CN101697512A - Method and system for anti-interference quantum secure direct communication - Google Patents
Method and system for anti-interference quantum secure direct communication Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention provides a method and a system for anti-interference quantum secure direct communication. The method comprises the following steps that: a sending end performs non-orthogonal state combination coding, randomly expands a bit to two bits, randomly selects two different base combinations, converts the two bits into corresponding quantum states in the base combinations and then sends the two bits through a quantum channel; and a receiving end randomly selects two same base combinations for quantum state measurement so as to realize definite measurement on one bit. The method and the system can effectively solve the problem of quantum secure direct communication under the condition of not accurate measurement on the quantum, and realize point-to-multipoint quantum information distribution.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the quantum secret communication technical field, particularly a kind of method and system of anti-interference quantum secure direct communication.
Background technology
Over nearly more than 20 years, the quantum information technology has obtained extensive concern and fast development with the performance performance of its uniqueness, the quantum key distribution (QKD) that particularly can serve the practical privacy of secret communication network has been gradually improved and maturation, and can predict recent years QKD will be applied in the actual secret signalling, but QKD is the random bit Negotiation Technology of a uncertainty, is difficult to realize the QKD of the point of specific key to multiple spot.Owing to multiple reason, the direct communication technical development of carrying out set secret information based on quantum uncertainty principle utilization subchannel is slow.
Calendar year 2001, people such as Almut Beige have proposed deterministic secure communication (deterministicsecure communication) notion first.2002, Kim
Proposed deterministic secure direct communication (Deterministic secure directcommunication, i.e. Ping-Pong agreement) based on the quantum entanglement system with Timo Felbinger, it is the quantum secure direct communication of an accurate safety.2003, Deng FuGuo etc. has proposed Two-Step quantum secure direct communication (the quantum secure direct communication based on the storage of quantum entanglement attitude, QSDC), and claim that Two-Step QSDC scheme is intrinsically safe quantum secure direct communication scheme, but criterion according to his proposition, the Two-StepQSDC scheme in fact neither be truly the quantum direct communication, because it stores the secure distribution of at first tangling particle based on quantum, carry out distribution of information again; This is equivalent to the distribution that communicating pair has at first carried out shared key or supplementary.In a word, such scheme can not be realized safe quantum secure direct communication, can not resist quantum channel noise and eavesdropping to disturb.
Summary of the invention
The objective of the invention is to, a kind of method of anti-interference quantum secure direct communication is provided, can effectively solve the quantum secure direct communication problem under the quantum uncertainty condition, realize the quantum information distribution of point to multiple spot;
Another object of the present invention is to, a kind of system of anti-interference quantum secure direct communication is provided, can effectively solve the quantum secure direct communication problem under the quantum uncertainty condition, realize the quantum information distribution of point to multiple spot.
The method of anti-interference quantum secure direct communication of the present invention wherein, comprises the following steps:
Transmitting terminal carries out nonopiate state combination coding, and a bit is expanded to two bits at random, selects two different bases combinations then at random, and these two bits switch be in the described base combination behind the corresponding quantum state throughput subchannel send;
Receiving terminal selects two identical base combination carrying out quantum states to measure at random, realizes bit location survey amount really.
The method of anti-interference quantum secure direct communication of the present invention wherein, comprises the following steps:
Transmitting terminal carries out nonopiate state combination coding, and a bit is expanded to two bits at random, selects two identical bases combinations then at random, and these two bits switch be in the described base combination behind the corresponding quantum state throughput subchannel send;
Receiving terminal selects two different base combination carrying out quantum states to measure at random, realizes bit location survey amount really.
Wherein, before transmitting terminal carries out nonopiate state combination coding, further comprise the following steps:
Transmitting terminal inserts error detecting code D in ciphertext C; Receiving terminal at first discloses error detecting code after carrying out the quantum state measurement, the error rate of assessment error detecting code, if this error rate surpasses theoretical value, the communication then thought is eavesdropped, the agreement termination; Otherwise, the open random number R of transmitting terminal
xReceiving terminal random number R ' with random number R
xObtain information M behind the XOR.
