CN101557589A - Method for preventing empty integrity protection algorithm from being used in normal communication and system thereof - Google Patents
Method for preventing empty integrity protection algorithm from being used in normal communication and system thereof Download PDFInfo
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- CN101557589A CN101557589A CNA2009101393577A CN200910139357A CN101557589A CN 101557589 A CN101557589 A CN 101557589A CN A2009101393577 A CNA2009101393577 A CN A2009101393577A CN 200910139357 A CN200910139357 A CN 200910139357A CN 101557589 A CN101557589 A CN 101557589A
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method for preventing an empty integrity protection algorithm from being used in the normal communication, which is applied to a long term evolution (LTE) system or a system architecture evolution (SAE) system. The method comprises the following steps: a user equipment (UE) sends security capability to a network according to an attach request; a mobile management entity (MME) in the network ensures the type of the attach request is normal or non-urgent and then memorizes the UE security capability which indicates that the UE dose not support the empty integrity protection algorithm (EIAO). The corresponding system comprises the UE and the MME; the UE is used for sending the UE security capability to the MME by the attach request; the MME is used for determining the type of the attach request to be normal or non-urgent and then memorizing the UE security capability which indicates that the UE dose not support the EIAO. After the adoption of the invention, the use of EIAO is limited in normal communication and a network attacker cannot get around a normal security protection mechanism by starting the EIAO in normal networking.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to access security mechanism in the mobile communication system, relate in particular to a kind of empty integrity protection algorithm that prevents and be used for the method and system of proper communication.
Background technology
Third generation partner program (3rd Generation Partnership Project, be called for short 3GPP) Long Term Evolution (Long Term Evolution, abbreviate LTE as) system/System Architecture Evolution (SystemArchitecture Evolution, abbreviate SAE as) access security adopt two-layer security architecture, that is to say, Access Layer (Access Stratum, be called for short AS) and Non-Access Stratum (Non Access Stratum, abbreviation NAS) security mechanism is separated, and has oneself independently safe context separately.When inserting the LTE/SAE network, UE needs elder generation by attaching process (Attach procedure) network to be registered when subscriber equipment (User Equipment is called for short UE).If also do not authenticate mutually between UE and the network, network side can require to authenticate and generate key mutually with UE after receiving Attach Request message.Mobile management entity (Mobility Manage Entity; be called for short MME) and enode b (evolved Node B; eNB) respectively according to UE security capabilities of receiving (Security Capability) and self networks configuration; after selecting corresponding security algorithm (comprising integrality and cryptographic algorithm); respectively by NAS SMC (Security Mode Command; safe mode command) and AS SMC will be separately selected security algorithm send to UE; simultaneously MME is also sent back to UE by the NAS message of integrity protection with the security capabilities of UE by NAS SMC or other and confirms; set up corresponding AS safe context and NAS safe context then, for escape way is set up in the communication between UE and the network side.If UE finds that the security capabilities that returns is incorrect, then can not enable safe context.After attaching process finishes, various application scenarioss are if switch, tracing Area is upgraded, UE transfers to state of activation from the free time, when negotiating algorithm is carried out in safe context renewal etc., UE no longer sends UE security capabilities to network, but the UE security capabilities that network uses MME to preserve comes selection algorithm.When authentification failure between UE and the network side or the failure of startup safe context, UE enters the limited-service state and (is called for short LSM, LSM refers in particular to not by authentication in this article, can only carry out the limited-service state of urgent call), this moment, network only can support that UE carries out urgent call, did not allow UE to use regular traffic.In general below several situations can cause UE to enter that limited-service state: UE does not have USIM (Universal Subscriber IdentityModule, USIM), USIM is of no use or be limited to use or the network of UE roaming and UE home network between do not sign roaming agreement etc.
In order to make UE, in urgent call, still can keep relevant safe context and enable signaling process using emergence call service under the limited-service state and under normal condition, using professional signaling process big difference not occur.Security mechanism in order to ensure NAS and AS layer can be supported urgent call; 3GPP has defined the security algorithm that is specifically designed to urgent call---empty integrity protection algorithm at present; (NullIntegrity Protection algorithm); its expression is not carried out integrity protection to data; called after EIA0, it is a kind of pro forma security algorithm.After network side is received the emergency attached request that UE sends (when UE can not be by normal attaching process access network; if it wants to carry out urgent call; then must pass through to initiate emergency attached process ability access network earlier); do urgent call if identify UE; then by safe mode command or RRC (Radio Resource Control; radio resource control) reconfiguration message notice UE enables empty integrity protection algorithm and null-encryption algorithm (Null cipheringalgorithm; called after EEA0 represents data not to be encrypted), UE just can carry out urgent call being not activated under the state of safe context like this.
