CN101710900B - Method for interacting signaling safely in session ignition protocol (SIP) registration domain - Google Patents
Method for interacting signaling safely in session ignition protocol (SIP) registration domain Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method for interacting signaling safely in a session ignition protocol (SIP) registration domain. The registration authentication process is the challenge-based registration authentication process which is defined in the RFC3261, but a digital certificate of the double-key mechanism is adopted in the registration authentication process, therefore, the bidirectional digital-certificate based authentication mechanism is realized, and a shared key SEED used for the non-registration signaling digital abstract authentication is transmitted safely. The non-registration authentication signaling adopts a convenient and efficient digital abstract authentication mode with strong compatibility so that the secure computing expenditure is very little, and the coexistence of high safety and high performance is realized. The invention can prevent the Impersonation attack, the Bye attack, the Cancel attack, the REFER attack, the UPDATE attack and other typical SIP attacks of the server. The invention utilizes the association of the registration authentication and the non-registration authentication and combines the high safety of the double-key authentication and the high efficiency of the digital abstract authentication, thereby having high utility value.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to method for interacting signaling safely in a kind of SIP log-on field, belong to communication and technical field of video monitoring.
Technical background
Conversation initialized protocol (Session Initiation Protocol is called for short SIP) receives very big concern in communication and network research field in recent years, and it is one of core protocol of next generation network.It is a standard that is proposed by the MMUSIC of IETF (Multiparty Multimedia Session Control) working group at first, with solving the signaling control on the IP network.On the IP network hierarchical mode, SIP is a signaling protocol that is operated on the application layer, can be used for setting up, revising and stop the Multimedia session process of participation in many ways.SIP is simply efficient because of it, aspect multimedia interactive, has obtained using widely; Yet; In the formulation process of Session Initiation Protocol; How most of attentiveness could be dynamic if all being placed on; Powerful, novel multimedia service function conveniently is provided, and has ignored fail safe, cause using merely Session Initiation Protocol to carry out inter-entity network service and face the registration deception, pretend to be server, distort message body and interrupt the threat and the attack of session etc.Therefore, in the system that with SIP is signaling, must effectively solve the safety problem of SIP session, otherwise system has by the danger of illegal control.
The fail safe of SIP is a vital problem, and a lot of solutions are arranged at present, but does not address this problem fully as yet so far.Session Initiation Protocol has provided four kinds of security schemes: HTTP discriminating, S/MIME, SIPS URI and transmission TLS and network layer ipsec security.(1) HTTP differentiates; It is a kind of security mechanism based on challenge-response structure that HTTP differentiates.The advantage that HTTP differentiates is simple, and password does not adopt the plaintext form on network, to send, and guarantees integrality to a certain extent.But there is serious potential safety hazard in traditional HTTP digest authentication: the unilateral authentication of server to client computer can only be provided, suffer the server spoof attack easily.Even used the HTTP digest authentication, assailant's this server that still can disguise oneself as carries out malfeasance.In addition, this authentication mechanism based on challenge responses makes signaling procedure elongated.(2) S/MIME; Safety/multipurpose Internet mail extension (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions; Be called for short S/MIME) be the secure e-mail agreement of expansion; Authentication mechanism depends on strict hierarchical structure, adopts undemanding trust model, and X.509 certificate format adopts.Encrypt and adopt symmetric cryptography and asymmetric encryption to combine, use the public key encryption session key earlier, use session key information again.The message that S/MIME mechanism produces is very long; Especially use the SIP tunneling mechanism; Therefore transport layer need be used the UDP mode that Transmission Control Protocol rather than Session Initiation Protocol are recommended; Thereby determine this security mechanism not use on a large scale, because have a lot of Session Initiation Protocol stacks and equipment not to support the TCP transmission means.In addition; Owing to use the both sides of S/MIME all must be able to check the other side's certificate; When in a local area network (LAN), using, also realize than being easier to; When between the net of several cities, in wide area network or the national network, using, the performance cost of examination certificate and construction cost and compatibility will be very big challenges, for the real-time system performance, be fatal.