Wherein, transmitting terminal inserts error detecting code D in ciphertext C before, further comprise the following steps:
Transmitting terminal is encrypted information code M, with random number R
xCarry out XOR with information code M, obtain
, wherein,
Be that mould 2 adds computing, ciphertext C is issued receiving terminal by quantum channel again by the QDC coding; Receiving terminal carries out the QDC decoding again, obtains message.
Wherein, before transmitting terminal is encrypted information code M, comprise the following steps: that further transmitting terminal carries out error correction coding to message I; Receiving terminal carries out error correction decoding again and obtains message I after carrying out the QDC decoding.
The system of anti-interference quantum secure direct communication of the present invention, wherein, comprise transmitting terminal and receiving terminal, wherein, transmitting terminal is used to carry out nonopiate state combination coding, and a bit is expanded to two bits at random, and select two different base combinations at random, be throughput subchannel transmission behind the corresponding quantum state in the described base combination with described two bits switch; Receiving terminal is used for selecting at random two identical base combination carrying out quantum states to measure, and realizes bit location survey amount really.
The system of anti-interference quantum secure direct communication of the present invention, wherein, comprise transmitting terminal and receiving terminal, wherein, transmitting terminal is used to carry out nonopiate state combination coding, and a bit is expanded to two bits at random, and select two identical base combinations at random, be throughput subchannel transmission behind the corresponding quantum state in the described base combination with described two bits switch; Receiving terminal is used for selecting at random two different base combination carrying out quantum states to measure, and realizes bit location survey amount really.
Wherein, described transmitting terminal before carrying out nonopiate state combination coding, is further used for inserting error detecting code D in ciphertext C; And receiving the open random number R of described receiving terminal
xNotice after, open random number R
xReceiving terminal is further used for after carrying out the quantum state measurement, open error detecting code, and the error rate of assessment error detecting code, when this error rate surpassed theoretical value, the communication thought was eavesdropped, the agreement termination; When this error rate does not surpass theoretical value, the open random number R of notice transmitting terminal
x, and with random number R ' with random number R
xObtain information M behind the XOR.
Wherein, described transmitting terminal inserts before the error detecting code D in ciphertext C, is further used for information code M is encrypted, with random number R
xCarry out XOR with information code M, obtain
, wherein,
Be that mould 2 adds computing, ciphertext C is issued receiving terminal by quantum channel again by the QDC coding;
Receiving terminal is used for the data that receive are carried out the QDC decoding, obtains message.
Wherein, described transmitting terminal before information code M is encrypted, is further used for message I is carried out error correction coding; Described receiving terminal is further used for carrying out error correction decoding and obtaining message I after carrying out the QDC decoding.
The invention has the beneficial effects as follows: according to the method and system of anti-interference quantum secure direct communication of the present invention, efficiently solve the information decoding problem under the quantum uncertainty condition, realized quantum secure direct communication; Realize quantum information or the key distribution of point, can solve cipher key distribution problem in the quantum secret communication network etc. to multiple spot; Utilize classical error correcting code to overcome the high bit-error problem of quantum secret communication system, reduced performance requirement quantized system.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the method schematic diagram of anti-interference quantum secure direct communication of the present invention.
Embodiment
Below, 1 method and system of describing anti-interference quantum secure direct communication of the present invention in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.
For convenience of description, below describe to adopt and be described with the similar method of nonopiate attitude quantum coding scheme that (the relevant programme principle can be with reference to the BB84-QKD agreement, Charles H.Bennett, and GillesBrassard, Quantum cryptography:Public key distribution and coin tossing, International Conference on Computers, Systems﹠amp; Signal Processing, Bagalore, India, December 10-12,1984, pp 175-179.), and agreement is used following quantum alphabet 1:
Table 1 quantum alphabet
That is: use two bases, one of them base comprises quantum state | 0 °＞and | 90 °＞, another base comprises quantum state | 45 °＞and | 135 °＞.Quantum state | 0 °＞and | 45 °＞representative " 0 ", quantum state | 90 °＞and | 135 °＞representative " 1 ".Being learnt by principle of quantum mechanics, is inconsistent to the measurement result of these two bases, promptly selects one to measure base the quantum state an of the unknown is measured at random, and measurement result is uncertain, if it is correct also promptly to measure base, the result who obtains so determines; Otherwise measurement result is at random.