Can do not abused to guarantee this algorithm but formulate a kind of special empty integral algorithm management method in the present technical specification, guarantee that promptly empty integral algorithm can only be used for urgent call or test, other purposes is invalid.Because it (is that eNB itself is unsafe that eNB is positioned at non-trust domain environment, eNB itself is the node that can not be trusted) in, if formulate not use the restriction scheme of empty integral algorithm specially, the network attack person can utilize and gain the method for enabling the sky integral algorithm by cheating the UE that is in the normal service state is attacked.With following scene is example, and this network security threats is described:
UE initiates normal attaching process when attempting access network, if the eNB (also can be Home eNodeB Home eNB) that inserts is controlled by the lawless person, eNB can (in fact UE security capabilities be meant the security algorithm tabulation that this UE can support with adhering to the UE security capabilities that carries in the request, priority comprising algorithm) be set to only support empty integral algorithm not support other algorithm, other algorithm in the security algorithm tabulation of perhaps UE being supported except empty integral algorithm is revised as the unsupported algorithm of present service network (as at will making up the title of some security algorithms) or the priority of empty integral algorithm is made as the highest, then this UE security capabilities is issued MME.After MME received, according to this UE security capabilities, selection and order UE used empty integral algorithm, and the security capabilities with UE stores simultaneously.When MME fed back to eNB by the NAS SMC that does not carry out integrity protection with the UE security capabilities of receiving, eNB can make amendment to this NAS message, the UE security capabilities that carries in this message is reverted to former UE security capabilities again, and then be transmitted to UE.UE checks that the back finds that its security capabilities was not modified, and therefore can not interrupt and the communicating by letter of network.By the mode of this man-in-the-middle attack, the lawless person just can reach the purpose that any safeguard protection is not carried out in the communication that makes between UE and the network.After this; after UE leaves this eNB; if UE does not re-register; then this UE can not issue network with its UE security capabilities again, if therefore negotiating algorithm takes place again, this MME can issue target eNB or target MME with the UE security capabilities of storage on it; and target eNB or target MME still can use empty integral algorithm to start safe context; make UE under situation about not re-registering, where no matter move to, all can't enable normal safety protecting mechanism.
X2 interface is the data transmission interface between source eNB and the target eNB, and the X2 interface switching is meant that MME does not participate in switching directly, and source eNB directly passes to target eNB with user plane and signaling plane by X2 interface, and transmits without MME.Under above-mentioned scene; when UE carries out the X2 interface switching; the network attack person just can utilize source eNB to pass false information and give target eNB; the present UE of deception target eNB is carrying out urgent call; and in the present technical specification; there is not special mechanism to make target eNB in X2 switches, confirm the service condition of present UE to MME (having only MME and UE really to know); whether MME to pass to the UE security capabilities of target eNB correct if just can contrasting source eNB; if therefore support EIA0 in the UE security capabilities that MME preserves; MME can not prevent target eNB to select the EIA0 algorithm for use, thereby causes the communication between UE and the target eNB not have safeguard protection.
Summary of the invention
The technical problem to be solved in the present invention is that a kind of empty integrity protection algorithm that prevents is used for the method and system of proper communication, avoids UE to use EIA0 that data are carried out integrity protection under the regular traffic state.
For addressing the above problem, the invention provides a kind of empty integrity protection algorithm that prevents and be used for the method for proper communication, be applied to Long Term Evolution LTE) in system or the System Architecture Evolution SAE system, comprising:
User equipment (UE) sends UE security capabilities by adhering to request to network;
Mobile management entity MME in the described network confirm described type of adhering to request be normal or non-emergent after, preserve the UE security capabilities that this UE of expression does not support empty integrity protection algorithm EIA0.
Further, said method also can have following feature:
When described type of adhering to request when being normal or non-emergent, described UE does not support EIA0 to this UE of UE security capabilities information representation that described MME sends.
Further, said method also can have following feature:
Described this UE of UE security capabilities information representation does not support that EIA0 is meant: do not comprise EIA0 in the described UE security capabilities.
