CN101420443A - Method and equipment for preventing loop detection information loss in BGP routing - Google Patents
Method and equipment for preventing loop detection information loss in BGP routing Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The present invention discloses a method for preventing information loss of loop detection of border gateway protocol and a device thereof. The method according to the invention comprises the following steps: generating an ISIS routing which carries AS-path property content of BGP routing when a network device injects BGP routing into an ISIS network, and releasing the ISIS routing into the ISIS network; receiving the ISIS routing from the ISIS network by a random network device and determining whether the AS-path property content carried by the received ISIS routing comprises the AS mark of the AS in which the AS-path is; and if the AS-path property content does not comprise the AS mark, allowing injecting the received ISIS routing into the BGP network and generating the BGP routing in injecting, wherein the AS-path property content of the BGP routing is the AS-path property content carried by the ISIS routing. Thus the loop detection information will not lost when the BGP routing traverses the ISIS network.
Description
Technical Field
The present invention relates to network communication technologies, and in particular, to a method and a device for preventing BGP (Border gateway protocol) loop detection information from being lost.
Background
The ISIS (inter System-to-inter System intra-domain routing information exchange protocol, an intra-domain routing information exchange protocol from an Intermediate System to an Intermediate System) is a routing protocol between the interiors of autonomous systems, and is widely applied to operator networks. BGP is a routing Protocol for dynamically exchanging routing information between autonomous systems, and is widely applied in large networks, such as MPLS (Multiple Protocol Label Switch, multiprotocol Label forwarding) core networks. As two important routing protocols, ISIS and BGP are often used together, for example, BGP is used internally by a service provider and ISIS is used between the service provider and a customer.
In the field of routing technology, avoiding loops is a problem that network deployment needs to pay important attention. Currently, many routing protocols have mechanisms to avoid loop generation, such as the BGP protocol. AS is well known, the BGP protocol prevents routing loops by identifying AS-Path (autonomous system Path) attributes AS loop detection information, which are specifically: after receiving a BGP route, the network device checks the AS-Path attribute of the BGP route, and if the AS-Path attribute includes an AS number of an AS (autonomous system ) in which the network device is located, it determines that a loop is generated, and discards the BGP route, thereby achieving the purpose of preventing a routing loop.
The loop avoidance mechanism of each routing protocol can function well in the respective network. However, as mentioned above, in practical networks, a plurality of routing protocols are often used in combination with each other to form a hybrid network. When routing information traverses networks using different routing protocols, for example, from a BGP network to an ISIS network, due to switching of the routing protocols, an AS-Path attribute, which is important information used in the BGP network to prevent a loop from generating, is lost, and when the routing information returns to the BGP network after traversing the ISIS network, the loop may occur due to loss of the AS-Path attribute information.
For example, fig. 1 shows a typical application in which a plurality of routing protocols are used in combination: MPLSVPN (Virtual Private Network). CE (Customer Edge) 1, CE2, and CE3 all belong to VPN 1. PE (Provider Edge) 1, PE2 and PE3 belong to the same AS 100. The PEs exchange routing information via an internal BGP protocol, i.e., IBGP protocol, and the CEs 2 and 3 exchange routing information via IGP (interior gateway protocol), where IGP is taken as an example of ISIS.
Assuming CE1 issues a route to PE1 within AS100, PE1 issues a route to PE2 using the IBGP protocol. At this point, PE2 receives the BGP route. PE2 then injects (inject) the BGP routes into the ISIS network (VPN 1 in fig. 1 where CE2 resides) and publishes them to CE2, which has a route to CE1 on CE 2. Wherein, the injection of the BGP route into the ISIS network means that: the effect of introducing (import) ISIS with the routing information described by the BGP protocol into the routing information described by the ISIS protocol is to transfer the routing information of the AS100 in the network where the PE2 is located to the VPN1 in the network where the CE2 is located. Both the introduction and injection are operations defined by RFC (request For comments) documents.
