CN102750478B - A kind of safety chip possessing security certificate transfer and lock-in techniques - Google Patents
A kind of safety chip possessing security certificate transfer and lock-in techniques Download PDFInfo
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- CN102750478B CN102750478B CN201210192321.7A CN201210192321A CN102750478B CN 102750478 B CN102750478 B CN 102750478B CN 201210192321 A CN201210192321 A CN 201210192321A CN 102750478 B CN102750478 B CN 102750478B
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- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 27
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 15
- 238000001629 sign test Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 25
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 10
- 238000007711 solidification Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 6
- 230000008023 solidification Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 6
- 206010027476 Metastases Diseases 0.000 abstract description 4
- 230000009401 metastasis Effects 0.000 abstract description 4
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 description 8
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 6
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 6
- 238000003860 storage Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 2
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Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of safety chip possessing security certificate transfer and lock-in techniques, described safety chip integrates a ROM memory block, solidifies safe Boot for user, a solidification chip public key in safe Boot; Safety chip also has public key storing unit in a sheet, for the factory public key of programming user; Also integrated at least one electrical fuse eFuse on safety chip, when eFuse does not blow, safe Boot uses chip public key to carry out data sign test, and in sheet, public key storing unit can be rewritten by download factory public key; After eFuse blows, safe Boot uses factory public key to carry out data sign test, and in sheet, public key storing unit can only read, and can not rewrite.The transfer that the present invention provides a kind of security control to weigh for safety chip and can not metastasis, its objective is that the safety ensureing this safety chip can be controlled completely by authorized main body, finally guarantees integrality and the authenticity of the information on safety chip.This technology has simple to operate, enforcement facility, degree of safety pole high.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to E-Payment field, information security field, field of cryptography, computer science.
Background technology
To payment Terminal Type, PCI(PaymentCardIndustry) specification DTRB4 is to firmware more new work regulation: if firmware is renewable, then cryptographic algorithm must be used to carry out certification to firmware; As the authenticity of firmware to be updated can not be confirmed, then will not upgrade and delete.Wherein firmware refers in the equipment of residing in, and provides safeguard protection to meet any code or the data of PCI requirement.In this sense, security certificate is exactly show the power of giving firmware and upgrading, or refers to the entitlement and the control that have firmware.For payment terminal, firmware also generally divides two parts: a part plays initialization terminal and guidance system software startup, is called Boot; Another part refers to the software comprising particular terminal application, and sometimes also comprising system software, is in this collectively application firmware.Application firmware must be upgraded by Boot, and Boot is generally solidification, or must also factory's ability programming.
For cryptographic algorithm, generally being recognized now spendable scheme is adopt public-key cryptosystem, uses public and private key certificate signature authentication mechanism to realize.PKI is disclosed key, only matches with private key and uses, as long as PKI is not tampered or upgrades, that authorisation body only having private key could upgrade firmware.Because private key is by authorisation body oneself keeping, relative to product itself, always suppose that it is safe.Therefore, protection product firmware is not arbitrarily upgraded by third party, guarantees firmware safety, and most important is exactly ensure that PKI is not arbitrarily distorted or upgrade.
At present, AtmelSO25 chip, sheet is not activated code Boot, after what a Boot client will first compile, sends the help programming of chip producer on chip.The control that the chip of Boot is crossed in such programming is just transferred in client's hand.The shortcoming of this scheme is: producer is necessary for each client's programming Boot, this adds increased the complicacy of producer's chip production stock and delivery.
In addition, AtmelSO101 chip, sheet adds Boot, and this Boot can be upgraded by user.User is by upgrading this Boot safe transfer in oneself hand.But once user upgrades Boot extremely, this chip will become waste paper.Therefore, the shortcoming of this scheme is: although improve the dirigibility of producing and getting ready the goods concerning chip producer, add the risk of user, will directly affect the first-pass yield of consumer products.
Further, MaximZA9L0 and ZA9L1 chip, though sheet has Boot, user needs to send producer Maxim PKI and carrys out programming on sheet.The shortcoming of the program is as AtmelSO25.
