CN102801819A - Method for passing through IPv6 addresses in network access control system - Google Patents
Method for passing through IPv6 addresses in network access control system Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method for passing through IPv6 addresses in a network access control system. After client RADIUS authentication is successful and before an RADIUS server sends an Access-Accept message, the RADIUS server sends an Access-Challenge message to a client, wherein the Access-Challenge message carries an EAP-Message attribute, and Expanded Types of an EAP Request message in the EAP-Message attribute carries an IPv6 address and listening port of a policy server. After the EAP Request message is sent to the client, the client resolves two extended attributes of the IPv6 address and listening Port of the policy server, and responses an EAP Response message which carries attributes of confirming to have received the IPv6 address and listening port. The method can solve a problem of passing through specified IPv6 addresses from the policy server to the client in the network access control system.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to data communication technology field, relate in particular to a kind of in network access control system the method for transparent transmission IPV6 address.
Background technology
Along with popularizing day by day with deep of network application, network security becomes very important problem day by day.(Network Access Control, NAC) application of technical scheme provides a relative whole network security solution in network insertion control.For example: the Endpoint Admission Domination (EAD) of H3C, the Network Admission Control (CNAC) of Cisco etc. is a network access control application system.In general, network access control application system is made up of authentication server, Security Policy Server, access device and client software.
After client is through authentication, need communicates by letter with Security Policy Server and accomplish the safety inspection of user terminal, to guarantee its access network system non-dangerously.Wherein communicating by letter between client and Security Policy Server generally used application layer protocol, normally initiatively initiated by client, thereby before their communication, client must get access to the IP address and the listening port of Security Policy Server.
At 802.1x and RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service; The remote customer dialing authentication system) the server cooperation is carried out in the system of authentication; The method that client is obtained the Security Policy Server address has two kinds: a kind of is the mode of the Vendor-Specific attribute expansion through radius protocol, another kind of then be the mode through RADIUS message transmission md5-challenge.Wherein:
The mode of Vendor-Specific attribute expansion; Be meant that specifically production firm's self-defined two attributes in the Vendor-Specific of RAIUDS attribute are respectively the IP address and the listening port of Security Policy Server; Said RADIUS authentication server sends to NAS (Network Access Server through the RAIUDS message; Network access server) access device; The NAS access device at first parses this two attributes, issues client through EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol, Extensible Authentication Protocol) message then.But the NAS access device of a certain manufacturer can't be resolved the self-defining privately owned attribute of other manufacturers usually, so this programme is not suitable for the common access network of forming of multivendor network equipment.
The mode of transparent transmission MD5-Challenge then is to utilize the byte that is not used in the MD5-Challenge attribute to come the IP address and the listening port of strategic server safe to carry.Particularly; The RADIUS authentication server is this MD5-Challenge attribute of transparent transmission in the EAP-Message attribute of the Access-challenge of radius protocol message; Promptly preceding 8 bytes of this attribute are taken by the random number of MD5-Challenge, and back 8 bytes are used for being set to the IP address and the listening port of Security Policy Server.The NAS access device can have no the ground of change with this attribute and send to client through the EAP message, and the IP address and the listening port of Security Policy Server have just been sent to client like this.Yet this mode only is applicable to the network environment of IPv4, is not suitable for the network environment of IPv6.Because the IPv6 address need take 16 bytes, and the MD5-Challenge attribute has only 16 bytes, except carrying MD5-challenge value content, does not have enough spaces to carry the IPv6 address again.Therefore, this scheme and inapplicable and IPv6 network environment.
Summary of the invention
In view of this, the present invention provide a kind of in network access control system the method for transparent transmission IPV6 address, can solve in network access control system, the IPv6 address of appointment is transparent to the problem of client from strategic server.
For realizing the object of the invention, implementation of the present invention is specific as follows:
The method of transparent transmission IPV6 in a kind of network access control system; Be applied to comprise in the network access control system of client, access device, strategic server and radius server; Wherein, Said radius server is after the success of client RADIUS authentication but before radius server sends the Access-Accept message; Send an Access-Challenge message to user terminal, wherein carry an EAP-Message attribute, carry the IPv6 address and the listening port of strategic server in the Expanded Types expansion type of the EAP Request message in this EAP-Message.