In actual deployment, there will typically be a back door link between CEs, such as the IGP link between CE2 and CE3 in fig. 1. Under normal conditions, traffic from CE2 to CE1 is forwarded through PE2, and traffic from CE3 to CE1 is forwarded through PE 3. If PE3 fails, then the traffic from CE3 to CE1 may go through the above-mentioned backhaul link to CE2 to CE 1; if PE2 fails, the traffic from CE2 to CE1 can go through the above-mentioned backhaul link to CE3 to CE1, ensuring successful forwarding.
But it is the presence of this backhaul link that may bring about a routing loop. Still referring to fig. 1, assume that a route N of CE1 is sent to PE2, and after the route N is injected into the ISIS network through PE2, the subsequent sending direction is: CE2 (by ISIS) → CE3 (by ISIS) → PE3 (by BGP) → PE2 (by ISIS) → CE 2. Since the AS-Path attribute is lost in the process of transferring the route N from PE2 to CE2, when the route N returns to AS100 through PE3, neither PE2 nor PE3 can perform loop detection according to the AS-Path attribute, and an obvious loop may be formed.
In fact, not only MPLS networks, but also ordinary IP networks have a problem that if a network device simultaneously runs ISIS protocol and BGP protocol, and the two routing protocols are used in combination: when the BGP route is injected into the ISIS network, the loop detection information AS-Path of the BGP route is lost, which results in a lack of loop detection conditions when the BGP route traverses the ISIS network and returns to the BGP domain again, thereby leading to a possibility of generating a routing loop.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of this, the present invention provides a method and a device for preventing loss of BGP loop detection information, which ensure that BGP routes do not lose loop detection information when traversing an ISIS network.
The invention discloses a method for preventing the loss of the detection information of the border gateway protocol loop, which is suitable for the mixed network of the routing information exchange protocol ISIS in the domain from the border gateway protocol BGP and the intermediate system to the intermediate system, and comprises the following steps:
when the network equipment injects the BGP route into the ISIS network, generating the ISIS route carrying the AS-path attribute content of the autonomous system path of the BGP route, and issuing the ISIS route into the ISIS network;
the method comprises the steps that network equipment receives an ISIS route from an ISIS network and judges whether AS-path attribute content carried by the received ISIS route comprises an autonomous system number of the autonomous system; if so, disallowing injection of the received ISIS route into the BGP network; otherwise, the received ISIS route is allowed to be injected into the BGP network, the BGP route is generated during injection, and the AS-path attribute content of the BGP route is the AS-path attribute content carried by the received ISIS route.
Wherein, after generating the ISIS route carrying the AS-path attribute content of the BGP route, the method further includes: and storing the AS-path attribute content carried by the ISIS route AS extension information in an extension information base of the network equipment.
The ISIS route issued to the ISIS network carries AS-path attribute content when being diffused in the ISIS network.
Preferably, the manner of carrying the AS-path attribute content by the ISIS route is AS follows: and carrying AS-path attribute content in a cross-domain subtype length value BGP-AS SUB-TLV field arranged in the ISIS routing message.
Preferably, the BGP-AS SUB-TLV field includes a type field, a length field, and a value field; and the value of the value range is AS-path attribute content.
The invention discloses a device for preventing the loop detection information loss of a border gateway protocol, which comprises:
a BGP route processing unit, configured to generate an ISIS route carrying AS-path attribute content of the BGP route when injecting the BGP route into the ISIS network, and issue the ISIS route to the ISIS network;
the ISIS route processing unit is used for receiving the ISIS route from the ISIS network and judging whether the AS-path attribute content carried by the received ISIS route comprises the autonomous system number of the autonomous system; if so, disallowing injection of the received ISIS route into the BGP network; otherwise, the received ISIS route is allowed to be injected into the BGP network, the BGP route is generated during injection, and the AS-path attribute content of the BGP route is the AS-path attribute content carried by the received ISIS route.