(3) transmission and IP Security; (Transport Layer Security TLS) provides connection-oriented Transport Layer Security service to Transport Layer Security.It works between TCP layer and the application program, can guarantee the confidentiality of data in transmission course through its TLS socket that provides.TLS mechanism is the most suitable not to have the structure of point-to-point of the trusting relationship of predefined, has realized that all any two internodal TLS connect and could guarantee the whole network SIP signaling security but for a network, have only.In addition, for TLS, on middle sip proxy server, connecting a large amount of UA, keep the long connection of a lot of concurrent TLS, is the thing of an effort.And TLS must adopt the cipher mode of hop-by-hop, with the time that prolongs user adding to conversation greatly.IPSec provides secure authentication and cryptographic services as a disclosed framework standard for the IP layer.The IPSec optimum is deployed in the sort of situation that is difficult to directly on the SIP application layer, increase fail safe.Have in advance the UA that shares key relation and the acting server of their first nodes and be well suited for using IPSec.But the IPSec network implementation is complicated, realizes that cost is higher, and the use of IPSec simultaneously will exert an influence to the performance of Network Transmission, thereby for being dispersed throughout the online sip terminal of Internet, it is unpractiaca setting up the IPSec passage all.In addition, IPSec can cause the problem that can't ensure safety when passing through NAT.(4) SIPS URI scheme; SIPS URI scheme is that of SIP URI grammer is additional, is different from " SIP " though this character string is " SIPs ".SIPS allows to specify the resource of hoping through secure access.The address-of-record that SIPS URI can be used as a specific user uses, and this user is known.When in request, using Request-URI, the SIPS scheme points out to ask each node of process, knows that request arrives the SIP element that this Request-URI of purpose indicates, and must encrypt through TLS; When the territory of target is arrived in request, its can be according to the local security policy and the forwarding strategy of aiming field, and very possible final step also is to arrive UAS with TLS.As the initiator who is used in request, SIPS encrypts the initiator to all paths of destination host.SIPS requires each node on the access link must possess the mutual authentication of TLS, and requires to support cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.The certificate that in verification process, receives should begin checking from the certificate root node that client is held, and certification authentication failure should cause the failure of asking.Because SIPS adopts the encryption of hop-by-hop and the mode of authentication, will prolong the time of user adding to conversation so greatly, cause the entire system performance low, construction cost is high.Owing to can face the registration deception when adopting Session Initiation Protocol to carry out inter-entity network service, pretend to be server, distort message body and interrupt the threat and the attack of session etc. as the control signaling; So in the system that with SIP is signaling, must effectively solve the safety problem of SIP session, otherwise system has by the danger of illegal control.Present existing safety method exists protective capability and performance defect, can not finely satisfy the demand of real-time system real-time high-efficiency.
Summary of the invention
The objective of the invention is to satisfy in a SIP log-on field real-time multimedia system to the high security and the high efficiency of signaling request.It has the fail safe of dual key system, has the high efficiency of digest authentication again, can well satisfy the real-time multimedia demands of applications.Sip message only is the message that is used for initiating media session and transfer control instruction in multimedia system; Itself does not contain user's private information the instruction that sip message carries, and does not protect the privacy of signaling can't cause the problem of leaking user's private information.Thereby instruction is private unimportant, need guarantee that execution command person only carries out the instruction that legal Shi Lingzhe sends, and guarantees that promptly the source of instructing is safe legal getting final product.The present invention has abandoned guaranteeing the technical thought of the privacy of signaling, only guarantees the non repudiation in signaling source and the integrality of signaling, can accomplish safe and efficiently like this, and then satisfies the real-time and the fail safe of real-time system.
