CN101951602A - Key distribution method with self-healing and head node revoking functions - Google Patents

Key distribution method with self-healing and head node revoking functions Download PDF

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Publication number
CN101951602A
CN101951602A CN2010105048390A CN201010504839A CN101951602A CN 101951602 A CN101951602 A CN 101951602A CN 2010105048390 A CN2010105048390 A CN 2010105048390A CN 201010504839 A CN201010504839 A CN 201010504839A CN 101951602 A CN101951602 A CN 101951602A
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node
group
session
key
healing
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温蜜
雷景生
袁仲雄
叶文珺
陈克非
郑燕飞
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Shanghai University of Electric Power
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Shanghai University of Electric Power
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Abstract

本发明涉及一种可自愈并带头节点撤销的密钥分发方法，采用的预分发的方式，在传感器节点撒布在具体区域之前就预置了秘密信息，然后利用秘密信息计算群组会话期密钥；当有消息丢失或者错过某些会话期时，节点仍然可以根据前后会话期的自愈秘密信息恢复丢失的会话密钥,而无需基站或者头节点为其重传广播消息，为网络节省了大量的通信和能量开销。另外,如果网络中负责组密钥分发的头节点被攻陷,敌人可能利用它来分发错误的会话密钥,进而使整个网络的通信不再安全,这种情况下网络中的其他节点可以根据某些已有规则监控头节点的行为并协同起来对其进行撤销,这也为网络中节点的正常运行提供了节点间相互监督的机制，还保障了网络中密钥信息的安全性。The present invention relates to a self-healing key distribution method that can be revoked by the leading node. The pre-distribution method is adopted, and the secret information is preset before the sensor nodes are spread in a specific area, and then the group session key is calculated using the secret information. key; when a message is lost or some sessions are missed, the node can still restore the lost session key according to the self-healing secret information of the previous and subsequent sessions, without the need for the base station or the head node to retransmit the broadcast message for it, saving the network Significant communication and energy overhead. In addition, if the head node responsible for group key distribution in the network is compromised, the enemy may use it to distribute wrong session keys, thereby making the communication of the entire network no longer safe. These existing rules monitor the behavior of the head node and cooperate to revoke it, which also provides a mechanism for mutual supervision between nodes for the normal operation of nodes in the network, and also ensures the security of key information in the network.

Description

But a kind of self-healing is also taken the lead the cryptographic key distribution method that node cancels
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of network security technology, but particularly a kind of self-healing and take the lead the cryptographic key distribution method that node cancels.
Background technology
In wireless sensor network, in order to ensure information security, internodal communication often needs to adopt safety measure protection.In all security mechanisms, encryption technology is the basis, can realize demands for security such as sensor network authentication, confidentiality, non-repudiation, integrality by encrypting.For encryption technology, encrypt and mainly contain two chief components, i.e. algorithm and key.Through years of researches and development, cryptographic algorithm has had very ripe international standard, such as: DES, AES etc., we can select according to the concrete application of sensor network.But no matter how powerful cryptographic algorithm is, we need first arranging key when carrying out confidential corespondence, if the key generation method a little less than having used, whole system all is weak and do not spent and decoded cryptographic algorithm so.Therefore the prerequisite that is a robust system with a strong key schedule, key management that Here it is.Therefore the key management in the sensor network becomes the key factor that influences network security.
According to tracking and the analysis to the domestic and international research document, in recent years, scholars both domestic and external had proposed multiple IKMP at wireless sensor network.Yet what most of agreements were paid close attention to all is the performance of the aspects such as connectedness, survivability, validity and autgmentability of key.Ignored under the situation of wireless transmission, information is lost or the node that has may be in resting state in a certain period through regular meeting, and under these circumstances, the self-healing ability of key mechanism is with extremely important.
The self-healing mechanism of key management is to guarantee that wireless sensor network carries out the important means of secure group communication on unreliable channel. particularly, in the group key distribution procedure, group key distribution broadcast is useful to the group member that is authorized to only, legal group member can recover shared cluster conversation key in conjunction with pre-assigned privacy information from broadcast, reversed and uncommitted disabled user then can not obtain the information of relevant cluster conversation key from broadcast, when legal group member returns group at off-line after a period of time more again, do not need to retransmit extra information and just can recover the cluster conversation key of losing immediately. cure mechanism certainly and in the wireless sensor network group key management, have important researching value.