Further, MaximMAXQ1850 chip, sheet has Boot, user can pass through the application firmware that this Boot download oneself.User locks the download function of Boot by software merit rating safety lock.But this safety lock can unlock in design, the sensitive data will automatically removed on sheet during unblock.Therefore, this scheme, can ensure the safety of sensitive data on sheet, but can not ensure the safety of equipment.Because after safety unlocks, assailant (or third party) can also upgrade application firmware, namely can download a false firmware to cheat user, steal user security information.
This patent adopts brand-new thinking, provides user to upgrade the scheme of PKI, and security control power is transferred to user on hand; Locking public-key mechanism (irrecoverable) by electrical fuse again makes assailant (or third party) cannot upgrade the object of application firmware by distorting PKI to reach.
Summary of the invention
The technical problem to be solved in the present invention, is transfer for safety chip provides a kind of security control to weigh and can not metastasis (namely locking).So-called transfer refers to that security control power is transferred to chip from chip producer uses client, reaches the object of mandate; The not transferable client of referring to of what is called is after obtaining mandate, and metastasis (namely locking) control can not be held in oneself on hand by this, other side any can not obtain mandate again.The object of the invention is to ensure that the safety of this safety chip can only be controlled completely by authorized main body, it has simple to operate, enforcement facility, degree of safety pole high.
Concrete technical scheme of the present invention is: a kind of safety chip possessing security certificate transfer and lock-in techniques, it is characterized in that: described safety chip integrates a ROM memory block, safe Boot is solidified, a solidification chip public key in safe Boot for user; Safety chip also has public key storing unit in a sheet, for the factory public key of programming user; Also integrated at least one electrical fuse eFuse on safety chip, when eFuse does not blow, safe Boot uses chip public key to carry out data sign test, and in sheet, public key storing unit can be rewritten by download factory public key; After eFuse blows, safe Boot uses factory public key to carry out data sign test, and in sheet, public key storing unit can only read, and can not rewrite.
The present invention can also be specially further:
Described safety chip is integrated with two electrical fuse eFuse0 and eFuse1;
Wherein, eFuse0 is used for the selection of sign test PKI, and safe Boot uses chip public key or factory public key to carry out data sign test according to eFuse0 condition selecting; When eFuse0 does not blow, safe Boot uses chip public key to carry out data sign test; After eFuse0 blows, safe Boot uses factory public key to carry out data sign test;
Wherein, eFuse1 is used for the rewritten characteristic of public key storing unit in control strip; When eFuse1 does not blow, in this sheet, public key storing unit can be rewritten by downloading factory public key; After eFuse1 blows, in this sheet, public key storing unit can only read, and can not rewrite.
Described electrical fuse technology can adopt fuse or antifuse technology.
The present invention has following characteristics:
On the one hand, the present invention, by PKI update mechanism, transfers to another authorisation body (client) security control power from an authorisation body (chip producer).PKI upgrades and adopts certificate signature mechanism, and the main body only having existing PKI corresponding private key just can upgrade PKI; Once upgrade PKI, then corresponding signature private key is also by synchronized update.
Another side, the present invention, by PKI lock-in techniques, makes again security control weigh and cannot continue transfer, ensures that safety is controlled completely by single authorisation body.According to PKI update mechanism above, PKI, once cannot upgrade after locking, therefore, only has the main body of final updating PKI just to have final security control and weighs, become final authorisation body.
Above-mentioned PKI update mechanism, be according to Public Key Infrastructure(PKI) standard, certificate of utility signature mechanism upgrades PKI.Utilize PKI system, ensure that and only have authorisation body just can upgrade PKI; Namely authorisation body refers to the main body having private key corresponding to existing PKI.Equally, other has and relates to security related operations, and main body all must be realized by certificate signature mechanism.
Above-mentioned PKI lock-in techniques, is blow PKI more new tunnel by electrical fuse principle (eFuse), PKI cannot be upgraded further, reach locking object.Wherein, so-called electrical fuse technology can be fuse, antifuse or other similar techniques.And above-mentioned PKI locking, refers to its function once locking, can not unlock, namely can not restore after function locking.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is the functional block diagram that the present invention possesses the safety chip of security certificate transfer and lock-in techniques.
Fig. 2 is another simple implementation block diagram that the present invention possesses the safety chip of security certificate transfer and lock-in techniques.
