CN102421094A - Distributed safety reprogramming method of wireless sensor network - Google Patents
Distributed safety reprogramming method of wireless sensor network Download PDFInfo
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- CN102421094A CN102421094A CN2011102559172A CN201110255917A CN102421094A CN 102421094 A CN102421094 A CN 102421094A CN 2011102559172 A CN2011102559172 A CN 2011102559172A CN 201110255917 A CN201110255917 A CN 201110255917A CN 102421094 A CN102421094 A CN 102421094A
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Abstract
The invention discloses a distributed safety reprogramming method of a wireless sensor network, which comprises the following steps: a network owner distributes a reprogramming authorization and a private key of a user to the user through a safety channel and loads a system public parameter to all sensor nodes, wherein the private key is generated on the basis of the reprogramming authorization and identity information of the user; when the user accesses the wireless sensor network for reprogramming target sensor nodes, the user establishes a reprogramming data packet for a new sensor program image and sends the reprogramming data packet to all target sensor nodes; and after receiving the reprogramming data packet, each target sensor node verifies the new sensor program image according to the loaded system public parameter: if the new sensor program image passes through verifying, the corresponding target sensor node receives and loads the new sensor program image, and if the new sensor program image fails in checking, the reprogramming data packet is discarded.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to wireless communication technology field, particularly relate to the reprogrammed technology in the wireless sensor network.
Background technology
Massive wireless sensor reaches its maturity, yet the safety problem of reprogrammed technology is not also effectively solved.Existing reprogrammed agreement is based on centralized method, promptly by the mode of base station through the multi-hop route program mirror image is sent to corresponding node.This method can not be worked in the base station or the base station can't be connected to that reliability can reduce greatly under the situation of node.Because transmission path is oversize, cause centralized approach efficient not high simultaneously, a little less than the autgmentability, be easy to attacked.The more important thing is that a lot of wireless sensor networks do not have configurating base station or are difficult to configurating base station.For such network, the network user who is authorized to can carry out distributed reprogrammed and seem very necessary.
Summary of the invention
The object of the present invention is to provide a kind of distributed security reprogramming method of wireless sensor network.
The network owner distributes to this user with user's reprogrammed authority and private key through secured channels in advance, and the network owner is loaded into system's common parameter on all the sensors node, and said private key generates based on user's reprogrammed authority and identity information; When the user got into wireless sensor network objective sensor node is carried out reprogrammed, the user set up the reprogrammed packet and this reprogrammed packet is sent to all objective sensor node for its new transducer program mirror image; Each objective sensor node is verified said new transducer program mirror image according to the said system common parameter that is loaded into self after receiving said reprogrammed packet: if said new transducer program mirror image is through checking; Then corresponding objective sensor node receives and loads said new transducer program mirror image; If authentication failed is then with said reprogrammed data packet discarding.
Further, the method for said " user sets up the reprogrammed packet and this reprogrammed packet is sent to all objective sensor node for its new transducer program mirror image " is following:
Said user is made as the more than one page data bag that generates sequentially with said reprogrammed packet, and wherein, the page data bag of a back generation includes the cryptographic hash of the page data bag of previous generation; Set up the Merkle Hash tree on the basis of the cryptographic hash of the page data bag that then in the end generates, generate the page data bag of initial page again according to this Merkle Hash tree; This user lumps together the generation parameter set with the set of metadata of the root node of said Merkle Hash tree and new transducer program mirror image, and said metadata comprises the version number of new transducer program mirror image and the identity set of size and all objective sensor node; Then, this user uses the private key of oneself said parameter set is signed and will be signed signing messages and the said parameter set that is produced to send to each objective sensor node in the lump; Then, this user backward of sequencing of pressing the generation of page data bag to each objective sensor node is sent all said page data bags.