Further, said method also can have following feature:
In the described UE security capabilities information, each algorithm all has its corresponding status attribute;
Described this UE of UE security capabilities information representation does not support that EIA0 is meant: the state of EIA0 correspondence is for banning use of in the described UE security capabilities.
Further, said method also can have following feature:
When described type of adhering to request when being normal or non-emergent, after the EIA0 deletion, preserve described UE security capabilities again in the described UE security capabilities information that described MME will receive.
Further, said method also can comprise:
Described MME sends to described UE with selected Non-Access Stratum security algorithm and the UE security capabilities of receiving by the Non-Access Stratum safe mode command then according to the UE security capabilities of preserving and self network security selection of configuration Non-Access Stratum security algorithm.
Further, said method also can comprise:
After described UE receives described Non-Access Stratum security algorithm, judge whether do not comprise EIA0 in the described Non-Access Stratum security algorithm and whether the current service state of UE is normal mode, if carry out this order, and send Non-Access Stratum safe mode command end to described MME.
Further, said method also can comprise:
Described MME sends to enode b eNB in the described network with the described UE security capabilities of preserving on it after receiving described Non-Access Stratum safe mode command end;
After described eNB receives, be after described UE selects the Access Layer security algorithm that does not comprise EIA0, to send to described UE by the Access Layer safe mode command according to security capabilities configuration of self and the described UE security capabilities information that receives.
Further, said method also can comprise:
Described UE is after receiving described Access Layer security algorithm, judge whether do not comprise EIA0 in the described Access Layer security algorithm and whether the current service state of UE is normal mode, if carry out this order, and send Access Layer safe mode command end to described eNB.
For addressing the above problem, the present invention also provides a kind of empty integrity protection algorithm that prevents to be used for the system of proper communication, is applied to Long Term Evolution LTE) in system or the System Architecture Evolution SAE system, comprising: user equipment (UE) and network side mobile management entity MME;
Described UE is used for sending UE security capabilities by adhering to request to described MME;
Described MME is used for after confirming that described type of adhering to request is normal or non-emergent, preserves the UE security capabilities that this UE of expression does not support empty integrity protection algorithm EIA0.
Further, said system also can have following feature:
When described type of adhering to request when being normal or non-emergent, described UE is used for sending the UE security capabilities information that this UE of expression does not support EIA0 to described MME.
Further, said system also can have following feature:
Described this UE of UE security capabilities information representation does not support that EIA0 is meant: do not comprise EIA0 in the described UE security capabilities.
Further, said system also can have following feature:
In the described UE security capabilities information, each algorithm all has its corresponding status attribute;
Described this UE of UE security capabilities information representation does not support that EIA0 is meant: the state of EIA0 correspondence is for banning use of in the described UE security capabilities.
Further, said system also can have following feature:
When described type of adhering to request when being normal or non-emergent, after the described UE security capabilities information EIA0 deletion that described MME also is used for receiving, preserve described UE security capabilities again.
Further, said system also can have following feature:
Described MME also is used for then selected Non-Access Stratum security algorithm and the UE security capabilities of receiving being sent to described UE by the Non-Access Stratum safe mode command according to the UE security capabilities of preserving and self network security selection of configuration Non-Access Stratum security algorithm.
Further, said system also can have following feature:
Described UE also is used for after receiving described Non-Access Stratum security algorithm, judge whether do not comprise EIA0 in the described Non-Access Stratum security algorithm and whether the current service state of UE is normal mode, if, then be used to carry out this order, and send Non-Access Stratum safe mode command end to described MME.
Further, said system also can have following feature:
Also comprise enode b eNB in the described system;
Described MME also is used for after receiving described Non-Access Stratum safe mode command end, and the described UE security capabilities of preserving on it is sent to described eNB;
Described eNB is used for after receiving described UE security capabilities, according to security capabilities configuration of self and the described UE security capabilities information that receives is after described UE selects the Access Layer security algorithm that does not comprise EIA0, to send to described UE by the Access Layer safe mode command.
Further, said system also can have following feature:
Described UE also is used for after receiving described Access Layer security algorithm, judge whether do not comprise EIA0 in the described Access Layer security algorithm and whether the current service state of UE is normal mode, if, send Access Layer safe mode command end then with also being used to carry out this order, and to described eNB.
After adopting the present invention, limited EIA0 and be used when proper communication, when having guaranteed normal access network, the network attack person can't get around normal safety protecting mechanism by enabling EIA0.In addition, send the security capabilities that comprises EIA0 during by urgent insert, guaranteed that again UE ability under the state of limited-service normally uses EIA0, guarantee urgent carrying out smoothly of inserting.