The present invention adopts two allo signaling security processes to ensure the safety of SIP signaling in the log-on field, and these two signaling security processes are: based on the register command verification process of digital certificate with based on the non-registered signaling verification process of digital digest.Register command verification process based on digital certificate is that equipment and server carry out safety certification, for non-registered signaling procedure produces and safety transmission SEED.Guarantee that based on the non-signaling verification process of digital digest the signaling of carrying out is complete, the source is legal.
Based on the REGISTER signaling conversation procedure that the register command verification process of digital certificate utilizes SIP equipment to register to sip server, adopt dual key encryption and decryption and signature to test to sign and carry out two-way authentication and carry the session key SEED of non-registered signaling security process.The session key that non-registered signaling security process utilizes the register command security process to consult adopts make an abstract the together method of authentication of signaling and session key SEED to ensure legitimacy and the integrality that signaling is originated; System has also defined time window in this process, and the information outside the time window is directly abandoned, and effectively prevents the Replay Attack that time window is outer, and then ensures the ageing of signaling.
In the present invention, the dual key algorithm can be selected RSA, ECC etc., and hash algorithm can be selected SHA1, SHA256, MD5 etc.The present invention also can be in the register command verification process, with the dual key algorithm change into DES, 3DES, AES, SM1, etc. the key algorithm of symmetry, use preparatory cipher key shared as encryption key, thus the exchange SEED of safety; Non-registered signaling verification process does not need to change, and the safety method of the key of a registration process that a kind of security intensity is equal to wildcard intensity still can be provided, and it is high or do not have in the system of digital certificate to can be used for the system safety requirement of strength.
The invention has the advantages that: when facility registration, adopted the dual key authentication mechanism based on the digital certificate of challenge mode, its security intensity is equal to the security intensity of the digital certificate that is adopted.This authentication is two-way authentication, because the assailant can't copy effective certificate in the certificate security intensity, thereby can resist counterfeit equipment or server registration attack.Owing to be A=E [PRs; H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED)] (annotate: From, To, Call-ID, Contact are the corresponding field value of sip message header field) calculating; Contact has been done integrity protection; The assailant can't substitute IP address or URI address for another surreptitiously, thereby can resist SIP registration hijack attack.The shared key SEED exchange process that is used for the authentication of non-registered signaling digital digest has used certificate to ensure, the secret intensity during the SEED exchange is equal to the certificate security intensity.In non-registered signaling digital digest verification process, C=H (From+To+Call-ID+Date+SEED+ message body), because SEED is a secret, the security intensity of C is equal to the security intensity of hash algorithm.Because SEED is only effective in a term of validity, the general default value of this term of validity is 3600 seconds in the Session Initiation Protocol again, and this value can require to shorten according to security intensity, and therefore conjecture and the analytical attack to SEED also is very difficult.The value of C is along with From, To, Call-ID, Date and message body is different and different, and same message is only just effective in the time window that allows in system, thereby can the outer Replay Attack of resistance time window.Because each bar signaling of server and equipment room has all been carried out based on the digital digest authentication of sharing key and has been carried out integrity protection simultaneously, thus can effectively prevent based on the server spoof attack of forging message, Bye attack, Cancel attacks, REFER attacks and the UPDATE attack.
Non-registered signaling authentication of the present invention has been adopted and has been realized simple and direct, efficient, compatible strong digital digest authentication mode.Its signaling process is simpler than other authentication mode based on challenge, few two signaling procedures.Because adopted the authentication mode based on the digital digest of sharing key, operand is less than the operand based on symmetric cryptography or dual key encryption mechanism.The digital digest value of non-registered signaling authentication is carried in message header, and its signaling can not supported normally operation in digital digest authentication SIP equipment or the network at other.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the two-way authentication register flow path sketch map based on digital certificate of method for interacting signaling safely in a kind of SIP log-on field according to the invention;
Fig. 2 is the signaling initiator of non-registered method for interacting signaling safely in a kind of SIP log-on field according to the invention and recipient's Signalling exchange schematic flow sheet.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing and specific embodiment the present invention is done further detailed introduction; Like Fig. 1, shown in 2; The present invention has adopted the REGISTER registration message that defines among the RFC3261 based on the verification process of challenging, in this process in the register command verification process based on digital certificate; Except accomplishing the two-way authentication of server and equipment, also want the swap server of safety and the shared key SEED of equipment room.