Existing key managing project with self-healing ability, they all concentrate on the research of cancelling the aspect of guaranteeing network security and ordinary node.But we know; in each session cycle; the head node of group all will be responsible for other group membership's node distribution secret informations; therefore; group's head node is taken as target of attack probably and becomes the safe weakness of group. after group's head node is captured; the secret information that it sent will be no longer safe; the information communication of whole network also all will be exposed to the assailants of malice. therefore; should cancel in time for group's head node of being captured or to group's head node of the misbehave of hatching a sinister plot; forbid that it continues the power of distributed key or list it in the person of capturing list no longer to receive and trust its message by other nodes; thereby the key of protection subsequent network no longer victim obtains, and then ensures the safety of subsequent network.But current transducer key managing project does not have so good method.
Summary of the invention
The present invention be directed to present transducer key managing project and have unsafe problem, but proposed a kind of self-healing and taken the lead the cryptographic key distribution method that node cancels, have self-healing ability and can cancel again under the situation of ordinary node, can also cancel the method for malice head node in the group based on cooperating mutually between node.
Technical scheme of the present invention is: but N={ N is supposed in a kind of self-healing and take the lead the cryptographic key distribution method that node cancels 1, N 2..., N nBe all initial sets that participate in node in the group, and suppose that reversed node can not add network once more, is promptly cancelled node and has monotonicity, F qBe a finite field, wherein q is a big prime number, and all mathematical operations are all at F qIn carry out.If H and H ' be 0,1} → F qOn band key hash function, n, t are system parameterss, the method concrete steps comprise as follows:
1) generation of secret information and node initializing: in the starting stage, the sensor node in the network has been divided into several groups according to their deployed position or function, to each group such as group l, a shielding of base station selection at random multinomial h l (x, y, z) ∈ F q (x, y, z),
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Group lIn node N i To be deposited in privately owned secret S i =h l (i, y, z), simultaneously, the base station will selection group randomly lIn a node N g As the head node of group, and deposited in the group secret information G G, l ,
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
------A
Next, head node N gSelect a prime number as key seed at random K 0 ∈ F q Generate the session key and secret preservation of group, then, head node N gSelect an initial random number at random s 0 ∈ F q N is got up in secret too preservation gBe j session phase calculating of group again with one-way Hash function H s j ( J 〉=1):
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
-------B
H j J Hash operation of (.) expression, s 0 Be the seed key of one-way hash chain, s j Group will be sent in confidence lIn the node that is not cancelled;
2) secret information broadcasting: at j session phase of group, head node N gProduce a random number earlier
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
As the self-healing secret information of the j time session, then, head node calculates the session key of group j session cycle with another one-way Hash function H ' ()
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
, here
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
------C,
Be located at j session cycle when beginning, base station and head node have all been known the malicious node set
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
,
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
,
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
, s Max Be the predefined max-session periodicity of system, then, head node is broadcasted following message:
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
-------D
Here cancel multinomial
3) in j session, the checking of the recovery legitimacy of group session key and self-healing key: when a unrepealed node N i Receive message B j After, it will calculate according to equation D A j (x)With
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE024
In a value at i place, thereby draw group l jGroup key in the individual session:
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
,?where
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE028
------E
Then, node N i Calculate with equation D Decrypt
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE030
Thereby, obtain the self-healing secret information
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE032
4) checking of self-healing property: suppose node N i ∈ NAdd group j1 session phase, and j2 ( J1＜j2) the individual session phase cancelled node by group N i Receive the session secret information of broadcasting B J1 (1≤j1) and B J2 (1≤j1＜j2), still lost the broadcast of j session phase B j (j1＜j＜j2), when receiving broadcast B J1 With B J2 After, node N i Can calculate corresponding session phase key with equation D K J1 With K J2 ; Then, node N i With K J2 Decrypt
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
Thereby, obtain j1 session phase to the self-healing secret information between j2 session phase
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE036
At last, node N i Can recover the cluster conversation key that all are lost by following form with equation B:
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE038
，?
