CN102663327A - RFID signcryption method based on ECC - Google Patents
RFID signcryption method based on ECC Download PDFInfo
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- CN102663327A CN102663327A CN2012100528511A CN201210052851A CN102663327A CN 102663327 A CN102663327 A CN 102663327A CN 2012100528511 A CN2012100528511 A CN 2012100528511A CN 201210052851 A CN201210052851 A CN 201210052851A CN 102663327 A CN102663327 A CN 102663327A
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Abstract
The invention relates to an RFID signcryption method based on ECC. In a method in the prior art, authentication is just carried out between a label and a reader, and the label does not be updated together with database data such that security vulnerabilities exist. The method in the invention guarantees privacy of the label through updating of a key pair, and every time the reader can only update the key pair which can not be authenticated, and synchronization of data update is guaranteed. The method in the invention assists in solving the safety problem that encryption and authentication can not be carried out simultaneously in the RFID system. Simultaneously, the method in the invention is characterized by short secret keys, high security and strong flexibility by virtue of intractability of the elliptic curve cryptography; with the method, less communication cost and higher safety performance are provided.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to technical field of RFID, it is related to a kind of RFID signcryption method based on ECC.
Background technology
Radio frequency identification(Radio frequency identification, abbreviation RFID)Technology is a kind of contactless automatic identification technology, and its principle is to utilize radiofrequency signal, and Space Coupling and transmission characteristic realize the automatic identification to object.RFID technique is the non-contact automatic identification technology risen from the 60 to 70's of last century, it has been widely used in the various fields such as industrial automation, business automation, communications and transportation control management, traffic surveillance and control system, Auto Express-way Toll Collector System, Item Management, production line balance automation, gate control system, financial transaction, warehousing management, livestock management, vehicle anti-theft such as automobile or train etc. at present.RFID technologies are widely used in industrial production and the various aspects of daily life at present.RFID technique shows huge development potentiality and application space, it is considered to be one of most promising information technology of 21 century.
RFID systems are communicated when carrying out front end data acquisition work between label and read write line using radio frequency signal, it is impossible to the data message effectively in protection RFID labels.Information in the label even malice that may be stolen is changed, in addition, the RFID labels without authentic communication security mechanism, is also existed and is easily leaked some sensitive informations to neighbouring recognizer, easily disturbed, the potential safety hazard such as be easily traced.RFID security, which has become, restricts its key factor used on a large scale.RFID system computing resource condition is severely limited, this exactly one of challenge of RFID security design.
The content of the invention
There is provided a kind of RFID signcryption method based on ECC in view of the shortcomings of the prior art by the present invention.
The technical solution adopted for solving the technical problem of the present invention is:
A kind of RFID signcryption method based on ECC comprises the following steps:
(1)Initialization data storehouse
In database, a storage table is initialized,,It is initialization shared key,,It is key after updating, key is sky after the renewal.
(2)Reader interrogates label
Read write line sends inquiry request and random number to label,Length can be by system self-defining, but need long enough to avoid repeating in a short time.
(3)The request of tag response reader
Plaintext is encoded after inquiry request is received and selects to generate point, then will be generated a little by label first()It is sent to reader;
(4)Database authenticating tag
When reader receives generation point()Afterwards, the random number that it generates oneselfTogether with generation point()Issue database;Database judges、Whether it is empty.
DrawWith;Then use respectivelyWithCalculated with ID all in database:With, whereinA high position for the ID character strings represented for binary form,The ID character string low levels represented for binary form.By result of calculation respectively withWithCompare, if the ID result of calculations of some label with、Equal, then the label passes through certification.
DrawWith;Then use respectivelyWithCalculated with ID all in database:With, by result of calculation respectively withWithCompare, if the ID result of calculations of some label withWithEqual, then the label is by certification, and abandons key(,), database update inquiry is turned to, if this group of tag ID result of calculation is unequal by above-mentioned comparison, second group of computing is carried out;
DrawWith;Then use respectivelyWithCalculated with ID all in database;With, by result of calculation respectively withWithCompare, if the ID result of calculations of some label withWithWith it is equal, then the label is used in combination by certification(,)Instead of(,), then(,)It is set to sky;If this tag ID result of calculation is unequal by above-mentioned comparison, stop authentication operation.
(5)Database initiates to update inquiry
Database generates random number, plaintext is encoded, then sent the ciphertext after coding and key updating inquiry request to reader together.
(6)Certification of the label to reader
Label is received after ciphertext and the key updating inquiry request of reader, and label utilizes itself,,,,,, verify whether itself ciphertext is equal with the ciphertext received, if equal carried out(7), otherwise stop checking.
(7)Tag update shared key is simultaneously responded
After label is to reader authentication, tag update key and being sent to reader is renewed back to should.
(8)Reader completes to update
If database is received to be renewed back to and answered, by keyReplace with, simultaneously willReplace with, and handle,It is set to sky;If database is not received to be renewed back to and answered, the group key of database purchase two(,)With(,).
Beneficial effects of the present invention:
Compared with prior art, the present invention is on the premise of basic encryption function is ensured, database certification is added verification process by the invention, can complete the synchronization of label and database, system is had higher security.
Key length required for the present invention is short, simplifies hardware circuit, it is adaptable to the severely limited situation of this computing resource condition of RFID system.
Embodiment
Specifically the invention provides a kind of label decryption method suitable for RFID system, methods described includes step:
(1)Initialization data storehouse and reader interrogate label
Initialization:In database, K is initializedp1 、Kp2 、Kpt1、 Kpt2For a storage table.In initialization:,It is initialization shared key,,It is key after updating, key is sky after renewal;
Reader queries label:Reader sends inquiry request Query, and random numberTo label, the response of label is waited;
(2)The request of tag response reader
Tag responses reader:Label will carry out four step computings after by inquiry request:
(3)Database authenticating tag
Reader reply data storehouse:When reader is received()Afterwards, the random number that it generates oneselfTogether with()Issue database.
