CN101667914B - Method and equipment for managing public key certificate - Google Patents
Method and equipment for managing public key certificate Download PDFInfo
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- CN101667914B CN101667914B CN2008102129153A CN200810212915A CN101667914B CN 101667914 B CN101667914 B CN 101667914B CN 2008102129153 A CN2008102129153 A CN 2008102129153A CN 200810212915 A CN200810212915 A CN 200810212915A CN 101667914 B CN101667914 B CN 101667914B
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method and equipment for managing a public key certificate, which belong to the filed of network information security. The method comprises the following steps: generating an authenticated core of a first node; generating the public key certificate of the first node according to the authenticated core; and transmitting the public key certificate to a second node. The equipment comprises an authenticated core generating module, a public key certificate generating module and a public key certificate transmitting module. The method and the equipment for managing the public key certificate ensure that a node can completely manage the public key certificate independently and autonomously through authenticated core technology, and get rid of the dependence on a trusted third party in any form radically; therefore, the node can adapt to an application environment of a completely autonomous mobile ad hoc network effectively; and the management of the public key certificate of the node have complete distributivity and self-organization.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to filed of network information security, particularly a kind of management method of public key certificate and equipment.
Background technology
Mobile ad hoc network is derivative a kind of network configuration technology from exploitation U.S. Department of Defense seventies in 20th century " battlefield wireless packet data network (PRNET, PacketRadio Network)) " project.Simultaneously; It has also drawn (the SURAN of U.S. Department of Defense's " anti-adaptive network of ruining " respectively; Survivable Adaptive Network) and the networking thought of " Globle Mobile Information Systems " projects such as (GloMo, Global Mobile Information Systems).Mobile ad hoc network is a kind of wireless mobile multi-hop network that does not rely on any static infrastructure, is the necessary complement and the extension of the Internet.Along with the development of wireless communication technology and portable terminal technology, mobile ad hoc network comes into one's own in the application in field such as dual-use day by day, and the research of related fields deepens continuously.
Mobile ad hoc network also has complete distributivity, node autonomy and opening except having mobility, self-organization.Specifically, all nodes all are reciprocity in the mobile ad hoc network, for accomplishing a task, need cooperation each other between the node, have complete distributivity; The various resources that each node is all fully independently managed and drawn oneself up, the decision factum has the node autonomy; In addition, because the mobility of node, each node can freely add or exit network at any time, is difficult to set up the stabilizing effective trusting relationship between node, so mobile ad hoc network also has opening.In the network environment of this distribution, autonomy, opening, if node has independently separate sources, these isolated nodes often are difficult to trust certain third party.In this case, each node all hopes oneself can independently control and manage the various resources of oneself, and does not rely on any type of trusted third party.
Public-key cryptography (abbreviation PKI) technology is a kind of important key cryptosystem, in the network information security, is bringing into play crucial effects, is widely used in authentication, digital signature and close will the negotiation.Public key certificate is the important carrier of public-key cryptography.The management of public key certificate comprises generation, distribution, checking to public key certificate usually, upgrades and cancels, and the management of public key certificate is the important foundation that realizes the network information security.Because have only key that effective public key certificate Managed Solution could guarantee that node in the network has oneself easily to (private cipher key/public-key cryptography); Realize effective key change with other node; Realize the authentication of internodal cipher consistency (key agreement), node and to the digital signature of message, so the management of public key certificate is most important to the safety that realizes network system.The management of public key certificate also is to realize the important foundation of mobile ad hoc network information security technology.
The management method of current mobile ad hoc network public key certificate roughly is divided into following two big types:
1. manage based on the distributed public key certificate of threshold password system
Research about the wireless self-networking security mechanism; Mostly be to adopt PKI (Public Key Infrastructure at present; Public key infrastructure)/CA (Certificate Authority; Authentication) mechanism promptly adopts public-key cryptosystem and public key certificate to realize identity discriminating and session key agreement etc.Such scheme often is distributed to the function of CA (CA) among the conventional P KI on n the server node, and (t≤n) individual node provides the function of traditional C A to any t through wherein for other node.
2. the management of self-organizing class public key certificate
This scheme is stressed that the public key certificate way to manage of node should not rely on any type of trusted third party (like the Distributed C A in the above-mentioned thresholding mode), and should be realized the self-management of certificate by node to the self-organizing characteristic of mobile ad hoc network.The research work of this type scheme mainly concentrates on nearest 2 years, also is the focus and the difficult point of research.
Yet, because mobile ad hoc network is different from traditional fixed network, have characteristics such as above-mentioned complete distributivity, node autonomy and opening, lack the support of fixing online trusted third party.How distribute fully, under the environment that node is autonomous with open; Need not fix the support of online trusted third party; With higher efficient realize the node public key certificate generation, distribution, checking, upgrade and cancel, be exactly that the mobile ad hoc network public key certificate is managed problem to be solved.
In realizing process of the present invention, the inventor finds that there is following problem at least in prior art:
There are some Technology Needs service to be provided in the prior art, the autonomous characteristic of these technological incompatibility nodes in MANET through trusted third party (TTP, Trusted Third Party); Though some technology need not be passed through trusted third party (TTP, Trusted Third Party) in the prior art service is not provided, must shares some essential informations in advance between node, these technology do not realize that the public key certificate management is autonomous completely.