And the BGP route processing unit is further used for storing the AS-path attribute content carried by the generated ISIS route AS extension information in an extension information base of the equipment where the AS-path attribute content is located.
The BGP route processing unit makes the ISIS route carry AS-path attribute content in the following way: and generating an ISIS routing message, wherein the AS-path attribute content of the BGP route is carried in a BGP-AS SUB-TLV field arranged in the ISIS routing message.
According to the technical scheme, the AS-path attribute of the BGP route is released together with the ISIS route when the conversion from the BGP to the ISIS is carried out, and the AS-path attribute carried by the ISIS route is restored to the attribute of the BGP route when the conversion from the ISIS to the BGP is carried out. Therefore, in the mutual introduction process of the BGP route and the ISIS route, the AS-path attribute is ensured not to be lost when traversing the ISIS network. The method can meet the actual networking requirements, prevent the generation of the loop, and fully utilize the characteristic of BGP for preventing the loop. Meanwhile, the scheme is simple to implement, the deployment and maintenance cost can be reduced, and the capability of the hybrid network for preventing the routing loop is greatly improved. Meanwhile, before the ISIS route is injected into the BGP network, the invention also checks whether the BGP-AS SUB-TLV field carried by the ISIS route comprises the local AS number, if so, the invention considers that a loop is generated and rejects the injection of the ISIS route, thereby avoiding the possibility of generating the loop at the boundary of the ISIS network and the BGP network.
The invention also defines a new type of ISIS Sub-TLV message field, namely BGP-ASSUB-TLV, which is used for carrying the AS-Path attribute of the BGP route. The method for carrying the AS-Path attribute by the BGP-AS SUB-TLV field is simple to realize, and is suitable for various mixed networks applying BGP and ISIS routing protocols, including IP networks and MPLS networks, and is also suitable for IPv 6.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating a combination of multiple routing protocols applied in MPLS VPN in the prior art.
Fig. 2 is a flowchart of a method for preventing BGP loop detection information loss according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a device for preventing BGP loop detection information loss according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is described in detail below by way of example with reference to the accompanying drawings.
The invention relates to a scheme for preventing BGP loop detection information from losing, which comprises the following basic ideas: when the network equipment injects the BGP route into the ISIS network, the ISIS route is issued together with AS-path attribute content of the BGP route;
when an ISIS route carrying AS-path attribute contents passes through the ISIS network and then arrives at a BGP network again, firstly, a network device receiving the ISIS route detects the AS-path attribute contents carried by the ISIS route, if the AS-path attribute contents contain an AS number of an AS where the network device is located, the AS-path attribute contents are regarded AS loop generation, and the received ISIS route is not injected into the BGP network; if not, allowing the received ISIS route to be injected into the BGP network; and during injection, generating a BGP route, wherein the AS-path attribute content of the BGP route is the AS-path attribute content carried by the received ISIS route, so that the AS-path attribute content carried by the ISIS route is restored to be the attribute of the BGP route.
Therefore, in the process of mutual introduction of the BGP route and the ISIS route, the AS-path attribute is ensured not to be lost, so that the loop detection information AS-path is ensured not to be lost when the BGP route passes through the ISIS network, and the loop is prevented from being generated. And the possibility of loop generation is avoided at the boundary of the ISIS network and the BGP network.
The technical scheme of the invention can be applied to various mixed networks which use BGP protocol and ISIS protocol in a combined mode, such as IP network and MPLS network, and is also applicable to IPv 6. As long as the network device implementing the scheme runs the BGP protocol and the ISIS protocol.
When the ISIS route carries the AS-path attribute content of the BGP route, the AS-path attribute content can be carried in a reserved field of the ISIS route message or in an idle bit of an existing field in the ISIS route message.
