CN102547694A - Chinese-remainder-theorem-based group key creation method for sensor network - Google Patents

Chinese-remainder-theorem-based group key creation method for sensor network Download PDF

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CN102547694A
CN102547694A CN2012100373224A CN201210037322A CN102547694A CN 102547694 A CN102547694 A CN 102547694A CN 2012100373224 A CN2012100373224 A CN 2012100373224A CN 201210037322 A CN201210037322 A CN 201210037322A CN 102547694 A CN102547694 A CN 102547694A
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key
group key
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温蜜
雷景生
杨俊杰
叶文珺
陈克非
孙超超
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Shanghai University of Electric Power
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Shanghai University of Electric Power
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Abstract

本发明涉及一种传感器网络中基于中国剩余定理的组密钥建立方法,采用的预分发的方式,在传感器节点撒布在具体区域之前就预置了秘密信息,然后利用秘密信息计算群组密钥;当有新节点加入或者旧节点撤销的情况下也可以更新组密钥,这保证了网络的安全性。另外,其抗攻击和密码分析的能力比一般基于对称机制的密钥管理方案要强。基于公钥性质的传感器网络密钥管理机制有利于其上层网络(如物联网中的传输层,应用层网络)对公钥密钥算法的扩展和使用。The invention relates to a method for establishing a group key based on the Chinese remainder theorem in a sensor network. The pre-distribution method is adopted, and secret information is preset before the sensor nodes are spread in a specific area, and then the group key is calculated using the secret information ; When a new node joins or an old node withdraws, the group key can also be updated, which ensures the security of the network. In addition, its ability to resist attacks and cryptanalysis is stronger than the general key management scheme based on symmetric mechanism. The key management mechanism of the sensor network based on the nature of the public key is conducive to the expansion and use of the public key algorithm in its upper network (such as the transport layer and application layer network in the Internet of Things).

Description

一种传感器网络中基于中国剩余定理的组密钥建立方法A Group Key Establishment Method Based on Chinese Remainder Theorem in Sensor Networks

技术领域 technical field

本发明涉及一种传感器网络安全技术,特别涉及一种传感器网络中基于中国剩余定理的组密钥建立方法。 The invention relates to a sensor network security technology, in particular to a group key establishment method based on the Chinese remainder theorem in the sensor network.

背景技术 Background technique

在无线传感器网络中,为了确保信息安全,节点间的通信往往需要采用安全措施进行保护。在所有的安全机制中,加密技术是基础,通过加密可以实现传感器网络认证、保密性、不可否认性、完整性等安全需求。对于加密技术而言, 加密主要有两个主要组成部分,即算法和密钥。经过多年的研究和发展,加密算法已经有了非常成熟的国际标准,比如: DES,AES等,我们可以根据传感器网络的具体应用进行选择。但是不管密码算法多么强大,我们在进行秘密通信时都需要先协商密钥,如果用了一个弱的密钥产生方法,那么整个系统都是弱的而不用去破译加密算法了。因此用一个强壮的密钥生成算法是一个强壮系统的前提,这就是密钥管理。因此传感器网络中的密钥管理成为影响网络安全的关键性因素。    In wireless sensor networks, in order to ensure information security, communication between nodes often needs to be protected by security measures. In all security mechanisms, encryption technology is the foundation, through which security requirements such as sensor network authentication, confidentiality, non-repudiation, and integrity can be realized. For encryption technology, encryption mainly has two main components, namely algorithm and key. After years of research and development, the encryption algorithm has a very mature international standard, such as: DES, AES, etc., we can choose according to the specific application of the sensor network. But no matter how strong the encryption algorithm is, we need to negotiate the key first when conducting secret communication. If a weak key generation method is used, then the entire system is weak and there is no need to decipher the encryption algorithm. Therefore, using a strong key generation algorithm is the premise of a strong system, which is key management. Therefore, key management in sensor networks becomes a key factor affecting network security. the

根据对国内外的研究文献的跟踪和分析,近几年,国内外的学者们已经提出了多种针对无线传感器网络的密钥管理协议。然而,大多数协议关注的都是对密钥的连通性、抗毁性、有效性等方面的性能。当传感器网络作为感知层接入到物联网以后,网络中信息的安全将受到各种类型终端的攻击和干扰。要保证信息的安全,传感器网络中的密钥将更需要提高其抗攻击能力或扩展性。 According to the tracking and analysis of domestic and foreign research literature, in recent years, scholars at home and abroad have proposed a variety of key management protocols for wireless sensor networks. However, most protocols focus on the performance of the key's connectivity, invulnerability, and validity. When the sensor network is connected to the Internet of Things as the perception layer, the security of information in the network will be attacked and interfered by various types of terminals. To ensure the security of information, the key in the sensor network will need to improve its anti-attack ability or scalability.