Embodiment
Feature for the present invention and technology contents, please refer to following detailed description and accompanying drawing, and accompanying drawing only provides reference and explanation, is not used for being limited the present invention.
Please refer to shown in Fig. 1, a kind of function example block diagram possessing the safety chip of security certificate transfer and lock-in techniques of the present invention.Described safety chip integrates a ROM memory block, and user solidifies safe Boot, a solidification sign test PKI (title chip public key) in safe Boot; Safety chip also has public key storing unit in a sheet, for the sign test PKI (title factory public key) of programming user; Also integrated two electrical fuses (eFuse0, eFuse1) on safety chip.
Wherein, eFuse0 is used for the selection of sign test PKI; Safe Boot uses chip public key or factory public key to carry out data sign test according to eFuse0 condition selecting.When eFuse0 does not blow, safe Boot uses chip public key to carry out data sign test; After eFuse0 blows, safe Boot uses factory public key to carry out data sign test.
Wherein, eFuse1 is used for the rewritten characteristic of public key storing unit in control strip.When eFuse1 does not blow, this storage unit can be undertaken rewriting (namely renewable) by downloading factory public key; After eFuse1 blows, this storage unit can only read, and can not rewrite.
According to above-mentioned functional block diagram is illustrated known, in default situations, safety chip when dispatching from the factory be use chip public key carry out data sign test.Sign test private key corresponding to chip public key is provided by chip companies, open to all users (or main body); Have the main body of this private key, just can manipulate safety chip, it is more newly downloaded to carry out factory public key.
Once user have updated factory public key, and blow eFuse0, then this safety chip of follow-up manipulation just must use private key that factory public key is corresponding to carry out data sign test.Therefore, the security control power of whole chip just transfers to user on hand.The transfer of the security certificate so namely realized.
Meanwhile, illustrate also known to functional block diagram according to above-mentioned, safety chip is when dispatching from the factory, and before eFuse1 does not blow, factory public key can arbitrarily upgrade.When user has upgraded PKI, and after blowing eFuse1, other user just cannot upgrade factory public key.So just realize factory public key locking.If at this moment, user blows eFuse0, namely realizes security certificate transfer, then user blows the locking that eFuse1 also just realizes safety simultaneously.
In sum, safety chip is not before performing security certificate transfer, and acquiescence is openly authorized all main bodys; When user has upgraded factory public key, and when switching use factory public key, namely realize security certificate transfer; Before safe non-locking, security certificate transfer can be repeated.For increasing security of system, user can realize safety locking by locking PKI; Security certificate transfer just cannot be performed again after safety locking.
With reference to figure 2, be that a kind of another of safety chip possessing security certificate transfer and lock-in techniques of the present invention realizes block diagram.Which simplify the design proposal of electrical fuse, two functions are controlled together: namely when eFuse does not blow by an electrical fuse eFuse, safe Boot uses chip public key to carry out data sign test, and factory public key storage unit can be undertaken rewriting (namely renewable) by downloading factory public key; After eFuse blows, safe Boot uses factory public key to carry out data sign test, and factory public key storage unit can only read, and can not rewrite.Relative to the implementation of Fig. 1, carry out the simplification of function; And the advantage of Fig. 1 implementation is, one can be provided to allow multilevel security mandate metastasis for user.Namely user can not carry out safety locking, because after safe transfer is complete, carry out the safe transfer of next round, third party must have the private key that set by current grant user, PKI is corresponding, can think that the system before not performing safety locking has been a security system.
Claims (4)
1. possess a safety chip for security certificate transfer and lock-in techniques, it is characterized in that: described safety chip integrates a ROM memory block, solidifies safe Boot for user, a solidification chip public key in safe Boot; Safety chip also has public key storing unit in a sheet, for the factory public key of programming user; An also integrated electrical fuse eFuse on safety chip, when eFuse does not blow, safe Boot uses chip public key to carry out data sign test, and in sheet, public key storing unit can be rewritten by download factory public key; After eFuse blows, safe Boot uses factory public key to carry out data sign test, and in sheet, public key storing unit can only read, and can not rewrite.
2. the safety chip possessing security certificate transfer and lock-in techniques according to claim 1, is characterized in that: described electrical fuse technology can adopt fuse or antifuse technology.