As shown in Figure 1, the method for anti-interference quantum secure direct communication of the present invention comprises the following steps:
At first carry out nonopiate state combination coding, 1 bit is expanded to 2 bits at random, promptly obtain { 00 at transmitting terminal, 01,10, among the 11} one, select two different bases combinations then at random, and be these two bits switch that the throughput subchannel sends behind the corresponding quantum state;
Receiving terminal selects two identical base combination carrying out quantum states to measure at random, must select same base for use to it to 1 quantum state transmitting-receiving two-end wherein as can be seen, this bit has been realized definite reception, but receiving terminal does not also know it is which bit, therefore receiving terminal must openly be measured base, and only after transmitting terminal told which measurement result of receiving terminal is effectively and whether this bit be initial value, receiving terminal can obtain a bit.Because this communication process has been realized both quantum direct communications of given data (Quantum DirectCommunication), therefore be referred to as the QDC sign indicating number, respective coding and decoding are referred to as QDC coding and QDC decoding respectively.In addition, the choosing base compound mode of transmitting-receiving two-end is exchanged the scheme that back (be that transmitting terminal selects two identical bases combinations to encode, receiving terminal selects two different bases combination carrying out quantum to measure) obtains and also belong to a part of the present invention.
In addition, be exposed to the listener-in in order to prevent message, based on as mentioned above, transmitting terminal also needs M is encrypted, as shown in Figure 1, and random number R
xCarry out XOR with M, obtain
(
Be that mould 2 adds computing), ciphertext C is issued receiving terminal by quantum channel again by the QDC coding; Receiving terminal is carrying out the QDC decoding, and obtains message.
Whether further, eavesdropped in order to detect the quantum communication process, based on as mentioned above, transmitting terminal also need insert some error detecting code D in ciphertext C, as shown in Figure 1; Receiving terminal at first discloses error detecting code after carrying out the quantum state measurement, the error rate of assessment error detecting code just thinks that communication is eavesdropped if this error rate has surpassed theoretical value, and agreement stops; Otherwise, the open R of transmitting terminal
xReceiving terminal is R ' and R
xObtain information M behind the XOR.
Further, in order to strengthen the interference free performance of quantum communications process, based on as mentioned above, transmitting terminal also needs message I is carried out error correction coding, as shown in Figure 1; Receiving terminal carries out error correction decoding again and obtains message I after carrying out the QDC decoding.This error correction coding is a prior art, and the present invention is not described in detail.
Wherein, when specific implementation, can in ciphertext C, insert error detecting code in the following way:
For sending both situations of given data of n bit, for the Probability Detection eavesdropping with maximum, transmitting terminal can insert the n bit at random in this n bit both given data random bit carries out QDC coding and transmission to this 2n bit then as error detecting code.The present invention has designed the following information code and the layout scheme at random of error detecting code.
Two bit sequence D=(d for input
0, d
1..., d
N-1) and C=(c
0, c
1..., c
N-1), produce RN=(r at random
0, r
1..., r
N-1), and carry out randomly ordered to the Bit data among D and the C by method described below:
Fun(D，C，RN)＝(f(d
0，c
0，r
0)，f(d
1，c
1，r
1)，…，f(d
n-1，c
n-1，r
n-1))，
F (d wherein
i, c
i, r
i)=(d
i, c
i), if r
i=0; F (d
i, c
i, r
i)=(c
i, d
i), if r
i=1; RN only uses once in addition, does not need to share in advance.
