CN102722598A - Incompatible failure safety analysis system and method for air plane motor - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention discloses an incompatible failure safety analysis system and method for an airplane motor, and belongs to the technical field of special risk analysis and evaluation of an airplane. The incompatible failure safety analysis system of the airplane motor comprises a demand information processing module, a parameter setting module, and an analog simulation and result output module. The incompatible failure safety analysis method for the airplane motor comprises the following steps: determining position parameters and size parameters of fragments of an airplane motor rotor relative to a digital mock-up of the airplane; detecting airplane models which have a possibility of having failures caused by the fragments of the airplane motor rotor with a region division and hierarchical bounding bolumes within a failure fragment reachable region, and distinguishing Catastrophic function risks and rationally providing analysis results of the incompatible failure safety of the rotors by carrying out the Boolean operation on a simulation result matrix and minimum cut sets. The incompatible failure safety analysis system and method disclosed by the invention can rapidly and accurately distinguish the potential risks of the incompatible failures of the rotor in an airplane design section, and provides the technical support for the safety design and the configuration design of an airplane system.

Description

Non-inclusive fail safe property analytic system of aircraft engine and method

Technical field

The invention discloses non-inclusive fail safe property analytic system of aircraft engine and method, belong to the aircraft abnormal risk and analyze and the technical field of assessing.

Background technology

In high engine speeds when running,, the fragment that comes off from rotor can not break away from and penetrate engine crankcase by containing and with engine rotor failure state is the non-inclusive inefficacy of engine rotor.The non-inclusive inefficacy of rotor is to threaten one of typical abnormal risk of aircraft utilization safety.The non-inclusive fragment of rotor may penetrate airframe, wing, fuel tank, and destroys the pipeline, circuit etc. of aircraft, causes cabin decompression, fuel leakage, system unit to lose efficacy and controls consequences such as malfunctioning, causes the generation of catastrophic failure most probably.Therefore, particularly important to the analysis of the non-inclusive fail safe property of aircraft engine rotor.External each aviation big country pays much attention to the problem that the non-inclusive fragment of engine rotor lost efficacy; Just carried out the research work of association area from the sixties in last century, its research field that relates to mainly comprises following aspect: non-inclusive fault statistics of engine and non-inclusive Research on Failure Model, the research of advanced material fuselage guard technology etc. comprehensively.

Domestic research in this area started late; Up to the present only the non-inclusive accident of engine was done some statistical works; Do not form the effective analytical approach of a cover as yet for safety analysis and assessment aspect, more not can be used for the means and the instrument of non-inclusive fail safe property analysis of rotor and assessment.The non-inclusive fail safe property analysis of state's internal rotor, assessment still rest on the empirical estimating aspect;, for the integrated and complication system in the such highland of aircraft, the combination in the time of can causing a plurality of systems of omission to lose efficacy simultaneously is dangerous; Simultaneously because the difficulty and the workload of its analysis and evaluation are very big; Cause analyzing low with assess effectiveness, cost is high, the cycle is long, in actual type of project, can't implement, and does not have engineering practicability.

Summary of the invention

Technical matters to be solved by this invention is to the deficiency of above-mentioned background technology, and non-inclusive fail safe property analytic system of aircraft engine and analytical approach are provided.

The present invention adopts following technical scheme for realizing the foregoing invention purpose:

The non-inclusive fail safe property analytic system of aircraft engine comprises: demand information processing module, parameter setting module, analog simulation and output module as a result, demand information processing module, parameter setting module, analog simulation and output module is all mutual with database as a result;

Said demand information processing module is used to import aircraft digital prototype model, calamitous function hazard analysis data, fault tree analysis data, sets up the mapping relations from calamitous function hazard analysis data to the mapping relations of fault tree analysis data, from the fault tree analysis data to aircraft digital prototype model;

Said parameter setting module is used for confirming parameter, failure risk factor parameter, the simulation accuracy value of rotor in the non-inclusive inefficacy fragment of location parameter, dimensional parameters, the rotor range coverage scope of aircraft digital prototype; Wherein: said failure risk factor parameter is to cause the dangerous minimal cut set of the calamitous function of aircraft to be triggered and the parameter introduced under the situation of catastrophic failure does not take place aircraft; The span of failure risk factor parameter is [0,1];

Said analog simulation and as a result output module be used to carry out the collision detection of rotor and aircraft digital prototype model, the result of output collision detection, and the non-inclusive inefficacy of quantitative test rotor causes the probability of aircraft generation catastrophic hazard.