Summary of the invention
In order to make public key certificate management Complete autonomy, the embodiment of the invention provides a kind of method and apparatus of public key certificate management.Said technical scheme is following:
A kind of method of public key certificate management, said method comprises:
Generate the authentication nuclear of first node; Wherein, Authentication nuclear be first node cert administrative institute need to generate behind the taproot Information Signature from the confirms body, the authentication of said generation first node nuclear specifically comprises: obtain parameter; Said parameter comprises: p, q: two big prime numbers, and satisfy q| (p-1); G:1 is to an integer between the p, and g
q≡ 1 mod p; H (.): the unidirectional hash function of collisionless; NM: the title of said first node or to the descriptor of said first node; (x, y): the core PKI of said first node is right, wherein x ∈ Z
q *, being the core private cipher key, y is corresponding core public-key cryptography, and y=g
xMod p; (x
s, y
s): said authentication nuclear to sign and issue PKI right, x wherein
s∈ Z
q *, be signature private cipher key, y
sBe corresponding signature public-key cryptography, and
Picked at random f ∈ Z
q *According to c=g
fMod p, d=x
s+ H (A) f mod q calculates c, d, and wherein, A is from the said partial parameters that obtains choosing the parameter, A={y, y
s, NM, H (.), p, q, g}; Make that AC is a said authentication nuclear, said AC={A, c, d}, the authentication nuclear that then generates said first node is said AC={A, c, d};
According to said authentication nuclear, generate the public key certificate of said first node; Wherein, the public key certificate of the said first node of said generation specifically comprises: confirm the validity refresh cycle rp of the length n of unidirectional hash chain, said public key certificate, choose random number t, according to H
i(t)=H (H
I-1(t)), i=1,2 ..., n., calculating said unidirectional hash chain is { H
n(t), H
N-1(t) ..., H (t) }, wherein, H (t) is a unidirectional hash function, H
i(t) expression is to continuous i the recursive call of H (t); Picked at random k ∈ Z
q *, e=g
kMod p is according to x '=x+H (AC||y||H
n(t) || n||e) k mod q, y '=g
x' mod p, calculate the PKI of deriving to (x ', y '), wherein, x ' is the private cipher key of deriving, y ' is the public-key cryptography of deriving; Picked at random j ∈ Z
q *, according to v=g
jMod p, s=x '+H (T) j mod q calculate v, s, confirm the st constantly that launches of said public key certificate, make public key certificate information T=(y, H
n(t), n, y ', rp, st AC), then generates the public key certificate of said first node i refresh cycle and is: Cert={H
N-i(t), T, y ', e, s, v};
Said public key certificate is sent to Section Point.
A kind of equipment, said equipment comprises:
Authentication karyogenesis module is used to generate the authentication nuclear of first node; Wherein, authentication nuclear be first node cert administrative institute need to generate behind the taproot Information Signature from the confirms body, said authentication karyogenesis module; Specifically comprise: parameter processing unit; Be used to obtain parameter, said parameter comprises: p, q: two big prime numbers, and satisfy q| (p-1); G:1 is to an integer between the p, and g
q≡ 1 mod p; H (.): the unidirectional hash function of collisionless; NM: the title of said first node or to the descriptor of said first node; (x, y): the core PKI of said first node is right, wherein x ∈ Z
q *, being the core private cipher key, y is corresponding core public-key cryptography, and y=g
xMod p; (x
s, y
s): said authentication nuclear to sign and issue PKI right, x wherein
s∈ Z
q *, be signature private cipher key, y
sBe corresponding signature public-key cryptography, and
Choose the unit, after being used for said parameter processing unit selection or generating parameter, picked at random f ∈ Z
q *Computing unit, be used for said choose the unit and select f after, according to c=g
fMod p, d=x
s+ H (A) f mod q calculates c, d, and wherein, A is from the said partial parameters that obtains choosing the parameter, A={y, y
s, NM, H (.), p, q, g}; Authentication karyogenesis unit after being used for said computing unit and obtaining c, d, makes that AC is said authentication nuclear, said AC={A, and c, d}, the authentication nuclear that generates said first node is said AC={A, c, d} is with the identify label of said AC as said first node;
The public key certificate generation module, the authentication that is used for generating according to said authentication karyogenesis module is examined, and generates the public key certificate of said first node; Wherein, said public key certificate generation module specifically comprises: unidirectional hash chain generation unit, be used for confirming the length n of unidirectional hash chain, the validity refresh cycle rp of said public key certificate, and choose random number t, according to H
i(t)=H (H
I-1(t)), i=1,2 ..., n., calculating said unidirectional hash chain is { H
n(t), H
N-1(t) ..., H (t) }, wherein, H (t) is a unidirectional hash function, H
i(t) expression is to continuous i the recursive call of H (t); Derive PKI to generation unit, be used for picked at random k ∈ Z
q *, e=g
kMod p is according to x '=x+H (AC||y||H
n(t) || n||e) k mod q, y '=g
x' mod p, calculate the PKI of deriving to (x ', y '), wherein, x ' is the private cipher key of deriving, y ' is the public-key cryptography of deriving; The public key certificate generation unit is used for picked at random j ∈ Z
q *, according to v=g
jMod p, s=x '+H (T) j mod q calculate v, s, confirm the st constantly that launches of said public key certificate, make public key certificate information T=(y, H
n(t), n, y ', rp, st, AC), generating the public key certificate of said first node i refresh cycle is Cert={H
N-i(t), T, y ', e, s, v};
The public key certificate sending module is used for the public key certificate that said public key certificate generation module generates is sent to Section Point.
The beneficial effect of the technical scheme that the embodiment of the invention provides is:
Through the authentication nuclear technology; Make node fully self-government carry out the public key certificate management; Thoroughly broken away from dependence to any form trusted third party; Thereby the mobile ad hoc network applied environment that can effectively adapt to Complete autonomy makes the management of node public key certificate possess distributivity and self-organization completely.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the method flow diagram of a kind of public key certificate management that provides of the embodiment of the invention 1;
Fig. 2 is hash value and the corresponding relation figure of refresh cycle in the unidirectional hash chain that provides of the embodiment of the invention 1;
Fig. 3 is the sketch map of a kind of equipment of providing of the embodiment of the invention 2.
Embodiment
For making the object of the invention, technical scheme and advantage clearer, embodiment of the present invention is done to describe in detail further below in conjunction with accompanying drawing.
The embodiment of the invention provides a kind of management method of public key certificate, specifically comprises: the authentication nuclear that generates first node; According to authentication nuclear, generate the public key certificate of first node; Public key certificate is sent to Section Point.
Referring to Fig. 1, the embodiment of the invention provides a kind of management method of public key certificate, and each node is examined for himself signing and issuing authentication, thereby further generates the public key certificate (Cert) of oneself; When a node need be with another node communication, need communicate by letter with node V like node N, this node N can send to node V with its public key certificate, by the validity of node V check public key certificate; And each node can also upgrade or cancel the public key certificate of oneself where necessary, and need communicate by letter with node V with node N below is example, describes, and detailed process is following:
101: obtain (obtain or independently select or independently generate) parameter, this parameter is following:
P, q: two big prime numbers, and q| (p-1);
G:1 is to an integer between the p, and g
q≡ 1 mod p;
H (.): the unidirectional hash function of collisionless;
NM: the title of node or to the descriptor of node;
(x, y): the core PKI of node is right, wherein x ∈ Z
q *, being the core private cipher key, y is corresponding core public-key cryptography, and y=g
xMod p;
(x
s, y
s): authentication nuclear to sign and issue PKI right, x wherein
s∈ Z
q *, be signature private cipher key, y
sBe corresponding signature public-key cryptography, and
(x, y) right as the core PKI, it is right to be used at node local generation deriving PKI.