In the RFC5305 technical document, a field in the ISIS routing message is defined: a subtype Length value (Sub-TLV) field. The Sub-TLV field is contained in the TLV field of the ISIS routing message and is used for describing the extended information of the ISIS routing message. For example, the Type 135 TLV field may carry one or more Sub-TLVs, each of which in turn includes a one-byte Type (Type) field, a one-byte Length (Length) field, and a 0 to multi-byte Value (Value) field. The Length field indicates the Length of the value field, and may be 4 bytes or 2 bytes. Several Sub-TLVs have been defined by RFC today.
The embodiment of the invention defines a new Sub-TLV field: BGP-AS SUB-TLV, called cross-domain subtype length value field, is used to store the AS-path attribute content of BGP routes in ISIS routing messages. The BGP-AS SUB-TLV may be carried in a type 135 TLV field, or may be carried in other types of TLV fields. The BGP-AS SUB-TLV is similar in format to the existing SUB-TLV, again having a type field, a length field, and a value field. Table 1 shows the format of BGP-AS SUB-TLV in the embodiment of the present invention.
| Type (Type) | Length (Length) | Value (Value) |
| 12 | 4 | BGP AS number |
TABLE 1
AS shown in table 1, the value of the type field in the BGP-AS SUB-TLV is a preset value that does not conflict with the existing value defined in the RFC document, and 12 is selected in this embodiment; the value of the length field is 4, which means that the length of the value field in the BGP-ASSUB-TLV field is 4 bytes, because the AS number of BGP is 4 bytes at most; the value field is populated with the BGP AS number, which is obtained from the AS-path attribute of the BGP route. Each BGP-AS SUB-TLV describes one AS number information individually, if the AS-path attribute of the BGP route includes multiple AS numbers, multiple BGP-AS SUB-TLVs are needed for description.
The following describes in detail an embodiment of using BGP-AS SUB-TLV to carry AS-path attribute content with reference to FIG. 2. As shown in fig. 2, this embodiment includes the steps of:
step 201: when the network device 1 injects the BGP route into the ISIS network, it obtains the AS-path attribute content in the BGP route, and adds the obtained AS-path attribute content to the BGP-AS SUB-TLV field of the ISIS route packet. The BGP-AS SUB-TLV field takes the format shown in table 1, where the value of the value field is the obtained AS-path attribute content.
Step 202: the network device 1 stores the BGP-AS SUB-TLV field content AS extension information in an extension information base of the network device 1, so that the corresponding BGP-AS SUB-TLV field is sent at the same time when ISIS routes are distributed later.
Step 203: the network device 1 issues the generated ISIS routing packet to the ISIS network. The ISIS routing messages carry BGP-AS SUB-TLV, namely AS-path information of BGP routing when ISIS network is diffused.
Step 204: after receiving the ISIS routing message from the ISIS network, the network device 2 judges whether BGP-AS SUB-TLV information in the received ISIS routing message contains an AS number of an autonomous system in which the network device 2 is located; if so, go to step 205; otherwise, step 206 is performed.
Wherein, the network devices 1 and 2 may be the same device or different devices.
Step 205: and determining to generate a loop, and not allowing the ISIS route in the received ISIS route message to be injected into the BGP network. At this point, the received ISIS route may be discarded. The process is ended.
Step 206: and allowing the ISIS route in the received ISIS route message to be injected into the BGP network, and restoring the AS number contained in the BGP-AS SUB-TLV field in the received ISIS route message into the AS-path attribute content of the BGP route during injection. The process is ended.
In practice, if the ISIS routing packet does not carry the BGP-AS SUB-TLV field, the existing injection operation according to the ISIS routing packet is executed.
According to the above process, with the processing method of fig. 2, after the BGP route traverses the ISIS network, the AS-path attribute of the loop detection information is not lost, so that after the BGP route traverses the ISIS network and returns to the BGP domain, loop detection can still be performed according to the AS-path attribute before traversing the ISIS network, thereby preventing the generation of loops.
An example is given below.