Description of drawings
Figure 1 shows that and prevent that the EIA0 algorithm is used for proper communication is carried out the realization flow figure of method first embodiment of safeguard protection;
Figure 2 shows that and prevent that the EIA0 algorithm is used for proper communication is carried out the realization flow figure of method second embodiment of safeguard protection.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with drawings and Examples technical scheme of the present invention is described in detail.
The present invention prevents that the basic design that empty integrity protection algorithm is used for the method for proper communication from being: when UE desires access network, send UE security capabilities by adhering to request to network; MME in the network is by adhering to the type information unit that carries of request and checking whether authentication success of UE, confirms described type of adhering to request be normal or non-emergent after, preserve and represent that this UE does not support the UE security capabilities of empty integrity protection algorithm EIA0.
When described type of adhering to request when being normal or non-emergent, described UE does not support EIA0 to this UE of UE security capabilities information representation that described MME sends.Wherein, this UE of UE security capabilities information representation does not support that EIA0 is meant: do not comprise EIA0 in the UE security capabilities or will directly the EIA0 in the UE security capabilities be deleted.
When specific implementation, each algorithm all has its corresponding status attribute in the UE security capabilities information; Above-mentioned this UE of UE security capabilities information representation does not support that EIA0 is meant: the state of EIA0 correspondence is set as and bans use of in the UE security capabilities.
After MME preserves UE security capabilities, also can comprise: MME sends to UE with selected Non-Access Stratum security algorithm and the UE security capabilities of receiving by the Non-Access Stratum safe mode command then according to the UE security capabilities of preserving and self network security selection of configuration Non-Access Stratum security algorithm; After UE receives the Non-Access Stratum security algorithm, judge whether do not comprise EIA0 in this Non-Access Stratum security algorithm and whether the current service state of UE is normal mode, if carry out this order, and send Non-Access Stratum safe mode command end to MME; MME sends to enode b eNB in the network with the UE security capabilities of preserving on it after receiving Non-Access Stratum safe mode command end; After eNB receives, behind the Access Layer security algorithm that does not comprise EIA0 for this UE selects according to the security capabilities configuration of self and the UE security capabilities information that receives, send to UE by the Access Layer safe mode command; UE judges whether do not comprise EIA0 in this Access Layer security algorithm and whether the current service state of UE is normal mode after receiving the Access Layer security algorithm, if carry out this order, and send Access Layer safe mode command end to eNB.
And prevent that empty integrity protection algorithm is used for the system of proper communication, comprising: UE and network side MME; UE is used for sending UE security capabilities by adhering to request to MME; MME is used for after to judge described type of adhering to request be normal or non-emergent, preserves the UE security capabilities that this UE of expression does not support empty integrity protection algorithm EIA0.
In addition, MME also can be used for then selected Non-Access Stratum security algorithm and the UE security capabilities of receiving being sent to UE by the Non-Access Stratum safe mode command according to the UE security capabilities of preserving and self network security selection of configuration Non-Access Stratum security algorithm; After UE also is used in and receives the Non-Access Stratum security algorithm, judge whether do not comprise EIA0 in this Non-Access Stratum security algorithm and whether the current service state of UE is normal mode, if then can be used for carrying out this order, and send Non-Access Stratum safe mode command end to MME.Also comprise eNB in this system; After MME also is used in and receives Non-Access Stratum safe mode command end, the UE security capabilities of preserving on it is sent to eNB; After eNB is used in and receives UE security capabilities, be after UE selects the Access Layer security algorithm that does not comprise EIA0, to send to UE by the Access Layer safe mode command according to security capabilities configuration of self and the UE security capabilities information that receives.After UE also is used in and receives the Access Layer security algorithm, judge whether do not comprise EIA0 in the Access Layer security algorithm and whether the current service state of UE is normal mode, if, and send Access Layer safe mode command end to eNB then with also can be used for carrying out this order.