Compare with existing technical scheme; The present invention carries the IPv6 address and the listening port of strategic server through the Expanded Types of the EAP Request message in this EAP-Message attribute; After said EAP Request message sends to client; Client parses IPv6 address and these two extended attributes of listening port Port of strategic server, and responds an EAP Response message, and it carries the attribute that acknowledges receipt of IPv6 address and listening port.Through the present invention, can solve in network access control system, the IPv6 address of appointment is transparent to the problem of client from strategic server.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the structural representation of network access control system of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is the method flow diagram of network access control system of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is EAP Request of the present invention and Response message format sketch map.
Fig. 4 is an Expanded Types attribute format sketch map of the present invention.
Fig. 5 is the realization flow sketch map that the present invention adopts the EAP-MD5 authentication.
Embodiment
In order to realize the object of the invention; The core concept that the present invention adopts is: after the success of client RADIUS authentication but before radius server sends the Access-Accept message; Said radius server sends an Access-Challenge message to user terminal, wherein carries an EAP-Message attribute, comprises an EAP Request message in this EAP-Message attribute; Be used for asking an Expanded Types; Through in Expanded Types, carrying the IPv6 address and the listening port of strategic server, after giving client, after client parses the IPv6 address and these two extended attributes of listening port Port of strategic server through this EAP Request message of access device transparent transmission; Respond an EAP Response message, it carries the attribute that acknowledges receipt of IPv6 address and listening port.Through the present invention, can solve in network access control system, the IPv6 address of appointment is transparent to the problem of client from strategic server.
For making technical scheme of the present invention clear more and clear, explain below in conjunction with the specific embodiment of the invention.As shown in Figure 1, the method for the present invention transparent transmission IPV6 address in network access control system is applied in the network access control system that comprises client, NAS access device, strategic server and certificate server.Wherein said method is specifically as shown in Figure 2, comprises the steps:
Step 21, said radius server send an Access-Challenge message to client; Wherein carry an EAP-Message attribute, carry the IPv6 address and the listening port of strategic server in the Expanded Types expansion type of the EAP Request message in this EAP-Message attribute.
Particularly, in this step, said radius server sends an Access-Challenge message to client, is to occur in client RADIUS authentication success back but before radius server sends the Access-Accept message.
The said EAP-Message attribute that in the Access-Challenge message, carries; Specifically be meant the EAP type of message that in the Access-Challenge message, carries; According to different authentication phase of living in, entrained EAP type of message specifically comprises four kinds of EAP request, EAP response, EAP Success, EAP failure.Wherein in this step, the EAP-Message attribute that in the Access-Challenge message, carries is specially EAP request message.
Further, the Expanded Types expansion type data format in the said EAP Request message is as shown in Figure 3:
According to stipulating among the RFC3748: when the Type value is 254, be expressed as Expanded Types expansion type, Vendor-ID is a vendor id, and Vendor-Type is manufacturer's expansion type, and Vendor data is manufacturer's growth data.
For realizing the object of the invention, in the present invention, need carry out self-defined expansion to Vendor-Type and Vendor data attribute.The concrete expansion as follows:
Vendor-Type is set to type A (such as 1234), and it is defined as strategic server IPV6 address, and corresponding Vendor data is set to this IPv6 address;
Vendor-Type is set to type B (such as being 1235), and it is defined as the port that strategic server is monitored, and its corresponding Vendor data is set to this port;
Vendor-Type is set to Type C (such as 1236), is defined as expression and whether receives strategic server IPv6 address, and its corresponding Vendor data is set to the sign whether received, does not receive that such as 0 expression 1 for receiving.
Vendor-Type is set to type D (such as 1237), is defined as the port whether expression receives that strategic server is monitored, and its corresponding Vendor data is set to the sign whether received, does not receive that such as 0 expression 1 for receiving.
Said EAP Request message format is as shown in Figure 4, particularly:
, when the EAP Request message of strategic server IPV6 address is carried in the client transmission, need the Code value in this EAP Request message is made as 1 at the RADIUS authentication server, be expressed as EAP Request message; Simultaneously, Type is set to 254, is expressed as the Expanded Types in the EAP Request message; Further in the Type-Data field, insert self-defining expansion type A and corresponding Vendor data and type B and corresponding Vendor data thereof thereof in the aforementioned Expanded Types expansion type in order, and Identifier and Length attribute are inserted according to the regulation of RFC.
After step 22, client receive the Access-Challenge message of radius server transmission; The Expanded Types of the EAP Request message from said EAP-Message attribute parses the IPv6 address and the listening port Port of strategic server; And respond an EAP Response message, it receives the IPv6 address of strategic server and the attribute of listening port to carry affirmation.
