CN102026178A - User identity protection method based on public-key mechanism - Google Patents
User identity protection method based on public-key mechanism Download PDFInfo
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- CN102026178A CN102026178A CN2010106159530A CN201010615953A CN102026178A CN 102026178 A CN102026178 A CN 102026178A CN 2010106159530 A CN2010106159530 A CN 2010106159530A CN 201010615953 A CN201010615953 A CN 201010615953A CN 102026178 A CN102026178 A CN 102026178A
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Abstract
The invention relates to the secret communication field of mobile communication technologies, and discloses a user identity protection method based on a public-key mechanism. The method comprises the following steps: an HSS (hierarchical service system) produces a pair of keys, namely, a public key PK and a secret key SK, then the public key PK is preset to a USIM (universal subscriber identity module) card of UE (user equipment) belonging to the public key PK in the form of a public key file PKF, and the secret key SK is stored in the HSS; a mobile phone sends the following information to an MME (mobility management entity), including HSS identification: HSS_ID, public-key PK version number: VER_PK; and data (IMSI || R|| VER_PK) encrypted by using an asymmetric encryption algorithm; after receiving the information, the MME sends the VER_PK and the (IMSI || R|| VER_PK) to the HSS according to the HSS_ID; and the HSS decrypts the VER_PK and the (IMSI || R|| VER_PK) by using the secret key SK. Because attackers do not know the secret key SK of the HSS, the attackers can not decrypt the (IMSI || R|| VER_PK).
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the secure communication field of mobile communication technology, relate in particular to a kind of user identity protection method based on PKI mechanism.
Background technology
PKI mechanism protection IMSI(international mobile subscriber identity: International Mobile Subscriber Identity, difference mobile subscriber's sign) information is avoided mobile subscriber person under attack illegal tracking and location.Long Term Evolution), (the 4th third-generation mobile communication technology: 4rd-generation), prior art generally adopts casual user's identity GUTI mechanism to 4G in mobile communication system 3G(3G (Third Generation) Moblie technology: 3rd-generation), LTE(Long Term Evolution:
(The unique temporary identity in the whole world: Globally Unique Temporary Identity) user identity is protected.When passing through the AKA(Authentication and Key Agreement: MME(mobile management entity after authentication Authentication and key agreement): Mobility Management Entity) to the UE(subscriber equipment: User Equipment, comprise ME and USIM) distribute the interim identify label GUTI that distributes, and the corresponding relation between storage GUTI and the IMSI.The user uses GUTI and network foundation to get in touch afterwards, as asking access network, routing update, adhering to request, beep-page message etc.This mechanism has reduced the transmission of IMSI on wireless channel, has increased the difficulty that the assailant intercepts and captures, and certain effect has been played in protection to IMSI.Can't obtain GUTI but work as user or network, in the time of perhaps can't obtaining the corresponding relation of IMSI and GUTI, the user must use IMSI to identify own identity, and IMSI will be exposed in the air interface with the plaintext form this moment.
If the assailant obtains certain specific user's permanent identification IMSI by passive or active attack, and when getting access to the corresponding relation of user real identification and permanent identification, privacy of user will be leaked.Therefore GUTI mechanism is incomplete for protection IMSI, can not satisfy the demand of some high-end user.
Summary of the invention
Permanent identification IMSI at the user who exists in the prior art leaks the technical problem that causes privacy of user to be leaked, and therefore is necessary to provide a kind of user identity protection method based on PKI mechanism.
The invention provides a kind of user identity protection method based on PKI mechanism, the method includes the steps of:
(1) produce a pair of public private key pair PK and SK by HSS, PKI PK is preset in the usim card of its UE of ownership with the form of PKI file PKF, and private key SK is stored among the HSS;
(2) mobile phone of MME usim card in preserving step (1) sends the user identity request;
When (3) mobile phone networks with following message:
HSS sign: HSS_ID;
PKI PK version number: VER_PK;
Adopt rivest, shamir, adelman ciphered data (IMSI||R||VER_PK);
Send to MME;
Wherein R is a random number, mixes with IMSI before encrypting;
(4) after MME receives message in the step (3), VER_PK, (IMSI||R||VER_PK) are sent to corresponding HSS according to HSS_ID;
(5) HSS receives that VER_PK, (IMSI||R||VER_PK) back utilization private key SK that MME sends are decrypted judgement.
