CN101611382B - Anti-tamper protected enclosure - Google Patents
Anti-tamper protected enclosure Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN101611382B CN101611382B CN2007800503367A CN200780050336A CN101611382B CN 101611382 B CN101611382 B CN 101611382B CN 2007800503367 A CN2007800503367 A CN 2007800503367A CN 200780050336 A CN200780050336 A CN 200780050336A CN 101611382 B CN101611382 B CN 101611382B
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- protected enclosure
- tamper protected
- holding circuit
- interference
- tamper
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/86—Secure or tamper-resistant housings
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Burglar Alarm Systems (AREA)
Abstract
A device for containing sensitive data including a housing, an anti- tamper protected enclosure located within the housing and being adapted to contain the sensitive data, anti-tamper protection circuitry located within the anti-tamper protected enclosure and at least one ball grid array arranged within the housing and mounted on an outer surface of the anti-tamper protected enclosure and electrically coupled to the anti-tamper protection circuitry for protecting against unauthorized access to the interior of the anti-tamper protected enclosure.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates generally to a kind of electron device that comprises sensitive data, more specifically, relates to the point of sales terminal of interference protection.
Background technology
Following american documentation literature is considered to represent the current state of prior art: United States Patent (USP) 6,646,565; 6,917,299 and 6,853,093.Thus, the disclosure of these patent documentations is incorporated into this by reference.
Summary of the invention
The present invention is devoted to provide a kind of improved security system, is used for electron device, particularly, and the point of sales terminal of interference protection and comprise other devices such as the sensitive information of personal data.For this instructions and claims, term " point of sales terminal " includes but not limited to PIN PAD, electronic cash register, ATM, card payment terminal and so on.
Therefore, according to a preferred embodiment of the invention, provide a kind of device that is used to hold sensitive data, comprising: housing; Anti-tamper protected enclosure, it is positioned at said housing and is suitable for holding said sensitive data; Anti-interference holding circuit, it is positioned at said anti-tamper protected enclosure; With at least one BGA device; It is arranged in the said housing; And be installed on the outside surface of said anti-tamper protected enclosure, and be electrically connected to said anti-interference holding circuit, the inside that prevents to touch without permission said anti-tamper protected enclosure to be used to protect.
Term " BGA device " refers to the circuit devcie that is encapsulated in the ball grid array package.
Preferably, said device also comprises the confidential data memory element that is positioned at said anti-tamper protected enclosure.Additionally or replaceability ground, said device also comprises the data input element that is installed in the said housing.Said BGA device preferably includes wire-bonded circuitry.
Preferably; At least to the situation of a Physical Interference, said anti-interference holding circuit is operationally carried out at least a in the following behavior: produce the alarm indication, make said component failure and wipe said sensitive data in to said at least one BGA.
According to a preferred embodiment, said device is a point of sales terminal.
According to another preferred embodiment of the invention, also provide a kind of anti-tamper protected enclosure, comprising: anti-interference holding circuit, it is positioned at said anti-tamper protected enclosure; With at least one BGA device, it is installed on the outside surface of said anti-tamper protected enclosure, and is electrically connected to said anti-interference holding circuit, the inside that prevents to touch without permission said anti-tamper protected enclosure to be used to protect.Preferably, said BGA device comprises wire-bonded circuitry.
Preferably, said anti-tamper protected enclosure comprises at least one grid that is electrically connected to said anti-interference holding circuit.In addition, said anti-interference holding circuit is connected to said at least one conductor networks via said at least one BGA device.In addition, said anti-interference holding circuit is connected to said at least one conductor networks through electrical connection section, and said electrical connection section extend past is by the hole, road of said at least one BGA device institute physical protection.
Preferably, the provider location of said at least one BGA device is chosen at least one electrical connection section in said anti-tamper protected enclosure physical protection to be provided.Additionally or substituting ground, said at least one BGA device comprises the ball that is not electrically connected to said anti-interference holding circuit.
Preferably, said anti-interference holding circuit comprises at least one flexible printed circuit board.Additionally or substituting ground, said anti-tamper protected enclosure comprises at least one printed circuit board.
Preferably, said anti-tamper protected enclosure also has the confidential data memory element that is positioned at wherein.
Preferably, said anti-interference holding circuit comprises comparator circuit.Additionally or substituting ground, one of at least under the situation of Physical Interference, said anti-interference holding circuit can be operated and produced the alarm indication in to said at least one BGA.