The above-mentioned process of independently selecting or generate parameter is the initialized process to node N; Can find out from above-mentioned initialized process node N; Independently accomplish initialization by node self, need not rely on any trusted third party, need not share any information in advance between node; Meet the characteristics such as complete distributivity, dynamic, autonomy of mobile ad hoc network fully, can be used for the node initializing in the mobile ad hoc network.
102: node N signs and issues PKI to (x through authentication nuclear
s, y
s), the partial parameters signature in the parameter that node N in 101 is independently selected or generates generates the authentication nuclear of node N.
Partial parameters A={y, y
s, NM, H (.), p, q, g}.Authentication nuclear (AC, Authenticated Core) be node cert administrative institute need to generate behind the taproot Information Signature from the confirms body, be that node realizes that the self-organizing public key certificate generates, the basis of management.
Node N is to A={y, y
s, NM, H (.), p, q, the g} signature, the process that generates authentication nuclear is following:
Secret picked at random f ∈ Z
q *, according to (1) formula, (2) formula, calculate c, d:
c＝g
f?mod?p (1)
d＝x
s+H(A)f?mod?q (2)
Above-mentioned basis (1) formula, (2) formula, the process that calculates c, d is exactly the signature process to the parameter among the A.
Make that AC is the authentication nuclear of node N, AC={A, c, d}.Because f is the random number that secret is chosen, so authentication nuclear AC has uniqueness, and in order to prevent that the node identity from being palmed off, node N examines the identify label of AC as oneself with authentication.
For guaranteeing that authentication nuclear AC is not forged, node N after generating authentication nuclear AC immediately with x
s, f destroys.
103: after node N generates the authentication nuclear of himself, generate unidirectional hash chain successively, utilize the authentication karyogenesis that generates in 102 PKI of deriving right, and then generate public key certificate.
The detailed process that node N generates its public key certificate is following:
At first, generate unidirectional hash chain, unidirectional hash chain is to be the basis with an initial value, the sequence of values of a forward-backward correlation that obtains through the unidirectional hash function of continuous recursive call.Suppose that r is an initial value, H (.) is a unidirectional hash function, H
i(.) expression is to continuous i the recursive call of H (.), that is:
Because H (.) is unidirectional hash function, so do not knowing under the situation of r, by H
i(r) ask H
I-1(r) (i＞1) is infeasible on calculating, and according to this one-way, each hash value of aforementioned calculation has just been constituted a unidirectional hash chain with opposite sequence arrangement:
H
n(r)，H
n-1(r)，H
n-2(r)，...，H
2(r)，H(r) n∈N
Though unidirectional hash chain only utilizes the unidirectional fast hash function of computing, some and the similar characteristic of public key cryptosyst are arranged.
Node N confirms length n, the certificate validity refresh cycle (rp, refurbish period) of unidirectional hash chain, chooses random number t, and (3) formula of utilization is calculated unidirectional hash chain:
H
i(t)＝H(H
i-1(t))，i＝1，2，...，n.(3)
Thereby obtain unidirectional hash chain { H
n(t), H
N-1(t) ..., H (t) }.Wherein random number t can be any number, also can be a sequence or character string or other.
As shown in Figure 2, hash value H
N-iCorresponding to i the validity refresh cycle of public key certificate, that is to say that (t) node N can be through issue H i refresh cycle
N-i(t) come the validity of its certificate is refreshed, just pass through H
N-i(t) confirm whether the public key certificate of node N is effective i refresh cycle.Like this, node N in fact just divides the lifetime of whole public key certificate for the n section, and every segment length is rp.Through corresponding hash value the validity of certificate in the corresponding refresh cycle is implemented control, thereby can realize cancelling of public key certificate more reliably.Owing to may not all use its public key certificate in each refresh cycle, so node can just issue corresponding hash value only when using public-key certificate, and the validity of certificate in the current refresh cycle is refreshed; Need not carry out any attended operation at ordinary times to its public key certificate.Thereby realized certificate management characteristic as required, effectively reduce the expense of public key certificate management.
Secondly, generate the PKI of deriving to (x ', y '), node N picked at random k ∈ Z
q *, e=g
kMod p, calculate the PKI of deriving to (x ' y ') according to (4) formula, (5) formula:
x’＝x+H(AC||y||H
n(t)||n||e)k?mod?q (4)
y’＝g
x’mod?p (5)
Wherein AC is the authentication nuclear (also being identify label) of node; X is the core private cipher key, and y is corresponding core public-key cryptography; N is the length of hash chain; T is a random number; (x ', y ') is that the PKI of deriving of node is right, and x ' is the private cipher key of deriving, and y ' is the public-key cryptography of deriving.
Generate the private cipher key x ' that derives through changeless core private cipher key x in the authentication nuclear in the local secret of node; And then generate be used for public key certificate derive PKI to (x '; Y '); Make that node can be right by the different PKI of deriving of same authentication karyogenesis where necessary, in time realize the renewal of public key certificate.
Then, the oneself who carries out public key certificate signs and issues, and node N utilizes the private key x ' that derives to sign and issue public key certificate for himself, the public-key cryptography of this certificate PKI y ' that derives exactly, and it is following specifically to sign and issue process:
Picked at random j ∈ Z
q *, according to (6) formula, (7) formula, calculate v, s:
v＝g
j?mod?p (6)
s＝x’+H(T)j?mod?q (7)
The moment (st, start time) of launching of confirming public key certificate makes public key certificate information T=(y, H
n(t), n, y ', rp, st, AC), then the public key certificate of node N i refresh cycle is:
Cert＝{H
n-i(t)，T，y’，e，s，v}
Cert={H
N-i(t), T, y ', e, s, the T among the v}; Y ', e, parameters such as s and v remained unchanged in the whole lifetime of public key certificate, only need be with corresponding hash value and { T, y '; E, s, v} are attached to together, just can constitute the public key certificate of corresponding different refresh cycles, and need not calculate again.
Launching the moment when st can be set at the public key certificate generation constantly of the public key certificate that comprises among the public key certificate information T also can be set at public key certificate and generate afterwards sometime.Node N can generate one or more public key certificate easily in advance under off-line state, so that use in the future.
By unidirectional hash chain, node N has been divided into n validity refresh cycle with the whole lifetime of public key certificate, and the lifetime of public key certificate is exactly the length n of unidirectional hash chain and the product of validity refresh cycle rp.Node N can specify the value of n and rp as required, thereby confirms the lifetime of public key certificate.
In addition, node N can generate a plurality of unidirectional hash chains in advance under initialization or off-line state.When public key certificate generates or upgrade, just need not to have calculated unidirectional hash chain, so temporarily from generation or the renewal that can quicken public key certificate.