Still using the network architecture of fig. 1, the lower VPN1 in fig. 1 uses ISIS as the route switching protocol. Assuming CE1 issues a route N, which may be the CE route;
the route N firstly reaches PE1, PE1 introduces the route N into BGP and sends the route N to PE2, and at the moment, the route N carries an AS-path attribute of 100;
in PE2, when a route N is injected into an ISIS network, an ISIS route is generated, the ISIS route carries a BGP-AS SUB-TLV field, the type is 12, the length is 4 bytes, and the value is 100; meanwhile, a routing management module (RM) in the PE2 stores BGP-AS SUB-TLV fields carried by the ISIS route AS extension information in a local extension information base;
the ISIS route carries BGP-ASSUB-TLV in the diffusion process from CE2 to CE3 in the ISIS network, namely carries AS-path information of the BGP route;
when the ISIS route is injected into the BGP network again at PE3, PE3 first performs a loop check, that is, checks the BGP-AS SUB-TLV field carried by the ISIS route, and if the field contains the local AS number of PE3, that is, 100, it is considered that a loop is generated, and the ISIS route is not injected into the BGP network; otherwise, the ISIS route is injected into the BGP process, and the generated BGP route carries AS-path information consistent with the BGP-AS SUB-TLV.
In this example, since the BGP-AS SUB-TLV field carried by the ISIS route from CE3 includes the AS number of AS 100: 100, PE3 would be considered a loop generation and the ISIS route would not be injected into the BGP network, thereby avoiding a loop generation.
In order to realize the method for preventing the BGP loop detection information from being lost, the invention provides equipment for preventing the BGP loop detection information from being lost. Fig. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of the device for preventing BGP loop detection information loss. As shown in fig. 3, the device is suitable for a network using BGP and ISIS, and includes a BGP route processing unit 31 and an ISIS route processing unit 32. Wherein,
the BGP route processing unit 31 is configured to generate an ISIS route carrying AS-path attribute content of the BGP route when injecting the BGP route into the ISIS network, and publish the ISIS route to the ISIS network. In an embodiment, the BGP route processing unit 31 generates an ISIS route packet, and carries the AS-path attribute content of the BGP route in a BGP-AS SUB-TLV field set in the ISIS route packet. The BGP-AS SUB-TLV field may specifically take the format of table 1 described above. The BGP route processing unit 31 further stores the AS-path attribute content carried by the generated ISIS route AS extension information in an extension information base (not shown in fig. 3) of the device where the AS-path attribute content is stored.
The ISIS route processing unit 32 is configured to receive an ISIS route from the ISIS network, and determine whether the AS-path attribute content carried by the received ISIS route includes an autonomous system number of the autonomous system in which the AS-path attribute content is located; if yes, determining to generate a loop and not allowing the received ISIS route to be injected into the BGP network; otherwise, the received ISIS route is allowed to be injected into the BGP network, the BGP route is generated during injection, and the AS-path attribute content of the BGP route is the AS-path attribute content carried by the received ISIS route.
The devices that prevent the loss of BGP loop detection information in fig. 1 are PE2 and PE 3. In the embodiment of the present invention, PE2 only relates to the function of BGP route processing unit 31, and PE4 only relates to the function of ISIS route processing unit 32.
In summary, the above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention. Any modification, equivalent replacement, or improvement made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (8)
1. A method for preventing the loop detection information loss of the border gateway protocol is suitable for the mixed network of the domain routing information exchange protocol ISIS from the applied border gateway protocol BGP and the intermediate system to the intermediate system, and is characterized in that the method comprises the following steps:
when the network equipment injects the BGP route into the ISIS network, generating the ISIS route carrying the AS-path attribute content of the autonomous system path of the BGP route, and issuing the ISIS route into the ISIS network;
the method comprises the steps that network equipment receives an ISIS route from an ISIS network and judges whether AS-path attribute content carried by the received ISIS route comprises an autonomous system number of the autonomous system; if so, disallowing injection of the received ISIS route into the BGP network; otherwise, the received ISIS route is allowed to be injected into the BGP network, the BGP route is generated during injection, and the AS-path attribute content of the BGP route is the AS-path attribute content carried by the received ISIS route.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein after generating the ISIS route carrying AS-path attribute content of the BGP route, further comprising: and storing the AS-path attribute content carried by the ISIS route AS extension information in an extension information base of the network equipment.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein an ISIS route published into an ISIS network carries AS-path attribute content AS it is flooded in the ISIS network.