When registrar was received the REGISTER registration message of equipment transmission, server produced a random number SEED (annotating: as shared key), and calculated the value of nonce, through 401 error messages the nonce value was sent to equipment end.Nonce=A&B (annotate: & is that character string connects decollator), A=E [PRs, H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED)] (annotate :+be the character string connector; H is the Hash computing), and B=E (PUd, SEED) (annotate: wherein, E is a cryptographic calculation; Registrar is s, and the PKI of registrar is PUs, and private key is PRs; Equipment is d, and the PKI of equipment is PUd, and the private key of equipment is PRd).
After equipment is received 401 message that server returns, decipher the B value with own private key, obtain SEED---D (PRd; B)=D [PRd, E (PUd, SEED)]=SEED; Calculate H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED) then; The D as a result [PUs, E [PRs, H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED)]] that utilizes result calculated again and decipher with server public key compares; If identical, prove that then the SEED value comes from the server that PKI is PUs just can carry out digital signature because only have the server of respective private keys to this SEED, thus authentication registrar.At this moment, equipment calculates the response value again, response=H (nonce+SEED), and the response value that will be worth as second REGISTER registration message sends to server end.
When server end was received second registration message from equipment, making an abstract with the nonce of SEED in message body of this equipment of own preservation was H (nonce+SEED), does comparison with the response value that this value and equipment are sent; If identical, explain that this message is the equipment of PUd from PKI, just can untie B=E (PUd SEED) obtains corresponding SEED because only have the equipment of corresponding private key PRd with PKI; So far server has also been done authentication to equipment, and after this server just can send the message 200OK that succeeds in registration to equipment, and concrete signalling interactive process is as shown in Figure 1:
1. the alignment SIP registrar server is sent the REGISTER registration message on the equipment.
2.SIP registrar is received the REGISTER registration message, generates random number as sharing key SEED.
3.SIP registrar calculates nonce value nonce=A&B, A=E [PR
s, H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED)], B=E (PU
d, SEED).
4.SIP being the nonce value with A&B, registrar sends 401 message to equipment.
5. when equipment is received 401 message, at first calculate D (PR
d, B)=D [PR
d, E (PU
d, SEED)] and obtain SEED, and calculate H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED) and D (PU
s, A)=D [PU
s, E [PR
s, H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED)]], when both were identical, message had promptly been done authentication to server from corresponding registrar.Calculate the response value, response=H (nonce+SEED).
6. equipment is that the response value is sent the REGISTER registration message with H (nonce+SEED) again.
7.SIP registrar is received register requirement; The SEED that sends to this equipment that preserves with oneself calculates H (nonce+SEED); The response that result of calculation and equipment are sent does comparison, and explanation is the signaling that relevant device is sent when identical, promptly equipment has been done authentication.
8. if checking is passed through, server then sends " 200OK " to equipment.So far, equipment is reached the standard grade and is succeeded in registration.
After the register command verification process completion based on digital certificate; Server and equipment have just been accomplished the exchange of shared key SEED; When server and equipment room have signaling to transmit, in SIP signaling head, increase a note territory, it has two parameter nonce and algorithm.Algorithm has shown the digest algorithm that nonce is used, and the value of nonce is H [(a From+To+Call-ID+Date+SEED+ message body)].When the recipient receives message, at first from message header, take out Date and the clock of oneself relatively, if not in time window, then abandon this instruction; If in time window, then with the SEED of own correspondence of preserving and the From in the message, To, Call-ID, Date, the message body calculating H [(From+To+Call-ID+Date+SEED+ message body)] that makes an abstract together.Nonce value in the note territory of carrying with this value and message values is done comparison, if identical, thinks that then this instruction is legal, accepts to instruct; Otherwise, instruct illegally, abandon this instruction; Because being the shared key between this equipment and server, SEED have only their both sides just can obtain this key.Idiographic flow is shown in non-registered signaling initiator of Fig. 2 and recipient's Signalling exchange flow process, and the initiator can be that server also can be an equipment.