Further, the method for said " each objective sensor node is verified said new transducer program mirror image according to the said system common parameter that is loaded into self after receiving said reprogrammed packet " is following:
Objective sensor node at first checks the legitimacy of said parameter set and user whether to have the reprogrammed authority: if the legal and said user of said parameter set has the reprogrammed authority, then objective sensor node uses said system common parameter that said signing messages is verified:
If said signing messages is legal; Then said page data bag is verified: wherein by the backward of the sequencing of the generation of page data bag; The page data bag of initial page is to use the root node of said Merkle Hash tree to verify by objective sensor node, and other page data bags are to be verified by the cryptographic hash that objective sensor node uses the page data bag of a back generation of this page data bag to be comprised; If in case a page data Bao Wei is wherein arranged, then show, directly abandon this new transducer program mirror image to the authentication failed of said new transducer program mirror image through checking; If all page data bags of said new transducer program mirror image have passed through checking, then load this new transducer program mirror image.
Compared with prior art, advantage of the present invention is:
(1) distributed reprogrammed (Distributed): because the network owner distributes to the user with user's reprogrammed authority and private key through secured channels in advance; Authorize the user carries out reprogrammed voluntarily to objective sensor node authority; Authorized user can carry out reprogrammed in the presence that does not have the base station, guarantee that simultaneously unauthorized user can not carry out reprogrammed.(2) support different user's reprogrammed authorities (Supporting Different User Privileges): the network owner distributes to the user with user's reprogrammed authority and private key through secured channels in advance; Through the setting to set of the node identity that comprises in user's reprogrammed authority and reserved area, the network owner can limit user right.(3) the reprogrammed ability (Partial Reprogram Capability) of part: controlled fully by the user for fear of sensor node; The sensor node checking is through behind the new transducer program mirror image; Only upgrade the program mirror image on the corresponding that part of module, special module (as the new procedures mirror image being carried out the module of authentication) only can be carried out reprogrammed by the network owner.(4) (Avoiding Reprogramming Conflicts) avoided in the reprogrammed conflict: in the present invention; If the legitimacy of the user's of entering network parameter set, the legitimacy of reprogrammed authority and signing messages all pass through checking; Then begin with; In this network user's the reprogrammed term of validity, only this network user is allowed to sensor node is carried out reprogrammed, reaches the purpose that conflict is avoided with this.(5) user's traceability (User Traceability): the corresponding signing messages that the user uses the private key of oneself parameter set to be signed and produce; So comprise private key for user in user's the signing messages; And private key for user is based on that user's reprogrammed authority and identity information generate, so user's reprogrammed authority and identity information only can be revised by the network owner.Each user has a unique corresponding identity information, and the network owner can so just reach user's traceability through this this reprogrammed of identity information identification user.(6) extensibility (Scalability): the network owner only is loaded into system's common parameter on all the sensors node; The size of said system common parameter and number of users, sensor node number have nothing to do, and therefore can guarantee the validity of system under a large amount of sensor nodes, a large amount of network user's environment.(7) dynamic property of participation (Dynamic Participation): when new user when the network owner registers, the network owner sends to this user with corresponding reprogrammed authority through secured channels with this user's private key, promptly accomplishes the user and participates in step.When new sensor node need add network, the network owner only need with system's common parameter be loaded on the sensor node and with sensor node deployment to the relevant position, promptly accomplish node participation step.Therefore can support new sensor node and new user's adding at any time.(8) freshness guarantee (Freshness): the present invention uses the method for inspection version number or timestamp to ensure the freshness of transducer program.(9) Denial of Service attack can be resisted (DoS Attacks Resistance): but the present invention uses the specific fascination method of information resisting abnegation service aggression.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the structural representation of the specific fascination method of information (Message specific puzzle).
Embodiment
Relevant technical term such as following table:
U
jJ the network user
S
jJ sensor node
UID
jUser U
jIdentification number
SK
jUser U
jPrivate key
PK
jUser U
jPKI
SK
OwnerNetwork owner's private key
PK
OwnerNetwork owner's PKI
G circled addition crowd
G
TThe circulation multiplicative group
ê bilinear mappings G * G → G
T
The generator of P circled addition crowd G
The Prime Orders of q circled addition crowd G
H
1From 0,1}
*MapToPoint hash function to G
H
2From 0,1}
*Arrive
The hash function mapping
Distributed security reprogramming method detailed process of the present invention is following:
The network owner distributes to this user with user's reprogrammed authority and private key through secured channels in advance, and said private key generates based on user's reprogrammed authority and identity information; In addition, the network owner can be loaded into system's common parameter on all the sensors node.Its detailed process is following:
The network owner carries out following operation:
1.G represent one by generator (generator) P=(x
P, y
P) the circled addition crowd (cyclic additive group) that generates, G
TRepresent a circulation multiplicative group (cyclic multiplicative group), G and G
TSame Prime Orders q is arranged.ê: G * G → G
TRepresent bilinear mappings (bilinear map).