现有的密钥管理方案,它们都集中在基于对称性质的密钥管理和研究。这些密钥管理方案虽然也能一定程度上起到保密的作用。但其抗攻击能力还不是很强;而且一旦扩展应用到物联网中,其基于对称密钥管理的部分可能成为整个网络攻击的弱点。 Existing key management schemes, they all focus on key management and research based on symmetric properties. Although these key management schemes can also play a role in keeping secrets to a certain extent. But its anti-attack ability is not very strong; and once it is extended and applied to the Internet of Things, its part based on symmetric key management may become the weakness of the entire network attack.

发明内容 Contents of the invention

本发明是针对无线传感器网络通讯节点的密钥管理抗攻击能力弱的问题,提出了一种传感器网络中基于中国剩余定理的组密钥建立方法,是一种结合秘密分享和中国剩余定理来构建组密钥管理方案。其抗攻击和密码分析的能力有所增强,此方法基于公钥性质的传感器网络密钥管理机制有利于其上层网络(如物联网中的传输层,应用层网络)对公钥密钥算法的扩展和使用。 The present invention aims at the problem of weak anti-attack ability of the key management of wireless sensor network communication nodes, and proposes a group key establishment method based on the Chinese remainder theorem in the sensor network, which is constructed by combining secret sharing and the Chinese remainder theorem Group key management scheme. Its ability to resist attacks and cryptanalysis has been enhanced. This method is based on the public key nature of the sensor network key management mechanism. Expand and use.

本发明的技术方案为:一种传感器网络中基于中国剩余定理的组密钥建立方法,方法具体步骤如下: The technical solution of the present invention is: a method for establishing a group key based on the Chinese remainder theorem in a sensor network, and the specific steps of the method are as follows:

1)假设网络中存在一个基站节点BS,和n个一般节点,Gc=(N1,N2,. .., Nn)是n个一般节点的初始集合; 1) Suppose there is a base station node BS and n general nodes in the network, Gc=(N 1 ,N 2 ,..., N n ) is the initial set of n general nodes;

2)秘密信息的生成和节点初始化的过程是: 2) The process of secret information generation and node initialization is:

第一步:BS选择n个两两互素的整数q1,q2, ..., qn,让它们作为n个节点的私密信息,这里, 当i                                                j时 gcd(q i ,q j )=1;然后BS 随机选择一个一次多项式f(x)=a1x+a0, 令Kg 为组密钥,并将其作为一次多项式的常数项,即a0=Kg;BS 随机产生两个整数作为f(x)的输入,得到两个秘密分享S0和Sg,Sg 是用来屏蔽组密钥Kg的;  Step 1: BS selects n pairs of mutually prime integers q 1 , q 2 , ..., q n , and lets them serve as the private information of n nodes. Here, when i j when gcd(q i ,q j )=1 ; then BS randomly selects a first-degree polynomial f(x)=a 1 x+a 0 , let K g be the group key, and use it as the constant term of the first-degree polynomial, That is, a 0 =K g ; BS randomly generates two integers as the input of f(x), and obtains two secret shares S 0 and S g , and S g is used to shield the group key K g ;

第二步:BS 用Sg 和 qi(i=1,…,n)产生如下的n个子秘密:  Step 2: BS uses S g and q i (i=1,...,n) to generate the following n sub-secrets:

Figure 2012100373224100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Figure 2012100373224100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE002

BS再由P= q1q2 ... qn , Pi= P/qi(i=1,…,n)计算得 P 和P iBS calculates P and P i from P= q 1 q 2 ... q n , P i = P/q i (i=1,...,n);

同时它还要由PiPi’=1 mod qi计算得Pi’ (i=1,…,n);  At the same time, it also needs to calculate P i ' (i=1,...,n) from P i P i '=1 mod q i;

进一步BS再计算出 yi=ciPiPi’ 和 si=yiP;  Further BS calculates y i =c i P i P i ' and s i =y i P;

第三步:BS 将消息{s1,…,sn, P1,…,Pn,S0} 广播给网络中所有的节点,如果BS与各节点间有对密钥,它也可以用各节点Ni 的对密钥对广播消息进行秘密传输,如: 