The signaling initiator to send with H (From+To+Call-ID+Date+SEED+ message body) with oneself SEED calculating and sending be the sip message of nonce value.
2. the signaling recipient takes out the Date value of the message that receives, and the comparison time window is if signaling not in time window, abandons this signaling; Otherwise, carry out 3.
3. the signaling recipient calculates signaling digest value H (From+To+Call-ID+Date+SEED+ message body) together with From, To, Call-ID, Date, the message body of the SEED value of relevant device and the SIP signaling that receives; And with signaling in nonce value compare, if identical the commentaries on classics go to carry out 4; Otherwise, abandon this instruction.
4. the signaling recipient executes instruction.
5. to send with H (From+To+Call-ID+Date+SEED+ message body) be the sip response message of nonce value to signaling recipient calculating and sending.
6. the signaling initiator takes out the Date value of the message that receives, and the comparison time window is if signaling not in time window, abandons this signaling; Otherwise, carry out 7.
7. the signaling initiator uses From, To, Call-ID, Date and the message body of SEED value of oneself preserving and the SIP signaling that receives to calculate signaling digest value H (From+To+Call-ID+Date+SEED+ message body) together; And compare with nonce value in the signaling, if identical time execution 8; Otherwise, abandon this instruction.
8. the signaling initiator executes instruction.
The present invention is made up of two security process that are mutually related, i.e. register command verification process and based on the non-registered signaling verification process of digital digest.The register command verification process is the key that non-registered signaling verification process provides symmetry.Server side uses nonce=A&B (& connects decollator as character string) in the register command verification process, A=E [PRs, H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED)] (annotate :+be the character string connector; H is the Hash computing; From, To, Call-ID, Contact are the corresponding field value of sip message header field; SEED is the shared key of server and equipment room, and SEED is produced by server side, is delivered to preservation this shared key SEED in equipment side's behind the equipment side), and B=E (PUd, SEED) (wherein, E is a cryptographic calculation; Registrar is s, and the PKI of registrar is PUs, and private key is PRs; Equipment is d, and the PKI of equipment is PUd, and the private key of equipment is PRd); Equipment side use D (PRd, B)=D [PRd, E (PUd, SEED)]=SEED obtains SEED, judge whether the D [PUs, E [PRs, H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED)]] of deciphering equal with H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED); Calculate the value of response, response=H (nonce+SEED).Non-registered signaling verification process clip Text is H (a From+To+Call-ID+Date+SEED+SIP message body).The implementation step of method for interacting signaling safely is summed up and is summarized as follows in a kind of SIP log-on field of the present invention:
One, register command verification process.
Register command verification process step:
1, the alignment SIP registrar server is sent the REGISTER registration message on the equipment.
2, SIP registrar server is received the REGISTER registration message, generates random number as sharing key SEED.
3, calculate nonce value nonce=A&B, A=E [PRs, H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED)], B=E (PUd, SEED).
4, SIP registrar server is that the nonce value is sent 401 message to equipment with A&B.
5, equipment is received " 401 ", at first calculate D (PRd, B)=D [PRd; E (PUd, SEED)] obtain sharing key SEED, calculate H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED) and D (PUs then; A)=D [PUs, E [PRs, H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED)]]; When both were identical, message was from corresponding registrar, and promptly equipment has been done authentication to server.Calculate the response value, response=H (nonce+SEED).
6, equipment is that the response value resends the REGISTER registration message with the result of H (nonce+SEED) again.