2. select a random number s ∈ Z
qAs master key (master key) and the relevant PKI PK of calculating
Owner=sP.
3. select two safety encipher hash function H1, H2.H wherein
1: 0,1}* → G and
Getting system's common parameter afterwards is params={G, G
T, ê, q, P, PK
Owner, H
1, H
2, system's common parameter is loaded on all the sensors node before network design in advance.Consider that an identity information is UID
j∈ 0,1}
*User U
jThe owner registers to network.In authentication after his log-on message, the network owner is based on user U
jReprogrammed authority Pri
jWith identity information UID
jGenerate U
jPKI be PK
j=H
1(UID
j|| Pri
j) ∈ G, and calculate user U
jPrivate key SK
j=sPK
j, " || " expression bit serial operation here.After this, the network owner is with user's reprogrammed authority and public and private key { Pri
j, PK
j, SK
j(for example: wire transmission layer security protocol (wired Transport Layer Security protocol) distributed to user U through secured channels
jUser's reprogrammed authority Pri
jBe used to represent the grade of user right, comprise the set of node identity (node identities set), the reprogrammed term of validity (subscription period) and reserved area (reserved), as shown in table 1.Node identity set (node identities set) is used for identifying user U
jReprogrammable node set; The reprogrammed term of validity (subscription period) comprises reprogrammable effective zero-time of user and concluding time; The reserved area is left the owner for and is used for further extending the user right details; For example can be used for being provided with the reprogrammed authority of user, perhaps be used for being provided with the reprogrammed authority (current part reprogrammed technology be according to module divide) of user disparate modules to different sensor part (for example: temperature sensor, soil humidity sensor).
Table 1. reprogrammed authority (Pri
j) form for example (bracket inner digital is represented the byte length in each territory)
As user U
jWhen the entering wireless sensor network carries out reprogrammed to objective sensor node, user U
jFor its new transducer program mirror image is set up the reprogrammed packet and this reprogrammed packet is sent to all objective sensor node.User U
jTake following step:
1. user U
jWith the program mirror image be divided into P fixed size the page or leaf, be labeled as the 1st page to the P page or leaf.User U
jWith every page of page data bag that is divided into N fixed size, wherein, the cryptographic hash of each page data bag of any page or leaf of other except the 1st page i all is attached to the corresponding page data of i-1 page or leaf and wraps again, and wherein i is the label and the 2≤i≤P of page or leaf; On the basis of the cryptographic hash of the 1st page of page data bag that in the end generates, set up Merkle Hash tree (Merkle hash tree).Use all data that produce when setting up the Merkle Hash tree to generate the page data bag of initial pages.The metadata of the root node of Merkle Hash tree, program mirror image (meta data) (comprises program mirrored version this shop (version number); Destination node identity set (targeted node identities set); Program mirror image size (code image size)) and the signature that relates to whole related contents be included in the middle of the signing messages; The metadata (meta data) of root node of Merkle Hash tree (root of the Merkle hash tree) and program mirror image is combined and produced parameter set m, and is as shown in table 2.
The form of table 2. parameter set m is (bracket inner digital is represented the byte length in each territory) for example
It should be noted that parameter set m and aforementioned reprogrammed authority Pri
jForm and length should set according to actual conditions.Destination node identity set (targeted node identities set) here is used for being provided with the label that the user hopes the sensor node of reprogrammed.
2. user U
jUtilize the private key SK of oneself
jThe signature sigma of calculating parameter collection m
j, σ wherein
j=H
2(m) SK
j
3. user U
jWith signing messages { UID
j, Pri
j, m, σ
jBeing sent to destination node, this signing messages is as the notice that has new program mirror image to upgrade.