Preferably, the utilization private key SK in the described step (5) is decrypted and judges and may further comprise the steps:
Preferably, described step (5) comprises that also HSS compares USIM VER_PK that reports and the VER_PK that oneself uses, if the VER_PK version number that USIM reports is current latest edition, then need not to upgrade the PKI file; If the VER_PK version number that USIM reports is an early version, then upgrade the PKI file.
Preferably, described method is further comprising the steps of:
HSS issues the IMSI data of mobile phone and the Ciphering Key that produces according to IMSI to MME, upgrades the PKI file if desired, then attaches issuing new PKI file PKFn; If do not need to upgrade the PKI file, then do not issue this parameter.
Preferably, described method is further comprising the steps of:
Enter authorizing procedure between mobile phone and the MME, and the authentication success.
Preferably, described method is further comprising the steps of:
MME distributes GUTI to MS, upgrades the PKI file if desired, then attaches issuing new PKI file PKFn; If do not need to upgrade the PKI file, then do not issue this parameter.
Preferably, described method is further comprising the steps of:
If mobile phone is received PKFn, USIM if checking gets nowhere then abandons this parameter, continues to use old PKI file PKFo with the signature of the new PKI file PKFn of old PKI file PKo checking; If be proved to be successful then replace old PKFo, adopt new PKn to encrypt IMSI when network next time.
Preferably, described method is further comprising the steps of:
Mobile phone reports the allocation result of GUTI and PKFn to MME.
Preferably, the asymmetric arithmetic in the described step (3) is a RSA Algorithm.
Preferably, the asymmetric arithmetic in the described step (3) is the ECC algorithm.
Beneficial effect of the present invention is: at first because the assailant does not know the private key of HSS, can not be decrypted (IMSI||R||VER_PK).Simultaneously in (IMSI||R||VER_PK), add random number R, made the assailant can not obtain the correlation of each reported data.Secondly: HSS will decipher the VER_PK data and compare with plaintext VER_PK data, guarantee the integrality of data, and prevent assailant's distorting data.When key was changed, HSS signed to PK and has guaranteed validity and the legitimacy that key is changed, and prevents to palm off the deception of network to mobile phone.The public private key pair of HSS is convenient to safeguard, management and changing, and SK is kept among the HSS forever, and the assailant can not derive SK by PK.Adopt key replacing mechanism that security intensity is further improved, increased assailant's decoding difficulty.Do not have private key at the usim card end, PKI can onlinely be changed.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is PKI file PKF structure among the present invention;
Fig. 2 is the IMSI guard method based on PKI mechanism.
Embodiment
Specify the specific embodiment of the present invention below in conjunction with Figure of description.
The invention provides a kind of user identity protection method based on PKI mechanism, wherein encryption and decryption and signature checking method adopt RSA Algorithm, ECC algorithm or other rivest, shamir, adelmans, and for ease of describing, the implementation procedure in the present embodiment adopts the ECC algorithm for example.Said method is the IMSI guard method based on PKI mechanism, as shown in Figure 2, wherein: at ECC(PK, (IMSI||R||VER_PK)) in ECC represent that asymmetric arithmetic, PK represent PKI, the encrypted data of (IMSI||R||VER_PK) expression; Just issue PKFn when (PKFn) the PKI file need is upgraded in expression, when not required this parameter not just; When HSS transmitted IMSI to MME, its fail safe was guaranteed by core net.It specifically comprises following steps:
(1) by the HSS(home subscriber server: Home Subscriber Server) produce a pair of public private key pair PK and SK, PKI PK is preset to the USIM(universal subscriber identity module of its UE of ownership with the form of PKI file PKF: Universal Subscriber Identity Module) in the card, private key SK is stored among the HSS.