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE040
,?…,
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE042
；
5) adding of new node: when a newcomer after j session phase joins group, the session key of the interim group of session was not designated N with one now before it did not just allow to obtain v∈ NNode join j session when interim, the manager of group such as head node will be node N vDeposit message in S v ={ s j , h l (v, g, z);
6) ordinary node and head node cancels :
A) cancelling of ordinary node: when a reversed joint N I ' When receiving broadcast message, promptly for any one node N I ' ∈ R j , A j (i ')=0, can not calculate group key from our reversed as can be seen node of equation C;
B) cancelling of head node: in case a node N uThe head node GH that detects its place group is captured or is worked not normally, and it is with node N gDispose the same period enter network and also be ready to replace node N gAnd become group lNew head node, it can be initiated one and take turns the process of cancelling, so broadcast following message: Be-msg={ u, group header error type, group id l, after other node among the group l receives these broadcasts, if certain node N iAlso aware head node N gMay be captured and be ready to select node N uBe new head node, it will send message so Msg (i, u)= h l (i, u, s Max + 1)Give node N u, here s Max Be the predefined max-session periodicity of system and be disclosed parameter; Otherwise, node N iThen can abandon node N uBroadcast and do not do any response. as node N uAfter receiving the answer message of its neighbor node, it can check whether the sender of message is cancelled, if node N uSuccessfully obtained 2tIndividually do not cancelled the trust of node and receive interdependent answer message, it can calculate so h l (x, u, s Max + 1), node N is issued in the base station during again in conjunction with deployment uPrivate information S u =h l (u, y, z), it will derive following multinomial:
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE046
?------F
So, node N uWith head node N before gJoin to be cancelled in the node set and get
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE048
, and select a key to generate seed at random
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE050
With
Figure 2010105048390100002DEST_PATH_IMAGE052
For generating, the key in next session cycle of its place group prepares, next, and node N uCan be according to step 2) begin to provide the generation of key and self-healing to safeguard for the secure communication of group in the subsequent network.
Beneficial effect of the present invention is: but the present invention's self-healing and take the lead the cryptographic key distribution method that node cancels, the head node that when group key distribution, group key self-healing property are provided, can also cancel common malicious node and be captured, thereby both the normal operation for node in the network provided supervision mechanism, had also ensured the fail safe of key information in the network.
Embodiment
We suppose N={ N 1, N 2..., N nBe all initial sets that participate in node in the group.And suppose that reversed node can not add network once more, is promptly cancelled node and has monotonicity. F qBe a finite field, wherein q is a big prime number, and all mathematical operations are all at F qIn carry out.If H and H ' be 0,1} → F qOn keyed Hash function, n, t are system parameterss.
The present invention comprises six processes altogether: 1) generation of secret information and node initializing; 2), secret information broadcasting; 3) in j session, the checking of the recovery legitimacy of group session key and self-healing key; 4) checking of self-healing property; 5) adding of new node; 6) ordinary node and head node cancels.Concrete operating procedure is as follows:
1) process of the generation of secret information and node initializing is: at first, in the starting stage, the sensor node in the network has been divided into several groups according to their deployed position or function.To each group such as group l, a shielding of base station selection immediately multinomial h l (x, y, z) ∈ F q (x, y, z), here
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE054
. (1)
Correspondingly, group lIn node N i To be deposited in privately owned secret S i =h l (i, y, z), simultaneously, the base station will selection group randomly lIn a node N g As the head node of group, and deposited in the group secret information G G, l , here
Figure 712468DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
(2)
Next, head node N gSelect a prime number as key seed at random K 0 ∈ F q Generate the session key and secret preservation of group, then, head node N gSelect an initial random number at random s 0 ∈ F q N is got up in secret too preservation gBe j session phase calculating of group again with one-way Hash function H s j ( J 〉=1):
Figure 793164DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
(3)
H j J Hash operation of (.) expression, s 0 It is the seed key of one-way hash chain.Note, if a node has s j It will be easy to use one-way Hash function H to calculate s J ' (j '〉j), but can not calculate s J ' ' ( J ' '＜j). s j Group will be sent in confidence lIn the node that is not cancelled.
2) process of secret information broadcasting is: for j session phase of group, head node N gProduce a random number earlier
Figure 545219DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
Self-healing secret information as the j time session.Then, head node calculates the session key of group j session cycle with another one-way Hash function H ' ()
Figure 554632DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
, here
Figure 821665DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
(4) be located at j session cycle when beginning, base station and head node have all been known the malicious node set ,
Figure 253226DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
,
Figure 371224DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
, s Max Be the predefined max-session periodicity of system, then, head node is broadcasted following message:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE056
(5)
Here cancel multinomial A j (x)Be to construct like this
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE058
, and
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE060
Be to use in the present invention as the shielding multinomial.
3) in j session, the process of the checking of the recovery legitimacy of group session key and self-healing key: when a unrepealed node N i Receive message B j After, it will calculate according to equation (5) A j (x)With h l (x, y, z)In a value at i place, thereby draw group l jGroup key in the individual session:
Figure 935673DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
,?where
Figure 610368DEST_PATH_IMAGE028
. (6)
Then, node N i Calculate with equation (5)
Figure 822168DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
Decrypt
Figure 376646DEST_PATH_IMAGE030
Thereby, obtain the self-healing secret information
4) checking of self-healing property: from top description, the session key and the self-healing secret information of group all can recover as can be seen for we.