Further be illustrated with two application examples of the present invention below
When Fig. 1 illustrated UE access LTE/SAE network, the first embodiment realization flow figure that UE security capabilities is consulted may further comprise the steps:
Step S101, the UE desire inserts the LTE/SAE network;
Step S102, UE judge to be about to initiates, and to adhere to request be emergency attached request or normally adhere to request, determination methods is: if UE is under unverified limited-service state, it is emergency numbers that the user dials the number that cries, think that then the request of adhering to that is about to initiate is emergency attached request, execution in step S103; Otherwise think that the request of adhering to that is about to initiate is normal (or being called non-emergent) to adhere to request, execution in step S104;
Step S103, UE sends to network after the classification information unit in the Attach Request message (Information Element is called for short IE) is made as " promptly ", carry the UE security capabilities that comprises EIA0 in this message, the UE security capabilities that perhaps only comprises EIA0 and null-encryption algorithm EEA0, execution in step S105 then;
Step S104, UE sends to network after the classification information unit in the Attach Request message is made as " non-emergent " or " normally ", carry the UE security capabilities that this UE of expression does not support EIA0 in this message, when specific implementation, can be with the EIA0 in this UE security capabilities deletion, or the mode by increasing by each algorithm state of expression in UE security capabilities is made as the state of EIA0 and bans use of;
Step S105, MME receives that UE sends adhere to request after, whether the classification information unit and the inspection UE that carry by Attach Request message pass through authentication, confirm that this adheres to request is emergency attached request or normally adhering to request (is confirmed to be urgent or the method for normally adhering to is: if the classification information unit is for urgent and the UE authentication is successful, MME confirms as emergency attached, if classification information is urgent, but authentication is passed through, make mistakes, MME requires the UE repeating transmission to adhere to request; If classification information be non-emergent and UE by authentication, then think and normally adhere to), if be emergency attached request then execution in step S107, otherwise execution in step S106;
Step S106, MME check in the UE security capabilities receive whether comprise EIA0, are not in the EIA0 that bans use of state if do not comprise EIA0 or comprise, execution in step S107 then, otherwise execution in step S116;
Step S107, the security capabilities of MME storage UE, and after the UE security capabilities that the security capabilities according to self disposes and preserves is selected suitable NAS layer security algorithm, this NAS layer security algorithm selected and UE security capabilities are sent to above-mentioned UE by the NAS safe mode command;
Step S108, UE judges the correctness of the corresponding relation of MME selected NAS layer security algorithm and UE current state, correct corresponding relation is: when UE is in the regular traffic state, can not select EIA0 for use; If be the LSM state, then can select EIA0 for use;
Step S109 is if corresponding relation is incorrect, promptly under the regular traffic state, network has been selected EIA0 for use, and UE then ignores this Security Mode Command message, does not carry out this order, again wait for receiving new NAS security command mode message, and after receiving, re-execute step S108;
Step S110, if corresponding relation is correct, UE uses above-mentioned selected NAS layer security algorithm to enable security mechanism, and sends NAS safe mode command end to MME;
Step S111, MME sets up request message by initial context the security capabilities of UE is sent to eNB;
Step S112, eNB sends after the security capabilities of UE and network configuration select suitable AS layer security algorithm according to MME, sends to UE by the AS safe mode command;
Step S113, UE judges the correctness of the corresponding relation of eNB selected AS layer security algorithm and UE current state, correct corresponding relation definition is as the definition among the step S108, if corresponding relation correct execution step S115, otherwise execution in step S114;
Step S114, UE ignore this Security Mode Command message, do not use this algorithm, wait for again receiving new AS security command mode message, and re-execute step S113 after receiving;
Step S115, UE sends AS safe mode command end to eNB, and negotiating algorithm is finished;
Step S116 adheres to failure, notifies its security capabilities of above-mentioned UE incorrect.
In the embodiment of the invention, during normal access network, do not support the UE security capabilities of EIA0 to MME by sending, MME is after judging that UE access network type is normal the access, preserve the UE security capabilities of not supporting EIA0, forbid that in UE security capabilities EIA0 is used, because after the attaching process, all negotiating algorithms between UE and the network all are to come selection algorithm by UE security capabilities and network configuration that MME preserves, therefore use limits to EIA0 when preserving UE security capabilities, after not only having avoided in attaching process negotiating algorithm EIA0 to be used but also can also guaranteeing to adhere to request, do not use EIA0 in the negotiating algorithm of other scenes.As in X2 switches, if wanting to deceive target eNB, source eNB uses EIA0, also can only issue the UE security capabilities of target eNB by modification, make it to support EIA0, and the UE security capabilities that MME can check that target eNB receives and own preservation is not simultaneously, can find this network attack, in time takes measures.