Description of drawings
From the hereinafter detailed description with the accompanying drawing, will more at large understand and cognitive the present invention, in the accompanying drawings:
Fig. 1 is the simplified illustration diagram of constructed according to a preferred embodiment of the invention and exercisable point of sales terminal;
Fig. 2 is the simplified illustration diagram of biopsy cavity marker devices of anti-tamper protected enclosure of a part that forms the point of sales terminal of Fig. 1;
Fig. 3 is the simplified electrical circuit diagram to the electrical connection section of the anti-interference holding circuit of in the point of sales terminal of Fig. 1 and 2, using; With
Fig. 4 is that diagram is summarized in the simplification of a part of the circuit of Fig. 3.
Embodiment
Referring now to Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 are that the simplified illustration of point of sales terminal 100 illustrates and formation makes up according to the preferred embodiment of the present invention and the biopsy cavity marker devices simplified illustration diagram of the anti-tamper protected enclosure of the part of exercisable formation point of sales terminal 100.The point of sales terminal of Fig. 1 preferably includes housing 110 and is installed in the data input element such as keyboard 112 in this housing.Preferably; Anti-tamper protected enclosure 114 is positioned at housing 110; And comprise one or more conductor networks with embedded electric conductor 118; Such as network 116 and 117, said embedded electric conductor 118 is electrically connected to anti-interference holding circuit 120, and anti-interference holding circuit 120 form especially is the integrated circuit that is arranged in anti-tamper protected enclosure 114.
Anti-tamper protected enclosure 114 can be formed by any suitable material.For example, it can be formed by a plurality of printed circuit board (PCB)s, and wherein, conductor networks is limited the conductor 118 that is formed on its one or more layers, and said one or more layers preferably include embedded layer.Alternatively, rigidity or nonrigid big envelope can be set up and be wrapped in one or more layers the flexible PCB, and said one or more layers flexible PCB has formed or embedded therein one or more conductor networks above that.
According to a preferred embodiment of the invention, at least one BGA device 124 is arranged in the housing 110 and is installed on the outside surface 126 of anti-tamper protected enclosure 114, and wherein this BGA device 124 comprises the encapsulation that the enhancement mode physical protection is provided.BGA device 124 preferably is electrically connected to anti-interference holding circuit; And be electrically connected to one or more conductor networks 116 and 117; So that protect, to touch anti-tamper protected enclosure 114, more specifically with preventing unauthorized; Prevent to touch the Key Circuit element, such as data storage elements 128, anti-interference holding circuit 120 with such as the electrical connection section in hole, road 130.It is understandable that, if this type of Key Circuit element can be by unwarranted personnel contact, with regard to the entail dangers to sensitive information, for example encryption key and personally identifiable information.
In the illustrated embodiment of Fig. 1 and 2, two BGA devices 124 are arranged on the right outside surface of two opposite faces of protection big envelope 114.It is understandable that, on any suitable surface of big envelope 114,, can adopt more or BGA device still less 124 according to circuit layout wherein.Preferably, BGA device 124 is arranged to make their entities to cover on the Key Circuit element of installing or placing in roughly the same position.
Referring now to Fig. 3 and 4, Fig. 3 and 4 diagrams are to the preferred disposition of the electrical connection section of anti-interference holding circuit 120.Can find out; Preferably be provided with a pair of parallel conductance path; Every paths provides following connection; This connection from power supply, cross over and one or morely to have the conductor networks 117 that embeds electric conductor, cross over BGA device and the local at least various conductive paths that limit of one or more conductor networks 116, the input end and the extension betwixt that arrive anti-interference holding circuit 120, said one or more conductor networks 116 comprise selected resistance.Anti-interference holding circuit 120 preferably includes comparator circuit, and it compares the impedance along parallelly connected path, so that will cause being indicated by the alarm of anti-interference holding circuit 120 generations to any Physical Interference of BGA device.Anti-interference holding circuit 120 can adopt the protectiveness step, and point of sales terminal was lost efficacy, and wipes all data on data storage elements 128, and sends tamper alert message.
It is understandable that the configuration of the various conductive paths that limited BGA device 124 can be random, but preferably include the conductive path interconnection balls that is not positioned at the BGA device periphery.It is understandable that, there is no need to make all balls to form a part that connects.
In the examples shown of Fig. 3, direct supply VSRAM 200 is arranged on 3.3 volts voltage place especially, and is connected in series to the ball A that forms BGA device 124 parts via resistor 202 and via first conductor networks 117.Ground connect 204 be connected in series to BGA device 124 via resistor 206 and via another conductor networks 117 ball B.