3. possess a safety chip for security certificate transfer and lock-in techniques, it is characterized in that: described safety chip integrates a ROM memory block, solidifies safe Boot for user, a solidification chip public key in safe Boot; Safety chip also has public key storing unit in a sheet, for the factory public key of programming user; Described safety chip is integrated with two electrical fuse eFuse0 and eFuse1; Wherein, eFuse0 is used for the selection of sign test PKI, and safe Boot uses chip public key or factory public key to carry out data sign test according to eFuse0 condition selecting; When eFuse0 does not blow, safe Boot uses chip public key to carry out data sign test; After eFuse0 blows, safe Boot uses factory public key to carry out data sign test; Wherein, eFuse1 is used for the rewritten characteristic of public key storing unit in control strip; When eFuse1 does not blow, in this sheet, public key storing unit can be rewritten by downloading factory public key; After eFuse1 blows, in this sheet, public key storing unit can only read, and can not rewrite.
4. the safety chip possessing security certificate transfer and lock-in techniques according to claim 3, is characterized in that: described electrical fuse technology can adopt fuse or antifuse technology.
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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| CN201210192321.7A CN102750478B (en) | 2012-06-12 | 2012-06-12 | A kind of safety chip possessing security certificate transfer and lock-in techniques |
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| CN201210192321.7A CN102750478B (en) | 2012-06-12 | 2012-06-12 | A kind of safety chip possessing security certificate transfer and lock-in techniques |
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| CN102750478A CN102750478A (en) | 2012-10-24 |
| CN102750478B true CN102750478B (en) | 2016-03-30 |
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| CN103544413B (en) * | 2013-10-31 | 2017-02-15 | 宇龙计算机通信科技(深圳)有限公司 | Method and device for verifying software copyright in intelligent terminal |
| TWI678658B (en) * | 2017-05-23 | 2019-12-01 | 慧榮科技股份有限公司 | Method for updating firmware of data storage device |
| TWI700627B (en) | 2017-05-23 | 2020-08-01 | 慧榮科技股份有限公司 | Data storage device and data storage method for confirming firmware data |
Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101322349A (en) * | 2005-12-12 | 2008-12-10 | 高通股份有限公司 | Certify and split system and method for replacing cryptographic keys |
| CN101950332A (en) * | 2010-07-12 | 2011-01-19 | 大唐微电子技术有限公司 | Chip protecting method and system |
| CN102088348A (en) * | 2010-12-22 | 2011-06-08 | 东南大学 | Mobile phone security chip for embedded platform and protection system comprising same |
Family Cites Families (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| NO321850B1 (en) * | 2004-06-25 | 2006-07-10 | Buypass As | Procedure for generating and verifying an electronic signature |
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Patent Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101322349A (en) * | 2005-12-12 | 2008-12-10 | 高通股份有限公司 | Certify and split system and method for replacing cryptographic keys |
| CN101950332A (en) * | 2010-07-12 | 2011-01-19 | 大唐微电子技术有限公司 | Chip protecting method and system |
| CN102088348A (en) * | 2010-12-22 | 2011-06-08 | 东南大学 | Mobile phone security chip for embedded platform and protection system comprising same |
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Effective date of registration: 20210326 Address after: 350001 20 / F, building 8, area F, Fuzhou Software Park, 89 software Avenue, Gulou District, Fuzhou City, Fujian Province Patentee after: Fujian anfan Electronic Technology Co.,Ltd. Address before: Room 307, building 20, area a, Fuzhou Software Park, 89 software Avenue, Gulou District, Fuzhou City, Fujian Province 350003 Patentee before: FUJIAN WITSI MICRO-ELECTRONICS Co.,Ltd. |
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Effective date of registration: 20240726 Address after: Building 8, Block F, Fuzhou Software Park, No. 89 Software Avenue, Gulou District, Fuzhou City, Fujian Province, China 350000 Patentee after: Fujian Fayi Technology Co.,Ltd. Country or region after: China Address before: 350001 20 / F, building 8, area F, Fuzhou Software Park, 89 software Avenue, Gulou District, Fuzhou City, Fujian Province Patentee before: Fujian anfan Electronic Technology Co.,Ltd. Country or region before: China |