser homepage key assignments at least.
10. according to each described device among the claim 6-9, said detecting module is provided with intercept point according to different browser versions in the position of corresponding call function.
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| CN105574190A (en) * | 2015-12-24 | 2016-05-11 | 北京金山安全软件有限公司 | Webpage access method and device |
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| CN106203092A (en) * | 2016-06-30 | 2016-12-07 | 北京金山安全软件有限公司 | Method and device for intercepting shutdown of malicious program and electronic equipment |
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| CN105224653B (en) * | 2015-09-30 | 2019-07-05 | 北京奇虎科技有限公司 | Processing method and processing equipment when a kind of browser is held as a hostage |
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| CN106203092B (en) * | 2016-06-30 | 2019-12-10 | 珠海豹趣科技有限公司 | Method and device for intercepting shutdown of malicious program and electronic equipment |
| CN106203092A (en) * | 2016-06-30 | 2016-12-07 | 北京金山安全软件有限公司 | Method and device for intercepting shutdown of malicious program and electronic equipment |
| CN106375441A (en) * | 2016-08-31 | 2017-02-01 | 北京深思数盾科技股份有限公司 | Function extension method based on WEB browser and terminal device |
| CN111488576A (en) * | 2020-04-23 | 2020-08-04 | 成都安易迅科技有限公司 | Method and system for protecting tampering of home page, electronic equipment and storage medium |
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