4. then, user U
jSend the page data bag of new program mirror image by sequencing from initial page to the P page or leaf.
Notice that the user has the situation of two kinds of reprogrammed: the one, the user wants the one or more specific sensor nodes of reprogrammed, such as S
1To S
j, its node identity information (identity) is ID
1To ID
jThis moment, sensing node was not known the positional information of oneself.When reprogrammed, user U
jThese node identity informations are added in the destination node identity set (targeted node identities set) of parameter set m.The integrality of parameter set m can be guaranteed through the signature technology (identity based signature) based on sign.Come all nodes of reprogrammed also to belong to first kind situation through broadcast mode, its method is that destination node identity set (targeted node identities set) is set is 0.The 2nd, user U
jWant the node in a certain zone is carried out reprogrammed.This moment, sensing node was known the positional information of oneself.What specifically, can node be known oneself belong to zone through deployment information or other existing safe targeting schemes are provided.When reprogrammed, need the information of reprogrammed specific region be added in the destination node set territory (targeted node set field) of parameter set m.
Objective sensor node is receiving signing messages { UID
j, Pri
j, m, σ
jAfterwards, at first checking wherein, whether legitimacy and the user of parameter set m have the reprogrammed authority: if the legal and said user of parameter set m has the reprogrammed authority, then objective sensor node using system common parameter is verified said signing messages:
Each sensor node is verified it according to following steps:
1. sensor node certificate parameter collection m and user's reprogrammed authority Pri at first
jLegitimacy (for example: node need check whether the identity information of self is included in user's reprogrammed authority Pri
jNode identity set in).Have only when the two is all legal, just get into next step; Otherwise, abandon the signing messages received, checking finishes.
2. objective sensor node using system common parameter is to the signing messages { UID of reception
j, Pri
j, m, σ
jVerify.The system's common parameter { G, the G that have had the network owner to load
T, ê, q, P, PK
Owner, H
1, H
2, sensor network is verified as follows: ê (σ
j, P)=ê (H
2(m) H
1(UID
j|| Pri
j), PK
Owner).If this equality is set up, then signature sigma
jBe legal.
If above-mentioned authenticating step passes through, then sensor node can be confirmed parameter set m and reprogrammed authority Pri
jBe that to come from ID be UID
jAuthorized user.Pass through signing messages { UID in the sensor node checking
j, Pri
j, m, σ
jAfter, confirm that wherein parameter set m is correct, and then the root node (root of the Merkle hash tree) of Merkle Hash tree is correct among definite parameter set m.Received the page data bag of initial page at sensor node after,, just can verify the correctness of the page data bag of all initial pages based on the architectural characteristic of Merkle Hash tree.The page data bag of initial page comprises the cryptographic hash of the 1st page data bag; The checking of the page data bag of initial page occurs in before the checking of the 1st page data bag; Therefore after the page data bag of initial page was passed through in checking, node can be verified the correctness of the 1st page data bag based on one-way (one-way) attribute of Hash equation.Similarly, i page data encapsulates after checking passes through, and i+1 page data bag also can be verified.Have only top step all to pass through, sensor node just can receive and load this program mirror image.If in case any one page data Bao Wei is arranged, then show in the said process, promptly directly abandon this program mirror image to the authentication failed of said new transducer program mirror image through checking.
The safeguard of the freshness of transducer program mirror image:
The network user has dual mode to ensure the freshness of transducer program mirror image.First kind of mode is: under this mode, each network user has the authority of the sensor node reprogrammed of pair zones of different or different sets, does not therefore exist a node by the situation of two or more network users' while reprogrammed.In the 1st step of sensor node authenticating step, node checks at first whether the program mirrored version this shop among the parameter set m that receives is up-to-date.And if only if its when being up-to-date version, remaining verification step just can be proceeded.Therefore, use version number to come the refresh routine mirror image can guarantee the freshness of transducer program mirror image.The second way is: under this mode, a sensor node can be licensed to a plurality of network users by the network owner, and the method for a feasible assurance freshness is to utilize timestamp mechanism to come the refresh routine mirror image.The user must add the current time and stab among the parameter set m when generating parameter set m.Objective sensor node is when checking the legitimacy of parameter set m wherein, and whether the timestamp of node in must inspection parameter set m is up-to-date.So just can guarantee that node always loads the program mirror image of latest edition.In this case, the present invention uses some existing Time synchronization technique safely and effectively (method of the TinySeRSync that is for example proposed by people such as Kun Sun) to realize the time synchronized of wireless sensor network.