After quantum communications finish, transmitting terminal is told the position of n bit-detection sign indicating number in whole sequence that receiving terminal inserts at random, receiving terminal screens corresponding bits and disclose corresponding measurement base and measurement result, transmitting terminal just determines whether to exist eavesdropping by the error code that compares this n Bit data, if there is eavesdropping, agreement stops; Otherwise receiving terminal is open to the pairing measurement base of all the other n Bit datas, and transmitting terminal tells which bit of receiving terminal is that effectively which needs negate, thereby finishes the both distributions of given data of n bit.
Below, operation principle of the present invention is specifically described:
Adopt QDC can under desirable channel condition, realize both quantum direct communications of given data; but the quantum information protection also must have following function; be that effective protection information is not revealed under any condition, guarantee the validity that eavesdropping detects, can tolerate certain quantum error code etc.Correspondingly, the present invention has selected classical error correcting code (ECC refers to classical error correcting code, can use error-correcting performance and efficient all convolution code, Turbo code, Hadamard sign indicating number, LDPC sign indicating number, utmost point long code etc. preferably), accidental enciphering (not having the one-time pad of sharing key), technology such as randomly ordered for use.
Realize the both definite reception of given data in the quantum channel system that makes an uproar is arranged based on QDC, as shown in Figure 1, random number R is carried out QDC coding and the throughput subchannel sends, receiving terminal carries out the QDC decoding, obtain existing the random number R of certain error code '.Following mask body is set forth the cataloged procedure of random number R and the process by random number R ' information extraction, i.e. the protocol procedures of anti-interference quantum secure direct communication, and be described below by protocol format:
1) supposes to obtain information code M after information I is through the ECC coding, i.e. M=m
0m
1M
N-1, transmitting terminal produces random number R x at random, and Rx is identical with the bit length of information code M, the row operation of going forward side by side
Produce random number D then at random as the eavesdropping error detecting code, the bit length m of D is not more than the bit length n of M, the bit of random number D is inserted among the ciphertext C at random, promptly carry out computing R=Fun (D, C RN), obtains the random number R of n+m bit, random number R is carried out the sequence Rs that QDC coding obtains 2 (n+m) bit, again Rs is converted to quantum state after the throughput subchannel send.
2) receiving terminal is measured according to QDC decoding rule, and obtain random number R '.
3) the open position sequence of random number D in random number R of transmitting terminal.
4) measurement result that the receiving terminal handle is relevant with random number D from random number R ' screen and measure base and measurement result openly corresponding, the sequence after the screening is designated as ciphertext C '.
5) transmitting terminal is eavesdropped detection, if error has surpassed the emergency exit limit value, thinks then to have eavesdropping that agreement stops; Otherwise, the open random number R x of transmitting terminal, agreement continues.
6) receiving terminal carries out computing
Then information code M ' is carried out the ECC decoding and obtains target message I.
Below, the performance index of QDC sign indicating number in quantized system are carried out labor.
(1) fail safe
Anti-interference quantum secure direct communication can detect eavesdropping and take precautions against eavesdropping, is the solution of a safety.Because on the one hand, if error code has surpassed the acceptable threshold value, agreement stops so; The listener-in can not extract any effective information from the quantum state of being eavesdropped, because she does not know to be used for the random number R of enciphered message sign indicating number, also promptly do not know the key of One-time pad, therefore can not obtain any effective information from the part ciphertext.Therefore the present invention can detect eavesdropping and can take precautions against eavesdropping.On the other hand, if do not exist under the situation of eavesdropping thinking, perhaps the influence that causes of eavesdropping within the acceptable scope and ECC can the situation of normal decoder under, still can exist some bits to reveal among the information code M ', these bits can not constitute a threat to information security so, because ECC can only correct a spot of error code, in most of code element all is under the condition of unknown, ECC can't decode, the listener-in can not effectively decode based on a small amount of bit information that these intercept so, thereby can not obtain any effective information.
Therefore, the present invention is the secrecy system of the physical security of approved safe, and can tolerate certain eavesdropping and error code, has system suitability and application prospect preferably.