The non-inclusive fail safe property analytical approach of aircraft engine comprises the steps:

Step 1; The demand information processing module imports aircraft digital prototype model, calamitous function hazard analysis data, fault tree analysis data, sets up the mapping relations from calamitous function hazard analysis data to the mapping relations of fault tree analysis data, from the fault tree analysis data to aircraft digital prototype model;

Step 2 is confirmed parameter, simulation accuracy value and the failure risk factor parameter of location parameter, dimensional parameters, the rotor non-inclusive inefficacy fragment range coverage scope of rotor in aircraft digital prototype model at parameter setting module;

Step 3, analog simulation and as a result output module carry out the non-inclusive fail safe property analysis of rotor, practical implementation is following:

Steps A in the non-inclusive inefficacy fragment of rotor range coverage scope, is carried out the trigger position that the space geometry conversion obtains the rotor fragment to the rotor fragment;

Step B carries out area of space to the non-inclusive property of rotor inefficacy fragment range coverage and divides, and surrounds aircraft digital prototype device model, rotor fragment model with bounding box;

Step C carries out collision detection with rotor fragment model bounding box one by one with aircraft digital prototype device model bounding box, finds out the aircraft digital prototype device model bounding box that all and rotor fragment model bounding box intersect;

Step D is for the aircraft digital prototype device model bounding box that intersects with rotor fragment model bounding box: the collision detection of doing aircraft digital prototype device model tri patch and rotor fragment model tri patch;

Step 4; Fault tree analysis data according to step 1 is set up confirm that to the mapping relations of aircraft digital prototype device model the non-inclusive inefficacy fragment of rotor scans inefficacy aircraft digital prototype device model under the path; Simulation result to step 3 carries out Boolean calculation; The non-inclusive inefficacy of quantitative test rotor causes the probability of airplane complete machine fault, and practical implementation is following:

Step 4-1 confirms that the value of each element in the collision matrix of consequence, the value of said collision matrix of consequence element are to represent that aircraft digital prototype equipment was hit by the rotor fragment and lost efficacy at 1 o'clock; The value of said collision matrix of consequence element is to represent that aircraft digital prototype equipment was not hit by the rotor fragment at 0 o'clock;

Step 4-2 carries out Boolean calculation with the minimal cut set rectangular array vector and the collision detection matrix of consequence column vector that obtain in the fault tree analysis data by row;

When minimal cut set rectangular array vector is the subclass of collision simulation matrix of consequence column vector, judge that this time collision has triggered minimal cut set, statistics minimal cut set triggering times;

Step 4-3, the quantitative Analysis airplane complete machine causes the probability of aircraft catastrophic hazard because of the non-inclusive inefficacy of rotor, and practical implementation is following:

Step a according to the definite number that triggers minimal cut set under the different catastrophic hazards of step 4-2 statistics minimal cut set triggering times, tries to achieve the catastrophic hazard probability of aircraft digital prototype when the non-inclusive inefficacy of single-stage rotor;

Step b considers the progression of aircraft engine number, every engine rotor, and the catastrophic hazard probability that the single-stage rotors at different levels that superpose are non-inclusive when losing efficacy is tried to achieve airplane complete machine causes the aircraft catastrophic hazard because of the non-inclusive inefficacy of engine rotor probability;

Step c, the degree of accuracy of check emulation: when the airplane complete machine of being tried to achieve as step b causes the probability of aircraft catastrophic hazard to meet the simulation accuracy value that step 2 is provided with because of the non-inclusive inefficacy of rotor, finish the non-inclusive fail safe property analysis of rotor; Otherwise, return step 3.