104: after node N generated its public key certificate t in 103, when node N need be when node V communicates by letter, node N sent to node V with its public key certificate.
In order to make node V obtain the public-key cryptography of oneself; Node N is attached to public key certificate in the relevant data (like node N in digital signature applications to the signature of certain message) and sends to node V together; This has demonstrated fully the principle of issue as required, can effectively avoid the message transmission because of adopting broadcast mode issue public key certificate to produce in the network.
Node V verifies public key certificate, when a node V for the first time to the public key certificate of node N (i.e. { H
N-i(t), T, y ', e, s, when v}) verifying, whole verification process comprises the steps:
At first, the authentication nuclear AC that comprises in the verification public key certificate confirms the identity of node N, other basic parameter that adopts in the core public-key cryptography y of acquisition node N and the public key certificate.
The authentication that comprises among node V verification public key certificate information T nuclear AC={A, c, d}, A={y wherein, y
s, NM, H (.), p, q, g}, judge whether (8) formula is set up:
g
d≡y
sc
H(A)mod?p (8)
C=g wherein
fMod p, d=x
s+ H (A) f mod q if (8) formula is set up, explains that then the authentication nuclear of node N is AC, and the core public-key cryptography is y, and other relevant parameters of public key certificate are respectively H (.), p, q and g, explain impliedly that also node N holds and the corresponding core private cipher key of y x simultaneously.
Secondly, after the authentication nuclear AC that comprises in the verification public key certificate was correct, whether the public-key cryptography y ' that confirms public key certificate was to (x y) derives and comes, thereby whether explanation y ' is the employed public-key cryptography of public key certificate of node N by the joint core PKI.
Node V judges whether (9) formula, (10) formula are set up:
g
s≡y’v
H(T)mod?p (10)
T=(y, H wherein
n(t), n, y ', rp, st, AC).Can know by (4) formula, (5) formula, explain that then the PKI y ' that derives is derived by key x if (9) formula is set up, and x be exactly the core private cipher key of node N, that is to say that y ' is the current public-key cryptography of node N really; If (10) formula is set up and is explained that then y ' is the public-key cryptography of public key certificate; If (9) formula, (10) formula are set up simultaneously and explained that then public key certificate is exactly the public key certificate of node N, its public-key cryptography is y '.
Then, when the public-key cryptography y ' that confirms public key certificate be by the joint core PKI to (x, y) derive and come after, whether N effective in the current refresh cycle as the public key certificate of public-key cryptography with y ' for the checking node.
Node V calculates current refresh cycle i according to (11) formula:
Judge whether (12) formula is set up:
H
i(H
n-i(t))＝H
n(t) (12)
The time deviation of supposing node V and node N is at acceptable scope, t
NCurrent time for node N.If (12) formula is set up, explain that then the public key certificate of node N is effectively at current refresh cycle i, H wherein
n(t) derive from public key certificate information T, H
N-i(t) evidence that is node N in order to prove that public key certificate provides in the validity of i refresh cycle, since the one-way of H (.), H
N-i(t) can not forge.
If need be mutual once more with node N after the node V, node V can carry out buffer memory to the public key certificate of node N so.Mutual once more as node V and node N like this, and when being in mutual same refresh cycle last time, node V just need not verify public key certificate once more, thereby can reduce the complexity of algorithm; When node V and node N mutual once more; When being in different refresh cycle; When node V needed once more the validity of verification public key certificate, at this moment node V only need verify whether a lower node N is effectively just passable in the current refresh cycle as the public key certificate of public-key cryptography with y ' again.
Node V verifies according to above-mentioned steps the public key certificate of node N, public key certificate through checking after, node N just can be with node V secure communication.
The public key certificate that node N utilizes the private key x ' that derives to sign and issue for himself with other node communication, can avoid core private cipher key x to expose the attack of preventing malice node to greatest extent because of frequent the use like this.
105: after node N generated its public key certificate in step 103, after the lifetime of the public key certificate of node N finished, node N upgraded its public key certificate.
After the lifetime of the public key certificate of node N finishes, this public key certificate can't use.At this moment, node N can through regenerate new unidirectional hash chain, regenerate new derive PKI to, construct new public key certificate again, accomplish renewal to public key certificate, new public key certificate still uses former authentication nuclear AC, detailed process is following:
At first, node N confirms the length n ' of new unidirectional hash chain, new validity refresh cycle rp ' according to practical application request;
Choose new random number t ', the unidirectional hash chain new according to computes:
H
i’(t’)＝H(H
i’(t’))，i’＝1，2，...，n’.
Obtaining new unidirectional hash chain is { H
n' (t '), H
n'
-1(t ') ..., H (t ') };
If node has generated a plurality of unidirectional hash chains in initialization procedure, then do not need this process of repetition, node can directly be chosen a unworn unidirectional hash chain.
Secondly, regenerate new derivative key to (x ", y "), the interim picked at random k ' ∈ of node N Z
q *, e '=g
k' mod p, according to (4 ') formula, (5 ') formula calculate new derive PKI to (x ", y "):
x″＝x+H(AC||y||H
n’(t’)||n’||e’)k?mod?q (4’)
y″＝g
x″mod?p (5’)
(x ", y ") is that the new PKI of deriving of node is right, x " is the private cipher key of deriving, y and " is the public-key cryptography of deriving.
Then; The oneself signs and issues new public key certificate, and node N confirms that new certificate launches st ' constantly, utilizes the new private key x that derives " for oneself signs and issues public key certificate; the public-key cryptography of this certificate is exactly the new PKI y that derives ", and new public key certificate still adopts former authentication to examine AC.It is following specifically to sign and issue process:
Confirm the st ' constantly that launches of new public key certificate, make T '=(y, H
n' (t '), n ', y ", rp ', st ', AC), picked at random
Calculate v ', s ' according to (6 ') formula, (7 ') formula:
v’＝g
j’mod?p (6’)
s’＝x″+H(T’)j’mod?q(7’)
Then node N is at the new public key certificate of i refresh cycle:
Cert’＝{H
n’
-i(t’)，T’，y″，e’，s’，v’}
106: after node N generated its public key certificate in step 103, node N can carry out validity control and cancel public key certificate.
Node N is through the public key certificate of issue corresponding to the current refresh cycle; Make public key certificate effective; And when the private cipher key x ' that suspects the corresponding current refresh cycle of public key certificate is cracked or reveals,, stop to issue public key certificate in the next refresh cycle; Public key certificate was lost efficacy, realize existing cancelling public key certificate.Carry out detailed introduction in the face of it down.