Figure 66331DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
; Step 3: BS broadcasts the message {s 1 ,…,s n , P 1 ,…,P n ,S 0 } to all nodes in the network. If there is a key pair between BS and each node, it can also use The key pair of each node N i secretly transmits the broadcast message, such as:
Figure 66331DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
;

3)组密钥的恢复过程: 3) The recovery process of the group key:

当各节点接收到基站BS发来的消息后,节点Ni先将用自己节点的私密信息qi计算出P=Piqi;   When each node receives the message sent by the base station BS, the node N i will use the private information q i of its own node to calculate P=P i q i ;

再根据yi =si/P恢复yi ; Then restore y i according to y i =s i /P;

然后由

Figure 2012100373224100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
计算出S g; then by
Figure 2012100373224100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
Calculate S g ;

再根据接收到的 S 和计算出的 S g , 节点Ni 将根据Shamir的秘密分享定理计算 Then according to the received S 0 and the calculated S g , the node N i will calculate according to Shamir's secret sharing theorem

出组密钥K,即a 0 =

Figure 466088DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
, 这里L i (0) 是由拉格朗日插值定理计算出的系 Group-out key K g , that is, a 0 =
Figure 466088DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
, where L i (0) is the system calculated by the Lagrange interpolation theorem

Figure 2012100373224100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
; number
Figure 2012100373224100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
;

4)新节点的加入: 4) Joining of new nodes:

当有一个新节点加入时,基站将从步骤2)过程的第二步开始重新产生n+1个子秘密;然后以同样的方式计算出P, Pi, Pi’ ,yi, s(i=1,…,n,n+1),并广播给所有节点;节点再以步骤3)过程中的方式恢复组密钥; When a new node joins, the base station will regenerate n+1 sub-secrets from the second step of step 2); then calculate P, P i , P i ' , y i , s i ( i=1,...,n,n+1), and broadcast to all nodes; the node restores the group key in the way of step 3);

5)节点的撤销: 5) Revocation of nodes:

当有一个节点需要从网络中撤销时,基站将从步骤2)过程的第二步开始重新产生n-1个子秘密;然后以同样的方式计算出P, Pi, Pi’ ,yi, s(i=1,…,n-1),并以节点对密钥加密的方式发送给所有节点;节点再以步骤3)过程中的方式恢复组密钥。 When a node needs to be withdrawn from the network, the base station will regenerate n-1 sub-secrets from the second step of step 2); then calculate P, P i , P i ' , y i , s i (i=1,...,n-1), and send it to all nodes in the way that the node encrypts the key; the node restores the group key in the way of step 3).

本发明的有益效果在于:本发明一种传感器网络中基于中国剩余定理的组密钥建立方法,采用的预分发的方式,在传感器节点撒布在具体区域之前就预置了秘密信息,然后利用秘密信息计算群组密钥;当有新节点加入或者旧节点撤销的情况下也可以更新组密钥,这保证了网络的安全性。另外,其抗攻击和密码分析的能力比一般基于对称机制的密钥管理方案要强。基于公钥性质的传感器网络密钥管理机制有利于其上层网络(如物联网中的传输层,应用层网络)对公钥密钥算法的扩展和使用。 The beneficial effect of the present invention is that: a group key establishment method based on the Chinese remainder theorem in the sensor network of the present invention adopts a pre-distribution method, and the secret information is preset before the sensor nodes are spread in a specific area, and then the secret information is used to The information calculates the group key; when a new node joins or an old node withdraws, the group key can also be updated, which ensures the security of the network. In addition, its ability to resist attacks and cryptanalysis is stronger than the general key management scheme based on symmetric mechanism. The key management mechanism of the sensor network based on the nature of the public key is conducive to the expansion and use of the public key algorithm in its upper network (such as the transport layer and application layer network in the Internet of Things).

具体实施方式 Detailed ways

中国剩余定理:如果假定q 1 ,…,q m m两两互素的正整数,即当i

Figure 797975DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
j时gcd(q i ,q j )=1。假定k 1 ,…,k m  是m 个任意的整数。考虑如下的同余方程组: Chinese Remainder Theorem: If it is assumed that q 1 ,...,q m are positive integers that are mutually prime to each other, that is, when i
Figure 797975DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
When j, gcd(q i ,q j )= 1. It is assumed that k 1 ,...,k m are m arbitrary integers. Consider the following congruence equations:

X

Figure 2012100373224100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
k 1  mod q 1 x
Figure 2012100373224100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
k 1 mod q 1

X

Figure 70824DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
k 2  mod q 2 x
Figure 70824DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
k 2 mod q 2

X

Figure 799746DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
k m  mod q m x
Figure 799746DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
k m mod q m

由中国剩余定理可得这个方程组模M的唯一解。这里

Figure 2012100373224100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
;而可由
Figure 501172DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
得,它就是唯一解。
Figure 272818DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
的逆;
Figure 791448DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
。 The unique solution of this system of equations modulo M can be obtained by the Chinese remainder theorem. here ;
Figure 2012100373224100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
; and by
Figure 501172DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
Yes, it is the only solution.
Figure 272818DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
yes inverse of
Figure 791448DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
.