The measure of resisting of Denial of Service attack:
In order to resist Denial of Service attack; Need specific fascination method of use information (Message specific puzzle) or client fascination method (client puzzle); It is following to resist the measure process: whole network is divided into a series of zone; Each sensor node belongs to a zone, and a zone can comprise a plurality of sensor nodes.The size in zone is set according to application scenarios, and the enough little reprogrammed granularity to support to distribute of zone setting.Each zone has head node to be responsible for producing a fascination variable (puzzle) and it is distributed to other nodes of region.In a zone, all nodes are periodically selected head node, and all nodes all can be considered the capacity factor of node when selecting head node, to prevent to consume excessively the energy of a certain specific nodes.
When a zone ran into Denial of Service attack, each node in this zone was optionally verified network user's signing messages of being received.Process is: each node adds described fascination variable (puzzle) in the middle of beacon message (beacon message), and periodically broadcasts these beacon messages, in order to the existence of statement service.The network user need add the solution of a fascination variable (puzzle) in the middle of each signing messages; When the solution of only working as this fascination variable (puzzle) is correct; The all the sensors node of the same area just can be verified this signing messages; Otherwise will can not verify this signing messages, so just resist Denial of Service attack.
In general, solve a puzzle and need in separating legal order, carry out the violence search, but the solution verifying speed is very fast.Moreover, the specific fascination method of information (Message specific puzzle) is to dispose according to traditional overtime setting of sensor node resource (conventional time-outs on node resources).Therefore, in order to set up a service disruption, the enemy must have sufficient resources to calculate the solution of the puzzle of sufficient amount within a certain period of time.Therefore, the effective resisting abnegation service aggression of the use of the specific fascination method of information (Message specific puzzle).
The present invention uses the specific fascination method of information (Message specific puzzle) to come for example.If a sensor network zone does not receive Denial of Service attack, the sensor node in the zone (is designated as S
j) can " denying " information is added to beacon message (beacon message), thereby hint to the user and not confuse variable (puzzle) that agreement is normally moved; If this sensor network zone receives Denial of Service attack, S
j" being " information of interpolation (comprises a time stamp T with fascination variable (puzzle)
j, a random number a and a positive integer l) and in beacon message (beacon message).For new sensor node S more
jOn the program mirror image, the user must calculate the answer (solve the puzzle) of fascination variable at official hour at interval.Effectively fascination variable answer value is integer L
i, integer L
iMeet the following conditions: as shown in Figure 1, at UID
j|| Pri
j|| m|| σ
j|| T
j|| a||L
iThe result's that last application hash function h () operation obtains preceding l position is 0 entirely.The intensity of parameter l decision fascination variable.Transmitting signing messages { UID
j, Pri
j, m, σ
jBefore, the user at first attempts to calculate fascination variable answer value L
i, next the user sends final signing messages { UID
j, Pri
j, m, σ
j, T
j, a, L
iTo S
jObviously, the answer value of the fascination variable of each signing messages can be by S
jVerify efficiently through a hash function operation and contrast.And if only if this verify successfully pass through after, S
jJust further certifying signature information { UID
j, Pri
j, m, σ
j}
Because the program mirror image sends by page or leaf, method of the present invention can be verified the packet in the current page or leaf that is transmitting immediately, and then can resist the Denial of Service attack that utilizes the checking time-delay.In addition, owing to used the specific fascination method of information, each sensor node can carry out Hash operation and contrast efficiently, to find false signing messages.Therefore the method used of the present invention resisting abnegation service aggression effectively.