(1) certificate validity control
As noted earlier, node N is divided into n validity refresh cycle rp with the whole lifetime of its public key certificate, and each refresh cycle is corresponding with a hash value in the unidirectional hash chain.In order to prove the validity of public key certificate in a refresh cycle, in time the issue public key certificate is corresponding to the unidirectional hash value of this refresh cycle for node N, and node V can in time obtain the current validity information of public key certificate through this hash value of checking.
The conventional public-key certificate is through the validity of the term of validity (validity period) show certificate; This term of validity was made up of a from date (notBefore) and a Close Date (notAfter), and the verifier confirms through judging whether current time was between these two dates whether certificate is effective.In case certificate generates, its term of validity has also just been confirmed (certificate all is effective) in the whole term of validity, and certificate is held the validity that node can't dynamically change certificate, only if the node updates certificate, and notify the former certificate of all nodes not re-use through broadcast mode.But because the node mobility of mobile ad hoc network, whole network might be split into some independent parts and can't be interconnected; And because the adding at any time of node and withdrawing from, a node may not receive certificate and hold the message that the former certificate of node notice does not re-use; So certificate is held message that node do not re-use former certificate will notify often difficulty relatively of all nodes.In addition, broadcast mode can produce a large amount of redundancy messages in network, brings bigger burden for whole mobile ad hoc network communication.
Comparatively speaking; The embodiment of the invention can have under the situation of the equal length term of validity (being the lifetime) at public key certificate; With thinner time granularity rp (being the 1/n of the term of validity) validity of public key certificate is implemented dynamically control; Make public key certificate effective through the issue public key certificate corresponding to the hash value of current refresh cycle, make the public key certificate inefficacy through stopping to issue corresponding hash value.Need not carry out any calculating and issue different hash values, need only with should value with the standing part of public key certificate T, y ', e, s, v} is attached to together and gets final product.The length rp of validity refresh cycle can be selected to confirm, when public key certificate generates or upgrade, can change flexibly based on needs by node oneself.Thereby the control of the validity of public key certificate has dynamic, flexibility and high efficiency.
(2) certificate cancels
Description according to top cert validity control is learnt; When the corresponding private cipher key x ' of its current public key certificate of node N suspection is cracked or reveals,, also can it be cancelled in the next refresh cycle even the lifetime of public key certificate finishes as yet; Specific practice is: the unidirectional hash chain through destroying current public key certificate and the initial random number t of this hash chain; Thereby stop to issue the corresponding value of all refresh cycles later on, in feasible each refresh cycle afterwards, node V can't obtain the corresponding effectively hash value of this certificate; Thereby can't pass through the checking of (12) formula, and then can confirm in time that this certificate is revoked.
This non-interactive type certificate revocation mode can solve under the mobile ad hoc network environment when adopting traditional certificate the problem that certificate revocation occurs better.For traditional certificate; When a nodes in MANET N suspects midway that its certificate is cracked and when issuing certificate revocation message; For above-mentioned reasons, checking node V possibly can't receive the broadcast of certificate revocation, can't know just that at this moment certificate is revoked.And checking node V judges from the term of validity of certificate, might think that the certificate that is revoked remains effective.At this moment, if this certificate is cracked, attack node and just can utilize this certificate successfully to palm off node N, and node N has no to discover.
Need to prove, monitor in real time, after the lifetime of public key certificate finishes, in time it is upgraded, generate new public key certificate through 105 pairs of public key certificate of above-mentioned steps; Carry out real-time effectiveness control through 106 pairs of public key certificate of above-mentioned steps, when the private cipher key x ' that suspects public key certificate is cracked or reveals, in time cancel public key certificate; Through above-mentioned steps 105 guaranteed in the step 104 when node N need be when node V communicates by letter, what node N sent to node V is effective public key certificate, rather than the invalid public key certificate that finished of lifetime; Through above-mentioned steps 106 guaranteed in the step 104 when node N need be when node V communicates by letter, what node N sent to node V is safe public key certificate, rather than private cipher key x ' unsafe public key certificate of being cracked or having revealed; Guaranteed that through above-mentioned steps 105 and step 106 node N communicates by letter with node V safely and efficiently in the step 104.
Technology in the method shown in the embodiment of the invention based on authentication nuclear; Make node fully self-government carry out the management of public key certificate; Thoroughly broken away from dependence to any form trusted third party; Thereby the mobile ad hoc network applied environment that can effectively adapt to Complete autonomy makes the management of node public key certificate possess distributivity and self-organization completely; And the public key certificate as required that distributes autonomous fully management; Greatly reduce the communication complexity in the management; The bookkeeping of all public key certificate of node is all accomplished in this locality based on application need by node, and all these operations all only just are performed when practical application demand is arranged, and need not carry out the additional maintenance operation at ordinary times to the public key certificate of node; Greatly reduce the communication overhead of public key certificate management, also eliminated the safety problem of the public key certificate management that causes because of interacting message basically.In addition,, make that the node utilization PKI of deriving is right, realized and the secure communication of other node, avoided the core private cipher key to expose the attack of preventing malice node to greatest extent because of frequent the use based on the technology of the PKI of deriving; And generate the private cipher key of deriving in the local secret of node through changeless core private cipher key in the authentication nuclear; And then it is right to generate the PKI of deriving that is used for public key certificate; Make that node can be right by the different PKI of deriving of same authentication karyogenesis where necessary, in time realize the renewal of public key certificate.Further, the validity of node public key certificate is implemented control, thereby can realize more reliably the cancelling of public key certificate strengthened the fail safe of public key certificate Managed Solution through unidirectional hash chain.
Referring to Fig. 3, the embodiment of the invention also provides a kind of equipment, and this equipment comprises:
Public key certificate generation module 302 is used for examining according to the authentication that authentication karyogenesis module 301 generates, and generates the public key certificate of first node;
Public key certificate sending module 303 is used for the public key certificate that public key certificate generation module 302 generates is sent to Section Point.
Wherein, authentication karyogenesis module 301 specifically comprises:
Parameter processing unit is used to obtain parameter, and parameter comprises:
P, q: two big prime numbers, and satisfy q| (p-1);
G:1 is to an integer between the p, and g
q≡ 1 mod p;
H (.): the unidirectional hash function of collisionless;
NM: the title of first node or to the descriptor of first node;
(x, y): the core PKI of first node is right, wherein x ∈ Z
q *, being the core private cipher key, y is corresponding core public-key cryptography, and y=g
xMod p;
(x
s, y
s): authentication nuclear to sign and issue PKI right, x wherein
s∈ Z
q *, be signature private cipher key, y
sBe corresponding signature public-key cryptography, and
Choose the unit, after being used for the parameter processing unit selection or generating parameter, picked at random f ∈ Z
q *
Computing unit is after being used to choose the unit and selecting f, according to c=g
fMod p, d=x
s+ H (A) f mod q calculates c, d;
Authentication karyogenesis unit after being used for computing unit and obtaining c, d, makes that AC is an authentication nuclear, AC={A, and c, d}, the authentication nuclear that generates first node is AC={A, c, d} is with the identify label of AC as first node.