Ball A preferably is electrically connected to the ball C of BGA device 124 through wire-bonded in BGA device 124.Ball C is connected in series to the ball D of BGA device 124 via resistor 208 and via the part of conductor element 116.Ball D preferably is electrically connected to the ball E of BGA device 124 through wire-bonded.Ball E in series is connected to first input end 214 of anti-interference holding circuit 120 via resistor 210 and resistor 212 via the part of conductor networks 116.
Ball C in series is connected to the ball F of BGA device 124 via resistor 216 via the part of conductor networks 116.Ball F preferably is electrically connected to the ball G of BGA device 124 through wire-bonded.Ball G in series is connected to first input end 214 of anti-interference holding circuit 120 via resistor 218 and via resistor 212 via the part of conductor networks 116.
Can be connected between second input terminal 219 of ball B and anti-interference holding circuit 120 with similar or consistent circuit mentioned above.
Be illustrated in detail in the formation part 220 of the part in a parallelly connected path wherein in the circuit mentioned above among Fig. 4.For the purpose of clear, Fig. 4 four layers of PCB of form diagram to a certain degree to amplify, its typically form big envelope 114 (Fig. 1 and 2) its go up the wall of installation BGA device 124 (Fig. 1 and 2).
Can find out among Fig. 4 that being connected in series between resistor 208 and ball C passed along electroplating ventilating hole (PTH) hole, road 221.Being connected in series between resistor 216 and ball C passed along hole, PTH road 222 and via conductor networks 116 parts.Being connected in series between resistor 208 and ball D passed along hole, PTH road 224 and via conductor networks 116 parts and along hole, PTH road 226.Being connected in series between resistor 216 and ball F passed along hole, PTH road 228.Being connected in series along hole, PTH road 230, passing between ball E and resistor 210 along the part of conductor networks 116 and along blind via hole 232.Being connected in series between resistor 218 and ball G along blind hole 234, along the part of conductor networks 116, and pass along hole, PTH road 236.Being connected in series between ball A and resistor 202 passed along hole, PTH road 238 and along conductor networks 117.Between resistor 212 and resistors in parallel 210 and 218, also be provided with and be connected in series.
Ball A preferably is connected to the ball C in BGA device 124 through wire-bonded via aluminium conductor 240.Ball G preferably is connected to the ball F in BGA device 124 through wire-bonded.Ball E preferably is connected to the ball D in BGA device 124 through wire-bonded.
Preferably, BGA device 124 is placed on the position that overlaps with hole, a plurality of road, and is as shown in the figure, and this has just prevented to touch these holes, road basically.
It is understandable that, can be provided with and the similar a plurality of circuit of circuit mentioned above.Will also be appreciated that printed circuit board (PCB) can be made up of the layer of any suitable number, preferred two layers or more a plurality of layer.Will also be appreciated that in addition and can adopt BGA device to come to the hole, various similar road that carries sensitive signal protection to be provided, hole, said road for example is through hole, blind hole and buried via hole.
According to a replaceability embodiment, conductor networks can be removed, and BGA device is directly connected to disturbance detection circuit.According to another replaceability embodiment, various conductor networks can be connected to various power supplys, and every kind of power supply has different voltages.
Those skilled in the art will recognize that the present invention is not limited to the content that preceding text specifically illustrate and describe.On the contrary, scope of the present invention comprises various combination of features of the present invention and the transformation of the present invention that does not belong to prior art that son makes up and those skilled in the art can carry out after reading above-mentioned instructions.
Claims (20)
1. device that is used to hold sensitive data comprises:
Housing;
Anti-tamper protected enclosure, it is positioned at said housing and is suitable for holding said sensitive data;
Anti-interference holding circuit, it is positioned at said anti-tamper protected enclosure; With
At least one BGA device; It is arranged in the said housing; And be installed on the outside surface of said anti-tamper protected enclosure, said at least one BGA device comprises several balls, a plurality of at least balls in said several balls are electrically connected to said anti-interference holding circuit; The inside that prevents to touch without permission said anti-tamper protected enclosure to be used to protect
Wherein, said at least one BGA device comprises the ball that is not electrically connected to said anti-interference holding circuit; And
Wherein, in to said at least one BGA one of at least under the situation of Physical Interference, said anti-interference holding circuit is operationally carried out at least a in the following behavior: produce the alarm indication, make said component failure and wipe said sensitive data.
2. device according to claim 1 also comprises the confidential data memory element that is positioned at said anti-tamper protected enclosure.
3. device according to claim 1, wherein said at least one BGA device comprises wire-bonded circuitry.
4. device according to claim 1, wherein said anti-tamper protected enclosure comprise at least one conductor networks that is electrically connected to said anti-interference holding circuit.