Therefore when the embodiment of the invention can guarantee normal access network; the network attack person can't get around normal safety protecting mechanism by enabling EIA0; send the security capabilities that comprises EIA0 during by urgent the access; guarantee that again UE ability under the state of limited-service normally uses EIA0, guarantee urgent carrying out smoothly of inserting
When Fig. 2 illustrated UE access LTE/SAE network, the second embodiment realization flow figure that UE security capabilities is consulted may further comprise the steps:
Step S201, the UE desire inserts the LTE/SAE network;
Step S202, UE judge to be about to initiate, and to adhere to request be emergency attached request or normally adhere to request, after type i E is set to corresponding state in this request message then, sends to network, and wherein, this request message carries the security capabilities of UE;
Step S203, after MME receives the UE security capabilities that UE sends, whether type i E and inspection UE according to this message pass through authentication, confirm that this adheres to request and is emergency attached request or normally adheres to request, if be emergency attached request then execution in step S204 asks then execution in step S205 if normally adhere to;
Step S204, MME preserves the UE security capabilities of receiving, execution in step S206 then;
Step S205, MME check the security capabilities of UE, EIA0 algorithm deletion that directly will be wherein or be made as and preserve this UE security capabilities after banning use of state;
Step S206, MME is after the UE security capabilities that the security capabilities according to self disposes and preserves is selected suitable NAS layer security algorithm, by the NAS safe mode command this NAS layer security algorithm selected and the UE security capabilities of receiving are sent it back to above-mentioned UE, when normal the access, the UE security capabilities of preserving with MME that sends back to UE is different, and the EIA0 algorithm in the UE security capabilities of preservation is deleted or be set as and forbid;
Step S207, UE judges the correctness of the corresponding relation of MME selected NAS layer security algorithm and UE current state, if correct execution step S209, otherwise execution in step S208, correct corresponding relation is: when UE is in the regular traffic state, can not select EIA0 for use; If be unverified LSM state, then can select EIA0 for use;
Step S208, UE ignore this NAS SMC message, receive NAS SMC again, and re-execute step S207 after receiving;
Step S209, UE use above-mentioned selected NAS layer security algorithm to enable security mechanism, and send NAS safe mode command end to MME;
Step S210, MME sets up request message by initial context the UE security capabilities of preserving on it is sent to eNB;
Step S211, eNB send to UE by the AS safe mode command after selecting suitable AS layer security algorithm according to the security capabilities of UE;
Step S212, UE judges the correctness of the corresponding relation of eNB selected AS layer security algorithm and UE current state, if correct execution step S214, otherwise execution in step S213; Correct corresponding relation definition is as the definition among the step S207;
Step S213, UE ignore this AS SMC message, receive AS SMC again, and re-execute step S212 after receiving;
Step S214, UE sends AS safe mode command end to eNB, and negotiating algorithm is finished.
Certainly; the present invention also can have other various embodiments; under the situation that does not deviate from spirit of the present invention and essence thereof; those of ordinary skill in the art work as can make various corresponding changes and distortion according to the present invention, but these corresponding changes and distortion all should belong to the protection range of the appended claim of the present invention.
Claims (18)
1, a kind of empty integrity protection algorithm that prevents is used for the method for proper communication, is applied to it is characterized in that in Long Term Evolution LTE system or the System Architecture Evolution SAE system, comprising:
User equipment (UE) sends UE security capabilities by adhering to request to network;
Mobile management entity MME in the described network confirm described type of adhering to request be normal or non-emergent after, preserve the UE security capabilities that this UE of expression does not support empty integrity protection algorithm EIA0.
2, the method for claim 1 is characterized in that,
When described type of adhering to request when being normal or non-emergent, described UE does not support EIA0 to this UE of UE security capabilities information representation that described MME sends.
3, method as claimed in claim 1 or 2 is characterized in that,
Described this UE of UE security capabilities information representation does not support that EIA0 is meant: do not comprise EIA0 in the described UE security capabilities.
4, method as claimed in claim 1 or 2 is characterized in that,
In the described UE security capabilities information, each algorithm all has its corresponding status attribute;
Described this UE of UE security capabilities information representation does not support that EIA0 is meant: the state of EIA0 correspondence is for banning use of in the described UE security capabilities.
5, the method for claim 1 is characterized in that,
When described type of adhering to request when being normal or non-emergent, after the EIA0 deletion, preserve described UE security capabilities again in the described UE security capabilities information that described MME will receive.