为了提供一种具有自愈能力的协商式可撤销头节点和普通节点的密钥分发方法,本发明一种传感器网络中基于中国剩余定理的组密钥建立方法如下: In order to provide a self-healing negotiable revocable head node and common node key distribution method, a group key establishment method based on the Chinese remainder theorem in the sensor network of the present invention is as follows:

首先:为了不失一般性,我们假设网络中存在一个基站节点BS,和n个一般节点。Gc=(N1,N2,. .., Nn)是n个一般节点的初始集合,Gc=(N1,N2,. .., Nn)。 First: In order not to lose generality, we assume that there is a base station node BS and n general nodes in the network. Gc=(N 1 ,N 2 ,. .., N n ) is the initial set of n general nodes, Gc=(N 1 ,N 2 ,. .., N n ).

1)秘密信息的生成和节点初始化的过程是: 1) The process of secret information generation and node initialization is:

第一步:BS选择n个两两互素的整数q1,q2, ..., qn,让它们作为n个节点的私密信息。这里, 当ij时 gcd(q i ,q j )=1。 然后BS 随机选择一个一次多项式f(x)=a1x+a0, 令Kg 为组密钥,并将其作为一次多项式的常数项,即a0=Kg。BS 随机产生两个整数作为f(x)的输入,得到两个秘密分享S0和Sg,Sg 是用来屏蔽组密钥Kg的。  Step 1: BS selects n pairwise mutually prime integers q 1 , q 2 , ..., q n , and lets them be the private information of n nodes. here when i When j, gcd(q i ,q j )=1 . Then the BS randomly selects a first-degree polynomial f(x)=a 1 x+a 0 , sets K g as the group key, and uses it as a constant term of the first-degree polynomial, that is, a 0 =K g . BS randomly generates two integers as the input of f(x), and obtains two secret shares S 0 and S g , and S g is used to shield the group key K g .

第二步:BS 用Sg 和 qi(i=1,…,n)产生如下的n个子秘密:  Step 2: BS uses S g and q i (i=1,...,n) to generate the following n sub-secrets:

Figure 24163DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Figure 24163DEST_PATH_IMAGE002

BS再由P= q1q2 ... qn , Pi= P/qi(i=1,…,n)计算得 P 和P iBS calculates P and P i from P= q 1 q 2 ... q n , P i = P/q i (i=1,...,n);

同时它还要由PiPi’=1 mod qi计算得Pi’ (i=1,…,n);  At the same time, it also needs to calculate P i ' (i=1,...,n) from P i P i '=1 mod q i ;

进一步BS再计算出 yi=ciPiPi’ 和 si=yiP。  Further , BS calculates y i =ci P i P i ' and s i =y i P.

第三步:BS 将消息{s1,…,sn, P1,…,Pn,S0} 广播给网络中所有的节点,如果BS与各节点间有对密钥,它也可以用各节点Ni 的对密钥对广播消息进行秘密传输,如: 

Figure 649049DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
。 Step 3: BS broadcasts the message {s 1 ,…,s n , P 1 ,…,P n ,S 0 } to all nodes in the network. If there is a key pair between BS and each node, it can also use The key pair of each node N i secretly transmits the broadcast message, such as:
Figure 649049DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
.

2)组密钥的恢复过程: 2) The recovery process of the group key:

当各节点接收到基站BS发来的消息后,节点Ni先将用自己节点的私密信息qi计算出P=Piqi;   When each node receives the message sent by the base station BS, the node N i will use the private information q i of its own node to calculate P=P i q i ;

再根据yi =si/P恢复yi ; Then restore y i according to y i =s i /P;

然后由

Figure 69666DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
计算出S g; then by
Figure 69666DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
Calculate S g ;

再根据接收到的 S 和计算出的 S g , 节点Ni 将根据Shamir的秘密分享定理计算出组密钥K,即a 0 =

Figure 479918DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
, 这里L i (0) 是由拉格朗日插值定理计算出的系数。 Then according to the received S 0 and the calculated S g , the node N i will calculate the group key K g according to Shamir's secret sharing theorem, that is, a 0 =
Figure 479918DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
, where L i (0) is the coefficient calculated by the Lagrange interpolation theorem .