In the non-inclusive fail safe property analytical approach of said aircraft engine, step D practical implementation is following:

Step D-1; The tri patch of aircraft digital prototype device model, the tri patch of high-energy rotator fragment model are done Hiberarchy Decomposition respectively, the level investing mechanism tree of structure aircraft digital prototype device model and the level investing mechanism tree of high-energy rotator fragment model:

If the root node of high-energy rotator fragment model, aircraft digital prototype device model level investing mechanism tree intersects, get into step D-2; Otherwise, do the collision detection of next aircraft digital prototype device model tri patch and high-energy rotator fragment model tri patch;

Step D-2; Method recurrence according to depth-first travels through the level investing mechanism tree of aircraft digital prototype device model and the level investing mechanism tree of high-energy rotator fragment model; Confirm and the crossing aircraft digital prototype device model level investing mechanism leaf nodes of high-energy rotator fragment model hierarchy investing mechanism tree root node, get into step D-3;

Step D-3; Aircraft digital prototype device model level investing mechanism leaf nodes and high-energy rotator fragment model hierarchy investing mechanism leaf nodes are done the crossing test of tri patch; Only when said tri patch intersects; Judge that said aircraft digital prototype device model is penetrated by the high-energy rotator fragment, the aircraft digital prototype device name that will be penetrated is saved to database.

The technical scheme that the present invention adopts; Have following beneficial effect: the present invention realized in the quick potential danger of the non-inclusive inefficacy of accurate identification rotor of airplane design stage, can technical support and method means be provided for aircraft system safety Design and configured.

Description of drawings

Fig. 1 is the synoptic diagram of the non-inclusive fail safe property analytic system of aircraft engine.

Fig. 2 sets up the synoptic diagram of mapping relations between calamitous function hazard analysis data, fault tree analysis data, the aircraft digital prototype model for the demand information processing module.

Fig. 3 for when rotor center not when the aircraft digital prototype belongs to the initial point of coordinate system, the rotor fragment is made the synoptic diagram of space geometry conversion.

Fig. 4 intersects the synoptic diagram of test for the model bounding box.

Fig. 5 is for making the synoptic diagram of Hiberarchy Decomposition to aircraft digital prototype device model triangular plate.

Embodiment

Be elaborated below in conjunction with the technical scheme of accompanying drawing to invention:

The non-inclusive fail safe property analytic system of aircraft engine as shown in Figure 1; Comprise demand information processing module, parameter setting module, analog simulation and output module as a result, demand information processing module, parameter setting module, analog simulation and output module is all mutual with database as a result.

The demand information processing module is used to import aircraft digital prototype model, calamitous function hazard analysis data, fault tree analysis data.As shown in Figure 2, set up mapping relations g from calamitous function hazard analysis (FHA) data to the mapping relationship f of fault tree analysis (FTA) data, from the fault tree analysis data to aircraft digital prototype device model.Catastrophic hazard set A in the danger of aircraft function comprises a ₁, a ₂Dangerous etc. function.Bottom event set B in the fault tree analysis comprises b ₁, b ₂Deng bottom event.The device model set C of aircraft digital prototype comprises c ₁, c ₂Deng device model.A and B follow mapping relationship f, and B and C follow mapping relations g.

Parameter setting module is used for confirming location parameter, the dimensional parameters (radius, thickness, length of blade, rotor fragment scan path) of rotor at aircraft digital prototype model, the non-inclusive inefficacy fragment of rotor range coverage range parameter and simulation accuracy.The situation that catastrophic failure does not take place aircraft can appear when causing the dangerous minimal cut set of the calamitous function of aircraft to be triggered; Can not consider the polymorphism of incident when remedying fault tree analysis; Introduce risks and assumptions; The span of risks and assumptions is [0,1], calamitous function danger at each mission phase of aircraft to a risks and assumptions should be arranged.

Analog simulation and as a result output module in the non-inclusive inefficacy fragment of rotor range coverage scope; Accomplish the total space and scan through rotor fragment and path thereof being done the space geometry conversion; And carry out the collision detection between rotor fragment and aircraft digital prototype device model in each space angle position; Do Boolean calculation through column vector with the column vector of the dangerous corresponding minimal cut set of the calamitous function of aircraft then, accomplish the quantitative test of the non-inclusive fail safe property of rotor with the collision detection matrix of consequence.