Further, authentication karyogenesis module 301 also comprises:
Destroy the unit, after being used for authentication karyogenesis unit and generating authentication nuclear AC, with x
s, f destroys.
Wherein, public key certificate generation module 302 specifically comprises:
Unidirectional hash chain generation unit is used for confirming the length n of unidirectional hash chain, the validity refresh cycle rp of public key certificate, chooses random number t, according to H
i(t)=H (H
I-1(t)), i=1,2 ..., n., calculating unidirectional hash chain is { H
n(t), H
N-1(t) ..., H (t) };
Derive PKI to generation unit, be used for picked at random k ∈ Z
q *, e=g
kMod p is according to x '=x+H (AC||y||H
n(t) || n||e) k mod q, y '=g
x' mod p, calculate the PKI of deriving to (x ', y '), wherein, x ' is the private cipher key of deriving, y ' is the public-key cryptography of deriving;
The public key certificate generation unit is used for picked at random j ∈ Z
q *, according to v=g
jMod p, s=x '+H (T) j mod q calculate v, s, confirm the st constantly that launches of public key certificate, make public key certificate information T=(y, H
n(t), n, y ', rp, st, AC), generating the public key certificate of first node i refresh cycle is Cert={H
N-i(t), T, y ', e, s, v}.
Further, this equipment also comprises:
Public key certificate receiver module 304 is used to receive the public key certificate that public key certificate sending module 303 sends to Section Point;
Public key certificate authentication module 305 is used for the public key certificate that verification public key certificate receiver module 304 receives;
Wherein, public key certificate authentication module 305 specifically comprises:
The card unit is veritified in authentication, is used to verify g
d≡ y
sc
H (A)Whether mod p sets up, if set up, then the authentication of first node nuclear is AC, and the core public-key cryptography is y, and other relevant parameters of public key certificate are respectively H (.), p, q and g;
The public-key cryptography authentication unit is used for authentication and veritifies card unit checking g
d≡ y
sc
H (A)After mod p sets up, checking
g
s≡ y ' v
H (T)Whether mod p sets up, if two formulas are all set up, then public key certificate is exactly the public key certificate of first node, and the public-key cryptography of public key certificate is y ';
The validation verification unit is used for the checking of public-key cryptography authentication unit
g
s≡ y ' v
H (T)After mod p sets up, according to
Calculate current refresh cycle i, checking H
i(H
N-i(t))=H
nWhether (t) set up, if set up, then the public key certificate of first node is effective at current refresh cycle i.
Further, this equipment also comprises:
Public key certificate update module 306 is used for after the lifetime of the public key certificate that public key certificate generation module 302 generates finishes, public key certificate being upgraded;
Wherein, public key certificate update module 306 specifically comprises:
New unidirectional hash chain generation unit is used for confirming the length n ' of new unidirectional hash chain, new validity refresh cycle rp ', chooses new random number t ', according to H
i' (t ')=H (H
i' (t ')), i '=1,2 ..., n '., calculating new unidirectional hash chain is { H
n' (t '), H
n'
-1(t ') ..., H (t ') };
Newly derive PKI to generation unit, be used for picked at random k ' ∈ Z
q *, e '=g
k' mod p, the "=x+H (AC||y||H according to x
n' (t ') || n ' || e ') k ' mod q, y "=g
x" mod p calculates the new PKI of deriving to (x ", y "), wherein, x " is the new private cipher key of deriving, y " is the new public-key cryptography of deriving;
New public key certificate generation unit is used for picked at random j ' ∈ Z
q *, according to v '=g
j' mod p, s '=x "+H (T ') j ' mod q, calculate v ', s ', confirm the new st ' constantly that launches, make new public key certificate information T '=(y, H
n' (t '), n ', y ", rp ', st ', AC), generating the new public key certificate of first node i refresh cycle is Cert '={ H
n'
-i(t '), T ', y ", e ', s ', v ' }.
Further, this equipment also comprises:
Public key certificate validity control module 307; Be used to issue public key certificate corresponding to the current refresh cycle; The public key certificate that said public key certificate generation module 302 is generated is effective, and when the private cipher key x ' that suspects the corresponding said current refresh cycle of public key certificate is cracked or reveals, in the next refresh cycle; Stop to issue the public key certificate corresponding to the next refresh cycle, the public key certificate that said public key certificate generation module 302 is generated lost efficacy.
Technology in the device shown in the embodiment of the invention based on authentication nuclear; Make node fully self-government carry out the management of public key certificate; Thoroughly broken away from dependence to any form trusted third party; Thereby the mobile ad hoc network applied environment that can effectively adapt to Complete autonomy makes the management of node public key certificate possess distributivity and self-organization completely; And the public key certificate as required that distributes autonomous fully management; Greatly reduce the communication complexity in the management; The bookkeeping of all public key certificate of node is all accomplished in this locality based on application need by node, and all these operations all only just are performed when practical application demand is arranged, and need not carry out the additional maintenance operation at ordinary times to the public key certificate of node; Greatly reduce the communication overhead of public key certificate management, also eliminated the safety problem of the public key certificate management that causes because of interacting message basically.In addition,, make that the node utilization PKI of deriving is right, realized and the secure communication of other node, avoided the core private cipher key to expose the attack of preventing malice node to greatest extent because of frequent the use based on the technology of the PKI of deriving; And generate the private cipher key of deriving in the local secret of node through changeless core private cipher key in the authentication nuclear; And then it is right to generate the PKI of deriving that is used for public key certificate; Make that node can be right by the different PKI of deriving of same authentication karyogenesis where necessary, in time realize the renewal of public key certificate.Further, the validity of node public key certificate is implemented control, thereby can realize more reliably the cancelling of public key certificate strengthened the fail safe of public key certificate Managed Solution through unidirectional hash chain.
All or part of content in the technical scheme that above embodiment provides can realize that through software programming its software program is stored in the storage medium that can read, storage medium for example: the hard disk in the computer, CD or floppy disk.