In order to further describe the self-healing property among the present invention, we suppose node N i ∈ NAdd group j1 session phase, and j2 ( J1＜j2) the individual session phase cancelled by group.Node N i Receive the session secret information of broadcasting B J1 (1≤j1) and B J2 (1≤j1＜j2), still lost (perhaps successfully not receiving) broadcast of j session phase B j (j1＜j＜j2).We are demonstration one lower node now N i How can utilize self-healing property to recover the session key of losing K j (j1＜j＜j2).
At first, when receiving broadcast B J1 With B J2 After, node N i Can calculate corresponding session phase key with equation (5) K J1 With K J2 ; Then, node N i With K J2 Decrypt
Figure 831079DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
Thereby, obtain j1 session phase to the self-healing secret information between j2 session phase
Figure 160035DEST_PATH_IMAGE036
At last, node N i Can recover the cluster conversation key that all are lost by following form with equation (3):
，?
Figure 348757DEST_PATH_IMAGE040
,?…,
Figure 365255DEST_PATH_IMAGE042
。
5) adding of new node: when a newcomer after j session phase joins group, the session key of the interim group of session before it does not just allow to obtain.Be designated N with one now v∈ NNode join j session when interim, the manager of group such as head node etc. will be node N vDeposit message in S v ={ s j , h l (v, g, z).
6) ordinary node and head node cancels :
A) cancelling of ordinary node: when a reversed joint N I ' When receiving broadcast message, even it is from the private information of oneself S I ' In obtained corresponding message
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE062
It can not recover session key and the self-healing secret information of current sessions phase, because for any one node N I ' ∈ R j , A j (i ')=0Can not calculate group key from our reversed as can be seen node of equation (4).
B) cancelling of head node: in case a node N uDetect the head node N of its place group gCaptured or work not normally, and it is with node N gDispose the same period enter network and also be ready to replace node N gAnd become group lNew head node, it can be initiated one and take turns the process of cancelling, so broadcast following message: B E-msg={ u, group header error type, group id l.After other node among the group l receives these broadcasts, if certain node N iAlso aware head node N gMay be captured and be ready to select node N uFor new head node (is found the method that certain node is captured and is selected the foundation of certain node to have a lot, but do not belong to the key issue of discussion required for the present invention, so supposition relies on existing some method node N here iFind and selected), it will send message so Msg (i, u)= h l (i, u, s Max + 1)Give node N u, here s Max It is the predefined max-session periodicity of system; Otherwise, node N iThen can abandon node N uBroadcast and do not do any response. as node N uAfter receiving the answer message of its neighbor node, it can check whether the sender of message is cancelled, thereby attacks if prevent to forge. node N uSuccessfully obtained 2tIndividually do not cancelled the trust of node and receive interdependent answer message, it can calculate so h l (x, u, s Max + 1). node N is issued in the base station during again in conjunction with deployment uPrivate information S u =h l (u, y, z), it will derive following multinomial:
Figure 676281DEST_PATH_IMAGE044
Figure 94535DEST_PATH_IMAGE046
(7)
So, node N uWith head node N before gJoin and cancelled node set
Figure 982856DEST_PATH_IMAGE048
In and select key to generate seed at random
Figure 52312DEST_PATH_IMAGE050
With For generating, the key in next session cycle of its place group prepares. next, and node N uCan process in accordance with the present invention 2 begin to provide the generation of key and self-healing to safeguard for the secure communication of group in the subsequent network.