The non-inclusive fail safe property analytical approach of aircraft engine comprises the steps:

Step 1; The demand information processing module imports aircraft digital prototype model, calamitous function hazard analysis data, fault tree analysis data, sets up the mapping relations g from calamitous function hazard analysis data to the mapping relationship f of fault tree analysis data, from the fault tree analysis data to aircraft digital prototype device model.

Step 2 is set area of space parameter, simulation accuracy value and the risk factor parameter that the non-inclusive inefficacy fragment of location parameter, dimensional parameters, the rotor of rotor in aircraft digital prototype model can reach at parameter setting module.

Step 3, analog simulation and as a result output module carry out the non-inclusive fail safe property analysis of rotor, specifically comprise the steps:

Steps A in the non-inclusive property of rotor inefficacy fragment range coverage scope, is carried out the trigger position that the space geometry conversion obtains the rotor fragment to the rotor fragment.

If rotor center is positioned at the initial point of aircraft digital prototype global coordinate, then fragment around the transformation matrix that x, y, z axle turn over angle θ (θ is the angle described in the random vector, corresponding angle of dispersion and translation angle) is:

Fragment around the matrix of x axle rotation is:

$R_x\left(\mathrm{\θ}\right)=\left[\begin{array}{cccc}1& 0& 0& 0\\ 0& \cos \mathrm{\θ}& \sin \mathrm{\θ}& 0\\ 0& -\sin \mathrm{\θ}& \cos \mathrm{\θ}& 0\\ 0& 0& 0& 1\end{array}\right]$

Fragment around the matrix of y axle rotation is:

$R_y=\left(\mathrm{\θ}\right)=\left[\begin{array}{cccc}\cos \mathrm{\θ}& 0& -\sin \mathrm{\θ}& 0\\ 0& 1& 0& 0\\ \sin \mathrm{\θ}& 0& \cos \mathrm{\θ}& 0\\ 0& 0& 0& 1\end{array}\right]$

Fragment around the matrix of z axle rotation is:

$R_z\left(\mathrm{\θ}\right)=\left[\begin{array}{cccc}\cos \mathrm{\θ}& \sin \mathrm{\θ}& 0& 0\\ -\sin \mathrm{\θ}& \cos \mathrm{\θ}& 0& 0\\ 0& 0& 1& 0\\ 0& 0& 0& 1\end{array}\right]$

If rotor center is not at the initial point of digital prototype global coordinate, as shown in Figure 3, need make translation and multiple conversions this moment to fragment.If the rotor center at certain fragment place is put P at engine shaft ₁P ₂Line on P _mThe position, around this anglec of rotation θ, must do like down conversion:

R(θ)＝T(-x _m，-y _m-z _m)·R _x(α)·R _y(β)·R _z(θ)·R _y(-β)·R _x(-α)·T(x _m，y _m，z _m)(12)

In the formula: T (x _m,-y _m,-z _m), T (x _m, y _m, z _m) make P _mOverlap R with the global coordinate system initial point _x(α), R _x(-α) makes P ₁P ₂Straight line falls in the xOz of plane, R _y(β), R _y(-β) makes P ₁P ₂Straight line overlaps R with the z axle _z(θ) make fragment around P ₁P ₂Straight line anglec of rotation θ.

Step B carries out area of space to the non-inclusive property of rotor inefficacy fragment range coverage and divides, and surrounds aircraft digital prototype device model, rotor fragment model with bounding box.

Area dividing is that the Virtual Space is decomposed, only to doing the collision detection between rotor fragment model and aircraft digital prototype device model in the rotor fragment range coverage scope.