After client receives the Access-Challenge message of radius server transmission; After the Expanded Types of the EAP Request message from said EAP-Message attribute parses the IPv6 address and these two extended attributes of listening port Port of strategic server; Respond an EAP Response message; It carries the attribute (ACK IPv6, ACK Port) that acknowledges receipt of IPv6 address and listening port.
Particularly, in patent of the present invention, need send in the EAP Response message to the RADIUS authentication server, need the Code value in this EAP Response message is made as 2, be expressed as EAP Response message when client; Simultaneously, Type is set to 254, promptly is expressed as Expanded Types expansion type; Further; In the Type-Data field, insert the Type C of the self-defining expansion of the present invention and corresponding Vendor data and type D and corresponding Vendor data thereof thereof in order; Identifier and Length attribute are inserted according to the regulation of RFC, and its message format is identical with aforementioned EAP Request message format shown in Figure 4.
The present invention is through carrying out self-defined expansion to the Expanded Types in EAP Request in the EAP-Message attribute and the EAP Response message; Can solve effectively in the current network access control system, the IPv6 address of appointment is transparent to the problem of client from strategic server.
Further specify implementation procedure of the present invention below in conjunction with the EAP-MD5 verification process, need to prove, the present invention adopts other like authentication mechanisms such as EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS or EAP-PEAP, can realize the present invention equally.In addition, owing in other authentication mechanisms, realize that through in Access-Challenge, carrying EAP Message attribute process of the present invention and EAP-MD5 implementation procedure are similar,, repeat no more at this for the saving length.But be not able to the scope that this comes limit the present invention design to contain.
As shown in Figure 5, realize method of the present invention through the verification process of EAP-MD5, specifically comprise the steps:
After step 51, client were initiated the EAPOL-Start request, the NAS access device was initiated the EAP-Request request, to client-requested Identity identity information.
The identity information request of step 52, client end response NAS access device is responded the EAP-Response message, and is carried Identity information.
After step 53, NAS access device receive this EAP Response message, it is encapsulated in the EAP-Message attribute of Access-Request message of RADIUS, and passes through radius server, the request authentication.
After step 54, radius server receive the client identity authentication request and authentication success from access device; Send the Access-Challenge message of RADIUS and give the NAS access device; And in this message, carry the EAP-Message attribute, the EAP Request message request MD5-Challenge of transparent transmission in this attribute.
After step 55, NAS access device receive the Access-Challenge message from radius server, parse the EAP-Request/MD5-Challenge message in the EAP-Message attribute wherein, send to client.
After step 56, client are received this EAP-Request/MD5-Challenge message request, send EAP-Response for the NAS access device and respond the MD5-Challenge attribute.
After step 57, NAS access device receive this EAP-Response/MD5-Challenge message, it is encapsulated among the EAP-Message in the RADIUS Access-Request message, passes through radius server.
After step 58, radius server were received this message, whether authentication success was perhaps failed to judge this user.
If authentication success; Before sending the Access-Accept message; Send an Access-Challenge message once more and give the NAS access device; Wherein carry an EAP-Message attribute, carry IPv6 address and listening port in the Expanded Types expansion type of the EAP Request message in this EAP-Message attribute; After the process access device parses this EAP Request message it is passed through client.
Client software is responded an EAP Response message after parsing IPv6 and these two extended attributes of Port, and it carries the Expanded Types attribute that acknowledges receipt of IPv6 address and listening port; Use this EAP Response of EAP-Message transparent transmission of RADIUS Access-Request to give server through access device, said then radius server is responded the RADIUS Access-Accept message that carries EAP-Success to access device.
Like authentification failure, then server response carries the RADIUS Access-Reject message of EAP-Failure.
Step 59, access device send to client after parsing EAP-Success or EAP-Failure message.
Compared to prior art, the present invention program increases following treatment step through behind the final judges authentication success of radius server:
Said radius server sends an Access-Challenge message to client; Wherein carry an EAP-Message attribute; And carry the IPv6 address and the listening port of strategic server in the Expanded Types expansion type of the EAP Request message in this EAP-Message attribute, and pass through client through the NAS access device;
After client parses the IPv6 address and these two extended attributes of listening port Port of the strategic server that carries in the Expanded Types expansion type of EAP Request message; Respond an EAP Response message, it carries the IPv6 address that acknowledges receipt of strategic server and the attribute of listening port.
Through the present invention, can solve in network access control system, the IPv6 address of appointment is transparent to the problem of client from strategic server, and does not change identifying procedure and the processing of authentification failure before the authentication.