(2) code efficiency
For with bigger Probability Detection eavesdropping behavior, need to select long error detecting code, need random number D the same at most with the bit length of information code M, can only use several error detecting codes the most at least, therefore, the code efficiency η of QDC satisfies condition
(wherein c represents the code efficiency of ECC).
(3) error-resilient performance analysis
There is certain classical error code because the quantum error code finally shows as the data that the recipient measures, therefore can utilize the ECC technology to overcome the influence that the quantum error code causes, thereby the error-resilient performance of QDC depends on the error-correcting performance of ECC fully.
If ECC adopts [7,3,4] linear block codes, it can correct a bit mistake so, also promptly can tolerate the quantum error code of 1/7=14.3%, and code efficiency is 3/7.
If ECC adopts [63,6,32] utmost point long code, it can correct 15 bit mistakes so, and promptly it can correct 23.8% quantum error code, but the code efficiency of this moment only is 9.5%.
(4) system suitability
More than describe based on single photon polarization state coding, obviously the present invention can be applied to the single photon communication system, and the present invention can realize on the quantum entanglement communication system that also difference is in the use of QDC sign indicating number in addition.It is right that transmitting terminal selects Z base or X base to prepare two EPR at random, and select base combination ZX or XZ base that these two particles 1 that tangle attitude are measured according to the QDC sign indicating number; Then particle 2 is sent to receiving terminal.Receiving terminal selects base combination ZZ or XX to measure to particle 2 at random.Can guarantee like this one of them quantum state to be carried out measurement of correlation, the result who obtains determining.
Therefore the present invention is applicable to single photon communication system and quantum entanglement communication system etc., has system suitability preferably.
In sum, the quantum secret communication method and system according to both given data of the present invention have the following advantages:
(1) the present invention has designed a non-orthogonal states combination coding and decoding scheme, efficiently solves the information decoding problem under the quantum uncertainty condition, has realized both quantum secure direct communications of given data.
(2) the present invention has designed a quantum secure direct communication scheme, can realize point-to-multipoint quantum information or key distribution, can solve cipher key distribution problem in the quantum secret communication network etc.
(3) the present invention is converted to classical error code to the quantum error code, utilizes classical error correcting code to overcome the high bit-error problem of quantum secret communication system, has reduced the performance requirement to quantized system.
(4) the present invention is the secret communication system of the physical security that can demonstrate,prove, there is not the back door, there is not the information security hidden danger that is replicated or usurps and bring based on system equipment of the present invention, also be that this quantum secret communication system can be accomplished not to be afraid of and loses, is not afraid of dissection and analysis, can really accomplish not concerning security matters of equipment.
More than be in order to make those of ordinary skills understand the present invention; and the detailed description that the present invention is carried out; but can expect; in not breaking away from the scope that claim of the present invention contains, can also make other changes and modifications, these variations and revising all in protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. the method for an anti-interference quantum secure direct communication is characterized in that, comprises the following steps:
Transmitting terminal carries out nonopiate state combination coding, and a bit is expanded to two bits at random, selects two different bases combinations then at random, and these two bits switch be in the described base combination behind the corresponding quantum state throughput subchannel send;
Receiving terminal selects two identical base combination carrying out quantum states to measure at random, realizes bit location survey amount really.
2. the method for an anti-interference quantum secure direct communication is characterized in that, comprises the following steps:
Transmitting terminal carries out nonopiate state combination coding, and a bit is expanded to two bits at random, selects two identical bases combinations then at random, and these two bits switch be in the described base combination behind the corresponding quantum state throughput subchannel send;
Receiving terminal selects two different base combination carrying out quantum states to measure at random, realizes bit location survey amount really.
3. the method for anti-interference quantum secure direct communication as claimed in claim 1 or 2 is characterized in that, before transmitting terminal carries out nonopiate state combination coding, further comprises the following steps:
Transmitting terminal inserts error detecting code D in ciphertext C; Receiving terminal at first discloses error detecting code after carrying out the quantum state measurement, the error rate of assessment error detecting code, if this error rate surpasses theoretical value, the communication then thought is eavesdropped, the agreement termination; Otherwise, the open random number R of transmitting terminal
xReceiving terminal random number R ' with random number R
xObtain information M behind the XOR.