6, the method for claim 1 is characterized in that, also comprises:
Described MME sends to described UE with selected Non-Access Stratum security algorithm and the UE security capabilities of receiving by the Non-Access Stratum safe mode command then according to the UE security capabilities of preserving and self network security selection of configuration Non-Access Stratum security algorithm.
7, method as claimed in claim 6 is characterized in that, also comprises:
After described UE receives described Non-Access Stratum security algorithm, judge whether do not comprise EIA0 in the described Non-Access Stratum security algorithm and whether the current service state of UE is normal mode, if carry out this order, and send Non-Access Stratum safe mode command end to described MME.
8, method as claimed in claim 7 is characterized in that, also comprises:
Described MME sends to enode b eNB in the described network with the described UE security capabilities of preserving on it after receiving described Non-Access Stratum safe mode command end;
After described eNB receives, be after described UE selects the Access Layer security algorithm that does not comprise EIA0, to send to described UE by the Access Layer safe mode command according to security capabilities configuration of self and the described UE security capabilities information that receives.
9, method as claimed in claim 8 is characterized in that, also comprises:
Described UE is after receiving described Access Layer security algorithm, judge whether do not comprise EIA0 in the described Access Layer security algorithm and whether the current service state of UE is normal mode, if carry out this order, and send Access Layer safe mode command end to described eNB.
10, a kind of empty integrity protection algorithm that prevents is used for the system of proper communication, is applied to it is characterized in that in Long Term Evolution LTE system or the System Architecture Evolution SAE system, comprising: user equipment (UE) and network side mobile management entity MME;
Described UE is used for sending UE security capabilities by adhering to request to described MME;
Described MME is used for after confirming that described type of adhering to request is normal or non-emergent, preserves the UE security capabilities that this UE of expression does not support empty integrity protection algorithm EIA0.
11, system as claimed in claim 10 is characterized in that,
When described type of adhering to request when being normal or non-emergent, described UE is used for sending the UE security capabilities information that this UE of expression does not support EIA0 to described MME.
12, as claim 10 or 11 described systems, it is characterized in that,
Described this UE of UE security capabilities information representation does not support that EIA0 is meant: do not comprise EIA0 in the described UE security capabilities.
13, as claim 10 or 11 described systems, it is characterized in that,
In the described UE security capabilities information, each algorithm all has its corresponding status attribute;
Described this UE of UE security capabilities information representation does not support that EIA0 is meant: the state of EIA0 correspondence is for banning use of in the described UE security capabilities.
14, system as claimed in claim 10 is characterized in that,
When described type of adhering to request when being normal or non-emergent, after the described UE security capabilities information EIA0 deletion that described MME also is used for receiving, preserve described UE security capabilities again.
15, system as claimed in claim 10 is characterized in that,
Described MME also is used for then selected Non-Access Stratum security algorithm and the UE security capabilities of receiving being sent to described UE by the Non-Access Stratum safe mode command according to the UE security capabilities of preserving and self network security selection of configuration Non-Access Stratum security algorithm.
16, system as claimed in claim 15 is characterized in that,
Described UE also is used for after receiving described Non-Access Stratum security algorithm, judge whether do not comprise EIA0 in the described Non-Access Stratum security algorithm and whether the current service state of UE is normal mode, if, then be used to carry out this order, and send Non-Access Stratum safe mode command end to described MME.
17, system as claimed in claim 16 is characterized in that, also comprises enode b eNB in the described system;
Described MME also is used for after receiving described Non-Access Stratum safe mode command end, and the described UE security capabilities of preserving on it is sent to described eNB;
Described eNB is used for after receiving described UE security capabilities, according to security capabilities configuration of self and the described UE security capabilities information that receives is after described UE selects the Access Layer security algorithm that does not comprise EIA0, to send to described UE by the Access Layer safe mode command.
18, system as claimed in claim 17 is characterized in that,
Described UE also is used for after receiving described Access Layer security algorithm, judge whether do not comprise EIA0 in the described Access Layer security algorithm and whether the current service state of UE is normal mode, if, send Access Layer safe mode command end then with also being used to carry out this order, and to described eNB.
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| CNA2009101393577A CN101557589A (en) | 2009-05-04 | 2009-05-04 | Method for preventing empty integrity protection algorithm from being used in normal communication and system thereof |
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| CNA2009101393577A CN101557589A (en) | 2009-05-04 | 2009-05-04 | Method for preventing empty integrity protection algorithm from being used in normal communication and system thereof |
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