Claims (1)

1. but a self-healing and take the lead the cryptographic key distribution method that node cancels is characterized in that, supposes N={ N 1, N 2..., N nBe all initial sets that participate in node in the group, and suppose that reversed node can not add network once more, is promptly cancelled node and has monotonicity, F qBe a finite field, wherein q is a big prime number, and all mathematical operations are all at F qIn carry out, establish H and H ' and be 0,1} → F qOn band key hash function, n, t are system parameterss, the method concrete steps comprise as follows:
1) generation of secret information and node initializing: in the starting stage, the sensor node in the network has been divided into several groups according to their deployed position or function, to each group such as group l, a shielding of base station selection at random multinomial h l (x, y, z) ∈ F q (x, y, z),
Figure 2010105048390100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Group lIn node N i To be deposited in privately owned secret S i =h l (i, y, z), simultaneously, the base station will selection group randomly lIn a node N g As the head node of group, and deposited in the group secret information G G, l ,
Figure 2010105048390100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
------A
Next, head node N gSelect a prime number as key seed at random K 0 ∈ F q Generate the session key and secret preservation of group, then, head node N gSelect an initial random number at random s 0 ∈ F q N is got up in secret too preservation gBe j session phase calculating of group again with one-way Hash function H s j ( J 〉=1):
Figure 2010105048390100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
-------B
H j J Hash operation of (.) expression, s 0 Be the seed key of one-way hash chain, s j Group will be sent in confidence lIn the node that is not cancelled;
2) secret information broadcasting: at j session phase of group, head node N gProduce a random number earlier
Figure 2010105048390100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
As the self-healing secret information of the j time session, then, head node calculates the session key of group j session cycle with another one-way Hash function H ' ()
Figure 2010105048390100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
, here
Figure 2010105048390100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
------C,
Be located at j session cycle when beginning, base station and head node have all been known the malicious node set
Figure 2010105048390100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
,
Figure 2010105048390100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
,
Figure 2010105048390100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
, s Max Be the predefined max-session periodicity of system, then, head node is broadcasted following message:
Figure 2010105048390100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
-------D
Here cancel multinomial
Figure 2010105048390100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
3) in j session, the checking of the recovery legitimacy of group session key and self-healing key: when a unrepealed node N i Receive message B j After, it will calculate according to equation D A j (x)With
Figure 2010105048390100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE024
In a value at i place, thereby draw group l jGroup key in the individual session:
,?where
Figure 2010105048390100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE028
------E
Then, node N i Calculate with equation D
Figure 370266DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
Decrypt
Figure 2010105048390100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE030
Thereby, obtain the self-healing secret information
Figure 2010105048390100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE032
4) checking of self-healing property: suppose node N i ∈ NAdd group j1 session phase, and j2 ( J1＜j2) the individual session phase cancelled node by group N i Receive the session secret information of broadcasting B J1 (1≤j1) and B J2 (1≤j1＜j2), still lost the broadcast of j session phase B j (j1＜j＜j2), when receiving broadcast B J1 With B J2 After, node N i Can calculate corresponding session phase key with equation D K J1 With K J2 ; Then, node N i With K J2 Decrypt
Figure 2010105048390100001DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
Thereby, obtain j1 session phase to the self-healing secret information between j2 session phase At last, node N i Can recover the cluster conversation key that all are lost by following form with equation B:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE038
，? ,?…,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE042
；
5) adding of new node: when a newcomer after j session phase joins group, the session key of the interim group of session was not designated N with one now before it did not just allow to obtain v∈ NNode join j session when interim, the manager of group such as head node will be node N vDeposit message in S v ={ s j , h l (v, g, z);
6) ordinary node and head node cancels :
A) cancelling of ordinary node: when a reversed joint N I ' When receiving broadcast message, promptly for any one node N I ' ∈ R j , A j (i ')=0, can not calculate group key from our reversed as can be seen node of equation C;
B) cancelling of head node: in case a node N uThe head node GH that detects its place group is captured or is worked not normally, and it is with node N gDispose the same period enter network and also be ready to replace node N gAnd become group lNew head node, it can be initiated one and take turns the process of cancelling, so broadcast following message: Be-msg={ u, group header error type, group id l, after other node among the group l receives these broadcasts, if certain node N iAlso aware head node N gMay be captured and be ready to select node N uBe new head node, it will send message so Msg (i, u)= h l (i, u, s Max + 1)Give node N u, here s Max Be the predefined max-session periodicity of system and be disclosed parameter; Otherwise, node N iThen can abandon node N uBroadcast and do not do any response. as node N uAfter receiving the answer message of its neighbor node, it can check whether the sender of message is cancelled, if node N uSuccessfully obtained 2tIndividually do not cancelled the trust of node and receive interdependent answer message, it can calculate so h l (x, u, s Max + 1), node N is issued in the base station during again in conjunction with deployment uPrivate information S u =h l (u, y, z), it will derive following multinomial:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE044
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE046
?------F
So, node N uWith head node N before gJoin to be cancelled in the node set and get
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE048
, and select a key to generate seed at random
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE050
With
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE052
For generating, the key in next session cycle of its place group prepares, next, and node N uCan be according to step 2) begin to provide the generation of key and self-healing to safeguard for the secure communication of group in the subsequent network.
CN2010105048390A 2010-10-13 2010-10-13 Key distribution method with self-healing and head node revoking functions Pending CN101951602A (en)

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