Bounding volume hierarchy (BVH) is bigger with volume and the bounding box of simple shape wraps up complicated geometric object, carries out the crossing test between the bounding box earlier.Collision detection in the non-inclusive fail safe property analytic system of aircraft engine has been selected axle alignment (AABB) bounding box for use.As shown in Figure 4, establish X ₁, X ₂Be respectively rotor fragment model and the AABB bounding box of the airplane equipment model that possibly lose efficacy, O _1iAnd O _2iBe respectively X ₁, X ₂The center, P _1iAnd P _2iBe respectively an O _1iAnd O _2iCorresponding point on axle.

Judge X ₁, X ₂The program that whether intersects is:

Step C carries out collision detection with the bounding box of rotor fragment model one by one with the bounding box of aircraft digital prototype device model, finds out the aircraft digital prototype device model that the bounding box of all and rotor fragment model intersects.

Step D is for the aircraft digital prototype device model bounding box that intersects with the bounding box of rotor fragment model: do the collision detection of aircraft digital prototype device model tri patch and rotor fragment model tri patch, specifically comprise the steps:

Step D-1 does Hiberarchy Decomposition respectively to the tri patch of aircraft digital prototype device model, the tri patch of rotor fragment model, the level investing mechanism tree of structure aircraft digital prototype device model and the level investing mechanism tree of rotor fragment model:

If the root node of rotor fragment model and aircraft digital prototype device model level investing mechanism tree intersects, get into step D-2; Otherwise, do the collision detection of next aircraft digital prototype device model tri patch and rotor fragment model tri patch.The synoptic diagram of the tri patch of aircraft digital prototype device model being done Hiberarchy Decomposition is as shown in Figure 5.

Step D-2; Method recurrence according to depth-first travels through the level investing mechanism tree of aircraft digital prototype device model and the level investing mechanism tree of rotor fragment model; Confirm and the crossing aircraft digital prototype device model level investing mechanism leaf nodes of rotor fragment model hierarchy investing mechanism tree root node, get into step D-3.

Step D-3; Aircraft digital prototype device model level investing mechanism leaf nodes and rotor fragment model hierarchy investing mechanism leaf nodes are done the crossing test of tri patch; Only when said tri patch intersects; Judge that said aircraft digital prototype device model is penetrated by the rotor fragment, the aircraft digital prototype device name that will be penetrated is saved to database.

Step 4; Fault tree analysis data according to step 1 is set up confirm that to the mapping relations of aircraft digital prototype device model the non-inclusive inefficacy fragment of rotor scans the aircraft digital prototype device model that lost efficacy under the path; The simulation result that step 3 is obtained carries out Boolean calculation; The non-inclusive inefficacy of quantitative test rotor causes the probability of airplane complete machine fault, and practical implementation is following:

Step 4-1 confirms emulation collision matrix of consequence by the simulation result that step 3 obtains

$\mathrm{\&Theta;}=\begin{array}{cc}\begin{array}{ccccc}{\mathrm{<figure-callout\; id="1"\; label="t"\; filenames="DEST\_PATH\_HDA00001938087100012.png"\; state="\{\{state\}\}">t</figure-callout>}}_1& ...& t_j& ...& t_n\end{array}& \\ \left[\begin{array}{ccccc}{\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{11}& ...& {\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{1j}& ...& {\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{1n}\\ .& & .& & .\\ .& & .& & .\\ .& & .& & .\\ {\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{i1}& ...& {\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{\mathrm{ij}}& ...& {\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{\mathrm{in}}\\ .& & .& & .\\ .& & .& & .\\ .& & .& & .\\ {\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{\mathrm{<figure-callout\; id="1"\; label="k"\; filenames="DEST\_PATH\_HDA00001938087100012.png"\; state="\{\{state\}\}">k</figure-callout>}1}& ...& {\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{\mathrm{kj}}& ...& {\mathrm{\&gamma;}}_{\mathrm{kn}}\end{array}\right]& \begin{array}{c}{\mathrm{<figure-callout\; id="1"\; label="c"\; filenames="DEST\_PATH\_HDA00001938087100012.png"\; state="\{\{state\}\}">c</figure-callout>}}_1\\ .\\ .\\ .\\ c_i\\ .\\ .\\ .\\ c_k\end{array}\end{array}$ Middle γ _IjValue,