4. The method according to claim 1, 2 or 3, wherein the manner of carrying the AS-path attribute content by the ISIS route is AS follows:
and carrying AS-path attribute content in a cross-domain subtype length value BGP-AS SUB-TLV field arranged in the ISIS routing message.
5. The method of claim 4, wherein the BGP-AS SUB-TLV field comprises a type field, a length field, and a value field; and the value of the value range is AS-path attribute content.
6. An apparatus for preventing border gateway protocol loop detection information loss, which is applicable to a hybrid network using BGP and ISIS, the apparatus comprising:
a BGP route processing unit, configured to generate an ISIS route carrying AS-path attribute content of the BGP route when injecting the BGP route into the ISIS network, and issue the ISIS route to the ISIS network;
the ISIS route processing unit is used for receiving the ISIS route from the ISIS network and judging whether the AS-path attribute content carried by the received ISIS route comprises the autonomous system number of the autonomous system; if so, disallowing injection of the received ISIS route into the BGP network; otherwise, the received ISIS route is allowed to be injected into the BGP network, the BGP route is generated during injection, and the AS-path attribute content of the BGP route is the AS-path attribute content carried by the received ISIS route.
7. The device of claim 6, wherein the BGP route processing unit is further configured to store, AS extension information, the AS-path attribute content carried by the generated ISIS route in an extension information base of the device in which the AS-path attribute content is stored.
8. The apparatus according to claim 6 or 7, wherein the BGP route processing unit makes the ISIS route carry AS-path attribute content in a manner that: and generating an ISIS routing message, wherein the AS-path attribute content of the BGP route is carried in a BGP-AS SUB-TLV field arranged in the ISIS routing message.
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Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN106330693A (en) * | 2015-06-19 | 2017-01-11 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Configuration method and device for autonomous system path (AS-PATH) of BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) routing |
| WO2020181881A1 (en) * | 2019-03-11 | 2020-09-17 | 华为技术有限公司 | Bgp route identification method, apparatus and device |
| CN113261246A (en) * | 2019-12-10 | 2021-08-13 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method, device and system for reducing routing loop |
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2008
- 2008-12-15 CN CNA2008102396991A patent/CN101420443A/en active Pending
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN106330693A (en) * | 2015-06-19 | 2017-01-11 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Configuration method and device for autonomous system path (AS-PATH) of BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) routing |
| CN106330693B (en) * | 2015-06-19 | 2021-01-26 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | BGP routing autonomous domain PATH AS-PATH configuration method and device |
| WO2020181881A1 (en) * | 2019-03-11 | 2020-09-17 | 华为技术有限公司 | Bgp route identification method, apparatus and device |
| CN111698189A (en) * | 2019-03-11 | 2020-09-22 | 华为技术有限公司 | BGP route identification method, device and equipment |
| CN111698189B (en) * | 2019-03-11 | 2021-12-14 | 华为技术有限公司 | BGP route identification method, device and equipment |
| CN114363003A (en) * | 2019-03-11 | 2022-04-15 | 华为技术有限公司 | BGP route identification method, device and equipment |
| CN114363003B (en) * | 2019-03-11 | 2024-01-02 | 华为技术有限公司 | BGP route identification method, device and equipment |
| US11936551B2 (en) | 2019-03-11 | 2024-03-19 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. | BGP route identification method, apparatus, and device |
| CN113261246A (en) * | 2019-12-10 | 2021-08-13 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method, device and system for reducing routing loop |
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