Database is judged first:(,)Whether it is empty, if(,)For sky, then A schemes are carried out, otherwise carry out B schemes.
A schemes:Database operation:
DrawWith;Then use respectivelyWithCalculated with ID all in database;With, by result of calculation respectively withWithCompare, if to have passed through the above-mentioned rate of exchange equal for the ID result of calculations of some label, the label passes through certification, turns to(4), otherwise stop authentication operation.
B schemes:
First group:Database operation:
DrawWith;Then use respectivelyWithCalculated with ID all in database;With, by result of calculation respectively withWithCompare, if the ID result of calculations of some label have passed through, above-mentioned comparison is equal, and the label abandons key by certification:(,)Turn to(4)If this group of tag ID result of calculation is unequal by above-mentioned comparison, second group of computing is carried out;
Second group:Database operation:
DrawWith;Then use respectivelyWithCalculated with ID all in database;With, by result of calculation respectively withWithCompare, if the ID result of calculations of some label have passed through, above-mentioned comparison is equal, and the label is used in combination by certification(,)Instead of(,), then(,)It is set to sky;If this tag ID result of calculation is unequal by above-mentioned comparison, stop authentication operation.
(4)Database initiates to update inquiry
Then will(,)Reader is given together with key updating inquiry request Query_new.In order to prevent to store two group keys in asynchronous problem caused by the 6th, 7 step Query_OK information are lost, database(,)With( ), wherein,。
(5)Certification of the label to reader
Reader reply data storehouse:Label receive reader renewal inquiry request Query_new and(,)Afterwards, label utilizes itself,,,,,Calculate:
Verify M3Whether disclosure satisfy that:= If, it is equal to carry out(6), otherwise stop checking.
(6)Tag update shared key is simultaneously responded
Tag responses reader:After label is to reader authentication, label is calculated as below:Obtain.More new key:,And send to be renewed back to reader and answer Query_OK.
(7)Reader completes to update
Claims (1)
1. a kind of RFID signcryption method based on ECC, it is characterised in that this method comprises the following steps:
(1)Initialization data storehouse, be specifically:
In database, a storage table is initialized,,It is initialization shared key,,It is key after updating, key is sky after the renewal;
(2)Reader interrogates label, is specifically:
Read write line sends inquiry request and random number to label,Length can be by system self-defining, but need long enough to avoid repeating in a short time;
(3)The request of tag response reader, be specifically:
Plaintext is encoded after inquiry request is received and selects to generate point, then will be generated a little by label first()It is sent to reader;
(4)Database authenticating tag, be specifically:
When reader receives generation point()Afterwards, the random number that it generates oneselfTogether with generation point()Issue database;Database judges、Whether it is empty;
DrawWith;Then use respectivelyWithCalculated with ID all in database:With, whereinA high position for the ID character strings represented for binary form,The ID character string low levels represented for binary form;By result of calculation respectively withWithCompare, if the ID result of calculations of some label with、Equal, then the label passes through certification;
DrawWith;Then use respectivelyWithCalculated with ID all in database:With, by result of calculation respectively withWithCompare, if the ID result of calculations of some label withWithEqual, then the label is by certification, and abandons key(,), database update inquiry is turned to, if this group of tag ID result of calculation is unequal by above-mentioned comparison, second group of computing is carried out;
DrawWith;Then use respectivelyWithCalculated with ID all in database;With, by result of calculation respectively withWithCompare, if the ID result of calculations of some label withWithWith it is equal, then the label is used in combination by certification(,)Instead of(,), then(,)It is set to sky;If this tag ID result of calculation is unequal by above-mentioned comparison, stop authentication operation;
(5)Database initiates to update inquiry, is specifically:
Database generates random number, plaintext is encoded, then sent the ciphertext after coding and key updating inquiry request to reader together;
(6)Certification of the label to reader, be specifically:
Label is received after ciphertext and the key updating inquiry request of reader, and label utilizes itself,,,,,, verify whether itself ciphertext is equal with the ciphertext received, if equal carried out(7), otherwise stop checking;
(7)Tag update shared key is simultaneously responded, and is specifically:
After label is to reader authentication, tag update key and being sent to reader is renewed back to should;
(8)Reader completes to update, and is specifically:
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Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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CN105681041A (en) * | 2014-11-18 | 2016-06-15 | 航天信息股份有限公司 | RFID ownership transfer method |
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CN101488854A (en) * | 2008-01-18 | 2009-07-22 | 华为技术有限公司 | Wireless RFID system authentication method and apparatus |
US8112626B1 (en) * | 2006-01-20 | 2012-02-07 | Symantec Corporation | Method and apparatus to provide public key authentication with low complexity devices |
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Patent Citations (2)
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US8112626B1 (en) * | 2006-01-20 | 2012-02-07 | Symantec Corporation | Method and apparatus to provide public key authentication with low complexity devices |
CN101488854A (en) * | 2008-01-18 | 2009-07-22 | 华为技术有限公司 | Wireless RFID system authentication method and apparatus |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
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张振宇: "基于ECC的RFID通信协议研究", 《中国优秀硕士学位论文全文数据库信息科技辑》, no. 7, 15 July 2010 (2010-07-15), pages 38 - 41 * |
Cited By (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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CN105681041A (en) * | 2014-11-18 | 2016-06-15 | 航天信息股份有限公司 | RFID ownership transfer method |
CN105681041B (en) * | 2014-11-18 | 2019-09-17 | 航天信息股份有限公司 | A kind of RFID ownership transfer method |
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Application publication date: 20120912 |