Wherein, i=1,2 ..., k, k represent the number of aircraft digital prototype equipment, c _lC _i..., c _kBe the label of aircraft digital prototype equipment, j=1,2 ..., n, n represent the number of times of emulation, t _l... T _j..., t _nBe the label of analog simulation test, γ _IjValue is to be illustrated in t at 1 o'clock _jC in the inferior emulation _iEquipment is hit by the rotor fragment and lost efficacy; γ _IjValue is to be illustrated in t at 0 o'clock _iC in the inferior emulation _iEquipment is not hit by the rotor fragment;

Step 4-2 goes out each corresponding minimal cut set matrix of each catastrophic hazard incident from the fault tree analysis extracting data $C_l^{\&prime;}=\begin{array}{cc}\begin{array}{ccccc}{\mathrm{\&psi;}}_{\mathrm{<figure-callout\; id="1"\; label="p"\; filenames="DEST\_PATH\_HDA00001938087100012.png"\; state="\{\{state\}\}">p</figure-callout>}1}& ...& {\mathrm{\&psi;}}_{\mathrm{pq}}& ...& {\mathrm{\&psi;}}_{\mathrm{pm}}\end{array}& \\ \left[\begin{array}{ccccc}{\mathrm{\&tau;}}_{11}& ...& {\mathrm{\&tau;}}_{1q}& ...& {\mathrm{\&tau;}}_{1m}\\ ...& & ...& & ...\\ {\mathrm{\&tau;}}_{\mathrm{<figure-callout\; id="1"\; label="p"\; filenames="DEST\_PATH\_HDA00001938087100012.png"\; state="\{\{state\}\}">p</figure-callout>}1}& ...& {\mathrm{\&tau;}}_{\mathrm{pq}}& ...& {\mathrm{\&tau;}}_{\mathrm{pm}}\\ ...& & ...& & ...\\ {\mathrm{\&tau;}}_{\mathrm{<figure-callout\; id="1"\; label="k"\; filenames="DEST\_PATH\_HDA00001938087100012.png"\; state="\{\{state\}\}">k</figure-callout>}1}& ...& {\mathrm{\&tau;}}_{\mathrm{kq}}& ...& {\mathrm{\&tau;}}_{\mathrm{km}}\end{array}\right]& \begin{array}{c}{c}_1\\ \\ c_i\\ \\ c_k\end{array}\end{array},$ Q=1,2 ..., m, m represent the minimal cut set number that fault tree comprises, p representes the dangerous number of calamitous function, (m, p value are all definite in demand information);

With simulation result matrix column vector t _jWith each minimal cut set rectangular array vector ψ _PqCarry out Boolean calculation t by row _j^ ψ _Pq, wherein, t _j=[γ _1jγ _Ijγ _Kj], ψ _Pq=[τ _1qτ _Pqτ _Kq].Work as t _j^ ψ _Pq=ψ _PqThe time, expression t _jEmulation has triggered minimal cut set, can cause the aircraft catastrophic hazard to take place, and statistical simulation triggers the number of times of minimal cut set.The triggering minimal cut set number of times of statistics comprises in the emulation number of minimal cut set when triggering same catastrophic hazard, also comprises the number d of minimal cut set when triggering different catastrophic hazard in the emulation.

Step 4-3, quantitative Analysis airplane complete machine cause the probability of aircraft catastrophic hazard because of the inefficacy of the non-inclusive property of rotor:

Step a, the dangerous number of times d that triggers minimal cut set of different calamitous functions in the statistical simulation according to step 4-2, utilize formula (1) to calculate the catastrophic hazard probability that the inefficacy of the non-inclusive property of single-stage rotor causes:

$p=\left\{\begin{array}{cc}0& (d=0)\\ \underset{s=1}{\overset{u}{\mathrm{\&Sigma;}}}{\mathrm{\&lambda;}}_s[1-\underset{w=1}{\overset{d}{\mathrm{\&Pi;}}}(1-{\mathrm{\&mu;}}_{\mathrm{ws}})]& (d>0)\end{array}\right.$

Wherein, d is the number of minimal cut set when triggering different catastrophic hazard in the emulation, the aircraft flight phases number of u for dividing, λ _sBe the probability (obtaining) of the non-inclusive inefficacy of s mission phase generation rotor through actual count result or engineering experience, μ _WsBe the failure risk factor that the inefficacy of s the non-inclusive property of mission phase generation rotor causes the aircraft catastrophic event to take place, μ _WsValue be [0,1].