3)新节点的加入: 3) Joining of new nodes:

当有一个新节点加入时,基站将从第1)过程的第二步开始重新产生n+1个子秘密;然后以同样的方式计算出P, Pi, Pi’ ,yi, s(i=1,…,n,n+1),并广播给所有节点;节点再以第2)过程中的方式恢复组密钥。 When a new node joins, the base station will regenerate n+1 sub-secrets from the second step of the 1) process; then calculate P, P i , P i ' , y i , s i ( i=1,...,n,n+1), and broadcast to all nodes; the node restores the group key in the way of 2) process.

4)节点的撤销: 4) Withdrawal of nodes:

当有一个节点需要从网络中撤销时,基站将从第1)过程的第二步开始重新产生n-1个子秘密;然后以同样的方式计算出P, Pi, Pi’ ,yi, s(i=1,…,n-1),并以节点对密钥加密的方式发送给所有节点;节点再以第2)过程中的方式恢复组密钥。 When a node needs to be withdrawn from the network, the base station will regenerate n-1 sub-secrets from the second step of the 1) process; then calculate P, P i , P i ' , y i , s i (i=1,...,n-1), and send it to all nodes in the way that the node encrypts the key; the node restores the group key in the way of 2) process.

Claims (1)

  1. In the sensor network based on the group key method for building up of Chinese remainder theorem, it is characterized in that the method concrete steps are following:
    1) supposes to exist in the network base-station node BS and n general node, Gc=(N 1, N 2. .., N n) be the initial sets of n general node;
    2) process of the generation of secret information and node initializing is:
    The first step: BS selects n coprime in twos integer q 1, q 2..., q n, let them as the private information of n node,, work as i here
    Figure 2012100373224100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
    During j Gcd (q i , q j )=1BS selects a polynomial f (x)=a at random then 1X+a 0, make K gBe group key, and with it as once polynomial constant term, i.e. a 0=K gBS produces the input of two integers as f (x) at random, obtains two secret sharing S 0And S g, S gBe to be used for the shield group key K g;
    Second step: BS uses S gAnd q i(i=1 ..., n) produce n following son secret:
    BS is again by P=q 1q 2... q n, P i=P/q i(i=1 ..., n) calculate PWith P i
    It also will be by P simultaneously iP i'=1 mod q iCalculate P i' (i=1 ..., n);
    Further BS calculates y again i=c iP iP i' and s i=y iP;
    The 3rd step: BS is with message { s 1..., s n, P 1..., P n, S 0Be broadcast to nodes all in the network, if between BS and each node pair key K is arranged In, it also can use each node N iKey is carried out secret transmission to broadcast, as:
    Figure 2012100373224100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
    3) recovery process of group key:
    After each node receives the message that base station BS sends, node N iTo use the private information q of own node earlier iCalculate P=P iq i
    Again according to y i=s i/ P recovers y i
    Then by
    Figure 2012100373224100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
    Calculate S g
    Basis receives again S 0 With calculate S g , node N iTo calculate according to the secret sharing theorem of Shamir
    Go out group key K g, promptly a 0 =
    Figure 2012100373224100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
    , here L i (0)Be to be by what the Lagrange's interpolation theorem calculated
    Number
    Figure 2012100373224100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
    ;
    4) adding of new node:
    Add fashionablely as a new node, the base station will be from step 2) second step beginning of process produces n+1 son secret again; Calculate P, P then in the same way i, P i', y i, s i(i=1 ..., n n+1), and is broadcast to all nodes; Node is again with the mode recovering group key in the step 3) process;
    5) cancelling of node:
    When a node need be cancelled from network, the base station will be from step 2) second step beginning of process produces n-1 son secret again; Calculate P, P then in the same way i, P i', y i, s i(i=1 ..., n-1), and the mode of secret key encryption is sent to all nodes with node; Node is again with the mode recovering group key in the step 3) process.
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CN106507347A (en) * 2017-01-09 2017-03-15 大连理工大学 A Key Generation Method for Protecting the Security of Wireless Sensor Networks
CN108833098A (en) * 2018-07-05 2018-11-16 西北大学 A kind of key management method of wireless sensor network based on Solution for System of Linear Equations
CN108833098B (en) * 2018-07-05 2021-08-03 西北大学 A Key Management Method for Wireless Sensor Networks Based on Solutions of Linear Equations
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