(2) as UE first during access service network, the mobile phone transmission user identity request of MME usim card in preserving step (1); (referring to 3GPP TS33.401, the 6.1.3 joint)
When (3) mobile phone networks with following message:
HSS sign: HSS_ID;
PKI PK version number: VER_PK;
Adopt rivest, shamir, adelman, as the data of ECC algorithm for encryption: ECC(PK, (IMSI||R||VER_PK));
Send to MME;
Wherein R is a random number, mixes with IMSI before encrypting, and guarantees each encrypted result difference; It is for VER_PK is carried out integrity protection that VER_PK is encrypted.
(4) after MME receives message in the step (3), according to HSS_ID with VER_PK, ECC(PK, (IMSI||R||VER_PK)) send to corresponding HSS;
(5) HSS receives VER_PK, the ECC(PK that MME sends, (IMSI||R||VER_PK)) after carry out following operation:
(6) HSS issues the IMSI data of mobile phone and the Ciphering Key that produces according to IMSI to MME, upgrades the PKI file if desired, then attaches issuing new PKI file PKFn, if do not need to upgrade the PKI file, does not then issue this parameter.PKI file PKF structure as shown in Figure 1.
(7) enter authorizing procedure between UE and the MME, and the authentication success.(referring to 3GPP TS33.401, the 6.1.1 joint)
(8) MME is to the ME(mobile device: Mobile Equipment) distribute GUTI, upgrade the PKI file if desired, then subsidiaryly issuing new PKI file PKFn, if do not need to upgrade the PKI file, then do not issue this parameter.
(9) if mobile phone is received PKFn, USIM if checking gets nowhere then abandons this parameter, continues to use old PKI file PKFo with the signature of the new PKI file PKFn of old PKI file PKo checking.If be proved to be successful then replace old PKFo, adopt new PKn to encrypt IMSI when network next time.
(10) mobile phone reports the allocation result of GUTI and PKFn in the step (9) to MME.
User identity protection method based on PKI mechanism of the present invention has the following advantages: at first because the assailant does not know the private key of HSS, can not be to ECC(PK, (IMSI||R||VER_PK)) be decrypted.Simultaneously at ECC(PK, (IMSI||R||VER_PK)) in added random number R, make the assailant can not obtain the correlation of each reported data.Secondly: HSS will decipher the VER_PK data and compare with plaintext VER_PK data, guarantee the integrality of data, and prevent assailant's distorting data.When key was changed, HSS signed to PK and has guaranteed validity and the legitimacy that key is changed, and prevents to palm off the deception of network to mobile phone.The public private key pair of HSS is convenient to safeguard, management and changing, and SK is kept among the HSS forever, and the assailant can not derive SK by PK.Adopt key replacing mechanism that security intensity is further improved, increased assailant's decoding difficulty.Do not have private key at the usim card end, PKI can onlinely be changed.
Above-described specific embodiment; purpose of the present invention, technical scheme and beneficial effect are further described; institute is understood that; the above only is specific embodiments of the invention; be not limited to the present invention; within the spirit and principles in the present invention all, any modification of being made, be equal to replacement, improvement etc., all should be included within protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. user identity protection method based on PKI mechanism, the method includes the steps of:
(1) produce a pair of public private key pair PK and SK by HSS, PKI PK is preset in the usim card of its UE of ownership with the form of PKI file PKF, and private key SK is stored among the HSS;
(2) mobile phone of MME usim card in preserving step (1) sends the user identity request;
When (3) mobile phone networks with following message:
HSS sign: HSS_ID;
PKI PK version number: VER_PK;
Adopt rivest, shamir, adelman ciphered data (IMSI||R||VER_PK);
Send to MME;
Wherein R is a random number, mixes with IMSI before encrypting;
(4) after MME receives message in the step (3), VER_PK, (IMSI||R||VER_PK) are sent to corresponding HSS according to HSS_ID;
(5) HSS receives that VER_PK, (IMSI||R||VER_PK) back utilization private key SK that MME sends are decrypted judgement.