Step b; Cause the probability of aircraft catastrophic hazard can further try to achieve probability

that airplane complete machine causes the aircraft catastrophic hazard because of the non-inclusive inefficacy of rotor wherein through the non-inclusive inefficacy of single-stage rotor; E is the engine bed number; R is the rotor progression of every engine, and n is a simulation times.

Step c, check emulation is accurate: when the airplane complete machine of being tried to achieve as step b causes the probability of aircraft catastrophic hazard to meet the simulation accuracy that step 2 is provided with because of the non-inclusive inefficacy of rotor, finish the non-inclusive fail safe property analysis of rotor; Otherwise, return step 3.

In sum; The present invention is through setting up the non-inclusive fail safe property analytic system of aircraft engine; In engine rotor inefficacy fragment range coverage scope; Employing causes the airplane equipment that lost efficacy based on area dividing and bounding volume hierarchy (BVH) method detection of engine rotor fragment, through to the Boolean calculation of simulation result matrix with the dangerous corresponding minimal cut set matrix of calamitous function, quantitatively provides the analysis result of the non-inclusive fail safe property of rotor.When the inefficacy of the non-inclusive property of the rotor that quantitative Analysis obtains causes the probability of airplane complete machine bust not meet the simulation accuracy value; Start simulation flow once more and meet accuracy requirement until the probability of malfunction that calculates; The emulation of this reaction type has further improved the accuracy of the non-inclusive inefficacy potential danger of identification rotor, can technical support and method means be provided for aircraft system safety Design and configured.

Claims (3)

1. the non-inclusive fail safe property analytic system of aircraft engine; It is characterized in that comprising: demand information processing module, parameter setting module, analog simulation and output module as a result, demand information processing module, parameter setting module, analog simulation and output module is all mutual with database as a result;

Said demand information processing module is used to import aircraft digital prototype model, calamitous function hazard analysis data, fault tree analysis data, sets up the mapping relations from calamitous function hazard analysis data to the mapping relations of fault tree analysis data, from the fault tree analysis data to aircraft digital prototype model;

Said parameter setting module is used for confirming parameter, failure risk factor parameter, the simulation accuracy value of engine rotor in the non-inclusive inefficacy fragment of location parameter, dimensional parameters, the rotor range coverage scope of aircraft digital prototype; Wherein: said failure risk factor parameter is to cause the dangerous minimal cut set of the calamitous function of aircraft to be triggered and the parameter introduced under the situation of catastrophic failure does not take place aircraft; The span of failure risk factor parameter is [0,1];

Said analog simulation and as a result output module be used to carry out the collision detection of engine rotor fragment and aircraft digital prototype device model; The result of output collision detection, and the non-inclusive inefficacy of quantitative test engine rotor causes the probability of aircraft generation catastrophic hazard.

2. the non-inclusive fail safe property analytical approach of aircraft engine is characterized in that comprising the steps:

Step 1; The demand information processing module imports aircraft digital prototype model, calamitous function hazard analysis data, fault tree analysis data, sets up the mapping relations from calamitous function hazard analysis data to the mapping relations of fault tree analysis data, from the fault tree analysis data to aircraft digital prototype model;

Step 2 is confirmed parameter, simulation accuracy value and the failure risk factor parameter of location parameter, dimensional parameters, the rotor non-inclusive inefficacy fragment range coverage scope of engine rotor in aircraft digital prototype model at parameter setting module;

Step 3, analog simulation and as a result output module carry out the non-inclusive fail safe property analysis of rotor, practical implementation is following:

Steps A in the non-inclusive inefficacy fragment of engine rotor range coverage scope, is carried out the trigger position that the space geometry conversion obtains the rotor fragment to the rotor fragment;