7, SIP registrar server is received register requirement; Shared key SEED with this equipment of oneself preserving calculates H (nonce+SEED); The response that result of calculation and equipment are sent does comparison, explains when identical that this signaling is the signaling that relevant device is sent, and promptly server has been done authentication to equipment.
If 8 checkings are passed through, server then sends " 200OK " to equipment.So far, equipment is reached the standard grade and is succeeded in registration.
Two, based on the non-registered signaling verification process of digital digest.
Non-registered signaling verification process step based on digital digest:
1, the signaling initiator to send with H (From+To+Call-ID+Date+SEED+ message body) with the shared key SEED calculating and sending of own preservation be the sip message of nonce value.
2, the signaling recipient takes out the Date value of the message receive, and the comparison time window is if signaling no longer in the time window, abandons this signaling; Otherwise, carry out 3.
3, the signaling recipient calculates signaling digest value H (From+To+Call-ID+Date+SEED+ message body) together with From, To, Call-ID, Date, the message body of corresponding shared key SEED value and the SIP signaling that receives; And with signaling in nonce value compare, if identical the commentaries on classics go to carry out 4; Otherwise, abandon this instruction.
4, signaling recipient execution command.
5, to send with H (From+To+Call-ID+Date+SEED+ message body) be the sip response message of nonce value to signaling recipient calculating and sending.
6, the signaling transmit leg takes out the Date value of the message that receives, and the comparison time window is if signaling not in time window, abandons this signaling; Otherwise, carry out 7.
7, the signaling transmit leg uses From, To, Call-ID, Date and the message body of shared key SEED value of oneself preserving and the SIP signaling that receives to calculate signaling digest value H (From+To+Call-ID+Date+SEED+ message body) together; And compare with nonce value in the signaling, if identical time execution 8; Otherwise, abandon this instruction.
8, signaling transmit leg execution command.
In the present invention; Dual key algorithm in the register command verification process can be selected RSA, ECC etc.; Hash algorithm can be selected SHA1, SHA256, MD5 etc.; Also can with the dual key algorithm change into DES, 3DES, AES, SM1, etc. the key algorithm of symmetry, use preparatory cipher key shared as encryption key, thus the exchange SEED of safety; Non-registered signaling verification process does not need to change, and the safety method of the key of a registration process that a kind of security intensity is equal to wildcard intensity still can be provided, and it is high or do not have in the system of digital certificate to can be used for the system safety requirement of strength.
The invention is not restricted to the foregoing description, to those skilled in the art, any improvement that the above embodiment of the present invention is made or change can not exceed the embodiments of the invention that only illustrate by way of example and the protection range of accompanying claims.
Claims (1)
1. method for interacting signaling safely in the SIP log-on field; It is characterized in that: comprise two security process that are mutually related; Be register command verification process and based on the non-registered signaling verification process of digital digest, the register command verification process is the key that non-registered signaling verification process provides symmetry.Server side uses nonce=A&B in the register command verification process, A=E [PRs, H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED)], B=E (PUd, SEED) wherein, & is that character string connects decollator; + be the character string connector; H is the Hash computing; E is a cryptographic calculation; Registrar is s, and the PKI of registrar is PUs, and private key is PRs; Equipment is d, and the PKI of equipment is PUd, and the private key of equipment is PRd; From, To, Call-ID, Contact are the corresponding field value of REGISTER message header field; SEED is the shared key of server and equipment room, and SEED is produced by server side, is delivered to preservation this shared key SEED in equipment side's behind the equipment side; Equipment side's use D (PRd, B)=D [PRd, E (PUd; SEED)]=the shared key SEED of SEED acquisition; The D [PUs, E [PRs, H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED)]] that judges deciphering whether and the result of H (From+To ten Call-ID+Contact+SEED) equate; Calculate the value of response, response=H (nonce+SEED), non-registered signaling verification process clip Text are H (From+To+Call-ID+Date+SEED+SIP message body); Its step is following:
(1), register command verification process;
Specifically may further comprise the steps:
A), the alignment SIP registrar server is sent the REGISTER registration message on the equipment;
B), SIP registrar server is received the REGISTER registration message, the value of the shared key SEED of generation random number conduct;
C), SIP registrar server calculates nonce value nonce=A&B, A=E [PRs, H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED)], B=E (PUd, SEED);
D), SIP registrar server is that the nonce value is sent 401 message to equipment with A&B;
E), equipment receives 401 message, at first calculate D (PRd, B)=D [PRd, E (PUd, SEED)] obtains sharing key SEED; Calculate then H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED) and D (PUs, A)=D [PUs, E [PRs; H (From+To+Call-ID+Contact+SEED)]]; When both value is identical, prove message from corresponding registrar, promptly equipment has been done authentication to sip server; Calculate the response value, response=H (nonce+SEED);
F), equipment is that the response value resends the REGISTER registration message with H (nonce+SEED) again;
G), SIP registrar server is received register requirement; Shared key SEED with this equipment of oneself preserving calculates H (nonce+SEED); The response that result of calculation and equipment are sent does comparison, and explanation is the signaling that relevant device is sent when identical, and promptly server has been done authentication to equipment;
H) if checking is passed through, SIP registrar server is then sent " 200OK " to equipment, and so far, equipment is reached the standard grade and succeeded in registration;
(2), based on the non-registered signaling verification process of digital digest;
Specifically may further comprise the steps:
A), the signaling initiator to send with H (From+To+Call-ID+Date+SEED+ message body) with the shared key SEED calculating and sending of own preservation be the sip message of nonce value;
B), signaling recipient takes out the Date value of the message receive, the comparison time window is if signaling not in time window, abandons this signaling; Otherwise, carry out c;
C), the signaling recipient calculates signaling digest value H (From+To+Call-ID+Date+SEED+ message body) together with From, To, Call-ID, Date and the message body of the shared key SEED value of relevant device and the SIP signaling that receives; And it is compare, if identical then commentaries on classics removes to carry out d with nonce value in the signaling; Otherwise, abandon this instruction;
D), signaling recipient execution command;
E), to send with H (From+To+Call-ID+Date+SEED+ message body) be the sip response message of nonce value to signaling recipient calculating and sending;
F), signaling initiator takes out the Date value of the message receive, the comparison time window is if signaling not in time window, abandons this signaling; Otherwise, carry out g;
G), the signaling initiator uses From, To, Call-ID, Date and the message body of SEED value of oneself preserving and the SIP signaling that receives to calculate signaling digest value H (From+To+Call-ID+Date+SEED+ message body) together; And compare with nonce value in the signaling, if identical time execution h; Otherwise, abandon this instruction;
H), signaling initiator execution command.
Priority Applications (1)
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| US9450928B2 (en) * | 2010-06-10 | 2016-09-20 | Gemalto Sa | Secure registration of group of clients using single registration procedure |
| CN104683734A (en) * | 2013-11-26 | 2015-06-03 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Video surveillance content adaptation method, system, central server and device |
| CN104113547B (en) * | 2014-07-23 | 2017-04-26 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | SIP (session initiation protocol) security protection video monitoring network access control system |
| CN104717220B (en) * | 2015-03-25 | 2018-09-21 | 江苏物联网研究发展中心 | Based on the encrypted control signaling safe transmission method of hardware |
| CN106850521A (en) * | 2016-04-18 | 2017-06-13 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | A kind of key exchange method of end-to-end voip coded communication |
| CN108616350B (en) * | 2018-03-20 | 2021-08-10 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | HTTP-Digest class AKA identity authentication system and method based on symmetric key pool |
| CN108599926B (en) * | 2018-03-20 | 2021-07-27 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | HTTP-Digest improved AKA identity authentication system and method based on symmetric key pool |
| CN108924142B (en) * | 2018-07-13 | 2021-01-19 | 江苏中利电子信息科技有限公司 | Secure voice talkback communication method based on SIP protocol |
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