5. device according to claim 4, wherein said anti-interference holding circuit is connected to said at least one conductor networks via said at least one BGA device.
6. device according to claim 5, wherein said anti-interference holding circuit is connected to said at least one conductor networks through electrical connection section, and said electrical connection section extend past is by the hole, road of said at least one BGA device institute physical protection.
7. device according to claim 1, the provider location of wherein said at least one BGA device are chosen at least one electrical connection section in said anti-tamper protected enclosure physical protection to be provided.
8. device according to claim 1, wherein said anti-interference holding circuit comprises at least one flexible printed circuit board.
9. device according to claim 1, wherein said anti-tamper protected enclosure comprises at least one printed circuit board.
10. device according to claim 1, wherein said device is a point of sales terminal.
11. an anti-tamper protected enclosure comprises:
Anti-interference holding circuit, it is positioned at said anti-tamper protected enclosure; With
At least one BGA device; It is installed on the outside surface of said anti-tamper protected enclosure; Said at least one BGA device comprises several balls; A plurality of at least balls in said several balls are electrically connected to said anti-interference holding circuit, the inside that prevents to touch without permission said anti-tamper protected enclosure to be used to protect;
Wherein, said at least one BGA device comprises the ball that is not electrically connected to said anti-interference holding circuit; And
Wherein, one of at least under the situation of Physical Interference, said anti-interference holding circuit operationally produces the alarm indication in to said at least one BGA.
12. anti-tamper protected enclosure according to claim 11 also comprises the confidential data memory element that is positioned at it.
13. anti-tamper protected enclosure according to claim 11 comprises at least one conductor networks that is electrically connected to said anti-interference holding circuit.
14. anti-tamper protected enclosure according to claim 13, wherein said anti-interference holding circuit is connected to said at least one conductor networks via said at least one BGA device.
15. anti-tamper protected enclosure according to claim 14; Wherein said anti-interference holding circuit is connected to said at least one conductor networks through electrical connection section, and said electrical connection section extend past is by the hole, road of said at least one BGA device institute physical protection.
16. anti-tamper protected enclosure according to claim 11, the provider location of wherein said at least one BGA device are chosen at least one electrical connection section in said anti-tamper protected enclosure physical protection to be provided.
17. anti-tamper protected enclosure according to claim 11, wherein said anti-interference holding circuit comprises at least one flexible printed circuit board.
18. anti-tamper protected enclosure according to claim 11, wherein said anti-tamper protected enclosure comprises at least one printed circuit board.
19. anti-tamper protected enclosure according to claim 11, wherein said anti-interference holding circuit comprises comparator circuit.
20. anti-tamper protected enclosure according to claim 11, wherein said at least one BGA device comprises wire-bonded circuitry.
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US11/627,166 | 2007-01-25 | ||
| US11/627,166 US7898413B2 (en) | 2007-01-25 | 2007-01-25 | Anti-tamper protected enclosure |
| PCT/US2007/088883 WO2008091470A1 (en) | 2007-01-25 | 2007-12-27 | Anti-tamper protected enclosure |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN101611382A CN101611382A (en) | 2009-12-23 |
| CN101611382B true CN101611382B (en) | 2012-07-04 |
Family
ID=39644774
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN2007800503367A Active CN101611382B (en) | 2007-01-25 | 2007-12-27 | Anti-tamper protected enclosure |
Country Status (4)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (2) | US7898413B2 (en) |
| EP (1) | EP2108150A4 (en) |
| CN (1) | CN101611382B (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2008091470A1 (en) |
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- 2007-12-27 WO PCT/US2007/088883 patent/WO2008091470A1/en active Application Filing
- 2007-12-27 CN CN2007800503367A patent/CN101611382B/en active Active
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2011
- 2011-01-27 US US13/015,099 patent/US20110122563A1/en not_active Abandoned
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| CN1503099A (en) * | 2002-11-26 | 2004-06-09 | 上海百利恒电器有限公司 | Structure and configuration of anti-interference computer casing |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| US7898413B2 (en) | 2011-03-01 |
| CN101611382A (en) | 2009-12-23 |
| US20080180245A1 (en) | 2008-07-31 |
| WO2008091470A1 (en) | 2008-07-31 |
| EP2108150A1 (en) | 2009-10-14 |
| US20110122563A1 (en) | 2011-05-26 |
| EP2108150A4 (en) | 2013-12-11 |
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Address after: The United States of California, Maria Duff West No. 88 Patentee after: Verifone Inc. Address before: American California Patentee before: Verifone Inc. |