Step B carries out area of space to the non-inclusive property of rotor inefficacy fragment range coverage and divides, with surrounding

Box surrounds aircraft digital prototype device model, rotor fragment model;

Step C carries out collision detection with engine rotor fragment model bounding box one by one with aircraft digital prototype device model bounding box, finds out the aircraft digital prototype device model bounding box that all and rotor fragment model bounding box intersect;

Step D is for the aircraft digital prototype device model bounding box that intersects with rotor fragment model bounding box: the collision detection of doing aircraft digital prototype device model tri patch and rotor fragment model tri patch;

Step 4; Fault tree analysis data according to step 1 is set up confirm that to the mapping relations of aircraft digital prototype device model the non-inclusive inefficacy fragment of rotor scans inefficacy aircraft digital prototype device model under the path; Simulation result to step 3 carries out Boolean calculation; The non-inclusive inefficacy of quantitative test rotor causes the probability of airplane complete machine fault, and practical implementation is following:

Step 4-1 confirms that the value of each element in the collision matrix of consequence, the value of said collision matrix of consequence element are to represent that aircraft digital prototype equipment was hit by the rotor fragment and lost efficacy at 1 o'clock; The value of said collision matrix of consequence element is to represent that aircraft digital prototype equipment was not hit by the rotor fragment at 0 o'clock;

Step 4-2 carries out Boolean calculation with the minimal cut set rectangular array vector and the collision detection matrix of consequence column vector that obtain in the fault tree analysis data by row;

When minimal cut set rectangular array vector is the subclass of collision detection matrix of consequence column vector, judge that this time collision has triggered minimal cut set, statistics minimal cut set triggering times;

Step 4-3, the quantitative Analysis airplane complete machine causes the probability of aircraft catastrophic hazard because of the non-inclusive inefficacy of engine rotor, and practical implementation is following:

Step a, the number of minimal cut set when confirming to trigger different catastrophic hazard in the emulation according to step 4-2 statistics minimal cut set triggering times is tried to achieve the catastrophic hazard probability of aircraft digital prototype when the non-inclusive inefficacy of single-stage rotor;

Step b considers the progression of aircraft engine number, every engine rotor, and the catastrophic hazard probability that the single-stage rotors at different levels that superpose are non-inclusive when losing efficacy is tried to achieve airplane complete machine causes the aircraft catastrophic hazard because of the non-inclusive inefficacy of engine rotor probability;

Step c, the degree of accuracy of check emulation: when the airplane complete machine of being tried to achieve as step b causes the probability of aircraft catastrophic hazard to meet the simulation accuracy value that step 2 is provided with because of the non-inclusive inefficacy of rotor, finish the non-inclusive fail safe property analysis of rotor; Otherwise, return step 3.

3. the non-inclusive fail safe property analytical approach of aircraft engine according to claim 2 is characterized in that said step D practical implementation is following:

Step D-1; The tri patch of aircraft digital prototype device model, the tri patch of high-energy rotator fragment model are done Hiberarchy Decomposition respectively, the level investing mechanism tree of structure aircraft digital prototype device model and the level investing mechanism tree of high-energy rotator fragment model:

If the root node of high-energy rotator fragment model, aircraft digital prototype device model level investing mechanism tree intersects, get into step D-2; Otherwise, do the collision detection of next aircraft digital prototype device model tri patch and high-energy rotator fragment model tri patch;

Step D-2; Method recurrence according to depth-first travels through the level investing mechanism tree of aircraft digital prototype device model and the level investing mechanism tree of high-energy rotator fragment model; Confirm and the crossing aircraft digital prototype device model level investing mechanism leaf nodes of high-energy rotator fragment model hierarchy investing mechanism tree root node, get into step D-3;

Step D-3; Aircraft digital prototype device model level investing mechanism leaf nodes and high-energy rotator fragment model hierarchy investing mechanism leaf nodes are done the crossing test of tri patch; Only when said tri patch intersects; Judge that said aircraft digital prototype device model is penetrated by the high-energy rotator fragment, the aircraft digital prototype device name that will be penetrated is saved to database.

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