The above is merely preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is in order to restriction the present invention, not all within spirit of the present invention and principle, any modification of being made, is equal to replacement, improvement etc., all should be included within the scope that the present invention protects.
Claims (6)
1. the method for transparent transmission IPV6 in the network access control system; Be applied to comprise in the network access control system of client, access device, strategic server and radius server; It is characterized in that; Said radius server sends an Access-Challenge message to client, wherein carries an EAP-Message attribute, carries the IPv6 address and the listening port of strategic server among the Expanded Types of the EAP Request message in this EAP-Message.
2. the method for claim 1 is characterized in that, said radius server sends an Access-Challenge message to client, is to occur in client RADIUS authentication success back but before radius server sends the Access-Accept message.
3. method as claimed in claim 2; It is characterized in that; Carrying the IPv6 address and the listening port of strategic server among the Expanded Types of said EAP Request message, specifically is to realize through Vendor-Type among the self-defined Expanded Types and Vendor data attribute.
4. method as claimed in claim 3 is characterized in that, the Vendor-Type of the Expanded Types of said EAP Request message and the self-defined expansion of Vendor data attribute are following:
Vendor-Type is set to type A, and it is defined as strategic server IPV6 address, and corresponding Vendor data is set to this IPv6 address;
Vendor-Type is set to type B, and it is defined as the port that strategic server is monitored, and its corresponding Vendor data is set to this port;
Vendor-Type is set to Type C, is defined as expression and whether receives strategic server IPv6 address, and its corresponding Vendor data is set to the sign whether received;
Vendor-Type is set to type D, is defined as the port whether expression receives that strategic server is monitored, and its corresponding Vendor data is set to the sign whether received.
5. method as claimed in claim 4 is characterized in that, when said RADIUS authentication server when client is sent the Access-Challenge message, in EAP Request message, the Code value is made as 1, be expressed as EAP Request message; Type is set to 254, is expressed as the Expanded Types in the EAP Request message; In the Type-Data field, insert aforementioned self-defining expansion type A and corresponding Vendor data and type B and corresponding Vendor data thereof thereof in order.
6. like the described any method of claim 1 ~ 5; It is characterized in that; Said client is behind the Access-Challenge message that receives the radius server transmission; The Expanded Types of the EAP Request message from said EAP-Message attribute parses the IPv6 address and the listening port Port of strategic server, and responds an EAP Response message, and it receives the IPv6 address of strategic server and the attribute of listening port to carry affirmation.
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| CN105141585A (en) * | 2015-07-31 | 2015-12-09 | 深信服网络科技（深圳）有限公司 | Authentication method and device |
| CN106656921A (en) * | 2015-10-30 | 2017-05-10 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method and device for obtaining address of security policy server |
| CN109302381A (en) * | 2018-08-21 | 2019-02-01 | 新华三大数据技术有限公司 | Radius attribute expansion method, device, electronic equipment and computer-readable medium |
| WO2019158964A1 (en) * | 2018-02-13 | 2019-08-22 | Pratik Sharma | Policy based function callbacks for a server |
| CN112291243A (en) * | 2020-10-29 | 2021-01-29 | 苏州浪潮智能科技有限公司 | Method, system medium and equipment for transparently transmitting data packet in routing mode |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| WO2019158964A1 (en) * | 2018-02-13 | 2019-08-22 | Pratik Sharma | Policy based function callbacks for a server |
| CN109302381A (en) * | 2018-08-21 | 2019-02-01 | 新华三大数据技术有限公司 | Radius attribute expansion method, device, electronic equipment and computer-readable medium |
| CN109302381B (en) * | 2018-08-21 | 2022-05-10 | 新华三大数据技术有限公司 | Radius attribute extension method, device, electronic equipment and computer readable medium |
| CN112291243A (en) * | 2020-10-29 | 2021-01-29 | 苏州浪潮智能科技有限公司 | Method, system medium and equipment for transparently transmitting data packet in routing mode |
| CN112291243B (en) * | 2020-10-29 | 2022-07-12 | 苏州浪潮智能科技有限公司 | Method, system medium and equipment for transparent transmission of data packet in routing mode |
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| CN102801819B (en) | 2016-04-20 |
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Address after: 310052 Binjiang District Changhe Road, Zhejiang, China, No. 466, No. Patentee after: Xinhua three Technology Co., Ltd. Address before: 310053 Hangzhou science and Technology Development Zone, Zhejiang high tech park, No. six and road, No. 310 Patentee before: Huasan Communication Technology Co., Ltd. |