The above is merely preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is in order to restriction the present invention, not all within spirit of the present invention and principle, any modification of being done, is equal to replacement, improvement etc., all should be included within protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. the management method of a public key certificate is characterized in that, said method comprises:
Generate the authentication nuclear of first node; Wherein, Authentication nuclear be first node cert administrative institute need to generate behind the taproot Information Signature from the confirms body, the authentication of said generation first node nuclear specifically comprises: obtain parameter; Said parameter comprises: p, q: two big prime numbers, and satisfy q| (p-1); G:1 is to an integer between the p, and g
q≡ 1 mod p; H (.): the unidirectional hash function of collisionless; NM: the title of said first node or to the descriptor of said first node; (x, y): the core PKI of said first node is right, wherein x ∈ Z
q *, being the core private cipher key, y is corresponding core public-key cryptography, and y=g
xMod p; (x
s, y
s): said authentication nuclear to sign and issue PKI right, x wherein
s∈ Z
q *, be signature private cipher key, y
sBe corresponding signature public-key cryptography, and
Picked at random f ∈ Z
q *According to c=g
fMod p, d=x
s+ H (A) f mod q calculates c, d, and wherein, A is from the said partial parameters that obtains choosing the parameter, A={y, y
s, NM, H (.), p, q, g}; Make that AC is a said authentication nuclear, said AC={A, c, d}, the authentication nuclear that then generates said first node is said AC={A, c, d};
According to said authentication nuclear, generate the public key certificate of said first node; Wherein, the public key certificate of the said first node of said generation specifically comprises: confirm the validity refresh cycle rp of the length n of unidirectional hash chain, said public key certificate, choose random number t, according to H
i(t)=H (H
I-1(t)), i=1,2 ..., n., calculating said unidirectional hash chain is { H
n(t), H
N-1(t) ..., H (t) }, wherein, H (t) is a unidirectional hash function, H
i(t) expression is to continuous i the recursive call of H (t); Picked at random k ∈ Z
q *, e=g
kMod p is according to x '=x+H (AC||y||H
n(t) || n||e) k mod q, y '=g
x' mod p, calculate the PKI of deriving to (x ', y '), wherein, x ' is the private cipher key of deriving, y ' is the public-key cryptography of deriving; Picked at random j ∈ Z
q *, according to v=g
jMod p, s=x '+H (T) j mod q calculate v, s, confirm the st constantly that launches of said public key certificate, make public key certificate information T=(y, H
n(t), n, y ', rp, st AC), then generates the public key certificate of said first node i refresh cycle and is: Cert={H
N-i(t), T, y ', e, s, v};
Said public key certificate is sent to Section Point.
2. the management method of public key certificate according to claim 1 is characterized in that, the authentication nuclear of the said first node of said generation is said AC={A, c, and behind the d}, said first node is with said x
s, said f destroys.
3. the management method of public key certificate according to claim 1 is characterized in that, said said public key certificate is sent to after the Section Point, also comprises:
Said Section Point receives said public key certificate;
Said Section Point is verified said public key certificate;
Said Section Point verifies that the process of said public key certificate is specially:
Said Section Point checking g
d≡ y
sc
H (A)Whether mod p sets up, if set up, then the authentication of said first node nuclear is AC, and the core public-key cryptography is y, and other relevant parameters of said public key certificate are respectively H (.), p, q and g;
Said Section Point checking g
d≡ y
sc
H (A)After mod p sets up, said Section Point checking
g
s≡ y ' v
H (T)Whether mod p sets up, if two formulas are all set up, then said public key certificate is exactly the public key certificate of said first node, and the public-key cryptography of said public key certificate is y ';
Said Section Point checking
g
s≡ y ' v
H (T)After mod p sets up, said Section Point basis
Calculate current refresh cycle i, said node verification H
i(H
N-i(t))=H
nWhether (t) set up, if set up, then the public key certificate of said first node is effective at current refresh cycle i.
4. the management method of public key certificate according to claim 1 is characterized in that, after the public key certificate of the said first node of said generation, also comprises:
After the lifetime of the public key certificate of said first node finished, said first node upgraded said public key certificate, generates new public key certificate;
Said said public key certificate is upgraded, the process that generates new public key certificate is specially:
Confirm the length n ' of new unidirectional hash chain, new validity refresh cycle rp ', choose new random number t ', according to H
i' (t ')=H (H
i' (t ')), i '=1,2 ..., n '., calculating new unidirectional hash chain is { H
n' (t '), H
n'
-1(t ') ..., H (t ') };
Picked at random k ' ∈ Z
q *, e '=g
k' mod p, the "=x+H (AC||y||H according to x
n' (t ') || n ' || e ') k ' mod q, y "=g
x" mod p calculates the new PKI of deriving to (x ", y "), wherein, x " is the new private cipher key of deriving, y " is the new public-key cryptography of deriving;
Picked at random j ' ∈ Z
q *, according to v '=g
j' mod p, s '=x "+H (T ') j ' mod q, calculate v ', s ', confirm the new st ' constantly that launches, make new public key certificate information T '=(y, H
n' (t '), n ', y ", rp ', st ', AC), the new public key certificate of then said first node i refresh cycle is:
Cert’＝{H
n’
-i(t’)，T’，y″，e’，s’，v’}。
5. the management method of public key certificate according to claim 1 is characterized in that, after the public key certificate of the said first node of said generation, also comprises:
Said first node issue is corresponding to the public key certificate of current refresh cycle; Make said public key certificate effective; And when the private cipher key x ' that suspects the corresponding said current refresh cycle of public key certificate is cracked or reveals; In the next refresh cycle, stop to issue said public key certificate, said public key certificate was lost efficacy.