4. the method for anti-interference quantum secure direct communication as claimed in claim 3 is characterized in that, transmitting terminal inserts error detecting code D in ciphertext C before, further comprises the following steps:
Transmitting terminal is encrypted information code M, with random number R
xCarry out XOR with information code M, obtain
Wherein,
Be that mould 2 adds computing, ciphertext C is issued receiving terminal by quantum channel again by the QDC coding; Receiving terminal carries out the QDC decoding again, obtains message.
5. the method for anti-interference quantum secure direct communication as claimed in claim 4 is characterized in that, before transmitting terminal is encrypted information code M, comprises the following steps: that further transmitting terminal carries out error correction coding to message I; Receiving terminal carries out error correction decoding again and obtains message I after carrying out the QDC decoding.
6. the system of an anti-interference quantum secure direct communication is characterized in that, comprises transmitting terminal and receiving terminal, wherein,
Transmitting terminal is used to carry out nonopiate state combination and encodes, and a bit is expanded to two bits at random, and selects two different bases combinations at random, is throughput subchannel transmission behind the corresponding quantum state in the described base combination with described two bits switch;
Receiving terminal is used for selecting at random two identical base combination carrying out quantum states to measure, and realizes bit location survey amount really.
7. the system of an anti-interference quantum secure direct communication is characterized in that, comprises transmitting terminal and receiving terminal, wherein,
Transmitting terminal is used to carry out nonopiate state combination and encodes, and a bit is expanded to two bits at random, and selects two identical bases combinations at random, is throughput subchannel transmission behind the corresponding quantum state in the described base combination with described two bits switch;
Receiving terminal is used for selecting at random two different base combination carrying out quantum states to measure, and realizes bit location survey amount really.
8. as the system of claim 6 or 7 described anti-interference quantum secure direct communications, it is characterized in that described transmitting terminal before carrying out nonopiate state combination coding, is further used for inserting error detecting code D in ciphertext C; And receiving the open random number R of described receiving terminal
xNotice after, open random number R
x
Receiving terminal is further used for after carrying out the quantum state measurement, open error detecting code, and the error rate of assessment error detecting code, when this error rate surpassed theoretical value, the communication thought was eavesdropped, the agreement termination; When this error rate does not surpass theoretical value, the open random number R of notice transmitting terminal
x, and with random number R ' with random number R
xObtain information M behind the XOR.
9. the system of anti-interference quantum secure direct communication as claimed in claim 8 is characterized in that,
Described transmitting terminal inserts before the error detecting code D in ciphertext C, is further used for information code M is encrypted, with random number R
xCarry out XOR with information code M, obtain
Wherein,
Be that mould 2 adds computing, ciphertext C is issued receiving terminal by quantum channel again by the QDC coding;
Receiving terminal is used for the data that receive are carried out the QDC decoding, obtains message.
10. the system of anti-interference quantum secure direct communication as claimed in claim 9 is characterized in that,
Described transmitting terminal before information code M is encrypted, is further used for message I is carried out error correction coding;
Described receiving terminal is further used for carrying out error correction decoding and obtaining message I after carrying out the QDC decoding.
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| CN101931528B (en) * | 2010-07-23 | 2011-12-07 | 北京邮电大学 | Method for attacking Fourier transform quantum secret sharing systems |
| CN101931528A (en) * | 2010-07-23 | 2010-12-29 | 北京邮电大学 | Method for attacking Fourier transform quantum secret sharing systems |
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| CN104468097A (en) * | 2015-01-13 | 2015-03-25 | 中国人民解放军理工大学 | Security data communication achieving method based on quantum key distribution |
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| US11258580B2 (en) * | 2019-10-04 | 2022-02-22 | Red Hat, Inc. | Instantaneous key invalidation in response to a detected eavesdropper |
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