2. the user identity protection method based on PKI mechanism as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that utilization private key SK in the described step (5) is decrypted and judges and may further comprise the steps:
At first differentiate PK version number, call corresponding private key SK (IMSI||R||VER_PK) is decrypted, decrypt IMSI and VER_PK*;
3. the user identity protection method based on PKI mechanism as claimed in claim 2, it is characterized in that described step (5) comprises that also HSS compares USIM VER_PK that reports and the VER_PK that oneself uses, if the VER_PK version number that USIM reports is current latest edition, then need not to upgrade the PKI file; If the VER_PK version number that USIM reports is an early version, then upgrade the PKI file.
4. the user identity protection method based on PKI mechanism as claimed in claim 3 is characterized in that described method is further comprising the steps of:
HSS issues the IMSI data of mobile phone and the Ciphering Key that produces according to IMSI to MME, upgrades the PKI file if desired, then attaches issuing new PKI file PKFn; If do not need to upgrade the PKI file, then do not issue this parameter.
5. the user identity protection method based on PKI mechanism as claimed in claim 4 is characterized in that described method is further comprising the steps of:
Enter authorizing procedure between mobile phone and the MME, and the authentication success.
6. the user identity protection method based on PKI mechanism as claimed in claim 5 is characterized in that described method is further comprising the steps of:
MME distributes GUTI to MS, upgrades the PKI file if desired, then attaches issuing new PKI file PKFn; If do not need to upgrade the PKI file, then do not issue this parameter.
7. the user identity protection method based on PKI mechanism as claimed in claim 6 is characterized in that described method is further comprising the steps of:
If mobile phone is received PKFn, USIM if checking gets nowhere then abandons this parameter, continues to use old PKI file PKFo with the signature of the new PKI file PKFn of old PKI file PKo checking; If be proved to be successful then replace old PKFo, adopt new PKn to encrypt IMSI when network next time.
8. the user identity protection method based on PKI mechanism as claimed in claim 7 is characterized in that described method is further comprising the steps of:
Mobile phone reports the allocation result of GUTI and PKFn to MME.
9. the user identity protection method based on PKI mechanism as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that the asymmetric arithmetic in the described step (3) is a RSA Algorithm.
10. the user identity protection method based on PKI mechanism as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that the asymmetric arithmetic in the described step (3) is the ECC algorithm.
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| CN106714159A (en) * | 2015-11-16 | 2017-05-24 | 普天信息技术有限公司 | Network access control method and system |
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| US11700131B2 (en) | 2016-03-10 | 2023-07-11 | Futurewei Technologies, Inc. | Authentication mechanism for 5G technologies |
| WO2018046017A1 (en) * | 2016-09-12 | 2018-03-15 | 中国移动通信有限公司研究院 | Information processing method, device, electronic equipment and computer storage medium |
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| CN106878009B (en) * | 2017-02-21 | 2021-04-09 | 蔚来(安徽)控股有限公司 | Key updating method and system |
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| US10798082B2 (en) | 2017-08-07 | 2020-10-06 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. | Network authentication triggering method and related device |
| CN109391942A (en) * | 2017-08-07 | 2019-02-26 | 华为技术有限公司 | Trigger the method and relevant device of network authentication |
| WO2019029531A1 (en) * | 2017-08-07 | 2019-02-14 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method for triggering network authentication, and related device |
| US12003957B2 (en) | 2018-10-04 | 2024-06-04 | Google Llc | Distributed network cellular identity management |
| CN109905879A (en) * | 2019-03-23 | 2019-06-18 | 西安电子科技大学 | Transmission line of electricity based on ECC algorithm monitors terminal security cut-in method |
| CN109905879B (en) * | 2019-03-23 | 2021-04-02 | 西安电子科技大学 | ECC algorithm-based safe access method for power transmission line monitoring terminal |
| CN113132979A (en) * | 2019-12-30 | 2021-07-16 | 中移雄安信息通信科技有限公司 | Method for acquiring and issuing IMSI encrypted public key and equipment |
| CN113132979B (en) * | 2019-12-30 | 2023-03-21 | 中移雄安信息通信科技有限公司 | Method for acquiring and issuing IMSI encrypted public key and equipment |
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