6. an equipment is characterized in that, said equipment comprises:
Authentication karyogenesis module is used to generate the authentication nuclear of first node; Wherein, authentication nuclear be first node cert administrative institute need to generate behind the taproot Information Signature from the confirms body, said authentication karyogenesis module; Specifically comprise: parameter processing unit; Be used to obtain parameter, said parameter comprises: p, q: two big prime numbers, and satisfy q| (p-1); G:1 is to an integer between the p, and g
q≡ 1 mod p; H (.): the unidirectional hash function of collisionless; NM: the title of said first node or to the descriptor of said first node; (x, y): the core PKI of said first node is right, wherein x ∈ Z
q *, being the core private cipher key, y is corresponding core public-key cryptography, and y=g
xMod p; (x
s, y
s): said authentication nuclear to sign and issue PKI right, x wherein
s∈ Z
q *, be signature private cipher key, y
sBe corresponding signature public-key cryptography, and
Choose the unit, after being used for said parameter processing unit selection or generating parameter, picked at random f ∈ Z
q *Computing unit, be used for said choose the unit and select f after, according to c=g
fMod p, d=x
s+ H (A) f mod q calculates c, d, and wherein, A is from the said partial parameters that obtains choosing the parameter, A={y, y
s, NM, H (.), p, q, g}; Authentication karyogenesis unit after being used for said computing unit and obtaining c, d, makes that AC is said authentication nuclear, said AC={A, and c, d}, the authentication nuclear that generates said first node is said AC={A, c, d} is with the identify label of said AC as said first node;
The public key certificate generation module, the authentication that is used for generating according to said authentication karyogenesis module is examined, and generates the public key certificate of said first node; Wherein, said public key certificate generation module specifically comprises: unidirectional hash chain generation unit, be used for confirming the length n of unidirectional hash chain, the validity refresh cycle rp of said public key certificate, and choose random number t, according to H
i(t)=H (H
I-1(t)), i=1,2 ..., n., calculating said unidirectional hash chain is { H
n(t), H
N-1(t) ..., H (t) }, wherein, H (t) is a unidirectional hash function, H
i(t) expression is to continuous i the recursive call of H (t); Derive PKI to generation unit, be used for picked at random k ∈ Z
q *, e=g
kMod p is according to x '=x+H (AC||y||H
n(t) || n||e) k mod q, y '=g
x' mod p, calculate the PKI of deriving to (x ', y '), wherein, x ' is the private cipher key of deriving, y ' is the public-key cryptography of deriving; The public key certificate generation unit is used for picked at random j ∈ Z
q *, according to v=g
jMod p, s=x '+H (T) j mod q calculate v, s, confirm the st constantly that launches of said public key certificate, make public key certificate information T=(y, H
n(t), n, y ', rp, st, AC), generating the public key certificate of said first node i refresh cycle is Cert={H
N-i(t), T, y ', e, s, v};
The public key certificate sending module is used for the public key certificate that said public key certificate generation module generates is sent to Section Point.
7. equipment according to claim 6 is characterized in that, said authentication karyogenesis module also comprises:
Destroy the unit, after being used for said authentication karyogenesis unit and generating said authentication nuclear AC, with said x
s, said f destroys.
8. equipment according to claim 6 is characterized in that, said equipment also comprises:
The public key certificate receiver module is used to receive the public key certificate that said public key certificate sending module sends to said Section Point;
The public key certificate authentication module is used to the public key certificate of verifying that said public key certificate receiver module receives;
Said public key certificate authentication module specifically comprises:
The card unit is veritified in authentication, is used to verify g
d≡ y
sc
H (A)Whether mod p sets up, if set up, then the authentication of said first node nuclear is AC, and the core public-key cryptography is y, and other relevant parameters of said public key certificate are respectively H (.), p, q and g;
The public-key cryptography authentication unit is used for said authentication and veritifies card unit checking g
d≡ y
sc
H (A)After mod p sets up, checking
g
s≡ y ' v
H (T)Whether mod p sets up, if two formulas are all set up, then said public key certificate is exactly the public key certificate of said first node, and the public-key cryptography of said public key certificate is y ';
The validation verification unit is used for said public-key cryptography authentication unit checking
g
s≡ y ' v
H (T)After mod p sets up, according to
Calculate current refresh cycle i, checking H
i(H
N-i(t))=H
nWhether (t) set up, if set up, then the public key certificate of said first node is effective at current refresh cycle i.
9. equipment according to claim 6 is characterized in that, said equipment also comprises:
The public key certificate update module is used for after the lifetime of the public key certificate that said public key certificate generation module generates finishes, said public key certificate being upgraded;
Said public key certificate update module specifically comprises:
New unidirectional hash chain generation unit is used for confirming the length n ' of new unidirectional hash chain, new validity refresh cycle rp ', chooses new random number t ', according to H
i' (t ')=H (H
i' (t ')), i '=1,2 ..., n '., calculating new unidirectional hash chain is { H
n' (t '), H
n'
-1(t ') ..., H (t ') };
Newly derive PKI to generation unit, be used for picked at random k ' ∈ Z
q *, e '=g
k' mod p, the "=x+H (AC||y||H according to x
n' (t ') || n ' || e ') k ' mod q, y "=g
x" mod p calculates the new PKI of deriving to (x ", y "), wherein, x " is the new private cipher key of deriving, y " is the new public-key cryptography of deriving;
New public key certificate generation unit is used for picked at random j ' ∈ Z
q *, according to v '=g
j' mod p, s '=x " and+H (T ') j ' mod q, calculate v ', s ', confirm the new st ' constantly that launches, make new public key certificate information T '=(y, H
n' (t '), n ', y ", rp ', st ', AC), generating the new public key certificate of said first node i refresh cycle is Cert '={ H
n'
-i(t '), T ', y ", e ', s ', v ' }.
10. equipment according to claim 6 is characterized in that, said equipment also comprises:
Public key certificate validity control module; Be used to issue public key certificate corresponding to the current refresh cycle; The public key certificate that said public key certificate generation module is generated is effective, and when the private cipher key x ' that suspects the corresponding said current refresh cycle of public key certificate is cracked or reveals, in the next refresh cycle; Stop to issue the public key certificate corresponding to the next refresh cycle, the public key certificate that said public key certificate generation module is generated lost efficacy.
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| CN2008102129153A CN101667914B (en) | 2008-09-05 | 2008-09-05 | Method and equipment for managing public key certificate |
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| CN101860455B (en) * | 2010-06-28 | 2012-11-21 | 华中科技大学 | Method for construction of network trust topology based on reliable loop |
| CN103138923B (en) * | 2011-11-24 | 2016-06-22 | 中国移动通信集团公司 | A kind of internodal authentication, Apparatus and system |
| CN105812131B (en) * | 2014-12-30 | 2019-12-20 | 大唐高鸿信息通信研究院（义乌）有限公司 | Vehicle-mounted node certificate updating method based on vehicle-mounted short-distance communication network |
| CN106059747A (en) * | 2016-08-09 | 2016-10-26 | 成都蓝海贝信息技术有限公司 | Reusable public key certificate scheme based on public key infrastructure |
| CN114050899B (en) * | 2022-01-11 | 2022-07-12 | 深圳市永达电子信息股份有限公司 | Full life cycle monitoring method and system based on certificate distribution |
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| CN1801029A (en) * | 2004-12-31 | 2006-07-12 | 联想(北京)有限公司 | Method for generating digital certificate and applying the generated digital certificate |
| CN1819513A (en) * | 2006-03-23 | 2006-08-16 | 北京易恒信认证科技有限公司 | CPK ID certificate and generating method thereof |
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