Claims (3)
1. the distributed security reprogramming method of a wireless sensor network is characterized in that, comprises the steps:
The network owner distributes to this user with user's reprogrammed authority and private key through secured channels in advance; And the network owner is loaded into system's common parameter on all the sensors node in advance, and said private key generates based on user's reprogrammed authority and identity information; When the user got into wireless sensor network objective sensor node is carried out reprogrammed, the user set up the reprogrammed packet and this reprogrammed packet is sent to all objective sensor node for its new transducer program mirror image; Each objective sensor node is verified said new transducer program mirror image according to the said system common parameter that is loaded into self after receiving said reprogrammed packet: if said new transducer program mirror image is through checking; Then corresponding objective sensor node receives and loads said new transducer program mirror image; If authentication failed is then with said reprogrammed data packet discarding.
2. the distributed security reprogramming method of wireless sensor network according to claim 1; It is characterized in that the method for said " user sets up the reprogrammed packet and this reprogrammed packet is sent to all objective sensor node for its new transducer program mirror image " is following:
Said user is made as the more than one page data bag that generates sequentially with said reprogrammed packet, and wherein, the page data bag of a back generation includes the cryptographic hash of the page data bag of previous generation; Set up the Merkle Hash tree on the basis of the cryptographic hash of the page data bag that then in the end generates, generate the page data bag of initial page again according to this Merkle Hash tree; This user lumps together the generation parameter set with the set of metadata of the root node of said Merkle Hash tree and new transducer program mirror image, and said metadata comprises the version number of new transducer program mirror image and the identity set of size and all objective sensor node; Then, this user uses the private key of oneself said parameter set is signed and will be signed signing messages and the said parameter set that is produced to send to each objective sensor node in the lump; Then, this user backward of sequencing of pressing the generation of page data bag to each objective sensor node is sent all said page data bags.
3. the distributed security reprogramming method of wireless sensor network according to claim 2; It is characterized in that the method for said " each objective sensor node is verified said new transducer program mirror image according to the said system common parameter that is loaded into self " is following after receiving said reprogrammed packet:
Objective sensor node at first checks the legitimacy of said parameter set and user whether to have the reprogrammed authority: if the legal and said user of said parameter set has the reprogrammed authority, then objective sensor node uses said system common parameter that said signing messages is verified:
If said signing messages is legal; Then said page data bag is verified: wherein by the backward of the sequencing of the generation of page data bag; The page data bag of initial page is to use the root node of said Merkle Hash tree to verify by objective sensor node, and other page data bags are to be verified by the cryptographic hash that objective sensor node uses the page data bag of a back generation of this page data bag to be comprised; If in case a page data Bao Wei is wherein arranged, then show, directly abandon this new transducer program mirror image to the authentication failed of said new transducer program mirror image through checking; If all page data bags of said new transducer program mirror image have passed through checking, then load this new transducer program mirror image.
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| CN103823691A (en) * | 2013-12-18 | 2014-05-28 | 浙江工商大学 | Wireless sensor network security online reprogramming method based on network coding |
| CN103838605A (en) * | 2013-12-18 | 2014-06-04 | 浙江工商大学 | Wireless sensor network code distribution method with packet loss tolerance and confidentiality protection |
| CN111163055A (en) * | 2019-12-05 | 2020-05-15 | 北京邮电大学 | Weak authentication method and device for non-ground network access |
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Cited By (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN103823691A (en) * | 2013-12-18 | 2014-05-28 | 浙江工商大学 | Wireless sensor network security online reprogramming method based on network coding |
| CN103838605A (en) * | 2013-12-18 | 2014-06-04 | 浙江工商大学 | Wireless sensor network code distribution method with packet loss tolerance and confidentiality protection |
| CN103838605B (en) * | 2013-12-18 | 2017-07-28 | 浙江工商大学 | Tolerate with packet loss and the secret wireless sensor network code distribution method ensured |
| CN103823691B (en) * | 2013-12-18 | 2017-10-24 | 浙江工商大学 | The online reprogramming method of wireless sensor network security based on network code |
| CN111163055A (en) * | 2019-12-05 | 2020-05-15 | 北京邮电大学 | Weak authentication method and device for non-ground network access |
| CN111163055B (en) * | 2019-12-05 | 2021-07-02 | 北京邮电大学 | Weak authentication method and device for non-ground network access |
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| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN102421094B (en) | 2014-10-29 |
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